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ELEMENTS 

OF 

LOGIC. 

COMPRISING 

THE .SUBSTANCE OF THE ARTICLE^ 

IN THE 

ENCYCLOPJIDIA METKOPOLITANA : 

WITH ADDITIONS, &c. 

BY RICHA^^.\ptATpi.X, D.D. 
ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN. 



THE ONLY COMPLETE AMERICAN EDITIOIT. 
FROM THE EIGHTH LONDON EDITION REVISKIX 

NEW YORK: 
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 

32? & 331, PEARL STREET, 
FBANKLIN SQUARE. 

185 3. • 



BCios 



Gift 
April 2S,t99t I 



THE RIGHT REVEREND 

EDWARD COPLESTON, D.D., 

LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF, 
&c., &;c. 



My Dear Lord, 

To enumerate the advantages I have derived 
from your instructions, both in regular lectures and 
in private conversation, would be needless to those 
acquainted with the parties, and to the public unin- 
teresting. My object at present is simply to acknowl- 
edge how greatly I am indebted to you in respect of 
the present work ; not merely as having originally im- 
parted to me the principles of the science, but also 
as having contributed remarks, explanations, and il- 
lustrations, relative to the most important points, to so 
great an amount that I can hardly consider myself as 
the Author of more than half of such portions of the 
treatise as are not borrowed from former publications. 
I could have wished, indeed,to acknowledge this more 
explicitly, by marking with some note of distinction 
those parts which are least my own. But I found it 
could not be done. In most instances there is arome- 
thing belonging to each of us ; and even in those 
parts where your share is the largest, it would not 
be fair that you should be made responsible for any 
thing that is not entirely your own. Nor is it possible, 
in the case of a science, to remember distinctly how 
far one has been, in each instance, indebted to the 
•uggastions of another. Information, as to matters of 



DEDICATION. 

fact, may easily be referred in the mind to the person 
from whom we have derived it : but scientific truths, 
when thoroughly embraced, become much more a part 
of the mind, as it were ; since they rest, not on the au- 
thority of the instructor, but on reasoning from data, 
which we ourselves furnish ;* they are scions engrafted 
on the stems previously rooted in our own soil ; and 
we are apt to confound them with its indigenous pro- 
ductions. 

You yourself also, I have reason to believe, have for- 
gotten the greater part of the assistance you have afford- 
ed in the course of conversations on the subject ; as 1 
have found, more than once, that ideas which I distinct- 
ly remembered to have received from you, have not been 
recognized by you when read or repeated. As far, 
however, as I can recollect, though there is no part of 
the following pages in which I have not, more or less, 
received valuable suggestions from you, I believe you 
have contributed less to the Analytical Outline, and to 
the Treatise on Fallacies, and more, to the subjoined 
dissertation, than to the rest of the work. 

1 take this opportunity of publicly declaring, that as, 
on the one hand, you are not responsible for any thing 
contained in this work, so, on the other hand, should 
you ever favour the world with a publication of your 
own on the subject, the coincidence which will doubt- 
less be found in it with many things here brought for- 
ward as my own, is not to be regarded as any indication 
of plagiarism, at least on your side. 
Believe me to be. 

My dear Lord, 
Your obliged and affectionate 

Pupil and Friend, 

mCHARD WHATELY 

• See B. IV. Ch. ii. § 1. 



'.rj/i yihi/yi/ 



PREFACE. 



The following Treatise contains the substance of the 
Article "Logic" in the Encyclopccdia Metropoliiana. 
It was suggested to me that a separate publication of it 
might prove acceptable, not only to some who are not 
subscribers to that work, but also to several who are; 
but who, for convenience of reference, would prefer a 
more portable volume. In fact a number of individuals 
had actually formed a design (prevented only by this 
publication) of joining together to have the Article re- 
printed for their own private use. 

I accordingly revised it, and made such additions, 
chiefly in the form of Notes, as I thought likely to in- 
crease its utility. 

When applied to to contribute the Article, I asked 
and obtained permission from Dr. Copleston (now Bish- 
op of Llandaff) to make use of manuscripts compiled 
in great measure from what I had heard from him in 
conversations on the subject, or w^hich he had read to 
me from his common-place book, interspersed with ob- 
servations of my own. These manuscripts I had drawn 
up and was in the habit of employing, for the use of 
my own pupils. 

In throwing them into a form suitable for the Ency- 
clopaedia, and in subsequently enlarging the Article in- 
to the present volume, I have taken without scruple 
whatever appeared most valuable from the works of 
former waiters ; especially the concise, but in general 
accurate, treatise of Aldrich. But while I acknow- 
1* 



Tl PREFACE. 

ledge my obligations to my predecessors, of whose la- 
bours I have largely availed myself, I do not profess to 
be altogether satisfied with any of the treatises that 
have yet appeared ; nor have I accordingly judged it 
any unreasonable presumptioa to point out what seem 
to me the errors they contain. Indeed, whatever de- 
ference an Author may profess for the authority of 
those who have preceded him, the very circumstance 
of his publishing a work on the same subject, proves 
that he thinks theirs open to improvement. In censur- 
ing, however, as I have had occasion to do, several of 
the doctrines and explanations of logical writers, and 
of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be understood that 
this is not from my having formed a low estimate of 
the merits of the Compendium drawn up by the Author 
just mentioned, but, on the contrary, from its populari- 
ty, (it being the one commonly used at Oxford)— from 
Ae impossibility of noticing particularly all the points 
in which we agree, — and from the consideration that 
errors are the more carefully to be pointed out in pro- 
portion to the authority by which they are sanctioned. 
I have to acknowledge assistance received from sev- 
eral friends who have at various times suggested re- 
marks and alterations. But 1 cannot avoid particular- 
izing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, 
who actually composed a considerable portion of the 
work as it now stands, from manuscripts not designed 
for publication, and who is the original author of sev- 
eral pages. Some valuable illustrations of the impor- 
tance of attending to the ambiguity of the terms used 
in Political Economy, were furnished by the kindness 
of my friend and former pupil, Mr. Senior, of Magda- 
len College, and now Master in Chancery, who pre- 
ceded me in the office of Professor of Political Economy 
at Oxford, and afterwards was appointed to the same 
at King's College, London. They are printed in the 
Appendix. But the friend to whom it is inscribed has 
contributed far rnore^ and that, in the most important 



parts, than all others together , so ^u?»h, ^*^de<!d, that, 
though there is in the treatise nrthing ot his which haj 
not undergone such expansion or modifieation as leaves 
me solely responsible for the whole, there is not a lit- 
tle of which I cannot fairly claim to be the Author. 

Each successive edition has been revised with the 
utmost care But though the work has undergone not 
only the close examination of myself and several friends, 
but the severer scrutiny of determined opponents, f am 
happy to find that no material errors have been detect- 
ed, nor any considerable alterations found necessary. 

On the utility of Logic many writers have said much 
in which I cannot coincide, and which has tended to 
bring the study into unmerited disrepute. By represent- 
ing Logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the diS' 
covery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching the use 
of the intellectual faculties in general, they raised ex- 
pectations which could not be realised, and which na- 
turally led to a re-action. The whole system, whose 
unfounded pretensions had been thus blazoned forth, 
came to be commonly regarded as utterly futile and 
empty; like several of our most valuable medicines, 
which, when first introduced, were proclaimed, each, 
as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite disorders ; 
and which consequently, in many instances, fell for a 
time into total disuse ; though, after a long interval, 
they were established in their just estimation, and em- 
ploy^^conformably to their real properties. 

In one of Lord Dudley's (lately published) letters to 
Bishop Copleston, of the date of 1814, he adduces a 
presumption against the study of Logic, that it was sedu- 
lously cultivated during the dark periods in which the 
intellectual powers of mankind seemed neaily paralyz- 
ed — when no discoveries were made, and wl. en various 
errors were wide-spread and deep-rooted* and that 
when the mental activity of the world revived, and phi- 
losophical inquiry flourished and bore its fruits, logical 
Studies fell into decay and contempt. And this I have 



▼iil PREFACB* 

introduced in the ** Elements of Rhetoric,*' (Part II. 
Ch. iii. § 2,) among other examples of a presumption 
not in itself unreasonable, but capable of being rebutted 
by a counter-presumption. When any study has been 
unduly or unwisely cultivated to the neglect of others, 
and has even been intruded into their province, there is 
a presumption that a re-action* will ensue, and an equal- 
ly excessive contempt, or dread, or disgust, succeed 
And in the present instance, the mistaken and absurd 
cultivation of Logic during Ages of great intellectual 
darkness, might have been expected to produce, in a 
subsequent age of comparative light, an association in 
men's minds, of Logic, with the idea of apathetic igno- 
rance, prejudice, and adherence to error ; so that the 
legitimate uses, and just value of the science (supposing 
it to have any) would be likely to be scornfully over- 
looked. Our ancestors having neglected to raise fresh 
crops of corn, and contented themselves with vainly 
threshing over and over the same straw and winnowing 
the same chaff, it might have been anticipated that their 
descendants would, for a time, regard the very opera- 
tions of threshing and winnowing with contempt, and 
would attempt to grind corn, straw and chaff all together. 

The revival of a study which had for a long time 
been regarded as an obsolete absurdity, w^ould probably 
have appeared to many persons, thirty years ago, as an 
undertaking far more difficult than the introduction of 
some new study ; — as resembling rather the attempt to 
restore life to one of the antediluvian fossil-plants, than 
the rearing of a young seedling into a tree. 

It is a curious circumstance that the very person to 
whom the letter just alluded to was addressed should 
have lived to witness so great a change of public opin- 
ion brought about (in a great degree- through his own 
instrumentality t) within the short interval—indeed with- 
in a small portion of the interval — between the writiag 

♦ See " Charge," 1843. 
t See Dedication. 



PREFACE IX 

of that letter and its publication, that the whole ground 
of the presumption alluded to has been completely cut 
away. During that interval, the treatise which was 
with his aid composed, and by his permission inserted 
in the Encyclopaedia, attracted so much attention as to 
occasion its separate publication, in a volume which has 
been frequently reprinted, not only in England, but in 
the United States of Ambrica ; where it is in use, f be- 
lieve, in every one of their Colleges. Add to which, 
the frequent allusions (compared with what could have 
been met with twenty or thirty years ago) to the sub- 
ject of Logic, by writers on various subjects. And 
moreover several other treatises on the subject, either 
original works or abridgements, have been making their 
appearance with continually increased frequency of late 
years. Some indeed of these have little or nothing in 
common with the present work except the title. But 
even that very circumstance is so far encouraging, as 
indicating that the name of this science instead of ex- 
citing, as formerly, an almost universal prejudice, is 
considered as likely to prove a recommendation. Cer- 
tainly Lord Dudley, were he now living, would not 
speak of the general neglect and contempt of Logic ; 
though every branch of Science, Philosophy, and Lite- 
rature, have flourished during the interval. 

To explain fully the utility of Logic is what can be 
done only in the course of an explanation of the sys- 
tem itself. One preliminary observation only (for the 
original suggestion of which I am indebted to the same 
friend to whom this work is inscribed) it may be worth 
while to offer in this place. If it were inquired what 
is to be regarded as the most appropriate intellectual 
occupation of MAN, as man, what would be the an- 
swer ? The Statesman is .^ng^aged with political affairs ; 
the Soldier with mil* ta^y the M:^,thematician, with the 
properties of niimbevs and ma(;'n:t.udes ;*the Merchant, 
with commercial coup-erns, &c. ; but in what are all and 
each of these eaaployed.' — employed^ I nri^rin, as m$n' 
2 



PREFACE. 

for there are many modes of exercise of the faculties, 
mental as well as bodily, which are in great measure com- 
mon to us with the lower animals. Evidently, in Rea 
sorting. They are all occupied in deducing, well or ill, 
Conclusions from Premises ; each, concerning the sub- 
ject of his own particular business. If, therefore, it be 
found that the process going on daily, in each of so ma- 
ny different minds, is, in any respect, the same-i and if 
the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced 
to a regular system, and if rules can be deduced from 
from that system, for the better conducting of the pro- 
cess, then, it can hardly be denied that such a system 
and such rules must be especiall^jr worthy the attention, 
— not of the members of this or that profession merely, 
but — of every one who is desirous of possessing a cul- 
tivated mind. To understand the theory of that which 
is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in ge- 
neral, and to learn to do \\i2LiweU, which every one will 
and must do, whether well or ill, may surely be consi- 
dered as an essential part of a liberal education. 

Even supposing that no practical improvement in ar- 
gumentation resulted from the study of Logic, it would 
not by any means follow that it is unworthy of atten- 
tion. The pursuit of knowledge on curious and inte- 
resting subjects, for its own sake, is usually reckoned 
no misemployment of time ; and is considered as, inci- 
dentally, if not directly, useful to the individual, by the 
exercise thus afforded to the mental faculties. All who 
study Mathematics are not training themselves to be- 
come Surveyors or Mechanics ; some knowledge of 
Anatomy and Chemistry is even expected in a man li- 
berally educated, though without any view to his prac- 
tising Surgery or Medicine. And the investigation of a 
process which is peculiarly and universally the occupah 
tion of Man, considered as Man, can hardly be reckoned 
a less philosojjhical pursuit than those just instanced. 

It has usually been assumed, however, in the case 
of tl e present subject, that a theory which does not 



PREFi.CE. JO 

lend to the improvement of practice is utterly unworthy 
of regard ; and then, it is contended that Logic has no 
such tendency, on the plea that men may and do rea- 
son correctly without it : an objection which would 
equally apply in the case of Grammar, Music, Chemis- 
try, Mechanics, &c., in all of which systems the prac- 
tice must have existed previously to the theory. 

But many who allow the use of systematic principles 
in other things, are accustomed to cry up Common- 
Sense as the sufficient and only safe guide in Reason- 
ing. Now by Common- Sense is meant, I apprehend, 
(when the term is used with any distinct meaning,) an 
exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system 
of rules : such an exercise as we must necessarily em- 
ploy in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, 
having no established principles to guide us,™-no line 
of procedure, as it were, distinctly chalked out, — we 
must needs act on the best extemporaaeous conjecture* 
we can form. He who is eminently skilful in doing 
this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common 
Sense. But that Common-Sense is only our second 
best guide — that the rules of Art, if judiciously framed 
are always desirable when they can be had, is an as 
sertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the tes- 
timony of mankind in general ; which is so much the 
more valuable, inasmuch as it may be accounted the 
'estimony of adversaries. For the generality have a 
strong predilection in favour of Common-Sense, except 
in those points in which they, respectively, possess the 
knowledge of a system of rules ; but in these points 
they deride any one who trusts to unaided Common- 
Sense. A sailor e. g. will, perhaps, despise the pre- 
tensions of medical men, and prefer treating a disease 
by Common- Sense : but he would ridicule the proposal 
of navigating a ship by Common- Sense, without regard 
to the maxims of nautical art. A physician, again, 
will perhaps contemn Systems of Political- Economy,* 

• See S<»uior'8 Introductory Lecture on political Economy, p. ?« 



XU JPREFACE. 

of Logic, or Metaphysics, and insist on the supenoi 
wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such matters 
but he would never approve of trusting to Common- 
Sense in the treatment of diseases. Neither, again, 
would the Architect recommend a reliance on Common- 
Sense alone, in building, nor the Musician, in music, 
to the neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their 
respective arts have been deduced from scientific rea- 
soning aided by experience. And the induction might 
be extended to every department of practice. Since, 
therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted Com- 
mon-Sense only in those cases where he himself has 
nothing else to trust to, and invariably resorts to the 
rules of art, wherever he possesses the knowledge of 
them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their 
testimony, though unconsciously and often unwillingly, 
to the preferableness of systematic knowledge to conjec- 
tural judgments. 

There is, however, abundant room for the employ- 
ment of Common- Sense in the application of the sys- 
tem. To bring arguments, out of the form in which 
they are expressed in conversation and in books, into 
the regular logical shape, must be of course, the busi- 
ness of Common-Sense, aided by practice, for such 
arguments are, by supposition, not as yet within the 
province of Science ; else they would not be irregular, 
but would be already strict syllogisms. To exercise 
the learner in this operation, I have subjoined in the 
Appendix, some examples both of insulated arguments, 
and (in the later editions) of the analysis of argumen- 
tative works. It should be added, however, that a 
large portion of what is usually introduced into Logi- 
cal treatises, relative to the finding of Arguments, — the 
different kinds of them, &c., 1 have referred to the head 
of Rhetoric f and treated of in a work on the Elements 
of that Art. 

It Was doubtless from a strong and deliberate convic- 
tion of the advantages, direct and indirect, accruing 



PREFACR. Zlil 

from an acquaintance with Logic, that the I niversity 
at Oxford, when re-modelling their system, not only 
retained that branch of study, regardless of the clam- 
ours of many of the half-learned, but even assigned a 
prominent place to it, by making it an indispensable 
part of the Examination for the first Degree. This 
last circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, in a 
great degree, produced an effect opposite to what was 
designed. It has contributed to lower instead of exalt- 
ing, the estimation of the study ; and to withhold from 
it the earnest attention of many who might have appli- 
ed to it with profit. I am not so weak as to imagine 
that any System can ensure great proficiency in any 
pursuit whatever, either in all students, or in a very large 
proportion of them : " we sow many seeds to obtain 
a few flowers ;" but it might have been expected (and 
doHbtless was expected) that.a majority at least of suc- 
cessful candidates would derive some benefit worth 
mentioning from their logical pursuits; and that a con- 
siderable proportion of the distinguished candidates 
would prove respectable, if not eminent logicians. 
Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable, or 
such as I might not have formed myself, had 1 been 
called upon to judge at that period when our experience 
was all to come. Subsequently, however, experience 
has shown that those expectations have been very in- 
adequately realized. The truth is, that a very small 
proportion, even of distinguished students, ever become 
proficients in Logic ; and that by far the greater part 
pass through the University without knowing any thing 
at all of the subject. . 1 do not mean that they have not 
learned by rote a string of technical terms; but that 
they understand absolutely nothing whatever of the 
principles of the science. 

I am aware that some injudicious friends of Oxford 
will censure the frankness of this avowal. I have only 
to reply that such is the truth ; and that I think too 
well of, and know far to(» well, the University in whi<^ 



XIT PREFACB. 

I have been employed in various academical occupa» 
tions above a quarter of a century, to apprehend dan- 
ger to her reputation from declaring the exact truth. 
With all its defects, and no human institution is per- 
fect, the University v^ould stand, I am convinced, 
higher in public estimation than it does, were the 
"whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in all points 
respecting it, more fully known. But the scanty and 
partial success of the measures employed to promote 
logical studies is the consequence, 1 apprehend, of the 
universality of the requisition. That which must be 
done by every one, will, of course, often be done but 
indiflerently ; and when the belief is once fully estab- 
lished, which it certainly has long been, that any thing 
which is indispensable to a testimonial, has little or 
nothing to do with the attainment of honors,* the low- 
est standard soon becomes the established one in the 
minds of the greater number ; and provided that stan- 
dard be once reached, so as to secure the candidate 
from rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any such 
branch of study is regarded as a matter of indifference, 
as far as any views of academical distinction are con- 
cerned. 

Divinity is one of these branches, and to this also 
most of what has been said concerning Logic might 
be considered as equally applicable ; but, in fact, there 
are several important differences between the two 
cases. In the first place, most of the students who 
are designed for the Church, and many who are not, 
have a value for theological knowledge, independently 
of the requisition of the schools ; and on that ground do 
not confine their views to the lowest admissible degree 
of proficiency ; whereas this can be said of yery few 
in the case of Logic. And moreover, such as design 
to become candidates for holy Orders, know that ano- 

*^ In the last framed Examination-statute an express declaration 
has been iijserted, that proficiency in Logic is to have weight in 
the assignment of honours. 



PREFACE, XV 

ther examination in Theology awaits them. But a 
consideration, which is still more to the present pur- 
pose, is, that Theology, not being a Science, admits of 
infinite degrees of proficiency, from that which is with- 
in the reach of a child, up to the highest that is attain- 
able by the most exalted genius ; every one of which 
degrees is inestimably valuable as far as it goes. If 
any one understands tolerably the Church- catechism, 
or even half of it, he knows something of divinity ; and 
that something is incalculaby preferable to nothing. 
But it is not so with a Science ; one who does not un- 
derstand the principles of Euclid's demonstrations, 
whatever number of questions and answers he may 
have learnt by rote, knows absolutely nothing of Ge- 
ometry : unless he attain this point, all his labour is 
Utterly lost ; worse than lost, perhaps, if he is led to 
believe that he has learnt something of Mathematics, 
when, in truth, he has not. And the same is the case 
with Logic, or any other Science. It does not admit 
of such various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. 
Of course I am far from supposing that all who under- 
stand any thing, much or little, of a certain Science, 
stand on the same level ; but I mean, what is surely 
undeniable, that one who does not embrace the funda- 
mental principles, of a Science, whatever he may have 
taken on authority, and learned by rote, knows, prop- 
erly speaking, nothing of that science. And such, 1 
have no hesitation in saying, is the case with a consid- 
erable proportion even of those candidates who obtain 
testimonials, including many who gain distinction. 
There are some persons (probably not so many as one 
in ten, of such as have in other respects tolerable abili- 
ties,) who are physically incapable of the degree of 
steady abstraction requisite for really embracing the 
principles of Logic or of any other Science, whatever 
pains may be taken by themselves or their teachers. 
But there is a much greater number to whom this is a 
great difficulty, though not an impossibility ; and who 



XVI PREFACE. 

having of course, a strong disinclination to such a study 
look naturally to the very lowest admissible standard 
And the example of such examinations in Logic as mus» 
he expected in the case of men of these descriptions, 
tends, in combination with popular prejudice, to degrade 
the study altogether in the minds of the generality. 

It was from these considerations, perhaps that it was 
proposed, a few years ago, to leave the study of Logic 
altogether to the option of the candidates : but the sug- 
gestion was rejected ; the majority appearing to think 
(in which opinion I most fully coincide) that, so strongly 
as the tide of popular opinion set against the study, the 
result would have been, within a few years, an almost 
universal neglect of that science. Matters were accor- 
dingly left, at that time, in respect of this point, on their 
former footing ; which I am convinced was far prefera- 
ble to the proposed alteration. 

But a middle course between these two was suggest- 
ed, which I was persuaded would be infinitely prefer- 
able to either ; a persuasion whichi had long entertain- 
ed, and which is confirmed by every day's observations 
and reflections ; of which, few^ persons, I believe, have 
bestowed more on this subject. Let the study of Logic, 
it w^as urged, be made optional to those who are merely 
candidates for a degree, but indispensable to the attain- 
ment of academical honours ; and the consequence would 
be, that it would speedily begin and progressively con- 
tinue, to rise in estimation and to be studied with real 
profit. The examination might then, it was urged, 
without any hardship, be made a strict one ; since no 
one could complain that a certain moderate degree of 
scientific ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain 
prescribed study, should be the conditions of obtaining 
distinction. The far greater part would still study Lo- 
gic ; since there would be (as before) but few who 
would be willing to exclude themselves from the possi- 
bility of obtaining distinction ; but it wriild be studied 
with a very different mind, when ennobled, as it were. 



PKEFACE. XrU 

by being made part of the passport to University r.on- 
ours, and when a proficiency in it came to be regarded 
generally as an honourable distinction. And in pro- 
portion as the number increased of those who really 
understood the science, the number, it was contended, 
would increase of such as would value it on higher and 
better grounds; It would in time come to be better 
known and better appreciated by all the well-informed 
part of society : and lectures in Logic at the University 
would then, perhaps, no longer consist exclusively of 
an explanation of the mere elements. This would be 
necessary indeed for beginners ; but to the more advan- 
ced students, the tutors would no more think of lectur- 
ing in the bare rudiments, than of lecturing in the Latin 
or Greek Grammar ; but, in the same manner as they 
exercise their pupils in Grammar, by reading with them 
Latin and Greek authors with continual reference to 
grammer-rules, so, they would exercise them in Logic 
by reading some argumentative work, requiring an an- 
alysis of it on logical principles. 

These effects could not indeed, it was acknowledged, 
be expected to show themselves fully till after a con- 
siderable lapse of time ; but that the change would begin 
to appear, (and that very decidedly) within three or four 
years, was confidently anticipated. 

To this it was replied, that it was most desirable that 
no one should be allowed to obtain the Degree of B.A. 
without a knowledge of Logic. This answer carries a 
plausible appearance to those unacquainted with the 
actual state of the University ; though in fact it is to- 
tally irrelevant. For it goes on the supposition, that 
hitherto this object has been accomplished ; — that every 
one who passes his examination does possess a know- 
ledge of Logic ; which is notoriously not the fact, nor 
ever can be, without some impoi'tant change in some 
part of our system. The question therefore is, not, as 
the above objection would seem to imply, whether a 
real, profitable knowledge of Logic shall be strictly re- 



XriU PREFACE. 

quired ol e/ery candidate for a Degree, (for this in fact 
never has been done) but whether, in the attempt to ac- 
complish this by requiring the form of a logical exami- 
nation from every candidate without exception, we shall 
continue to degrade the science, and to let this part ol 
the examination be regarded as a ^ere form, by many 
who might otherwise have studied Logic in earnest, 
and with advantage: — whether the great majority of 
candidates, and those too of a more promising descrip- 
tion, shall lose a real and important benefit, through 
the attempt, (which, after all, experience has proved to 
be a vain attempt) to comprehend in this benefit a very 
small number, and of the least promising. 

Something of an approach to the proposed alteration, 
was introduced* into the Examination-statute passed in 
1830 ; in which, permission is granted to such as are 
candidates merely for a testimonial, to substitute for Lo- 
gic a portion of Euclid. I fear, however, that little or 
nothing will be gained by this ; unless indeed the Ex- 
aminers resolve to make the examinations in Logic far 
stricter than those in Euclid. For since every one who 
is capable of really understanding Euclid must be also 
capable of Logic, the alteration does not meet the case 
of those whose inaptitude for Science is invincible ; and 
these are the very description of men whose (so-called 
logical-examinations tend to depress the science. Those 
few who really are physically incapable of scientific 
reasoning, and the far greater number who fancy them- 
selves so, or who at least will rather run a risk than 
surmount their aversion, and set themselves to study in 
earnest, — all these will be likely, when the alternative 
is proposed, to prefer Logic to Euclid ; because in the 
latter, it is hardly possible, at least not near so easy as 
in Logic, to present the semblance of preparation by 
learning questions and answers by rote : — in the cant 
phrase of undergraduates, by getting crammed. Expe« 
rience has proved this, in the case of the Responsion- 
examinations, where the alternative of Logic or Euclid 



PREFACE. XIX 

has. always been proposed to the candidates ; of whom 
those most averse to Science, or incapable of it, are al- 
most always found to prefer Logic. 

The determination may indeed be formed, and acted 
on from henceforth, that all w^ho do in reality know 
nothing, properly speaking, of any Science, shall be re- 

i'ected : all 1 know is, that this has never been the case 
litherto. 

Still, it is a satisfaction to me, tbat attention has been 
called to the evil in question, and an experimental mea- 
sure adopted for its abatement. A confident hope is 
thus afforded, that in the event (which I much fear) of 
the failure of the experiment, some other more effectual 
measure may be resorted to.* 

I am sensible that many may object, that this is not 
the proper place for such remarks as the foregoing : 
what has the Public at large, they may say, to do with 
the statutes of the University of Oxford ? To this it 
might fairly be replied, that not only all who think of 
sending their sons or other near relatives to Oxford, but 
all likewise who are placed under the ministry of such 
as have been educatea there, are indirectly concerned, 
to a certain degree, in the system there pursued. But 
the consideration which had the chief share in induc- 
ing me to say what I have, is, that the vindication of 
Logic from the prevailing disregard and contempt under 
which it labours, would have been altogether incom- 
plete without it. For let it be remembered that the sci- 
ence is judged of by the Public in this country, in a very 
great degree, from the specimens displayed, and the re- 
ports made, by those whom Oxford sends forth. Every 
one, on looking into the University- Calendar or Statute- 
Book, feels himself justified in assuming, that whoever 
has graduated at Oxford must be a Logican : not, in- 

• Since this was written, the experiment has been tried. In the 
first Examination-list under the new Statute (Easter, 1831,) of 125 
candidates who did not aspire to the higher classes, twenty five pre- 
sented Euclid for their examination, and one hundred, Logic I 



XX PREFACB 

deed, necessarily, a first-rale Logician ; but such as to 
satisfy the public examiners that he has a competent 
knowledge of the science. Now, if a very large pro- 
portion of these persons neither are, nor think them- 
selves at all benefited by their (so-called) logical edu- 
cation, and if many of them treat- the study with 
contempt, and represent it is a mere tissue of obsolete 
and empty jargon, which it is a mere waste of time to 
attend to, let any one judge what conclusions respect- 
ing the utility of the study, and the wisdom of the Uni- 
versity in upholding it, are likely to be the result. 

That prejudices so deeply- rooted as those I have al- 
luded to, and supported by the authority of such emi- 
nent names, especially that of Locke, and (as is com- 
monly, though not very correctly supposed) Bacon, 
should be overthrown at once by the present treatise, 
I am not so sanguine as to expect ; but if I have been 
successful in refuting some of the most popular objec- 
tions, and explaining some principles w^hich are in gen- 
eral ill-understood, it may be hoped that just notions on 
the subject may continue (as they have begun) ,^to gain 
ground more and more. 

ft may be permitted me to mention, that as I have 
addressed myself to various classes of students, from 
the most uninstructed tyro, to the farthest- advanced 
Logician, and have touched accordingly both on the 
most elementary principles, and on some of the most 
remote deductions from them, it must be expected that 
readers of each class will find some parts not well cal- 
culated for them. Some explanations will appear to the 
one too simple and puerile ; and for another class, some 
of the disquisitions will be at first too abstruse. If to 
each description some portions are found interesting, it 
is as much as I can expect. 

With regard to the style, I have considered per^pi- 
cuity not only, as it always must be, the first point, but 
as one of such paramount importance in such a subject, 
as to justify the neglect of all others. Prolixity of ex- 



PR£FAC£. XXi 

planation, — homeliness in illustration, — and baldness 
of expression, I have regarded as blemishes not worth 
thinking of, when anything was to be gained in respect 
of clearness. To some of my readers a temporary dif- 
ficulty may occasionally occur from the use of some 
technical terms different, or differently applied from what 
they have been accustomed to.* They must consider, 
however, that the attempt to conform in this point to 
the usage of every logical writer, would have been, on 
account of their variations from each other, utterly hope- 
less. [ have endeavoured, in the terms employed, to 
make no wanton innovations, but to conform generally 
to established usage, except when there is some very 
strong objection to it ; —where usage is divided, to pre- 
fer what may appear in each case the most convenient 
term ; — and, above all, to explain distinctly the sense 
in which each is employed in the present work. 

If any should complain of my not having given a 
history of all the senses in which each technical term 
has been used by each writer from its first introduction, 
and a review of the works of each, I can only reply that 
my design was not to write a Logical Archaeology, or 
a Commentary on the works of former Logicians, but 
an elementary introduction to the science. And few, 1 
suppose, would consider a treatise, for instance, on 
Agriculture, as incomplete, which should leave un- 
touched the questions of, who was the inventor of the 
E lough, — what successive alterations that implement 
as^'undergone, — and from what region wheat was first 
introduced. 

And if again any should complain of the omission of 
such metaphysical disquisitions on the laws of thought, 
and the constitution of the human mind generally, as 
they have been accustomed to include under the head 
of Logic, my answer must be, that that term has been 
employed by me in a different sense ; for reasons which 
T have stated in several parts of this treatise, and espe- 
♦ See Book ii. Chap. i. § 1 



XXU PREFACE. 

cially in Book IV. Chap. iii. ; and that I am therefore 
only to be censured, at the utmost, as not having un- 
dertaken a work of a different kind, and on a different 
subject. 

I would not, on the other hand, be understood as 
complaining of those who have used the word Logic in 
a more extended sense, or as underrating the value of 
their works. Only, the reader should be cautioned 
against the mistake — much commoner, I believe, than 
is generally thought — of confounding the extension of 
the application of a name, with the enlargement of the 
boundaries of a science. 

It is proper however to mention that the first Part of 
the "Elements of Rhetoric" contains a discussion of 
such points as many writers have treated of under the 
department of Logic. 

The technical language employed in this treatise, is, 
throughout, with the exception of a very few cases 
where some departure from ancient usage appeared in- 
dispensable, that of the older works on the subject. 
Some degree of prejudice perhaps might have been, in 
the outset, avoided, and a far greater appearance of 
originality produced, by adopting novel forms of ex- 
pression. There are also many writers who have found 
fault with the established technical language, as cum- 
brous and perplexing. I have always found however 
that the phraseology they adopt in its stead consists of 
far more tedious circumlocution than that which 
they censure ; while it is often less clear and less 
correct. 

It should be observed however that all technical lan- 
guage (as well as all rules of art) must be expected to 
present, at first, a difficulty for the learner to surmount ; 
though in the end, it will greatly facilitate his procedure. 
But with this view it is necessary that such language 
and rules should be not only distinctly understood, but 
also learnt, and remembered as familiarly as the Alpha- 
bet, and emj)loyed constantly, and with scrupulous ex- 



pRErACE. xxm 

aetneM. Otherwise technical language will prove an 
incumbrance instead of an advantage ; just as a suit of 
clothes would be, if instead of putting them on and 
wearing them, one should carry them about in his 
hands. 

Of the correctness of the fundamental doctrines main- 
tained in the work, I may be allowed to feel some con- 
fidence ; not so much from the length of time that 1 
have been more or less occupied with it — enjoying at 
the same time the advantage of frequent suggestions and 
corrections from several judicious friends — as from the 
nature of the subject. In works of taste, an author 
cannot be sure that the judgment of the Public will 
coincide with his own ; and if he fail to give pleasure, 
he fails of his sole or most appropriate object. But in 
the case of truths which admit of scientific demonstration, 
it is possible to arrive by reasoning at as full an assu- 
rance of the justness of the conclusions established, as 
the imperfection of the human faculties will admit ; and 
experience, accompanied with attentive observation, and 
with repeated trials of various methods, may enable one 
long accustomed to tuition, to ascertain with considera- 
ble certainty what explanations are the best comprehend- 
ed. Many parts of the detail, however, may probably 
be open to objections ; but if (as experience now autho- 
rizes me the more confidently to hope) no errors are 
discovered, which materially aflfect the substantial utility 
of the work, but only such as detract from the credit of 
the author, the object will have been attained which I 
ought to have had principally in view. 

No credit, 1 am aware, is given to an author's own 
disclaimer of personal motives, and profession of ex- 
clusive regard for public utility ; since even sincerity 
cannot, on this point, secure him from deceiving him- 
self ; but it may be allowable to observe, that one whose 
object was the increase of his reputation as a writer, 
could hardly have chosen a subject less suitable for his 
purpose than the present. At the time of the fi:rst pub- 



XXIV PREFACE. 

lication, the study was neither popular, nor, apparently, 
likely soon to become, sa Ignorance, fortified by pre- 
judice, opposed its reception, even in the minds of those 
who are considered as both candid and well-informed 
And as, on the one hand, a large class of modern phi- 
losophers might be expected to raise a clamour against 
«* obsolete prejudices ;" " bigoted devotion to the decrees 
of Aristotle ;" " confining the human mind in the tram- 
mels of the Schoolmen," &c., so, on the other hand, all 
such as really are thus bigoted to every thing that has 
been long established, merely because it has been long 
established, were likely to exclaim against the pre- 
sumption of an author, who presumes to depart in 
several points from the track of his predecessors. 

There is another circumstance, also, which tends 
materially to diminish the credit of a writer on this and 
some other kindred subjects. We can make no dis- 
coveries of striking novelties: the senses of our readers 
are not struck, as with the return of a Comet which had 
been foretold, or the extinction of a taper in carbonic- 
acid gas : the materials we work upon are common and 
familiar to all, and, therefore, supposed to be well un- 
derstood by all. And not only is any one's deficiency 
in the use of these materials, such as is generally unfelt 
by himself, but when it is removed by satisfactory ex- 
planations — when the notions, which had been perplex- 
ed and entangled, are cleared up by the introduction of 
a few simple and apparently obvious principles, he will 
generally forget that any explanation at all was needed, 
and consider all that has been said as mere truisms, 
which even a child could supply to himself. Such is 
the nature of the fundamental principles of a science — 
they are so fully implied in the most evident and well- 
known truths, that the moment they are fully embraced, 
it becomes a difficulty to conceive that we could ever 
have been not aware of them. And hence, the more 
simple, clear, and obvious any principle is rendered, the 
more likely is its exposition to elicit those common 



PREFACE. XXV 

remarks, * of cour^ ! of course !" ** no one could ever 
doubt that ;" " this is all very true, but there is nothing 
new brought to light ; — nothing that was not familiar 
to every one," " there needs no ghost to tell us that " 
I am convinced that a verbose, mystical, and partially 
obscure way of writing on such a subject, is the most 
likely to catch the attention of the multitude. The 
generality verify the observation of Tacitus, " omne 
ignotum pro mirifico :" and when any thing is made very- 
plain to them, are apt to fancy that they knew it 
already ; so that the explanations of scientific truths are 
likely, for a considerable time at least, to be, by most 
men, underrated the more, the more perfectly they ac- 
complish their object 

A very slow progress, therefore, towards popularity 
(far slower indeed than has in fact taken place ) is the 
utmost that I expected for such a treatise as I have 
endeavoured to make the present- I felt myself bound, 
nowever, not only as a member of Society, but more 
especially as a Minister of the Gospel, to use my en- 
deavours towards promoting an object which to me ap- 
pears highly important, and (what is much more) whose 
importance was appreciated by very few besides. The 
cause of Truth universally, and not least, of religious 
Truth, is benefited by every thing that tends to promote 
sound reasoning, and facilitate the detection of fallacy 
The adversaries of our Faith would, I am convinced, 
have been on many occasions more satisfactorily an- 
swered, and would have had fewer openings for cavil, 
had a thorough acquaintance with Logic been a more 
common qualification than it is. In lending my en- 
deavours, therefore, whether with greater or less suc- 
cess, towards this object, I trust that I am neither use- 
lessly nor unsuitably employed. 

Those who are engaged in, or designed for the Sacred 
Ministry, and all others who are sensible that the cause 
of true ileligion is not a concern of th<e Ministry alone, 
should remember that this is no time to forego any of 

d 



XXVI PREFAGJJ. 

the advant^es which: that caiise may de rire from ai» 
active and judicious cultivation of the faculties 
Among the enemies of Christianity in the present day^ 
are included, if I mistake not, a very different descrip- 
tion of persons from those who were chiefly to be met 
with a century, or even half a century ago : what were 
ealled ** men af wit anil pleasure about town ;" — igno- 
rant, shallow, flippant declaimers, or dull and power- 
less pretenders to Philosophy. Among the enemies ol 
the Gospel now, are to be found men not only of learn- 
ing and ingenuity, but ol cultivated (wgrnnenlative 
powers, and not unversed in the principles of Logic. II 
th« advocates of our Religion think praper to disregard 
this help, tbey will find, on careful inquiry, that their 
opponents do not. And let them not trust too carelessly 
to the strength of their cause. Truth will, indeed, pre- 
vail, where all other points are nearly equal ; but it may 
suffer a temporary discomfiture, if hasty assumptions^ 
unsound arguments, and vague and empty declamation^ 
occupy the place of a train of close^ accurate, and lu- 
minous reasoning. 

It is^ not, however, solely, or chiefly, far polemical 
purposes, that the cultivation of the reasoning faculty 
is desirable ; in persuading, in mvestigating, in learn- 
ing, or teaching, in all the multitude of cases in which 
it is our object to arrive at just conclusions, or to lead 
others to them, it is most important. A knowledge of 
logical rules will not indeed supply the want of other 
knowledge ; nor was it ever proposed, by any one who 
really understood this science, to substitute it for any 
other ; but it is no le^ true that no other can be sub- 
stituted for this ; that it is valuable in every branch of 
study ; and that it enables us to use to the greatest ad- 
vantage the knowledge we possess, it is to be hoped, 
therefore, that those Academical Bodies, who have been 
wise enough to retain this science, will, instead of be- 
ing persuaded to abandon it, give their attention rathei 
i» its improvement and more effectual cultivation. 



CONTENTS. 



Introduction 


29 


BOOK I. 




Analytical Outline of the Science . 


60 


BOOK IT. 




Synthetical Compendium . . . . 
Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind, and 

of Terms .... 
Chap. II. — Of Propositions ... 
Chap. III. — Of Arguments .... 
Chap. IV.— Supplement to Chap. III. 
Chap. V. — Supplement to Chap. 1. 


81 

ih, 

88 

104 

122 

144 


BOOK 111. 




Of Fallacies . . 


175 


BOOK IV. 




Dissertation on the Province of Reasoning . 
Chap. I. — Of Induction .... 
Chap. II.— On the Discovery of Truth . 
Chap. III. — Of Inference and Proof 
Chap. IV.— Of Verbal and Real Questions 
Chap, v.— Of Realism . . 


247 
248 
256 
281 

. 288 
294 


Appendix. 




No. I. — On certain Terms which are peculiarly 
liable to be used ambiguously . 

No. II. — Miscellaneous Examples for the exer- 
cise of Learners .... 

No. III. — Example of Analysis 

Index . 


304 

361 
378 

391 



ADVERTISEMENT 

TO 

THE EIGHTH EDITION. 



In the present edition several passages have heea 
transferred from the parts of the vrork in which they 
had formerly been placed, to others ; and some hare 
been altered in expression. 

The reader virill please to observe that the angular 
brackets are used to indicate that the word [thus] en- 
closed is equivalent in sense to that which precedes it 



ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 



INTRODUCTION. 

^ 1. Logic, in the most extensive sense Definition 
in which it has been thought advisable to ^f Logic, 
employ the name, may be considered as the Science, 
and also as the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the 
principles on which argumentation is conducted, and 
furnishes such rules as maybe derived from those prin- 
ciples, for guarding against erroneous deductions. Its 
most appropriate oifice, however, is that of instituting 
an analysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning ; 
and in this point of view it is, as I have said, strictly a 
Science : while, considered in reference to the practical 
rules above mentioned, it may be called the Art of 
Reasoning.. For it is to be remembered, that as a saencc 
is conversant about speculative knowledge only, and art 
is the application of knowledge to practice, hence. Lo- 
gic (as well as any other system of knowledge) becomes 
when applied to practice, an art ; while confined to the 
theory of reasoning, i\ is strictly a science : and it is as 
such that it occupies the higher place in point of digni- 
ty, since it professes to develope some of the most inte- 
resting and curious intellectual phenomena.* 

Considering how early Logic attracted prevailing 
the attention of philosophers, it may ap- Mistakes res- 
pear surprising that so little progress P®^*^°S Logic 

♦ It is surely strange, therefore to find in a treatise on Logic, 
(Aldricli's) a distinct dissertation to prove that it is an Art, and not 
ft Science ! 



30 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. (§ 1 

should have been made, as is confessedly the case, in 
developing its principles, and perfecting the detail of 
the system ; and this circumstance has been brought 
forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility of the 
study. But a similar argument might have been urged 
with no less plausibility, at a period not very remote 
against the study of Natural Philosophy ; and, very 
recently, against that of Chemistry. No science can 
be expected to make any considerable progress, which 
is not cultivated on right principles. Whatever may 
be the inherent vigour of the plant, it will neither be 
flourishing nor fruitful till it meet with a suitable soil 
and culture : and in no case is the remark more appli- 
cable than in the present ; the greatest mistakes having 
alw^ays prevailed respecting the nature of Logic ; and 
its province having in consequence been extended by 
many writers to subjects with which it has no proper 
connexion. Indeed, with the exception perhaps of 
AristotlCj (who is himself, however, not entirely ex- 
empt from the errors in quesstion,) hardly a writer on 
Logic can be mentioned who has clearly perceived, and 
steadily kept in view throughout, its real nature and 
object. Before his time, no distinction was drawn be- 
tween the science of which we are speaking, and that 
which is now usually called Metaphysics ; a circum- 
stance which alone shows how small was the progress 
made in earlier times. Indeed, those who first turned 
their attention to the subject, hardly thought of inquir- 
ing into the process of Reasoning itself, but confined 
themselves almost entirely to certain preliminary points, 
the discussion of which is (if logically considered) sub- 
ordinate to that of the main inquiry. 

To give even a very condensed account 
L^ic d^ftinct ^^ ^^^ li^es and works of ail the principal 
from the writers on Logic — of the technical terms 
teaching of introduced by each, and the senses in which 
each employed them — and of the improve- 
ments or corruptions, that were fri m time to time in- 



§ 1.] INTRODUCTION. 31 

Produced — in short, to write the History and Antiqui- 
ties of Logical Science — would be foreign to my pres- 
^ent design. Such a work, if undertaken by a compe- 
tent writer, would be, though not of a popular charac- 
ter, yet highly interesting and instructive to a limited 
class of students. But the extensive research which 
would form one indispensable qualification for such a 
task, would be only one out of many, even less com- 
mon, qualifications, without which such a work would 
he worse than -useless. The author should be one 
thoroughly on his guard against the common error of 
confounding together, or leading his readers to con- 
found, an intimate acquaintance with many books on a 
given subject, and a clear insight into the subject itself. 
With ability and industry for investigating a multitude 
^f minute particulars, he should possess the power of 
rightly estimating each according to its intrinsic im- 
portance, and not (as is very commonly done,) accord- 
ing to the degree of laborious research it may have cost 
him, or the rarity of the knowledge he may in any case 
have acquired. And he should be careful, while re- 
cording the opinions and expressions of various authors 
on points of science, to guard both himself and hi« 
readers against the mistake of taking any thing on ait- 
ihority, that ought to be evinced by scientiEc reason- 
ing ; or of regarding each technical term as having a 
sort of |)rescriptive right to retain for ever the meaning 
attached to it by those who first introduced it In no 
subject, in shoit, is it more important for an author to 
he free from all tinge of antiquarian pedantry. 

But if I felt myself as full}^ competent to the task of 
writing such a history of Logic, as I have alluded to, 
as I am conscious of not being so, I should still deci- 
dedly prefer keeping such a work altogether distinct 
from a treatise on the science; because the combination 
of the two in a single volume would render it the more 
difficult to avoid the blending of them confusedly to- 
gether, and also because, on such a plan, the distiiic- 



32 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [§ 51 

tion could not be so easily preserved between Logic, in 
the sense in which I am here using that title, and va- 
rious metaphysical disquisitions to which several wri- 
ters have given the same name. 

For these reasans I have thought it best to take only 
a slight and rapid glance of the series of logical writers 
down to the present day, and of the general tendency 
of their labours. 

Rariy writers § 2. Zeno the Eleatic, whom most ae- 
on Logic, counts represent as the earliest systematie 
WTiter on the subject of Logic, or, as it was then called. 
Dialectics, divided his work into three parts ; the first 
of which (upon Consequences) is censured by Socrates 
[Plato, Parmen.l for obscurity and confusion. In his 
second part, however, he furnished that interrogatory 
method of disputation {kgdTrtaLg'] which Socrates adopt- 
ed, and which has since borne his name. The third 
part of his work was devoted to what may not be im- 
properly termed the art of wrangling [epicrT^/t^,] 
which supplied the disputant with a collection of so- 
phistical questions, so contrived, that the concession ol 
some point that seemed unavoidable, immediately in- 
volved some glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be 
esteemed as at all falling within the province of Logic, 
is certainly not to be regarded (as some have ignorantly 
or heedlessly represented it) as its principal or proper 
business. The Greek philosophers generally have un - 
fortunately devoted too much attention to it ; but we 
must beware of falling into the vulgar error of suppos- 
ing the ancients to have regarded as a serious and in- 
trinsically important study, that which in fact they con- 
sidered as an ingenious recreation. The disputants di- 
verted themselves in their leisure hours by making trial 
of their own and their adversary's acuteness, in the en- 
deavour mutually to perplex each other with subtle 
fallacies ; much in the same way as men amuse them- 
selves with propounding and guessing riddles, or with 
the game of chess; to each of which diversions the 



§2.] INTRODUCTION. 33 

sportive disputations of the ancients bore much resem- 
blance. They were closely analogous to the wrestling 
and other exercises of the Gymnasium ; these last being 
reckoned conducive to bodily vigour and activity, as the 
former were to habits of intellectual acuteness ; but the 
immediate object in each was a sportive, not a serious 
contest ; though doubtless fashion and emulation often 
occasioned an undue importance to be attached to suc- 
cess in each. 

Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as 
any farther a logician than as to what re- ^'^^' 
spects his erotetic method of disputation ; a course of 
argument constructed on this principle being properly 
an hypothetical Sorites, which may easily be reduced 
into a series of syllogisms. 

To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, ^ ,. , 
and Antisthenes ; both pupils of Socrates. Antisthenes. 
The former of these prosecuted the subject 
of the third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is said 
to have been the author of many of the fallacies attri- 
buted to the Stoical school. Of the writings of the lat- 
ter nothing certain is known ; if, however, we suppose 
the above-mentioned sect to be his disciples in this study, 
and to have retained his principles, he certainly took a 
more correct view of the subject than Euclid. The 
Stoics divided all Xektcl — every thing that could be 
said — into three classes; 1st, the Simple Term; 2d, 
the Proposition ; 3d, the Syllogism ; viz. the hypotheti- 
cal ; for they seem to have had little notion of a more 
rigorous analysis of argument than into that familiar 
form. 

We must not here omit to notice the merits of Archy* 
tas, to whom we are indebted (as he him- 
self probably was, in a great degree, to ^^ ^ ^^' 
older writers) for the doctrines of the Categories. He, 
however, (as well as the other writers on the subject) 
appears to have had no distinct view of the proper ob- 
iect and just limits of the science of Logic ; but to have 



34 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. ^ 2 

blended with it metaphysical discussions not strictly 
connected with it, and to have dwelt on the investiga- 
tion of the nature of Terms and Propositions, without 
maintaining a constant reference to the principles of 
Reasoning ; to which all the rest should he made sub- 
servient 

. The state, then, in which Aristotle found 

the science (if, indeed, it can properly be 
said to have existed at all before his time) appears to 
have been nearly this ; the division into Simple Terms, 
Propositions, and Syllogisms, had been slightly sketch- 
ed out ; the doctrine of the Categories, and perhaps that 
of the Opposition of propositions, had been laid down ; 
and, as some believe, the analysis of Species into Gen- 
us and Differentia had been introduced by Socrates. 
These, at best, were rather the materials of the system, 
than the system itself ; the foundation of which indeed 
he distinctly claims the merit of having laid, and whiph 
remains fundamentally the same as he left it 

It has been remarked, that the logical system is one 
of those few theories which have been begun and com- 
pleted by the same individual. The history of its dis- 
covery, as far as the main principles of the science are 
concerned, properly commences and ends with Aristo- 
tle; and this may perhaps in part account for the sub- 
sequent perversions of it. The brevity and simplicity 
of its fundamental truths (to which point indeed all real 
Science is perpetually tending) has probably led many 
to suppose that something much more complex, ab- 
struse, and mysterious, remained to be discovered. The 
vanity, too, by which all men are prompted unduly to 
magnify their own pursuits, has led unphilosopln.i >sd 
minds, not in this case alone, but in many others, \? Cjc. 
tend the boundaries of their respective sciences, not by 
the patient development and just application of the prin- 
ciples of those sciences, but by wandering into irrele- 
vant subjects. The mystical employment of numbers 
by Pjrthagoras, in matters utterly foreign to arithmetic. 



f5^.3 INTRODUCTION. ^ 

ia perhaps the earliest instance of the kind. A mora 
curious and important one is the degeneracy of Astro- 
nomy into judicial Astrology ; but none is more strik- 
ing than the misapplication of Logic, by those who 
have treated of it as " the art of rightly employing the 
rational faculties," or who have intruded it into the 
province of Natural Philosophy, and regarded the Syl- 
logism as an engine for the investigation of Nature ; 
while they overlooked the extensive field that was be- 
fore them within the legitimate limits of the science ; 
and perceived not the importance and difficulty of the 
task, of completing and properly filling up the masterly 
sketch before them. 

The writings of Aristotle were not only for the most 
part absolutely lost to the world for about two centu- 
ries, but seem to have been but little studied for a long 
time after their recovery. An art, however, of Logic, 
derived from the principles traditionally preserved by 
his disciples, seems to have been generally known, and 
to have been employed by Cicero in his philosophical 
works ; but the pursuit of the science seems to have 
been abandoned for a long time. As early in the Chris- 
tian era as the second and third centuries, the Peripate- 
tic doctrines experienced a considerable revival; and 
we meet with the names of Galen, Ammo- 
nius, (who seems to have taken the lead Ammonius, 
among the commentators on Aristotle) Alex- Alexander,* 
ander of Aphrodisias, and Porphyry, as lo- ^^^P^J^Y- 
gicians ; but it is not till the close of the fifth century, 
or the beginning of the sixth, that Aristotle's logical 
works were translated into Latin by the celebrated Boe- 
thius.* Not one of these seems to have , . 
made any considerable advances in develop- °^ *^^* 
ing the theory of reasoning. Of the labours of Galen 
(who added the insignificant fourth Figure to the three 
recognized by Aristotle) little is known ; and Porphy- 
ry's principal work is merely on the predicables. We 
* Bom about a. d. 475^ and died about ▲. o. 624. 



86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [^3. 

have little of the science till the revival of learning 
among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle's treatises on 
this as well as on other subjects, were eagerly studied 

schoolmen. \^- ^*^.f "S ^J ^^^ »^™?^ °^ ^""^ %" 

zantme writers oi no great importance, we 
come to the times of the Schoolmen ; whose waste of 
ingenuity, and frivolous subtilty of disputation, have 
been often made the subject of complaints, into the jus- 
tice of which it is unnecessary here fully to inquire 
It may be sufficient to observe, that their fault did not 
lie in their diligent study of Logic, and the high value 
they set upon it, but in their utterly mistaking the true 
nature and object of the science ; and by the attempt to 
employ it for the purpose of physical discoveries, in- 
volving every subject in a mist of words, to the exclu- 
sion of sound philosophical investigation.* Their er- 
rors may serve to account for the strong terms in which 
Bacon sometimes appears to censure logical 
pursuits ; but that this censure was intend- 
ed to bear against the extravagant perversions, not the 
legitimate cultivation of the science, may be proved from 
his own observations on the subject, in his Advance^ 
ment of Learning, " Had Bacon lived in the present 
day, I am inclined to think he would have made his 
chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry and illo- 
gical reasoning. Certainly he would not have com- 
plained of Dialectics as corrupting Philosophy. To 
guard now against the evils prevalent in his time, would 
be to fortify a town against battering-rams, instead of 
against cannon. "f 

His moderation, however, was not imi- 
tated in other quarters. Even Locke con- 
founds in one sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory, 
with the absurd misapplications and perversions of it 

♦ Of the character of the School-dmm7y, Dr. Hampden's Bamp* 
ton Lectures furnish the best view that has, perhaps, ever ap. 
peared. 

\ Fol. Eoon. Lect. ix. p. 237 



4 3.] INTRODUCTION, 37 

in later years. His objection to the science, as unser- 
viceable in the discovery of truth (which has of late 
been often repeated,) while it holds good in reference 
to many (misnamed) logicians, indicates that, with re- 
gard to the true nature of the science itself, he had no 
clearer notions than they have, of the just limits of lo- 
gical science, as confined to the theory of Reasoning ; 
and of the distinct character of that operation from the 
observations and experiments which are essential to the 
study of Nature. 

For instance, in chap. xvii. " on Reason," (which, by 
the way, he perpetually confounds with Reasoning,) 
he says, in § 4, "If syllogisms must be taken for the 
only proper instrument of reason and means of know- 
ledge, it will follow, that before Aristotle there was not 
one man that did or could know any thing by reason ; 
and that since the invention of syllogisms there is not 
one in ten thousand that doth. But God has not been 
so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged 
creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational, 
t. e. those few of them that he could get so to examine 
the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above three- 
score ways that three propositions may be laid together, 
there are but fourteen wherein one maybe sure that the 
conclusion is right," &c. " God has been more boun- 
tiful to mankind than so : He has given them a mind 
that can reason without being instructed in methods of 
syllogizing," &c. . All this is not at all less absurd than 
if any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern 
chemists respecting caloric, and on hearing described the 
process by which it is conducted through a boiler into 
the water, which it converts into a gas of sufficient 
elasticity to overcome the pressure of the atmosphere, 
&c., should reply, " If all this were so, it would follow 
that before the time of these chemists no one ever did 
or could make any liquor boil." 

He presently after inserts an encomium upon A ristotle, 
in which he is equally unfortunate ; he praises him for 



as ELEMENTS OF LOGIC, K «. 

the ** invention of syllogisms :" to which he certainly 
had no more claim than Linnaeus to the creation of plants 
and animals ; or Harvey, to the praise of having made 
the blood circulate; or Lavoisier, to that of having 
formed the atmosphere we breathe. And the utility ot 
this invention consists, according to him, in the great 
service done against " those who were not ashamed to 
deny any thing ;" a service which never could have been 
performed, had syllogisms been an invention or dis- 
covery of Aristotle's ; for what sophist could ever have 
consented to restrict himself to one particular kind of 
arguments, dictated by his opponent ? 

in an ordinary, obscure, and trifling writer, all this 
confusion of thought and common-place declamation 
might as well have been left unnoticed ; but it is due to 
the general ability and to the celebrity of such an author 
as Locke, that errors of this kind should be exposed. 

An error apparently different, but substantially the 
^ same, pervades the treatises of Watts, and 

some other modern writers on the subject. 
Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic theory to 
the vast purposes to which others had attempted to 
apply it, he still craved after the attainment of some 
equally comprehensive and all-powerful system ; which 
he accordingly attempted to construct under the title of 
The Right Use of Reason — which was to be a method 
of invigorating and properly directing all the powers df 
the mind: a most magnificent object indeed, but one 
which not only does not fall under the province of Logic, 
but cannot be accomplished by any one science or system 
that can even be conceived to exist. The attempt to 
comprehend so wide a field, is no extension of science, 
but a mere verbal generalization, which leads only to 
vague and barren declamation. 

It is not perhaps much to be wondered at, that in still 
later times several ingenious writers, forming their 
notions of the science itself from professed masters in 
it, such as have just been alluded to, and judging of 



f 3.1 INTRODUCTION. 3B 

its value from their failures, should have tieated the 
Aristotelic system with so much reprobation and scorn. 

The vague aspirations of some of these 
writers after a " true "— " rational "—" phi- e^pe^'cSfs*^ 
losophical system of Logic," which, year some writers, 
after year, and generation after generation, 
is talked of, and hoped for, and almost promised, but 
which is acknowledged to have never yet existed,* may 
recall to one's mind the gorgeous visions which floated 
before the imagination of the Alchemists, of the Phil- 
osopher's Stone, and the Universal Medicine ; and which 
made them regard with impatience and with scorn the 
humble labours of existing Metallurgy and Pharmacy. 
1 believe that in respect of the piesent subject, the views 
I am alluding to arise in great measure from men's not 
perceiving that Language,^ of some kind or other, is 
(as will be more fully shown hereafter) an indispensa- 
ble instrument of all Reasoning that properly deserves 
the name. And hence it is that one may Tendency t© 
And such writers as I allude to speaking Realism, 
disdainfully of " rules applicable merely to reasoning 
in words /' — representing Language as serviceable only 
"in conveying arguments to another;" and even as 
" limiting the play of our faculties ;" and again aa 
** rendering the mental perception of all abstract truths 
obscure and confused, in so far as the rude symbol of 
each idea is taken in the stead of the idea itself ;" with 
other such expressions, emanating from that which is 
in truth the ancient and still prevalent doctrine of 
"Keahsm." 

♦ I have even seen a complaint made, that the introduction of some 
such perfect system has been prevented, by the application of the 
term Logic to that vsrhich is commonly so called. We do not find, 
however, that the application of the names of Astronomy and 
Chemistry to the studies formerly so caliect, prevented the origi- 
nation of more philosophical systems. ^ 

t Hobbes, who has very clearly pointed this out, has unhappily 
diminished the benefit that might have been derived from much 
that he has written, by the prejudice he has raised against himself 
through his exceptionable doctrines in Morals, Politics, and Reli* 
^ion. 



40 ELEMENTS OP LOGIC. M 4. 

The SylloorisHc theory has usually been 
views of the Considered by these objectors as professing 
lature of the to furnish a 'peculiar method of reasoning, 
icience. instead of a method of analyzing that men- 

tal process which must invariably take place in all 
correct reasoning ; and accordingly they have contrasted 
the ordinary mode of reasoning with the syllogistic, and 
have brought forward with an air of triumph the argu- 
mentative skill of many who never learned the system ; 
a mistake no less gross than if any one should regard 
Grammar as a peculiar Language, and should contend 
against its utility, on the ground that many speak cor- 
rectly who never studied the principles of grammar. 
For Logic, w^hich is, as it were, the Grammar of Rea- 
soning, does not bring forward the regular Syllogism as 
a distinct mode of argumentation, designed to be sub- 
stituted for any other mode ;* but as the form to which 
all correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced : and 
which, consequently, serves the purpose (when we are 
employing Logic as an art) of a test to try the validity 
of any argument ; in the same manner as by chemical 
analysis we develope and submit to a distinct examina- 
tion the elements of which any compound body is com- 
posed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophis- 
tication and impurity. 

§ 4. Many misconceptions not very dissimilar to 
those of Locke, which continue to prevail, more or less, 
in the present day, will be hereafter noticed, as far aa 
is needful, in appropriate places. In this Introduction 

* strange as it may seem, there are some, (I suspect not a few,) 
who even go a step further, and consider Logic as something 
opposed to right reasoning. I have seen a Review, of a work which 
the Reviewer characterized as the production of an able Logician^ 
and which he therefore concluded was likely to have influence with 
such as will not reason ! The " not" might naturally have been 
regarded as a misprint, but that the context shows that such wai 
the reviewer's real meaning. 

On seeing such a passage written in the 19th century, who can 
wonder that in the Middle Ages, Grammar (*• Gramarye") was 
segarded as a kind of magical art ? 



§ 4.J INTRODUCTION. 41 

it would be unsuitable to advert to them except very 
briefly, and that, only with a view to caution the 
learner, unused to these studies, against being dishear- 
tened in the outset, by hearins:, generally, that objec- 
tions have been raised against the leading principles of 
the science, by writers of considerable repute ; objec- 
tions which he will hardly suppose to be, in se great a 
degree as they really are, either founded on mistake, or 
dnimportant, and turning, in reality, on mere verbal 
questions. 

For instance, some, he may be told, have maintained 
that men reasom — or that they may reason — from a 
single premiss, without any other being either express- 
ed or understood ; — that men may, and do reason from 
one individual case to another, without the intervention 
of any general [universal] proposition, whether stated 
or implied ; — that the inferences from Induction are not 
drawn by any process that is, in substance. Syllogis- 
tic ; — that the conclusion of a Syllogism is not really 
inferred from the Premises ; — that a Syllogism is nothing 
but a kiijd of trap for ensnaring the incautious ; and 
that it necessarily involves the fallacy of " begging the 
question ;" with other such formidably- sounding objec- 
tions; which, when simply spoken of as being afloat, 
and as maintained by able men, are likely to be sup- 
posed far more powerful than they will be found on a 
closer examination. 

Of those w^ho speak of a single premiss being sufli- 
cient to warrant a conclusion, some, it will be found, 
were confining their thoughts to such flat and puerile 
examples as Logical writers are too apt to employ ex- 
clusively ; as " Socrates is a man ; therefore he is a liv- 
ing-creature, &c. ;" in which the conclusion had been 
already stated m the one premiss, to any one who does 
but understand the meaning of the words : ** living-crea- 
ture" being a part of what is signified in the very term 
"Man." But in such an instance as this; "He has 
swallowed a cup of laurel-water, therefore he has taken 
4 



42 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [§ 4 

poison," the inference is one which no one could draw 
who should be ignorant — as everybody was, less than a 
century ago (though using the loord in the same sense 
as now, to signify a " liquor distilled from laurel- 
leaves") that this liquor is poisonous. 

Others again, when they speak of reasoning from one 
individual instance to another, without any universal 
premiss, mean sometimes, that no such premiss is ex- 
pressed (which is the case oftener than not) and that 
perhaps even the reasoner himself, if possessed of no 
great command of language, might be at a loss to state it 
correctly. * And indeed it continually happens that even 
long trains of reasoning will flash through the mind 
with such rapidity that the process is performed un- 
consciously, or at least leaves no trace in the memory, 
any more than the motions of the muscles of the throat 
and mouth iu speaking, or the judgments by which we 
decide as to the distances of visible objects ;t so that a 
conclusion may be supposed to be seized by intuition, 
which in reality is the result of rapid inference. 

* It may be added, that in inward solitary reasoning, many and 
perhaps most persons, but especially those not much accustomed 
to read or speak concerning the subjects that occupy their thoughts 
make use, partly of sigus that are not arbitrary and conventional, but 
which consist of mentBl-conceptions of individual objects ; taken 
each, as a representative of a Class. E. g. a person practically 
conversant with mechanical operations, but not with discussions 
of them in words, may form a conception of— in colloquial phrase, 
" figure to himself"— a certain field or room, with whose shape he 
is familiar, and may employ this, in his inward trains of thought, 
as a Sign, to represent, for instance, " parallelogram or ** trapezi- 
um," &c. ; or he may " figure to himself" a man raising a weight 
by means of a pole, and may use this conception as a general sign, 
in place of the term " lever ;" and the terms themselves he may be 
unacquainted with ; in which case he will be at a loss to impart 
distinctly to others his own reasonings ; and in the attempt, will 
often express himself (as one may frequently observe in practical 
men unused to reading and speaking) not only indistinctly, but 
even erroneously. See below, § 6. Hence, partly, may have 
arisen the belief in those supposed •* abstract ideas " which will be 
hereafter alluded to, and in the possibility of reasoning without the 
use of any signs at all. 

t The distance of an object having been, till a comparatively late 
period, supposed to be directly perceived by the eye. 



§ 4.] INTRODUCTION. 43 

Some, again, appear to include under the title of 
" reasoning" every case in which a person believes one 
thing in consequence of his believing another thing ; 
however far he may be from having any good grounds 
to warrant the inference : and they accordingly include 
those processes which take place in the minds of in- 
fants and of brutes ; which are apt to associate with the 
appearance of an object before them the remembered 
impression of something that formerly accompanied it. 
Such a process is alluded to in the familiar proverbs 
that " A burnt child dreads the iire ;" or as it is express- 
ed in another form, "The scalded cat fears cold water ;" 
or again in the Hebrew proverb, " He who has been 
bitten by a serpent is afraid of a rope." Most logical 
writers hawever have confined the name of " reason- 
ing" to valid argument ; which cannot exist without a 
universal premiss, implied, if not expressed. For when- 
ever there are not two premises which, taken jointly, 
do imply, and virtually assert the conclusion — the al- 
leged premiss or premises being such that a person may 
without inconsistency believe them true and yet not 
believe the conclusion — then, we have what Logicians 
have been accustomed to call an apparent, but not real 
argument. 

Some however have denied that the conclusion is in- 
ferred from the universal premiss. But then, they ac- 
knowledge that the truth of that premiss is an indis- 
pensable condition of such inference : an admission 
which would satisfy most Logicians. For if any bo- 
tanical physiologist for instance, w^ere to deny that the 
branches of a tree derive nourishment from the roots, 
saying that the branches are nourished by the juices of 
the earth, but admitting that the roots are an indispen- 
sable condition, and that if they are destroyed, the 
branches will wither, this would not be reckoned as 
substantially any new doctrine. And so also if any 
one choose to maintain that the conclusion is drawn 
from the one premiss, by, or through, the other premiss, 



44 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [§ 5 

this would be accounted merely a needless and unim- 
portant innovation in phraseology. 

So also when inferences from Induction are spoken 
of as not being — or not necessarily bem<j — substantiallj 
Syllogistic, the learner might at first sight be startled 
and perplexed, till he found it at the same time admit 
ted that we have to decide, in each case of Induction 
the question, whether the instances adduced be " suffi 
cienf'to warrant the inference ; — whether it be " allow- 
able" to draw the conclusion. And the decision of this 
question in the affirmative — i. e. the decision that the 
procedure is not a mere random guess — is, if express- 
ed in words, the very premiss necessary to complete the 
Syllogism. (See B. iv. ch. i. § 1. 

So also it will be seen that the alleged entrapping 
character of a Syllogism, merely amounts to this ; that 
whoever perceives the validity of an argument, has no 
mode of escape from the " snare" (so called) except by 
the way he entered, viz. the premises. He has only 
the alternative of allowing, one of them to be false, or 
else, the conclusion to be true. And it is a matter of 
daily occurrence, that a man is undeceived as to some 
principle he had incautiously admitted, by perceiving 
what It would lead to. 

Complaints § 5. Complaints have also been made 
against Logic, that Logic leaves untouched the greatest 
difficulties, and those which are the sources of the chiel 
errors in reasoning ; viz. the ambiguity or indistinct- 
ness of Terms, and the doubts respecting the degrees ol 
evidence in various Propositions : an objection which 
is not to be removed by any such attempt as that oi 
Watts to lay down " rules for forming clear ideas," and, 
for " guiding the judgment ;" but by replying that no 
art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls 
within its province, and indeed more than can be taught 
by any conceivable art. Such a system ot universal 
knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning or 
meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity — cer- 



^ 5.] INTRODUCTION. 45 

tainty or uncertainty — of every proposition, thus supei 
ceding all other studies, it is most unphilosophical to 
expect, or even to imagine. And to find fault with Lo- 
gic for not performing this, is as if one should objec* 
to the science of Optics for not giving sight to the 
blind ; or as if (like the man of whom Warburton tells 
a story in his Div, Leg.) one should complain of a 
reading-glass for being of no service to a person who 
had never learned to read. 

In fact, tha difficulties and errors above alluded to 
are not in the process of Reasoning itself (which alone 
is the appiropriate province of Logic), but in the sub- 
ject-matter about which it is employed. This process 
will have been correctly conducted if it have conformed 
to the logical rules, which preclude the possibility of 
any error creeping in between the principles assumed, 
and the conclusions we deduce from them. But still 
that conclusion may be false, if the principles we start 
from are so ; and the known falsity of a conclusion will 
often serve (as has been above remarked) to correct a 
mistake made in the outset. In like manner, no arith- 
metical skill will secure a correct result to a calculation, 
unless the data are correct from which we calculate ; 
nor does any one on that account undervalue Arithme- 
tic ; and yet the objection against Logic rests on no bet- 
ter foundation. 

There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect be- 
tween the two sciences. All numbers (which are the 
subject of Arithmetic) must be numbers of some things^ 
whether coins, persons, measures, or any thing else ; but 
to introduce into the science any notice of the ^Amgs re- 
specting which calculations are made, would be evident- 
ly irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character ; 
we proceed therefore with arbitrary signs, representing 
numbers in the abstract. So also does Logic pronounce 
on the validity of a regularly- constructed argument, 
equally well, though arbitrary symbols may have been 
substituted for the Terms ; and, consequently, without 



46 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [^ o 

any regard to the things signified by those terms. And 
the possibility of doing this (though the employment of 
such arbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected to, 
even by writers who understood not only Arithmetic 
but Algebra) is a proof of the strictly scientific charac- 
ter of the system. But many professed logical writers, 
not attending to the circumstances which have been just 
mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on various 
branches of knowledge ; disquisitions which must evi- 
dently be as boundless as human knowledge itself, since 
there is no subject on which Reasoning is not employed, 
and to which, consequently. Logic may not be applied. 
The error lies in regarding every thing as the proper 
province of Logic to which it is applicable* 

Many however who do not fall altogether into that 
error, yet censure any logical treatise which, like the 
present, professes to be wholly conversant about Lan- 
guage ; and speak of the science as treating, properly, 
of the comparison of " abstract Ideas" of which. Lan- 
guage, they say, merely supplies the names. It may be 
sufficient at present to reply, that, supposing there re- 
ally exist in the mind — or in some minds — certain 
" abstract ideas," by means of which a train of reason- 
ing may he carried on independently of Common -terms 
{or Signs of any kind,] — for this is the real point at is- 
sue — and that a system of Logic may be devised, hav- 
ing reference to such reasoning — supposing this — 
still, as I profess not to know anything of these " ab- 
stract ideas," or of any " Universals" except Signs, or 
to be conscious of any such reasoning-process, I at least 
must confine myself to the attempt to teach the only 
Logic I do pretend to understand. Many, again, who 
speak slightingly of Logic altogether, on the ground of 
its being " conversant only about wor^s," entertain fun- 

* A similar error is complained o? by Aristotle, as having taken 
place with respect to Rhetoric ; of which, indeed, we find si)eci- 
mens in the arguments of several of the interlocutors in Cic. de 

Or a tore. 



X§ 5 INTRODUCTION. 47 

damentally the same views as the above ; that is, they 
take for granted that Reasoning may be carried on al- 
together independently of Language ; which they re- 
gard (as was above remarked) merely as a means oi 
communicating it to others. And a Science or Art 
which they suppose to be confined to this office, they 
accordingly rank very low. 

Such a view I beheve to be very prevalent. The 
majority of men would probably say, if asked, that the 
use of Language is peculiar to Man ; and that its office 
is to express to one another our thoughts and feelings. 
But neither of these is strictly true. Brutes do possess 
in some degree the power of being taught to understand 
what is said to them, and some of them even to utter 
sounds expressive of what is passing within them. But 
they all seem to be incapable of another, very important 
use of language, which does characterize Man ; viz., 
the employment of " Common- terms," (" general- 
terms") formed by Abstraction, as instruments of 
thought ; by which alone a train of Reasoning may be 
carried on. 

And accordingly, a Deaf -mute, before he has been 
taught a Language — either the Finger- language, or 
Reading — cannot carry on a train of Reasoning, any 
more than a Brute. He differs indeed from a Brute in 
possessing the mental capability of employing Lan- 
guage ; but he can no more make use of that capability, 
till he is in possession of some System of arbitrary gen- 
eral-signs, than a person born blind from Cataract can 
make use of his capacity of Seeing, till the Cataract is 
removed. 

Hence, it will be found by any one v/ho will ques- 
tion a Deaf-mute who has been taught Language after 
having grown up, that no such thing as a train of Rea- 
soning had ever passed through his mind before he was 
taught. 

If indeed we did reason by means of those " Abstract- 
ideas " which some persons talk of, and if the Lan- 



48 ELEMENTS OF- LOGIC. [^ 6. 

guage we use served merely to communicate with other 
men, then, a person would be able to reason, who had 
no knowledge of any arbitrary Signs. But there are 
no grounds for believing that this is possible ; nor con- 
sequently, that "Abstract-ideas" (in that sensp of the 
word) have any existence at all.* 

§ 6. From what has been said, it will be evident that 
there is hardly any subject to which it is so difficult to 
introduce the student in a clear and satisfactory manner, 
as the one we are now engaged in. In any other branch 
of knowledge, the reader, if he have any previous ac- 
quaintance with the subject, will usually be so far the 
better prepared for comprehending the exposition of the 
principles; or if he be entirely a stranger to it, will at 
least come to the study with a mind unbiassed, and free 
from prejudices and misconceptions: whereas, in the' 

* There have been some very interesting accounts published, by- 
travellers in America, and by persons residing there, of a girl nam- 
ed Laura Bridgeman, who has been, frOm birth, not only Deaf-and- 
Dumb, but also Blind. She has however been taught the finger- 
language, and even to read what is printed in raised characters, 
and also to write. 

The remarkable circumstance in reference to the present subject, 
is, that when she is alone, Yiqv fingers are generally observed to be 
moving, though the signs are so slight and imperfect that others 
cannot make out what she is thinking of. But if they inquire of 
her, she will tell them. 

It seems that, having once learnt the use of Signs, she finds the 
necessity of them as an Instrument of thought, when thinking of 
anything beyond mere individual objects of sense. 

And doubtless every one else does the same ; though in om»* case, 
no one can (as in the case of Laura Bridgeman) see the operation ; 
nor, in general, can it be heard ; though some few persons have a 
nabit of occasionally audibly talking to themselves ; or as it is call- 
ed, •' thinking aloud." But the Signs we commonly use in silent 
reflection are merely mental conceptions, usually, of uttered words : 
and these doubtless, are such as could be hardly at all understood 
oy another, even if uttered audibly. For we usually think in a 
Kind of short-hand, (if one may use the expression) like the notes 
one sometimes takes down on paper to help the memory, which con 
sist of a word or two — or even a letter — to suggest a whole sen- 
tence j so that such notes would be unintelligible to any one else. 

It has been observed also that this girl, when asleep, and doubt- 
less dreaming, has her fingers frequently in motion : being in fact 
talking in her sleep. See above, ^ 4. 



4 6. j INTRODUCTION. 49 

present case, it cannot but happen, that many who have 
given some attention to logical pursuits (or what are 
usually considered as such) will have rather been be- 
wildered by fundamentally erroneous views, than pre- 
pared, by the acquisition of just principles, for ulterior 
progress ; and that not a few who pretend not to any 
acquaintance whatever with the science, will yet have 
imbibed either such prejudices against it, or such false 
notions respecting its nature, as cannot but prove obsta- 
cles in their study of it. 

There is, however, a di/Sculty which Difficulty at 
exists more or less in all abstract pursuits ; tending ab- 
though It is perhaps more felt in this, and stract pursuits, 
oiten occasions it to be rejected by beginners as dry and 
tedious , viz. the difficulty of perceiving to what ulti- 
mate end — to what practical or interesting application 
— the abstract principles lead, which are hrst laid before 
the student ; so that he will often have to work his way 
patiently through the most laborious part of the system, 
before he can gain any clear idea of the drift and inten- 
tion of it. 

This complaint has often been made by chemical stu- 
dents ; who are wearied with descriptions of Oxygen, 
Hydrogen, and other invisible Elements, before they 
have any knowledge respecting such bodies as common- 
ly present themselves to the senses. And accordingly 
some teachers of chemistry obviate in a great degree 
this objection, by adopting the analytical Analytical 
instead of the synthetical mode of procedure and syntheti- 
when they are first introducing the subject ^^ ^°^® ^^^' 
to beginners ; i. e. instead of synthetically enumerating 
the elementarv substances — proceeding next to the 
simplest combinations of these — and concluding with 
those more complex substances which are of the most 
common occurrence, they begin hy analyzing these last, 
and resolving them step by step into their simple ele- 
ments ; thus at once presenting the subject in an inte- 
resting point 0'^ view, and clearly setting forth *he ob- 
5 



50 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book 1 

ject of it. The synthetical form of teaching is indeed 
sufficiently interesting to one who has made considera- 
ble progress in any study; and being more concise/re- 
gular, and systematic, is the form in which our know- 
ledge naturally arranges itself in the mind, and is re- 
tained by the memory : but the analytical is the more 
interesting, easy, and natural kind of introduction ; as 
being the form in which the first invention or discovery 
of any kind of system must originally have taken place. 
It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by giving a 
slight sketch, in this form, of the logical system, before 
we enter regularly upon the details of it. The reader 
will thus be presented with a kind of imaginary history 
of the course of inquiry by which that system may be 
conceived to have occurred to a philosophical mind. 



BOOK I. 

ANALl riCAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE. 

§ 1. In every instance in which we reason, in the 
strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of arguments, (I 
mean real, i. e. valid arguments) whether for the sake 
of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, 
or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever 
may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain pro- 
cess takes place in the mind which is one and the same 
in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted. 

Of course it cannot be supposed that every one is 
even conscious of this process in his own mind ; much 
less, is competent to explain the principles on which it 
proceeds. This indeed is, and cannot but be, the case 
with every other process respecting which any system 
has been formed ; the practice not only may exist inde- 



§ l.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 51 

pendently of the theory, but mvM have preceded the 
theory. There must have been Language before a sys- 
tem of Grammar could be devised ; and musical compo- 
sitions, previous to the Science of Music This, by 
the way, will serve to expose the futility of the popu- 
lar objection against Logic, that men may reason very 
well who know nothing of it. The parallel instances 
adduced, show that such an objection might be applied 
in many other cases, where its absurdity would be ob- 
vious ; and that there is no ground for deciding thence, 
either that the system has no tendency to ixTjprove prac- 
tice, or that even if it had not, it might not still be a 
dignified and interesting pursuit. 

One of the chief impediments to the at- Reasoning 
tainment of a just view of the nature and process similar 
object of Logic, is the not fully under- in all subjects 
standing or not sufficiently keeping in mind, the same- 
ness of the reasoning-process in all cases. If, as the 
ordinary mode of speaking would seem to indicate, 
Mathematical reasoning, and Theological, and Meta- 
physical, and Political, &c. were essentially different 
from each other, i. e. different kinds of reasoning, it 
would follow, that supposing there could be at all any 
such science as we have described Logic, there must be 
so many different species, or at least different branches, 
of Logic. And such is perhaps the most prevailing 
notion. Nor is this much to be wondered at : since it 
is evident to all, that some men converse and write, in 
an argumentative way, very justly on one subject, and 
very erroneously on another ; in which again others 
excel, who fail in the former. This error may be at 
once illustrated and removed, by considering the par- 
allel instance of Arithmetic ; in which every one is 
aware that the process of a calculation is not affected 
by the nature of the objects, whose numbers are before 
us : but that {e.g.) the multiplication of a number is 
the very same operation, whether it be a number of 
men, of miles, or of pounds ; though nevertheless per- 



52 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Booi I. 

sons may perhaps be found who are accurate in the re- 
sults of their calculations relative to natural -philosophy, 
and incorrect in those of political- economy, from their 
diiFerent degrees of skill in the subjects of these two 
sciences ; not surely because there are different arts of 
Arithmetic applicable to each of these respectively. 

Others again, who are aware that the simple system 
of Logic may be apphed to all subjects whatever, are 
yet disposed to view it as a peculiar method of reason- 
ing, and not, as it is, a method of unfolding and ana- 
lyzing our reasoning : whence many have been led {e. g. 
the author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk of 
comparing Syllogistic-reasoning with Moral-reasoning ; 
taking it for granted that it is possible to reason cor- 
rectly without reasoning logically; which is, in fact, as 
great a blunder as if any one were to mistake grammar 
for a peculiar language, and to suppose it possible to 
speak correctly without speaking grammatically. They 
have in short considered Logic as an art of reasoning , 
whereas (so far as it is an art) it is the art of reason- 
ing ; the logician's object being, not to lay down prin- 
ciples by which one may reason, but, by which all must 
reason, even though they are not distinctly aware of 
them : — to lay down rules, not which may be followed 
with advantage, but which cannot possibly be departed 
from in sound reasoning. These misapprehensions 
and objections being such as lie on the very threshold 
of the subject, it would have been hardly possible, 
without noticing them, to convey any just notion of 
the nature and design of the logical system. 

Origin of § 2. Supposing it then to have been per- 
Logic. ceived that the operation of Reasoning is 
in all cases the same, the analysis of that operation 
tould not fail to strike the mind as an interesting mat- 
ter of inquiry. And moreover, since (apparent) argu- 
ments which are unsound and inconclusive, are so of- 
ten employed, either from error or design ; and since 
even those who are not misled by these fallacies, are so 



§2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 53 

often at a loss to detect and expose them m a manner 
satisfactory to others, or even to themselves ; it could 
not but appear desirable to lay down some general 
rules of reasoning applicable to all cases ; by which a 
person might be enabled the more readily and clearly to 
state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his ob- 
jection to the arguments of an opponent ; instead of ar- 
guing at random, without any fixed and acknowledged 
principles to guide his procedure. Such rules would 
be analogous to those of Arithmetic, which obviate the 
tediousness and uncertainty of calculations in the head ; 
wherein, after much labour, different persons might ar- 
rive at different results, without any of them being able 
distinctly to point out the error of the rest. A system 
of such rules, it is obvious, must, instead of deserving 
to be called the '* art of wrangling," be more justly 
characterized as the " art of cutting short wrangling,*' 
hy bringing the parties to issue at once, if not to agree- 
ment ; and thus saving a waste of ingenuity. 

In pursuing the supposed investigation, Analysis of 
it will be found that every Conclusion is argument, 
deduced, in reality, from two other propositions ; (thence 
called Premises ;) for though one of these may be, and 
commonly is suppressed, it must nevertheless be under- 
stood as admitted; as may easily be made evident by 
supposing the denial of the suppressed premiss ; which 
will at once invalidate the argument ; e. g. if any one, 
from perceiving that " the world exhibits marks of de- 
sign," infers that " it must have had an intelligent au- 
thor," though he may not be aware in his own mind of the 
existence of any other premiss, he will readily under- 
stand, if it be denied that " whatever exhibits marks of 
design must have had an intelligent author," that the 
affirmative of that proposition is necessary to the validi- 
ty of the argument.* Or again, if any one on meeting 

* Some choose to call this proposition not ^.premiss but merely a 
eondtion. This however is, substantially, (as has been formerly 
remarked) just what Logicians mean. Whoever has any good 



64 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book 1 

with " an animal which has horns on the head" infers 
that "it is a ruminant," he will easily perceive, that 
this would he no argument to any one who should not 
De aware of the general fact that " all horned animals 
ruminate." 

.^ An argument thus stated regularly and 

y ogism. ^^ ^^ij length, is called a Syllogism ; which 

therefore is evidently not a peculiar hind of argument 

but only a peculiar /orm of expression, in which every 

argument may be stated.* 

When one of the premises is supp?-essed, (which for 
brevity's sake it usually is) the argument is called an 
Enthymeme. And it may be worth while to remark, 
that when the argument is in this state, the objections 
of an opponent are (or rather appear to be) of two kinds • 
VIZ. either objections to the assertion itself, or objec- 
tions to its force as an argument. E. G. In one of the 
above instances an atheist may be conceived either de- 
nyingt that the world does exhibit marks of design, or 
denyingj that it follows from thence that it had an in- 
ground for believing his inference to be a just one, must believe 
this condition to exist. 

* Some writers, and Locke among others, who profess to despise 
what they call *' syllogistic reasoning," distinctly admit— as Locke 
does e. g. in ch. xvii. that " all right reasoning may be reduced to the 
form of Syllogism ;" (which is admitting the utmost that I conceive 
any Logician maintains) only, there are, he says, other and better 
" ways of reasoning :" that is, as he proceeds to explain, people do 
not always, or usually, express their reasoning in a syllogistic form ; 
as if any one had ever doubted that ! Except indeed it be a writer 
in the Edinburgh Review, (in 1839) who in deprecating and derid 
ing all attempts to adduce evidences of the truth of Christianity , as 
useless, and even dangerous, for the mass of mankind, (a discovery, 
by the way, which its first promulgators were not enlightened 
enough to make) gives as a reason, that " the Gospel has been the 
stay of countless millions who never framed a syllogism." And 
very probable it is, that Nicodemus for instance, and those who de- 
puted him, when he said " we know that thou art a teacher sent 
from God ; for no man can do these miracles that thou doest ex- 
cept God be with him," though he spoke grammatically and reason- 
ed conclusively, may have never heard of syllogisms, or even of 
nouns and verbs, 

t As the ancient atheists did. 

I As the modern atheists do. 



^ 2.J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 55 

telligent author. Now it is important to keep in mind 
that the only difference in the two cases is, that in the 
one, the expressed premiss is denied, in the other the 
suppressed; for the /orce as an argument of either pre« 
miss depends on the other premiss : If both be admitted, 
the conclusion legitimately connected with them cannot 
be denied. 

Tt is evidently immaterial to the argu- 
ment whether the Conclusion be placed eason. 
first or last ; but it may be proper to remark, that a 
Premiss placed after its conclusion is called the Reason* 
oi it, and is introduced by one of those conjunctions 
which are called causal ; viz- *' since," " because," &c. 
which may indeed be employed to designate a Premiss, 
whether it came first or last. The illative conjunctions, 
" therefore," &c. designate the Conclusion. 

It is a circumstance which often occa- proof and 
sions error and perplexity, that both these cause, 
classes of conjunctions have also another signification, 
heing employed to denote, respectively. Cause and Ef- 
fect as well as Premiss and Conclusion : e. g. If I say 
" this ground is rich because the trees on it are flourish- 
ing," or "the trees are flourishing, and therefore the 
soil must be rich," I employ these conjunctions to de- 
note the connexion of Premiss and conclusion ; for it is 
plain that the luxuriance of the trees is not the cause 
of the soil's fertility, but only the cause of my knowing 
it. If again I say, "the trees flourish because the 
ground is rich," or " the ground is rich, and therefore 
the trees flourish," I am using the very same conjunc- 
tions to denote the connexion of cause and effect ; for in 
this case, the luxuriance of the trees, being evident to 
the eye, would hardly need to be proved, but might 
need to be accounted for. 

There are, however, many eases, in which the Cause 
ts employed to prove the existence of its Effect ; espe- 

* The Major-premiss is often called the Principle ; and the word 
Reason is then confined to the Minor. 



56 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I 

cially in arguments relating to future events ; as e. g 
when from favourable weather any one argues that the 
crops are likely to be abundant :* the cause and the 
reason, in that case, coincide. And this contributes to 
their being so often confounded together in other cases. 

§ 3. In an argument, such as the examples above 
given, it is, as has been said, impossible for any one, 
who admits both Premises, to avoid admitting the Con- 
clusion. 

A man may perhaps deny, or doubt, and require proof, 
that all animals that are horned do ruminate. Nay, it 
is conceivable that he may even not clearly understand 
what " ruminant " means ; but still it will be not the 
less clear to him, that, supposing these Premises grant- 
ed, the Conclusion must be admitted. 

And even if you suppose a case where one or both of 
the Premises shall b^^anifestly false and absurd^ this 
will not alter the conclusiveness oi the Reasoning j 
though the conclusion itself may perhaps be absurd al- 
so. For instance, " All the Ape- tribe are originally 
descended from Reptiles or Insects : Mankind are of 
the Ape-tribe; therefore Mankind are originally de- 
scended from Reptiles or Insects:" here, every onef 
would perceive the falsity of all three of these proposi- 
tions. But it is not the less true that the conclusion 
follows from those premises, and that z/ they were true, 
it would be true also. 

Apparent But there will be frequently an apparent 

arguments, connexion of Premises with a Conclusion 
which does not in reality follow from them, though to 
the inattentive or unskilful, the argument may appear 
to be valid. And there are many other cases in which 
a doubt may exist whether the argument be valid or not : 
i. e. whether it be possible or not to admit the Premises, 
and yet deny the Concmsion. It is of the highest im- 
poiiance, therefore, to lay down some regular form to 

*See Appendix^ No. I. art. Keasow. See &lso Rhetoric, Voirt I. 
ch. 2, § ii. 
t Except certain French Naturalists. 



§ 3.] ANALYTICAL OUTL^tl^E. 57 

which every valid argument may be reduced, and to 
devise a rule which shall show the validity of every ar- 
gument in that form, and consequently the unsoundness 
of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to 
it. j&. G. If such an argument as this be proposed, 
" every rational agent is accountable ; brutes are not 
rational agents ; therefore they are not accountable :" oi 
again, " all wise legislators suit their laws to the gen- 
ius of their nation ; Solon did this ; therefore he was a 
wise legislator :" there are some, perhaps, who would 
not perceive any fallacy in such arguments, especially 
if enveloped in a cloud of words ; and still more, when 
the conclusion is true, or (which comes to the same 
point) if they are disposed to believe it: and others 
might perceive indeed, but might be at a loss to explain, 
the fallacy. Now these [apparent] arguments exactly 
correspond, respectively, with the following, the absur- 
dity of the conclusions from which is manifest : " every 
horse is an animal ; sheep are not horses ; therefore they 
are not animals ;" and, " all vegetables grow ; an ani- 
mal grows ; therefore it is a vegetable." These last 
examples, I have said, correspond exactly (considered 
as arguments) with the former ; the question respecting 
the validity of an Argument, being, not whether the 
conclusion be true^ but whether it/o/Zoi^'s from the pre- 
mises adduced. 

This mode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward 
a similar one whose conclusion is obviously absurd, is 
often, and very advantageously, resorted to in address- 
ing those who are ignorant of Logical rules ;* but to 

* An exposure of some of Hume's fallacies in his ** Essay on 
Miracles;" and elsewhere, was attempted, on this plan, a few years 
ago, in a pamphlet (published anonymously, as the nature of the 
argument required, but which I see no reason against acknowledg- 
ing) entitled " Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte ;" 
in which it was shown that the existence of that extraordinary per- 
son could not, on Hume's principles, be received as a well authen- 
ticated fact ; since it rests on evidence less strong than that which 
supports the Scripture-histories. 

For a clear development of the mode in which this last evidence 
operates on most minds, see " Hinds on Inspiration.'' p. 30 — 46 



6S ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boos. 1 

lay down such rules, and employ them as a test, is eyi. 
dently a safer and more compendious, as well as a more 
philosophical mode of proceeding. To attain these, it 
would plainly he necessary to analyze some clear and 
valid arguments, and to observe in what their conclu- 
siveness consists. 

Analysis of Let US then examine and analyze such 
an argument, an example as one of those first given : 
for instance, " Every animal that has horns on the head 
is ruminant; the Elk has horns on the head; therefore 
the Elk is ruminant." It will easily be seen that the 
validity [or " conclusiveness;" or " soundness"] of the 
Argument does not at all depend on our conviction of 
the truth of either of the Premises ; or even on our un- 
derstanding the meaning of them. For if we substitute 
for one of the things we are speaking about, some un- 
meaning Symbol, (such as a letter of the alphabet) 
which may stand for anything that may be agreed on, 
the Reasoning remains the same. 

For instance, suppose we say, (instead of " animal 
that has horns on the head,") " Every X is ruminant; 
the Elk is X ; therefore the Elk is ruminant ;" the Ar- 
gument is equally valid. 

And again, instead of the word " ruminant," let us 
put the letter " Y :" then the argument " Every X is Y ; 
the Elk is X ; therefore the Elk is Y ;" would be a valid 
argument as before. 

And the same would be the case if you were to put 
«c 2" for " the Elk :" for the syllogism '' Every X is 
Y; Z is X; therefore Z is Y," is completely valid, 
whatever you suppose the Symbols X, Y, and Z to 
etand for. 

Any one may try the experiment, by substituting for 
X, Y, and Z, respectively, any word he pleases ; and 
ie will find that, if he does but preserve the same/o7*??i 
of expression, it will be impossible to admit the truth 
of the Premises, without admitting also the truth of the 
Conclusion. 



§3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 59 

And it is worth observing here, that . 
nothing is so Ukely to lead to that — very may be^under- 
common, though seemingly strange— error, stood though 
of supposing ourselves to understand dis- not.^^^"^^ ^^^ 
tinctly what in reality we understand but 
very imperfectly, or not at all, as the want of attention 
to what has been just explained. 

A man reads — or even writes — many pages perhaps, 
of an argumentative work, in which one or more of the 
terms employed convey nothing distinct to his mind : 
and yet he is liable to overlook this circumstance, from 
finding that he clearly understands the Arguments. He 
may be said, in one sense, to understand what he is 
reading ; because he can perfectly follow the train of 
Reasoning, itself. But this, perhaps, he might equally 
well do, if he were to substitute for one of the words 
employed, X, or Z, or any other such unknown Sym- 
bol ; as in the examples above. But a man will often 
confound together, the understanding of the Arguments, 
in themselves, and the understanding of the words em- 
ployed, and of the nature of the things those words 
denote. 

It appears then, that valid Reasoning, when regularly 
expressed, has its validity [or conclusiveness] made 
evident from the mere form of the expression itself, 
independently of any regard to the sense of the words. 

In examining this form, in such an example as that 
just given, you will observe that in the first Premise 
(" X is Y,*') it is assumed universally of the Class of 
things (whatever it may be) which "X" denotes, that 
** Y " may be affirmed of them : and in the other Premise, 
(" Z is X") that " Z " (whatever it may stand for) is 
referred to that Class, as comprehended in it. Now it 
is evident that whatever is said of the whole of a Class, 
may be said of anything that is comprehended [or " in- 
cluded," or " contained,"] in that Class: so that we are 
thus authorized to say (in the conclusion) that " Z '* 
is " Y." 



60 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. i^ook i 

Thus also, in the example first given, having assumed 
universally, of the Class of " Things which exhibit 
marks of design," that they " had an intelligent maker," 
and then, in the other Premiss, having referred " The 
world " to that Class, we conclude that it may be as- 
serted of ** The world " that " it had an intelligent 
makfcf." 

And the process is the same w^hen anything is denied 
of a whole Class. We are equally authorized to deny 
the same, of whatever is comprehended under that Class. 
For instance, if I say, " No liar is deserving of trust ; 
this man is a liar ; therefore he is not deserving of trust ;" 
I here deny " deserving of trust," of the whole Class 
denoted by the word " liar ;" and then 1 refer " this 
man " to that Class ; whence it follows that " deserv- 
ing of trust" may be denied of him. 

This argument also will be as manifestly valid, if (as 
in the former case) you substitute for the words which 
have a known meaning, any undetermined Symbols, 
such as letters of the alphabet. " No X is Y ; Z is X ; 
therefore Z is not Y," is as perfect a syllogism as the 
other with the affirmative conclusion. 

. And here it is to be observed, that by 

wo?d'cia°s*^^ " Class'' is meant throughout this treatise, 
not merely a " Head " or " general-descrip- 
tion" to which several things are actually referred, 
but one to which an indefinite number of things might 
conceivably h^ referred; viz., as many as (in the collo- 
quial plirase) may " answer to the descripti(fn." E.G. 
One may conceive that when the first- created man ex- 
isted alone, some superhuman Beings may have contem- 
plated him not merely as an individual bearing the pro- 
per-name of Adam, but also, by Abstraction, simply, as 
possessing those attributes which we call collectively 
" humanity," [" human-nature ;'"] and may have ap- 
plied to him a name—such as " Man " — implying those 
attributes, [that description] and which would conse- 
quently suit equally w^ell any of his descendants. 



§ 3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 6i 

When then anything is said to be " referred to such 
and such a Class" this is to be understood either of an 
actual, or what may be called 3, potential Class: i. e. 
the word Class is used whether there actually exist, or 
not, several things to which the description will apply. 
For it is evident, that, in any case, we refer something 
to a certain Class in consequence of that thing's possess- 
ing certain attributes, and not, vice versa. And this 
being kept in mind, there is a convenience in employ- 
ing the word "Class" instead of introducing circum- 
locution by always speaking of " description." 
' It will be found, then, on examination, that all vahd 
arguments whatever may be easily reduced to such a 
form as that of the foregoing syllogisms; and that 
consequently the principle on which they are con- 
structed is the UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning. So 
elhptical, indeed, is the ordinary mode of expression, 
even of those who are considered as prolix writers— z. e. 
60 much is implied and left to be understood in the 
course of argument, in comparison of what is actually 
stated, (most men being impatient, even to excess, of 
any appearance of unnecessary and tedious formality of 
statement,) that a single sentence will often be found, 
though perhaps considered as a single argument, to con- 
tain, compressed into a short compass, a chain of sever- 
al distinct arguments. But if each of these be fully 
developed, and the whole of what the author intended 
to imply be stated expressly, it will be found that all 
the steps even of the longest and most complex train of 
reasoning, may be reduced into the above form.* 

It is a mistake (which might appear Meaning of 
scarcely worthy of notice, had not so many, " logical rea- 
even esteemed writers, fallen into it) to ^°"^°^'" 
imagine that Aristotle and other logicians meant to pro- 
pose that this prolix form of unfolding arguments should 

* One of the ancients is reported to have compared Logic to the 
closed fist, and Rhetoric to the open hand, 'f^^ me it appears that 
the reverse of this comparison would t e r: ect. 



62 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Boor. 1 

universally supersede, in argumentative discourses, the 
common forms of expression; and that, *'to reason 
logically," means, to state all arguments at full length 
in th^ syllogistic form ; and Aristotle has even been 
charged with inconsistency for not doing so. It has 
been said that " in his Treatises of Ethics, Politics, ^c, 
he argues like a rational creature, and never attempts 
to bring his own system into practice."* As well might 
a chemist be charged with inconsistency for making use 
of any of the compound substances that are commonly 
employed, without previously analyzing and resolving 
them into their simple elements ; as well might it be 
imagined that, "to speak grammatically," means to 
parse every sentence we utter. The chemist (to pursue 
the illustration) keeps by him his tests and his method 
of analysis, to be employed when any substance is of- 
fered to his notice, the composition of which has not 
been ascertained, or in which adulteration is suspected. 
Now a fallacy may aptly be compared to some adulter- 
ated compound ; " it consists of an ingenious mixture 
of truth and falsehood, so entangled — so intimately 
blended— that the falsehood is (in the chemical phrase) 
held in solution : one drop of sound logic is that 
test which immediately disunites them, makes the 
Foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the 
bottom."! 
Aristotle's § 4. But to resume the investigation of 
dictum, the principles of Reasoning : the Maxim 
resulting from the examination of a syllogism in the fore- 
going form, and of the application of which, every va- 
lid argument is in reality an instance, is, " that what- 
ever is predicated (z.e. affirmed or denied) universally, of 
any Class of things, may be predicated, in like manner, 
(^viz. affirmed or denied) of any thing comprehended in 

* Lord Karnes. 

f This excellent illustration is cited from a passage in an anony- 
mous pamphlet, " An Examination of Rett's Logic." The author 
displays, though in a hasty production, great reach of thought, as 
well as knowledge of his subject. 



§ 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLWE 63 

that Class." This is the principle, commonly, called 
the dictum de omniet nullo, for the indication of which 
we are indehted to Aristotle, and which is the keystone 
of his whole logical system. 

It is remarkable that some, otherwise judicious wri- 
ters, should have been so carried away by their zeal 
against that philosopher, as to speak with scorn and ri^ 
dicule of this principle, on account of its obviousness 
and simplicity ; though they would probably perceive 
at once, in any other celsc, that it is the greatest triumph 
of philosophy to refer many, and seemingly very vari- 
ous, phenomena to one, or a very few, simple principles ; 
and that the more simple and evident such a principle 
is, provided it be truly applicable to all the cases in 
question, the greater is its value and scientific beauty. 
If, indeed, any principle be regarded as not thus appli- 
cable, that is an objection to it of a different kind. Such 
an objection against Aristotle's Dictum, no one has ever 
attempted to establisk by any kind of proof ; but it has 
often been taken for granted ; it being (as has been 
stated) very commonly supposed, without examination, 
that the syllogism is a distinct kind of argument, and 
that the rules of it accordingly do not apply, nor were 
intended to apply, to all reasoning whatever. Dr. Camp- 
bell* endeavours, imder this misapprehension, with 
some ingenuity, and not without an air of plausibility, 
to show that every syllogism must be futile and worth- 
less, because the premises virtually assert the Conclu- 
sion little dreaming, of course, that his objections, how- 
ever specious, lie digdJasXihe process of reasoning itself , 
universally; and will, therefore, of course apply to those 
very arguments which he is himself adducing. He 
should have been reminded of the story of the woodman, 
who had mounted a tree, and was so earnestly em- 
ployed in loppmg the boughs, that he unconsciously cut 
off the bough on which he was standing. 

It is still more extraordinary to find other eminei^^ 
^ '* Philosophy of Rhetoric." 



t4 Ey;.EMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I 

authors* adopting, expressly, the very same objections 
and yet distinctly admitting the possibility of reducing 
every course of argument t<) a series of syllogisms. 

Mistake re- ^^® °^ ^^^^^ writers brings an objection 
specting the against the Dictum of Aristotle, which it , 
meaning of jy^^y be worth while to notice briefly, foi 
ic urn. ^^^ ^^-^^ ^1 setting in a clearer light the 
real character and object of that Principle. Its appli- 
cation being, as has been seen, to a regular and con- 
clusive Syllogism, he supposes it intended to prove and 
make evident the conclusiveness of such a syllogism ; 
and remarks how unphilosophical it is to attempt giv- 
ing a demonstration of a demonstration. And certainly 
the charge would be just, if we could imagine the lo- 
gician's object to be, to increase the certainty of a con- 
clusion which we are supposed to have ah*eady arrived 
at by the clearest possible mode of proof. But it is 
very strange that such an idea should ever have occur- 
red to one who had even the slightest tincture of Natu- 
ral-philosophy : for it might as well be imagined that a 
natural philosopher's or a chemist's design is to strength- 
en the testimony of our senses by a priori reasoning, 
and to convince us that astone when thrown will fall to 
the ground, and that gunpowder will explode when fired, 
because they show that according to their principles 
those phenomena must take place as they do. But it 
would be reckoned a mark of the grossest ignorance 
and stupidity not to be aware that their object is not to 
prove the existence of an individual phenomenon, which 
our eyes have witnessed, but (as the phrase is) to ac- 
count for it : i. e. to show according to what principle 
it takes place ; — to refer, in short, the individual case 
to a general law of nature. The object of Aristotle's 
Dictum is precisely analogous ; he had, doubtless, no 
thought of adding to the force of any individual syllo- 
gism ; his design was to point out the general principle 

* As Dngald Stewart : Philosophy, vol. ii. : and Locke, vol. ii 

ch. r:. § 4. 



^4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 65 

on which that process is conducted which takes place 
in each syllogism. And as the Laws* of nature (as 
they are called) are in xeaHty meielj generalized facts , 
of which all the phenomena coming under them are 
particular instances ; so, the proof drawn from Aris- 
totle's Dictum is not a distinct demonstration brought 
to confirm another demonstration, but is merely a gen- 
eralized and abstract statement of all demonstration 
whatever ; and is, therefore, in fact, tke very demon- 
stration which {mutatis mutandis) accommodated to the 
various subject-matters, is actually employed in each 
particular case. 

In order to trace more distinctly the dif- rpj^^ Dictum 
ferent steps of the abstracting process, by a statement of 
which any particular argument may be f^^^^^f^ /^ 
brought into the most general form, we 
may first take a syllogism {i. e. an argument stated ac- 
curately and at full length,) such as the example for- 
merly given, '* whatever exhibits marks of design, &c.," 
and then somewhat generalize the expression, by sub- 
stituting (as in algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols 
for the significant terms that were originally used ; the 
syllogism will then stand thus: '• every B is A; C is 
B ; therefore C is A." The reasoning, when thus stat- 
ed, is no less evidently valid, whatever terms, A. B, 
and C, respectively, may be supposed to stand for. 
Such terms may indeed be inserted as to make all or 
some of the assertions false ; but it will still be no less im- 
possible for any one who admits the truth of the jyre- 
mises, in an argument thus constructed, to deny the 
conclusion ; and this it is that constitutes the conclu- 
siveness of an argument. 

Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed, it ap- 
pears clearly, that "A stands for any thing whatever 
that is afSrmed of a certain entire class," {viz. of every 
B> " which class comprehends or contains, in it some- 
thinp- else,^' viz. C. (of which B is, in the second pre* 

* Appendix, No. I. art. Laiv. 
6 



66 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book I 

miss, affirmed) ; and that, consequently, the first term 
(A) is, in the conclusion, predicated of the third C. 

Now to assert the validity of this process, now before 
us, is to state the V3ry Dictum we are treating of, with 
hardly even a verbal alteration : viz. : 

1 . Any thing whatever, predicated of a whole class, 

2. Under which class something else is contained, 

3. May be predicated of that which is so contained. 
The three members into which the Maxim is here 

distributed, correspond to the three propositions of the 
syllogism to which they are intended respectively to 
apply.* 

utility of The advantage of substituting for the 
non-signifi- terms, in a regular syllogism, arbitrary 
cant symbols, unmeaning symbols, such as letters of the 
alphabet, is much the .same as in Geometry : the Rea- 
soning itself is then considered, by itself, clearly, and 
without any risk of our being misled by the truth or 
falsity of the conclusion; which is, in fact, accidental 
and variable ; the essential point being:, as far as the 
argument is concerned, the connexion between the 
premises and the conclusion. We are thus enabled to 
embrace the general principle of all reasoning, and to 
perceive its applicability to an indefinite number of in- 
dividual cases. That Aristotle, therefore, should have 
been accused of making use of these symbols for the 
purpose of darkening his demonstrations, and that too 
by persons not unacquainted with Geometry and Alge- 
bra, is truly astonishing. If a geometer, instead of de 
signating the four angles of a square by four letters, 
were to call them north, south, east, and west, he would 
not render the demonstration of a theorem the easier; 
and the learner would be much more likely to be per- 
plexed in the application of it. 

It belongs then exclusively to a Syllogism, properly 
so called {i. e. a valid argument, so stated that its con- 
tiusiveness is evident from the mere form of the ex-* 

* See Book iv. cli. iii. ^ 1 



^ 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 67 

pressioii,) that if letters, or any other unmeaning sym- 
bols, be substituted for the several terms, the validity 
of the argument shall still be evident. Whenever this 
is not the case, the supposed argument is either unsound 
and sophistical, or el^e may be reduced (without any 
alteration of its meaning) into the syllogistic form; 
in vrhich form, the test just mentioned may be applied 
to it. 

Some persons have remarked of the Truecharac 
"Dictum" (meaning it as a disparagement) ter of the die- 
that it is merely a somewhat circuitous *^^""- 
explanation of what is meant by a Class. It is, in truth, 
just such an explanation of this as is needful to the 
student, and which must be kept before his mind in 
reasoning. For we should recollect that not only every 
Class [the Sign of which is, a *' Common-term"] com- 
prehends under it an indefinite number of individuals — 
and often of other Classes — differing in many respects 
from each other, but also most of those individuals and 
classes may be referred, each, to an indefinite number 
of classes according as we choose to abstract this point 
or that, from each. 

Now to remind one, on each occasion, that so and so 
is referable to such and such a Class, and that the class 
which happens to be before us comprehends such and 
such things — this is precisely all that is ever accomplish- 
ed by Reasoning. 

For one may plainly perceive, on looking at any of 
the examples above, that w^ien we assert both the 
Premises taken in conjunction, we have, virtually, 
implied the Conclusion. Else, indeed, it would 7iot be 
impossible (as it is) for any one to deny the Conclusion, 
vvho admits both Premises.* 

^ Hence, some have considered it as a disparagement to a Syllo- 
gism (which they imagine to be one kind of Argument) that ^ou 
can gain no new truth from it ; the Conclusions it establishes being 
in fact known already, by every one who has admitted the 
Premises. 

Sijicc, however, a Syllogism is not a certain distinct kind of ar- 



eS ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book L 

Detection of What is Called an unsound or fallacious 
unsound argu- argument (z. e. an apparent argument, 
ments. which is, in reality, none) cannat, of 

course be reduced into this form ; but when stated in 
the form most nearly approaching to this that is possi- 
ble, its fallaciousness becomes more evident, from its 
nonconformity to the foregoing rule : ^. g. "whoever 
is capable of deliberate crime is responsible ; an infant 
is not capable of deliberate crime ; therefore, an infant 
is not responsible," (see § 3) ; here the term " responsi- 
ble" is affirmed universally of " those capable of delib- 
erate crime ;" it might, therefore, according to Aristo- 
tle's Dictum, have been affirmed of anything contained 
under that class ; but, in the instance before us, nothing 
is mentioned as contained under that class ; only, the 
term *' infant" is excluded from that class ; and though 
what is affirmed of a whole class may be affirmed of 
any thing that is contained under it, there is lib ground 
for supposing that it may be denied of whatever is not 
so contained ; for it is evidently possible that it may be 
applicable to a whole class and to something else be- 
sides. To say e. g. that all trees are vegetables, 
does not imply that nothing else is a vegetable ; nor, 
when it is said, that " all who are capable of deliberate 
crime are responsible," does this imply, that " no others 
are responsible," for though this may be very true, 
it has not been asserted in the premiss before us ; and 
in the analysis of an argument, we are to discai-d all 
consideration of what might be asserted ; contemplating 
only what actually is laid down in the premises. It is 
evident therefore, that such an apparent argument as 
the above does not comply v/ith the rule laid down, 
nor can be so stated as to comply with it ; and is con- 
sequently invalid. 

Again, in this instance, " food is necessary to life j 

gument, but any argument whatever, stated in a regular form, the, 
complaint, such as it is, lies against Reasoning altogether. In B 
v.ch. 2, this point is more fully explained. 



^ 5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE 69 

corn is food ; therefore, corn is necessary to life :" the term 
" necessary to life" is affirmed of food, but not univer- 
sally; for it is not said of every kind of Jbod: the 
meaning of the assertion being manifestly that " some 
food is necessaiy to life ;" so that, expressed in sym- 
bols, the apparent argument might stand thus ; " Some 
X is Y ; Z is X ; therefore Z is Y." - Here again, there- 
fore, the rule has not been complied with, since that 
which has been predicated, [affirmed or denied] not of 
the ivhole, but of a part only of a certain class, cannot 
be, on that ground, predicated of whatever is contain- 
ed under that class. 

There is an argument against miracles by the well- 
known Mr. Hume, which has perplexed many persons, 
and which exactly corresponds to the above. It may 
be stated thus : " Testimony is a kind of evidence more 
likely to be false, than a miracle to be true ;" (or, as it 
may be expressed in other words, we have more rea- 
son to expect that a witness should lie, than that a mir- 
acle should occur) " the evidence on which the Chris- 
tian miracles are believed, is testimony ; therefore the 
evidence on which the Christian miracles are believed 
is more likely to be false than a miracle to be true." 

Here it is evident that what is spoken of in the first 
of these Premises, is, '^ some testimony ;"not" all testi- 
mony," [or any whatever i\ and by " a witness" we un- 
derstand, " some v/itness," not, every witness : so that 
this apparent argument has exactly the same fault as 
the one above.* 

§ 5. The fallacy in these last cases is, what is usu 
ally described in logical language as consisting in the 
•' nondistribution of the middle term 5" i. e. its not being 
employed to denote all the objects to which it is appli- 
cable. In order to understand this phrase, it is neces- 
sary to observe, that a Proposition being an expression 
m which one thing is said, i. e. affirmed or denied of 
another, {e. g. " A is B,") botJi that of which some 

* See Appendix ii. Flxample No.26 



10 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

tiling is said, and that which is said of it {t. e. both A 
and B,) are called " terms ; from their being (in their na- 
ture) the extremes or boundaries of the Proposition : 
and there are, of course, two, and but two, terms in a 
proposition (though it may so happen that either ol 
them may consist either of one word, or of several ;) 
Distribution and a term is said to be " distributed," 
of terms. when it is taken universally, so as to 
stand for everything it is capable of being applied to; 
and consequently " undistributed," when it stands for a 
portion only of the things signified by it: thus ^^ all 
food," or every kind of food, are expressions which im- 
ply the distribution of the term " food ;" " some food" 
would imply its non-distribution. And it is also to be 
observed that the term of which, in one premiss, some- 
thing is affirmed or denied, and to which, in the other 
premiss, something else is referred as contained in it, 
is called the " middle" term in the syllogism, as stand- 
ing between the other two {viz. the two terms of the 
conclusion,) and being the medium of proof. Now it 
is plain, that if in each premiss a j^arf only of this mid- 
dle-term is employed, i. e. if it be not at all distributed, no 
conclusion can be drawn. Hence, if, in the example for- 
merly adduced, it had been merely stated that " some- , 
thing" (not " whatever" or" everything") " which ex- 
hibits marks of design, is the work of an intelligent au- 
thor," it would not have followed, from the world's ex- 
hibiting marks of design, that that is the work of an in- 
telligent author. 

It is to be observed, also, that the words " all" and 
" every," which mark the distribution of a term, and 
" some," which marks its non-distribution, are not al- 
ways expressed : they are frequently understood, and left 
to be supplied by the context ; e. g. " food is necessary ;" 

viz. " some food :" " man is mortal ;" viz. " every m^n" 
Indefinite Propositions thus expressed are called 

Propositions, ^j logicians " indefinite" because it is left 
undetermined by the form of the expression whether 



I 5. ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 71 

the " subject" (the term of which something is affirmed 
or denied being called the " subject" of the proposition, 
and that which is said of it, the *' predicate")be dis- 
tributed or not. Nevertheless it is plain that in every 
proposition the Subject either is, or is not, meant to be 
distributed ; though it be not declared whether it is or 
net. Consequently, every proposition, whether ex- 
pressed indefinitely or not, must be understood as either 
" universal" or " particular :" those being called Uni- 
versal in which the predicate is said of the whole of the 
subject (or, in other words, where the subject is distri- 
buted); and those Particular, in which it is said only 
of a part of the subject; e. g. " All men are sinful," 
is universal ; " some men are sinful," particular. And 
this division of propositions is, in logical language, said 
to be according to their " quantity.'' 

But the distribution or non- distribution Quantity and 
of the predicate is entirely independent of quality of pro 
the quantity of the proposition ; nor are Positions- 
the signs " all" and " some" ever affixed to the predi- 
cate ; because its distribution depends upon, and is in- 
dicated by, the " quality'' of the proposition ; ?". e. its 
being affirmitave or negative ; it being a universal rule, 
that the predicate of a negative proposition is distribu- 
ted, and of an affirmative, undistributed. The reason 
of this may easily be understood, by considering that a 
term which stands for a whole Class may be applied to 
{i. e. affirmed of) any thing that is comprehended under 
that class, though the term of which it is thus affirmed 
may be of much narrower extent than that other, and 
may, therefore, be far from coinciding with the whole 
of it. Thus it may be said with truth, that " the Ne- 
groes are uncivilized," though the term uncivilized be 
of much wider extent than " Negroes," comprehending, 
besides them, Hottientots, &c. ; so that it would not be 
allowable to assert, that ''all who are uncivilized are 
Negroes;" it is evident, therefore, that it is a part only 
of the term " uncivilized" that has been affirmed of 



72 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book 1 

" Negroes :*' and the same reasoning applies to every 
affirmative proposition ; for though it may so happen 
that he subject and predicate coincide ; i. e. or of equal 
extent, as, e .g. "all men are rational animals;" "all 
equilateral triangles are equiangular ;" (it being equally 
true, that " all rational animals are men," and that" all 
equiangular triangles are equilateral ;)yet this is not 
implied by the form of the expression ; smce it would 
be no less true, that " all men are rational animals," 
even if there were other rational animals besides 
Man. 

It is plain, therefore, that if any part of the predicate 
is applicable to the subject, it may be affirmed, and, of 
course, cannot be denied, of that subject ; and conse- 
quently, w^hen the predicate is denied, of the subject, 
this implies that no part of that predicate is applicable 
to that subject ; i. e. that the whole of the predicate is 
denied of the subject; for to say e. g. that " no beasts 
of prey ruminate," implies that beasts of prey are ex- 
cluded from the whole class of ruminant animals, and 
consequently that " no ruminant ani ma] s are beasts of 
prey." And hence results the above-mentioned rule, 
that the distribution of the predicate is implied in ne- 
gative propositions, and its non-distribution, in af- 
firmatives. 

Non-distri- '^^^ learner may perhaps be startled at 
bution of the being told that the predicate of an affirma- 
affirmar^ s^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^ei^^r distributed ; especially as Al- 
drich has admitted that accidentally this 
may take place ; as in such a proposition as " all equi- 
lateral triangles are equiangular ;" but this is not accu- 
rate : he might have said that in -such a proposition as 
the above, the predicate is distributable, but not that 
it is actually distributed: i. e. it so happens that "all 
equiangular triangles are equilateral ;" but this is not 
implied in the previous assertion ; and the point to be 
considered is, not what might be said with truth, but 
what actually has been said. And accordingly mathc- 



§ 5.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 73 

maticians give distinct demonstrations of the above two 
propositions. 

li it happen to be my object to assert that the Predi- 
cate as well as the Subject of a certain affirmative pro- 
position is to be understood as distributed — and if I say, 
for instance, " all equilateral triangles, and no others, 
are equiangular,"— I am asserting, in reality, not one pro- 
position, merely, but two. And this is the case when- 
ever the proposition I state is understood (whether from 
the meaning of the words employed, or from the gen- 
eral drift of the discourse) to imply that the whole of 
the Predicate is meant to be affirmed of the Subject. 

Thus, if I say of one number — suppose 100 — that it 
is the square of another, as 10, then, this is understood 
by every one, from his knowledge of the nature of 
numbers f to imply, w^hat are, in reality, the two pro- 
positions, that 100 is " the square of 10," and also that 
"the square of 10 is 100." So also, if I say that 
** Romulus w^as the first king of Rome," this impHes, 
from the peculiar signification of the words, that " the 
first king of Rome w^as Romulus." 

Terms thus related to each other are called in tech- 
nical language, " convertible'' [or " equivalent"] terms 
But then, you are to observe that when you not only 
affirm one term of another, but also affirm (or imply) 
that these are " convertible'' terms, you are making not 
merely one assertion, but tzvo- 

It is to be remembered, then, that it is Distribution 
not sufficient for the middle term to occur of middle 
in a universal proposition; since if that terms, 
proposition be an affirmative, and the middle term be 
the predicate of it, it will not be distributed : e. g. if in 
the example formerly given, it had been merely assert- 
ed, that " all the works of an intelligent author show 
marks of design," and that " the universe shows marks 
of design," nothing could have been proved ; since, 
thcugh both these propositions are universal, the mid- 
dle-term is made the predicate in each, and both aie 



74 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I. 

affirmative ; and accordingly, the rule of Aristotle is not 
here complied with, since the term " work of an intel- 
ligent author," which is to be proved applicable to " the 
universe," would not have been affirmed of the middle- 
term ("what shows marks of design") under which 
" universe" is contained ; but the middle- term on the 
contrary, would have been affirmed of it. 

If, however, one of the premises be negative, the 
middle-term may then be made the predicate of that, and 
will thus, according to the above remark, be distributed ; 
e. g. «« no ruminant animals are predacious; the lion is 
predacious ; therefore the lion is not ruminant :" this is 
a valid syllogism ; and the middle term (predacious) is 
distributed by being made the predicate of a negative 
proposition.^ The form, indeed, of the syllogism is not 
that prescribed by the Dictum, but it may easily be re- 
duced to that form, by stating the first proposition thus : 
" no predacious animals are ruminant ;" which is mani- 
festly implied (as was above remarked) in the assertion 
that '^ no ruminant animals are predacious ;" The syl- 
logism will thus appear in the form to which the dictum 
applies. 
The dictum It is not every argument, indeed, that can 
universally I^q reduced to this form by so short and sim- 
app ica e. ^^q an alteration as in the case before us : a 
longer and more complex process will often be required ; 
and rules will hereafter be laid down to facilitate this 
process in certain cases : but there is no sound argument 
but what can be reduced into this form, without at all 
departing from the real meaning and drift of it ; and the 
form will be found (though more prolix than is needed 
for ordinary use) the most perspicuous in which an ar- 
gument can be exhibited. 

All reasoning whatever, then, rests on the one sim- 
ple principle laid down by Aristotle, that "what is pre- 
dicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term 
distributed, may be predicated in like manner (z. e, af- 
firmatively or negatively) oi anything contained under 



§ G.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 76 

that term.'' So that when our object is to prove any 
proposition, i. e. to show that one term may rightly be 
affirmed or denied of another, the process which really 
takes place in our minds is, that we refer that term (of 
which the other is to be thus predicated) to some class* 
(i. e. middle- term) of which that other may be affirmed, 
or denied, as the case may be. 

Whatever the subject-matter of an argument may be, 
the reasoning itself, considered by itself, is in every case 
the same process ; and if the writers against Logic bad 
kept this in mind, they would have been cautious of 
expressing their contempt of what they call " syllogis- 
tic reasoning," which is in truth all reasoning; and 
instead of ridiculing Aristotle's principle for its obvious- 
ness and simplicity, would have perceived that these are, 
in fact, its highest praise : the easiest, shortest, and 
most evident theory, provided it answer the purpose of 
explanation, being ever the best. 

§ 6. If we conceive an inquirer to have reached, in 
his investigation of the theor)^ of reasoning, the point 
to which we have now arrived, a question which would 
be likely next to engage his attention, is that of Predi- 
cation; i. e. since in reasoning we are to find a middle- 
term which may be predicated affirmatively of the sub- 
ject in question, we are led to inquire what terms may 
be affirmed, and what denied, of what others. 

It is evident that a proper-name, or any common 
other term which denotes but a single indi- ^^^ singular 
vidual, as " Caesar," " the Thames," the ^^^ ' 
Conqueror of Pompey," " this river," (hence called in 
Logic a " Singular-term ") cannot be affirmed of any- 
thing besides that individual, and may therefore be de- 
nied of anything else ; we may say, " this river is the 
Thames," or " Caesar was the conqueror of Pompey;" 
but we cannot say of anything else that it is the 
Thames, &c. 

* That is, either an actual, or a potential class. See above, ^ 8. 



76 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. I 

On the other hand, those terms which are called 
" Common^' as denoting any one individual of awholq 
class, as " river," " conqueror," may of course be af- 
firmed of any, or all that belong to that class : [of any- 
thing answering to a certain description^ as, "the 
Thames is a river ;" " the Rhine and the Danube are 
rivers." 

Common-terms, therefore, are called " predicables" 
(viz. affirmatively -^le^dJicabl^i) from their capability of 
being affirmed of others : a singular term, on the con- 
trary, may be the subject of a proposition, but never 
the Predicate, unless it be of a negative proposition; 
(as e. g. the first-born of Isaac vv^as not Jacob ;) or, un- 
less the subject and Predicate be only two expressions 
for the same individual object ; as in some of the above 
instances. 

Abstraction The process by which the mind arrives 
and General!- at the notions expressed by these " com- 
zation. mon" (or in popular language, "general") 

terms, is properly called " generalization ;" though it is 
usually (and trulyj said to be the business of abstrac- 
tion; for generalization is one of the purposes to which 
abstraction is applied. When we di'aw off and contem- 
plate separately smj -part of an object presented to the 
mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract 
that part. Thus, a person might, when a rose was be- 
fore his eyes or mind, make the scent a distinct object 
of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, 
form, &c. ; and thus, even though it were the only' 
rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the 
faculty of abstraction ; but if in contemplating several 
objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, 
we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregard- 
ing the differences, and give to all and each of these 
objects a name applicable to them in respect of this 
agreement, i. e a common name as " rose,"— or again 
if Ave give a name to some attribute wherein they agree, 
y^s * fragrance" or " redness,"— we are then said tc 



§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 7? 

generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not necessa- 
rily imply generalization, though generalization implies 
abstraction. 

Much needless difficulty has been raised respecting 
the results of this process ; many having contended, 
and perhaps more having taken for granted, that there 
must be some really-existing thing,* corresponding to 
each of those " general" [or " common"] terms, and of 
which such term is the name, standing for and repre- 
senting it : e. g. that as there is a really existing being 
corresponding to the j^roper name, " JEtna," and sig- 
nified by it, so, the common term, "mountain," must 
also have some really existing thing corresponding to 
it ; and of course distinct from each individual moun- 
tain (since the term is not singular but common,) yet 
existing in each, since the term is applicable to each of 
them. " When many diiFerent men," it is said, " are 
at the same time thinking or speaking about a ' moun- 
tain,' i. e. not any particular one, but ' a mountain gen- 
erally.' their minds must be all employed on something ; 
which must also he one thing, and not several, and yet 
cannot b6 any one individual." And hence a vast train 
of mystical disquisitions about ideas, &c. has arisen, 
whicfi are at best nugatory, and tend to obscure our 
view of the process which actually takes place in the 
mind. 

The fact is, the notion expressed by a ^, ,. 

, . ^ ' 1 i. r ' Notions ex- 

common-term is merely an inadequate [m- pressed by 
complete] notion of an individual; and common 
from the very circumstance of its inadequa- *®™^- 
cy, it w^ill apply equally well to any one of an indefi- 
nite number of individuals of the same description ; — 
to any one, in short, possessing the attribute or attri- 
butes that have been abstracted, and which are desig- 
nated by that cornmon-term. E. G. If I omit the men- 
tion and the consideration of every circumstance which 

* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book ly. Chap. v. 



78 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1 

distinguishes iEtna from any other mountain, I thei 
form a notion (expressed by the common term " Moun 
tain") which inadequately designates iEtna {i e. 
"which does not imply any of its peculiarities, nor it^ 
numerical singleness,) and is equally applicable to any 
one of several other individuals. 

Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely exten- 
ded by a further abstraction applied to common-terms : 
e. g. as by abstraction from the term Socrates v^e obtain 
the common-term '' Philosopher;" so, from " philoso- 
pher," by a similar process, we arrive at the more 
general -term " man ;" from " man " we advance to 
"animal," &c. And so also, you may advance from 
any " ten " objects before you, (for instance, the 
fingers ; from which doubtless arose the custom of reck- 
oning by tens) to the general-term — the number " ten ;" 
and thence again, to the more general- term, " number ;" 
and ultimately to the term " quantity."* 

^.«. . V. We are thus enabled, not only to sepa- 
Different ab- , . . -, - -, -^ . c 

stractions from ^^-^e, and consider smgly one part oi an 

the same ob- object presented to the mind, but also to fix 
^^^^' arbitrarily upon whatever part we please, 

according as may suit the purpose we happen to have in 
view. E. G. any individual person to whom we may 
direct our attention, may be considered either in a politi- 
cal point of view, and accordingly referred to the class of 
merchant, farmer, lawyer, &c. as the case may be ; or 
physiologically, as negro, or white-man ; or theologi- 

* The employment of this faculty at pleasure has been regarded, 
and perhaps with good reason, as the characteristic distinction of 
the human mind from that of the brutes. Accordingrly, even the 
most intelligent brutes seem incapable of forming any distinct 
notion of number : to do which evidently depends on Abstraction. 
For in order to count any objects, you must withdraw your 
thouffhts from all differences hetween themj and regard them simply 
as units. And accordingly, the savage tribes (who are less removed 
than we are from the brutes) are remarked for a great deficiency 
in their notions of number. Few of them can count beyond ten, or 
twenty ; and some of the rudest savages have no words to express 
any numbers beyond five See Dr. Taylor's " i&atural-history ol 
society." 



§ 6. J ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 79 

cally, as Pagan, Mahometan, Christian, &c. ; or geo- 
graphically, as European, American, &c. And so, in 
respect of anything else that may be the subject of our 
reasoning: we arbitrarily fix upon and abstract that 
point which is essential to the purpose in hand ; so that 
the same object may be referred to various different 
classes, according to the occasion. Not, of course, that 
we are allowed to refer anything to a class to which it 
does not really belong ; which would be pretending to 
abstract from it something that was no part of it ; but 
that we arbitrarily fix on any part of it which we choose 
to -abstract from the rest. 

It is important to notice this, because men are often 
disposed to consider each object as really and properly 
belonging to some one class alone ;* from their having 
been accustomed, in the course of their own pursuits, 
to consider, in one point of view only, things which 
may with equal propriety be considered in other points 
of view also : i. e. referred to various classes, (oi 
predicates.) And this is that which chiefly constitutes 
what is called narrowness-of-mind. E. G. a mere 
botanist might be astonished at hearing Different 

such plants as clover and lucerne inclu- modes of clas- 
ded in the language of a farmer, under the si^^^-^io"- 
term " grasses," which he has been accustomed to limit 
to a tribe of plants widely different in all botanical char- 
acteristics ; and the mere farmer might be no less sur- 
prised to find the troublesome *' weed," (as he has been 
accustomed to call it,) known by the name of Couch- 
grass, and which he has been used to class with nettles 
and thistles, to which it has no botanical affinity, ranked 
by the botanist as a species of wheat, ( Triticum Repens.) 
And yet neither of these classifications is in itself 
erroneous or irrational ; though it would be absurd, in 
a botanical treatise, to class plants according to their 
agricultural use ; or, in an agricultural treatise, according 
to the structure of their flowers. So also, a diamond 
^ Sec the subjoined Dissertation; Book IV chap v. 



80 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. 1 

would be classed by a jeweller along with the ruby, 
emerald, &c., as a precious stone: while the chemist 
classes it, along with plumbago and coal, as one of the 
forms of carbon. 

The utility of these considerations, with a view to 
the present subject, will be readily estimated, by recur- 
ring to the account which has been already given of the 
process of reasoning; the analysis of which shows 
that it consists in referring the term we are speaking of 
to some class, viz. a middle term ; which term again is 
referred to, or excluded from (as the case mav be) another 
class, viz. the term which we wish to affirm or deny of 
the subject of the conclusion. So that the quality of 
our reasoning in any case must depend on our being 
able correctly, clearly, and promptly, to abstract from 
ihe subject in question that which may furnish a mid- 
dle-term suitable to the occasion. 

The imperfect and irregular sketch which has here 
utility of the ^^^^ attempted, of the logical system, may 

analytical suffice (even though some parts of it should 
form j^Q^ ^Q at once fully understood by those 
who are entirely strangers to the study) to point out the 
general drift and purpose of the science, and to render 
the details of it both more interesting and more intelli- 
gible. The Analytical form, which has here been 
adopted, is, generally speaking, better suited for intro- 
ducing any science in the plainest and most interesting 
form; though the Synthetical, which v/ilL henceforth 
be employed, is the more regular, and the more compen- 
dious form for storing it up in the memory. 

It is to be observed, however, that technical terms 
and rules w^ill be rather an incumbrance than a help, 
unless we take care not only to understand them tho- 
roughly, but also to learn them so perfectly that they 
may be as readily and as correctly employed as the 
names of the most familiar objects around us. 

But if any one will take the trouble to do this once for 
allf he will find that in the end, much trouble will hi^ve 



Chap. I. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. SI 

been saved. For, the explanations given of Fuch techni- 
cal terms and general rules, when thoroughly learnt, 
once, will save the necessity of going through nearly 
the same explanation, over and over again On each sepa- 
rate occasion. 

In short, the advantage of technical-terms is just like 
what w^e derive from the use of any other common- 
terms. When, for instance, we have once accurately 
learnt the definition of a " circle," or have had fully 
described to us what sort of creature an " elephant," is, 
to say " I drew a circle," or, "I saw an elephant," 
would be sufficiently intelligible, without any need of 
giving the description or definition at full length, ovf^i 
and over again, on every separate occasion. 



BOOK II. 



SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 

Ciup. I.^ — Of the Operations of the Mind and of 

Terms. 

§ 1. There are three operations [or 
/States] of the mind which are immediate- the^MinS^ ° 
ly concerned in argument ; which are call- 
ed by logical writers — 1st. Simple-apprehension; 2d 
Judgment ; 3d. Discourse or Reasoning.* 

♦ Logical writers have in general begun by laying down that 
there are, in all, three opexations of the mind : {in universum tres) 
an assertion by no means incontrovertible, and which, if admitted 
is nothing to the present purpose. Our business is with argumentO' 
Hon, expressed in words, and the operations of the mind implied in 
that; what others there may be, or whether any, are irrelevant 
questions. 

The opening of a treatise with a statement respecting the opera- 
tions of the mind universally, tends to foster the prevailing error 
7 



82 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book IL 

1 St. Simple-apprehension they define to 
hension^^^^^* ^^ ^^^^ ^-ct or condition of the mind in 

which it receiA'es a notion of any object ; 
and which is analogous to the perception of the senses. 
It is either incomplex or complex:! Incomplex-appre- 
hension is of one object, or of several without any re- 
lation being perceived between them, as of " a man," 
" a horse," ** cards :" complex, is of several with such 
a relation, as of "a man on horseback," "a pack of 
cards." "^ 

2d. Judgment is the comparing together 
u gmen . ^^ ^^ niind two of the notions [or ideas] 
which are the objects of Apprehension, whether com- 
plex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they agree or 
disagree -wi\h each other: [or that one of them belongs 
or does not belong to the other.] Judgment, therefore, 
is either affirmative or negative, 

3d. Reasoning [or "discourse"] is the 

act of proceeding from certain judgments 

to dinoWiQx founded upon them, [or the result of them.] 

§ 2. Lano-uao-e affords the sz>7? 5 by which 

these operations of the mind are not only 
expressed, and communicated to others, but even, for 
the most part, carried on by ourselves. The notion ob- 
tained in an act of apprehension, is called, when ex- 
pressed in language, a term ; an act oi judgment is ex^ 
pressed by a proposition ; an act of reasoning, by an 
argument ; (which, when regularly expressed, is a 
syllogism ;) as e. g. 

" Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial ; 
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence, 
Therefore they are beneficial:" 

is a syllogism ; the act of reasoning being indicated by 

(from which probably the minds of the writers were not exempt) of 
supposing that Logic professes to teach " the use of the mental fa- 
culties in general ;"-the " right use of reason," according to Watts, 
t With respect to the technical terms employed in this work, see 
the Preface 



CuAP. I. »5 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDrL^^'I. 83 

the word " therefore'' It consists of three propositions, 
each of which has (necessarily) two terms, as " bene- 
ficial," " dispensations of Providence," &c. 

In introducing the mention of language previonsly 
to the definition of Logic, I have departed from estab- 
lished practice, in order that it may be clearly under- 
stood, that Logic is entirely conversant about language. 
If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind, 
without any employment of language, orally or men- 
tally, (a metaphysical question whicn I shall not here 
discuss) such a process does not come within the pro- 
vince of the science here treated of.* This truth, most 
writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully aware 
of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care to 
impress on their readers. 

Language is employed for various pur- purposes for 
poses. It is the province of the historian, which Lan- 
for instance, to convey information by §,^^55 ^^ ^^' 
means of language, of the poet, to afford p°^^ * 
a certain kind of gratification — of the orator to per- 
suade, &c. &c. ; while it belongs to the argumentative 
writer or speaker, as such, to convince the understand- 
ing- And as grammar is conversant about language 
universally, for whatever purpose it is employed, so, it 
is only so far as it is employed for this last purpose, 
viz. that of reasoning, that it falls under the cogni- 
zance of Logic. 

And whereas, in reasoning, terms are lia- ^^^^^ 
ble to be indistinct, {i. c. without any clear 
determinate meaning,) propositions to be ^^opo^itions. 
false and arguments inconclusive. Logic un- Syllogisms, 
dertakes directly and completely to guard against this last 
defect, and incidentally, and in a certain degree, against 
the others, as far as can be done by the proper use of 
language. It is, therefore, (when regarded as an art) 
" the art of employing language properly for the pur- 
pose of reasoning; and of distinguishing what is pro- 

* See Introduction, ^5 



84 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

perly and truly an argument, from spurious imitations 
of it." The importance of such a study no one can right- 
ly estimate who has not long and attentively consid- 
ered how much our thoughts are influenced by expres- 
sions, and how much error, perplexity, and labour are 
occasioned by a faulty use of language ; and many who 
are not unaware oithat, have yet failed to observe that 
" signs'' (such as language supplies) are an indispensa- 
ble instrument of ail reasoning, strictly so called. 

Degree and ^^' reference however to the above men- 
manner in tioned defects, two important distinctions 
^^^^^^1 d*^^ ^^^ ^^ ^® observed. 1st. It is to be re- 
fects are to be membered that that which is really a term, 
guarded may be indistinctly apprehended by the 
agains . person employing it, or by his hearer ; and 

so also, a proposition which is false, is not the less a 
real proposition : but, on the other hand, any expression 
or statement which does not really ^ro-ye anything, is not 
really, an argument at all, though it may be brought 
forward and passed off as such. 

2dly, It is to be remembered that (as it is evident 
from has been formerly said) no rules can be devised 
that will equally guard against all three of th« above- 
mentioned defects. 

To arrive at a distinct apprehension of every thing 
that may be expressed by any term whatever, and 
again to ascertain the truth or falsity of every conceiv- 
able proposition, is manifestly beyond the reach of any 
system of rules. But on the other hand, it is possible 
to exhibit any pretended argument whatever in such a 
form as to be able to pronounce decisively on. its validi- 
ty or its fallaciousness. 

So that the last of the three defects alluded to (though 
not, the two former) may be directly and completely ob- 
viated by the application of suitable rules. But the 
other two defects can be guarded against (as will pres- 
ently be shown) only indirectly, and to a certain de- 
cree 



Chap. I. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 80 

In other words, rules may be framed that will ena- 
ble us to decide, what is ot is not, really a " term," — > 
really, a "proposition" — or really, an "argument:" 
and to do this, is to guard completely against the defect - 
of inconclusiveness ; since nothing that is inconclusive, 
is, really, an " argument ;" though that may be really 
a " term" of which you do not distinctly apprehend the 
meaning; and that which is really a ^' proposition ^^ 
may be sl false proposition. 

A syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolva- 
ble into three propositions, and each pro- Analysis of 
position containing two terms ; of these p'^oposSon!^ 
terms, that which is spoken of is called the 
subject ; that which is said of it, the predicate ; and 
these two are called the terms [or extremes] because, 
logically, the subject is placed jfzr.sf, and the predicate 
last ;* and, in the middle, the copula, which indicates 
the act of judgment, as by it the predicate is affirmed or 
denied of the subject. The copula must be either is 
or IS not; which expressions indicate simply that you 
affirm or deny the predicate, of the subject. The sub- 
stantive-verb is the only verb recognized by Logic ; 
inasmuch as all others are compound ; being resolvable, 
by means of the verb, " to be," and a participle or ad- 
jective : e. g. " the Romans conquered :" the word con- 
quered is both copula and predicate, being equivalent 
to " were (Cop.) victorious" (Pred.) 

It is proper to observe, that the copula, as such, has 
no relation to time ; but expresses merely the agree- 
ment or disagreement of two given terms : hence, if any 
other tense of the substantive-verb besides the present, 
IS used, it is either understood as the same in sense, 
(the difference of tense being regarded as a matter of 
grammatical propriety only ;) or else, if the circum- 
stance of time really do modify the sense of the whole 

* In Greek and in Latin, very often, and, not unfrequently, in 
English, the predicate is, actually, put first : as " great is Diana of 
the Ephesians." 



86 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an es- 
sential, then, this circnmstance is to he regarded as a 
part of one of the terms : " at tliat time" or some such 
expression, being understood: as -'this man was hon- 
est ;" i. e. *' he is one formerly-honest." In such cases, 
an emphasis, accompanied with a peculiar tone, is usu- 
ally laid on the substantive-verb.* 

Sometimes the: substantive -verb is both copula and 
predicate ; i. e. where existence only is predicated : e. g. 
Deus est, " there is a God." One of Jacob's sons is 
not." And observe, that the copula, merely as such, 
does not imply real existence : e. g. "a faultless man 
is a bemg feigned by the Stoics, and which one must 
not expect to meet with." 

^3. It is evident that a term may consist either of 
one w^ord or of several ; and that it is not every word 
that is categorematic, i. e. capable of being 
Categorema- employed by itself as a term. Adverbs, 
^^' prepositions, &c. and also nouns in any 

other case besides the nominative, are syn- 
Syncatego- categorematic, i. e. can only form part of a 
rematic. term. A nominative noun may be by itself 
a term. A verb (all except the substantive- 
Mixed, verb used as the copula) is a mixed word, 
being resolvable into the copula and predicate, to which 
it is equivalent ; and, indeed, is often so resolved in the 
mere rendering out of one language into another ; as 
" ipse adest," " he is present." 

It is to be observed, however, that under 
" verb," we do not include the infinitive, 
which is properly a noun-substantive, nor the partici- 
ple, which is a noun-adjective. They are verbals, 

^ strange to say, there are persons who thus understand our 
Lord's dticlaration to Pilate : " my kingdom u not of this world j" 
viz. " now ;^^ meaning (secretly) that it was to become so here- 
after, when his followers should have attained greater strength I 
VVhat can be the moral sentiments of those who can believe such 
tt) iiave been the secret sense of the words of a divine messengei 
svhu i-; to bt' our model of truth and of all virtue I 



Chap. 1. 1 3.] SlkTNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 87 

being related to their respective verbs in respect of the 
things they signify : but not verbs, inasmuch as tliey 
diifer entirely in their mode of signification. It is 
worth observing, that an infinitive (though it often 
comes last in the sentence) is never the predicate^ ex- 
cept when another infinitive is the subject \ e. g. 

subj. pred 

*M hope to succeed ;" i. e. *' to succeed is what I hope." 

" Not to advance is to fall back." 

It is to be observed, also, that in English there are 
two infinitives, one in " ing,'' the same in sound and 
spelling as the participle-present; from which, how- 
ever, it should be carefully distinguished ; e. g. " rising 
early is healthful," and " it is healthful to rise early," 
are equivalent. 

Grammarians have produced much needless perplex- 
ity by speaking of the participle in " ing,'' being em- 
ployed so and so ; when it is manifest that that very 
employment of the word constitutes it, to all intents and 
purposes, an infinitive and not a participle. 

The advantage of the infinitive in ing, is, that it may 
be used either in the nominative or in any oblique case ; 
not (as some suppose) that it necessarily implies a 
habit; e.g. "seeing is believing:" '' there is glory 
in dying for one's country:" "a habrt of observ- 
ing," &c. 

If 1 say " he is riding," and again " riding is pleas- 
ant," in the former sentence "ridiag" is an adjective, 
and is the predicate ; in the latter it is a substantive 
and is the subject ; the sentence being equivalent to 
" it is pleasant to ride." 

In this, and in many other cases, the English word 
IT serves as a representative of the subject when that is 
put last : e. g. 

pred. subj. 

"It is to be hoped that we shall succeed." 
An adjective (including participles) cannot, by itself. 



88 J'lLEMPJNTS OF LOGIC. [Book II, 

be made the subject of a proposition ; but is often em« 
ployed as a predicate : as " Crassus was rich ;" though 
some choose to consider some substantive as understood 
in every such case, {e. g. rich man) and consequenily 
do not reckon adjectives among simple-terms ; \i. e, 
vs^ords which are capable, singly, of being employed as 
terms.] This, however, is a question of no practical 
consequence ; but 1 have thought it best to adhere to 
Aristotle's mode of statement. {See his Categ.) 
Sim le-terms ^^ simple- terms, then, (which are what 
^ * the first part of Logic treats of) there are 

many divisions ; of which, however, one will be suf- 
ficient for the present purpose ; viz, into singular and 
common : because, though any term whatever may be 
a subject, none but a common term can be affirmatively 
Singular and predicated of several others. A singular- 
common-terms, term stands for one individual, as ** Caesar," 
" the Thames :" these, it is plain, cannot be said [pre- 
dicated] affirmatively, of anything hut those individuals 
respectively. A common-term is one that may stand 
for any of an indefinite number of individuals, which 
are called its significates ; i. e. can be applied to any of 
them, as comprehending them in its single signification ; 
as " man," " river," *' great." 

The learner who has gone through the Analytical 
Outline, will now be enabled to proceed to the second 
and third Chapters either with or without the study of 
the remainder of what is usually placed in the YusX 
Chapter, but which I have subjoined as a supplement. 
See Chap. V 



Chap. IL — Of Propositions. 

§ 1 . The second part of Logic treats of the proposi' 
tion; which is, ^^ judgment expressed in words ^' 
Definition A proposition is defined logically " a 
of proposition, sentence indicative ,^' [or " asserting"] i. e 



Chap.il §1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 89 

which '^ affirms or denies."* It is this that distin- 
guishes a proposition from a question^ a command, &c 

Logical writers are accustomed to add, in explanation 
of this definition, that a ""' proposition." must not be 
ambiguous ; inasmuch as that which has more than one 
meaning, is in reality not one, hut several propositions 
And they also add that it must not be imperfect or un- 
grammatical ; and which is only saying that any com- 
bination of w^ords that does not really form a " sen- 
tence " cannot be a " proposition ;" though one may 
perhaps conjecture from it what it was that the speaker 
meant to assert. 

Propositions considered merely as sen- 
tences, are distinguished into " categori- and hyp^theti 
cal" and " hypothetical." cai proposi- 

The categorical asserts simply that the *^^^^ 
predicate does, or does not, apply to the subject : as 
" the world had an intelligent maker:" " man is not ca- 
pable of raising himself, unassisted, from the savage 
to the civilized state." The hypothetical [called by- 
some writers, " compound"] makes its assertion under a 
condition, or with an alternative ; as "if the world is 
not the work of chance, it must have had an intelligent 
maker :"" either mankind are capable of rising into 
civilization unassisted or the first beginning of civiliza- 
tion must have come from above." 

The former of these two last examples is of that kind 
called " conditional- propositions ;"t the '■^condition" 
being denoted by " if," or some such word. The latter 
example is of the kind called " disjunctive ;" the alter- 
native being denoted by " either" and " or." 

The division of propositions into categorical and hy- 
pothetical, is, as has been said, a division of them con- 
sidered merely as sentences ; for a like distinction might 

"* Sentence" being in logical language, \he genus, and " indi- 
cative "the "differentia," [or distinguishing-quality.] See Ch. 
V. § 6. 

f Or '* hypothetical," according to those writers who use the 
word " compound" where we have used " hypothetical " 



^O ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 11 

be extended to other kinds of sentences also. Thus 
"are men capable of raising themselves to civiliza- 
tion ?" " go and study books of travels/' are what might 
be cd^ieA categorical sentences, thongh not propositions 
" If man is incapable of civilizing himself, vf hence came 
the first beginning of civilization ?" might be considered 
as a conditional question ; and " either admit the conclu- 
sion, or refute th*^. argument," as a disjunctive command 

Categorical propositions are subdivided into the piire, 
which asserts simply [purely] that the subject does or 
does not agree with the predicate, and the Tno^ia/, which 
expresses in what mode [or manner] it agrees ; e. g. 
" an intemperate man will be sickly ;" " Brutus killed 
Caesar ;" are pure. '' An intemperate man will proba- 
bly be sickly ;" " Brutus killed Caesar justly ;" are mo- 
dal. At present we speak only of pure categorical 
propositions. 

Substance of The above division of propositions (into 
a proposition, categorical and hypothetical) is called in 
the phraseology of Logical writers, a " division of them 
according to their substance ;" i. e. considered simply as 
sentences. 

The" chwcsLcteYistic-quality" [differentia] of a proposi- 
tion being its " asserting," — i. e. " affirming or denying" 
something, hence propositions are divided? 
ciua 1 y. g^(.(,Qj.(jjj^g Iq ii^qIy a quality f" into " affirma- 
tive" and " negative." The division of them again, into 
" true" and false," is also called a division according to 
their " quality ;" namely, the " quahty of the ^natter :" 
(as it has relation to the subject-matter one is treating of) 
while the other kind of quality (a proposition's being af- 
firmative or negative) is " the quality of the exp7'ession." 

The " quality of the matter" is considered (in relation 
to our present inquiries) SiS accidental, and the " quality 
of the expression" as essential. For though the truth or 
falsity of a proposition — for instance, in natural-history, 
is the u:ost essential point in reference to natural-his- 
tory and of a mathematical proposition, in reference to 



Chap. II. ^ 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMFEl^JDIlDiri 91 

mat^iematics, and so in other cases — this is merely acci- 
dental in reference to an inquiry (such as the pres- 
ent) only as io form of expression. In reference to that, 
the essential difference is that between affirmation and 
negation. 

And here it should be remarked by the way, that as, 
on the one hand, every proposition must be either true 
or false, so, on the other hand, nothing else can be, 
strictly speaking, either true or false. In colloquial 
language however, " true" and " false" are often more 
loosely applied ; as when men speak of the " true cause " 
of any thing ; meaning, '' the real cause ;" — the " true 
heir," that is, the rightful heir ; — a ''false prophet," — 
that is, a pretended prophet, or one who utters false- 
hoods; — a "true" or "false" argument; meaning a 
valid^ [real] or an apparent-^xgum^nX ; — a man " true," 
or " false " to his friend ; i. e. faithful or unfaith- 
ful, &c. ^ 

A proposition, it is to be observed, is affirmative or 
negative, according to its copula ; i. e. according as the 
predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. Thus, 
" not to advance, is to fall back," is affirmative : " No 
miser is truly rich " [or " a miser is not truly rich "] is 
a negative. " A few of the sailors were saved," is an 
affirmative ; " Few of the sailors were saved," is prop- 
erly a negative ; for it would be understood that you 
were speaking of " most of the sailors," and denying 
that they were saved. 

Another division * of propositions is Quantity, 
according to their quantity [or extent.] If 
the predicate is said of the whole of the subject, the 
proposition is universal: if oipart of it only, the propo- 
sition is particular (or partial :) e. g. " Britain is an 
island ;" " all tyrants are miserable ;" " no miser is 
rich ;" are universal propositions, and their subjects are, 
therefore, said to be distributed ; being understood to 
stand, each, for the whole of its significates : but, " some 

* See Chap. V. ^ 3. 



92 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book U 

islands are fertile ;" " all tyrants are not assassinated ;" 
are particular^ and their subjects, consequently, not 
distributed, being taken to stand for a part only of their 
significates. 

As every proposition must be either affirmative or 
negative, and must also be either universal oy particular, 
we reckon, in all, four kinds of pure categorical propo- 
sitions, {i. e considered as to their quantity and quality 
both;) viz. universal affirmative, whose symbol (used 
for brevity) is A; universal negative, E ; particular 
affirmative, I ; particular negative, 0. 

§ 2. When the subject of a proposition is a common- 
term, the universal signs (" all, no, every") are used to 
indicate that it is distributed, (the proposition being con- 
sequently then universal ;) the particular signs (" some, 
&c.") the contrary. Should there be no sign at all to 
the common term, the quantity of the proposition 
(which is called an indefinite proposition) is ascertained 
by the matter; i. e. the nature of the connexion between 
the extremes : which is either necessary, impossible, or 
contingent. In necessary and in impossible matter, an 

I (1 fi 't indefinite is understood as a universal: 
e. g. " birds have wings ;" i, e. all : " birds 
are not quadrupeds ;" i. e. none : in contingent matter, 
(z. e. where the terms partly [sometimes] agree, and 
partly not) an indefinite is understood as a particular ; 
e. g. " food is necessary to life ;" i. e. some food ; " birds 
sing ;" i e. some do ; " birds are not carnivorous ;" i e. 
soine are not, or, all are not. 

It is very perplexing to the learner, an(| needlessly 
so, to reckon indefinites as one class of propositions in 
respect of quantity.* They must be either universal or 
particular, though it is not declared which. The person, 
indeed, who utters the indefinite proposition, may be 
mistaken as to this point, and may mean to speak uni- 
versally in a case where the proposition is not univer- 

* Such a mode of classification resembles that of some gramma 
rians, who, among the genders, enumerate the doubtful gender I 



Chap. II. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 93 

sally true. And the hearer may be in doubt which was 
meant, or ought to be meant; but the speaker must 
mean either the one or the other. 

Of course the determination of a question relating to 
the " matter," i. e. when we are authorized to use the 
universal, and when, the particular sign — when an 
affirmative, and when a negative — is what cannot be 
determined by Logic. 

As for singular propositions, {viz those Singular 
whose subject is either ^, proper name, or a Propositions, 
common term with a singular sign) they are reckoned 
as universals, (see Book IV. Ch. lY. § 2.) because in 
them we speak of the ivhole of the subject ; e. g. when 
we say, " Brutus was a Roman," we mean the whole of 
Brutus. This is the general rule ; but some singular-pro- 
positions may fairly he leckoned particular ; i. e. when 
some qualifying word is inserted, which indicates that 
you are not speaking of the whole of the subject ; e. g. 
" Caesar was not wholly di tyrant ;" " this man is occa- 
sionally intemperate ;" " non omnis moriar." 

It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the 
most naturally, accounted universals ; but it is only by 
viewing them in the other light, that we can regularly 
state the contradictory io a singular proposition. Strict- 
ly speaking, when we regard such propositions as ad- 
mitting of a variation in quantity, they are not proper- 
ly considered as singular ; the subject being, e. g. not 
Ccesar, but the parts of his character. 

It is evident that the subject is distru Distribution 
buted in every universal propositi on^ and of terms. 
never in a particular : (that being the very difference 
between universal and particular propositions :) but the 
distribution or non-distribution of \he predicate, depends 
(not on the quantity, but) on the quality, of the propo- 
sition ; for, if any part of the predicate agrees with the 
subject, it must be affirmed and not denied of the sub- 
ject ; therefore, for an affirmative-proposition to be true, 
it is sufficierit that some part of the predicate agrees 



94 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book II 

with the subject ; and (for the same reason) for a ne- 
gative to be true, it is necessary that the whole of the 
predicate should disigree with the subject: e. g\ it is 
true that *' learning is useful" though the whole of the 
term " useful" does not agree with the term " learning" 
(for many things are useful besides learning;) but " no 
vice is useful," would be false if any part of the term 
"useful" agreed with the term "vice;" i.e. if you 
could find any one useful thing which was a vice. 

And this holds good equally whether the negative 
proposition be " universal" or " particular." For to say 
that " some X is not Y" (or — which is the same in sense 
— that " all X is not Y") is to imply that there is no 
pari of the term " Y" [no part of the class which " Y" 
stands/or] that is applicable to the whole without excep- 
tion, of the term " X ;" — in short, thdt there is some part 
of the term " X" to which " Y" is wholly inapplicable. 

Thus, if I say, "some of the men found on that island 
are not sailors of the ship that was wrecked there," or, 
in other words, " the men found on that island areno^, 
all of them, sailors of the ship, &c." I imply that the 
term sailors, &c." is wholly inapplicable to some of the 
" men on the island ;" though it might perhaps be ap- 
plicable to others of them. 

Again, if I say " some coin is made of silver," and 
" some coin is not made of silver," (or in other words, 
that " all coin is not made of silver") in the former of 
these propositions I imply, that in some portion (at 
least) of the class of " things made of silver," is found 
[or comprehended] " some coin :" in the latter proposi- 
tion I imply that there is " some coin" which is con- 
tained in no portion of the class of " things made of sil- 
ver ;" or (in other words) which is excluded from the 
lohole of that class. So that the term " made of sil- 
ver" is distributed in this latter proposition, and not, in 
the former. 

The two practical rules then to be observed respect- 
ing distribution, are, 



Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 9i? 

1st. All universal propositions (and no particular) 
distribute the subject. 

2d. All negative (and no af&rmative) the predicate.* 
It may happen indeed, that the whole of the predicate 
in an affirmative may agree vi'ith the subject ; e, g. ii 
is equally true, that " all men are rational animals ;" 
and " all rational animals are men ;" but this is merely 
accidental, and is not at all implied in the form of ex- 
pression, which alone is regarded in Logic. f 

Of Opposition. ^ 

§ 3. Two propositions are said to he opposed to each 
other, when, having the same subject and predicate, 
they differ, in quantity or quality or both.i It is evi- 

* Hence, it is matter of common remark, that it is difficult to 
prove a negative. At first sight this appears very obvious, from 
the circumstance that a negative has one more term distributed 
than the corresponding affirmative. But then, again, a difficulty 
may be felt in accounting for this, inasmuch as any negative may 
be expressed (as we shall see presently) as an affirmative, and vice 
rej'sa. The proposition, e. g. that " such a one is not in the town," 
might be expressed by the use of an equivalent term, •' he is absent 
from the town." 

The fact is, however, that in every case where the observation 
as to the difficulty of proving a negative holds good, it will be 
found that the proposition in question is contrasted with one which 
has really a term the less, distributed ; or a term of less extensive 
sense, E. G. It is easier to prove that a man has proposed wise 
measures, than that he has never proposed an unwise measure. In 
fact, the one would be to prove that " Someo£ his measures are 
wise ;" the other, that ''All his measures are wise." And num- 
berless such examples are to be found. 

But it will very often hanpen that there shall be negative pro- 
positions much more easily established than certain affirmative 
ones on the same subject E G. That '* The cause of animal-heat 
is not respiration," is said to have been established by experiments ; 
but what the cause is remains doubtful. See Note to Chap. III. § 5 

t When, however, a singular term is the predicate, it must, of 
course, be co-extensive with the subject ; as " Romulus was the 
founder of Rome." In this and also in some other cases (see B. I. 
§ 5.) we judge, not from the form of the expression, but from the 
signification of the terms, that they are " equivalent" [** converti- 
ble "] terms. 

^For opposition oi terms, see Chap. V. 



dQ ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

dent, that with any given subject and predicate, you 
' may state four distinct propositions, viz. A, E, I, and O ; 
any two of which are said to he opposed ;* hence there 
are four different kinds of opposition, -yz^r; 1st. the two 
Contraries, universals (A and E) are called contraries 
Subcontraries.^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ' ^^' ^^^ t WO particular, (I and 
Subalterns ^^ subcontraries ; 3d. A and I, or E and 0, 
Contradicto- subalterns ; 4th. A and 0, or E and I, con- 
"es. tradictories. 

As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of any pro- 
position (its quantity and quality being known) must 
depend on the matter of it, we must bear in mind, that, 
" in necessary _ matter, all affirmatives are true, and 
negatives false ; in impossible matter, vice versa ; in 
contingent matter, all universals, false, and particulars 
true ;" e. g. " a// islands (or some islands) are surround- 
ed by water," must be true, because the matter is neces- 
sary : to say, "no islands, or some — not Sfc" would 
have been false : again, " some islands are fertile ;" 
'* some are not fertile," are both true, because it is con- 
tingent matter: put ''all" or "no" instead of "-some,'^ 
and the propositions will be false. 

Hence it will be evident, that contraries will be both 
false in contingent matter, but never both true : subcon- 
traries, both true in contingent matter, but never both 
false : contradictories, always one true and the other 
false, ^c. with other observations, which will be imme- 
diately made on viewing the scheme ; in which the four 
propositions are denoted by their symbols, the differerit 
kinds of matter by the initials, n,i,c, and the truth or 
falsity of each proposition in each matter, by the letter 
V. for (verum) true, f. for (falsum) false. 

You may substitute for the unmeaning symbols X, Y 
(which stand for the terms of the above propositions^ 
Vf hatever significant terms you will ; and on their mean 

* In ordinary language, however, and in some logical treatises, 
propositions wkich do not differ in qucdity (viz. suba^Mrns) are no* 
reckoned as " opposed." 



Chap II. § 3] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 97 




[Some X is Y] 



subcontraries- 



[Some X is not Y] 



ing, of course, will depend the truth or falsity of each 
proposition. 

For instance, naturalists have observed that " ani- 
mals having horns on the head are universally rumi- 
nant; that, of- " carnivorous animals" none are rumi- 
nant;" and that, of " animals with hoofs," some are ru- 
minant, and some not. Let us take then instead of " X," 
" animals with horns on the head," and for " Y," " rumi- 
nant :" here, the real connexion of the terms in respect 
of their meaning — which connexion is called the " mat- 
te f of a proposition — is such that the predicate may be 
affirmed universally of the subject ; and of course, the 
affirmatives (whether universal or particular) will be 
true, and the " negatives" false. In this case the " mat- 
ter" is technically called " necessary ;" inasmuch as w» 



98 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 11 

x^annot avoid believing the predicate to be applicable to 
the subject. 

Again, let " X" represent " carnivorous- animal," and 
«c Y" " ruminant :" this is a case of what is called " im- 
possible matter ;" (i. e. where we cannot possibly con- 
ceive the predicate to be applicable to the subject) being 
just the reverse of the foregoing; and, of course, both 
the affirmatives will here be false, and both negatives 
true. 

And lastly, as an instance of what is called " contin- 
gent matter," — i. e. where the predicate can neither be 
affirmed universally, nor denied universally, of the sub- 
ject, take " hoofed-animal" for " X" and '' ruminant" for 
" Y;" and of course the universals will both be false, 
and the particulars, true : that is, it is equally true that 
^' some hoofed animals are ruminant," and that " some 
are not." 

By a careful study of the above scheme, bearing in 
mind and applying the rule concerning matter, the learn- 
er will easily elicit all the maxims relating to " opposi- 
tion ;" as that, in the subalterns, the truth of the parti- 
cular (which is called the subalternate) follows from 
the truth of the universal {subalternans), and the falsity 
of the universal from the falsity of the particular : that 
subalternans differ in quantity alone ; contraries, and 
also subcontraries, in quality alone : contradictories, in 
both : and hence, that if any proposition is known to be 
true, we infer that its contradictory is false ; if false, its 
contradictory true, &c. 

Belief and dis- *' Contradictory-opposition" is the kind 
belief coincide, most frequently alluded to because (as is 
evident from what has been just said) to deny oi to dis- 
believe — a proposition, is to assert or to believe, its con- 
tradictory ; and of course, to assent to, or maintain a 
proposition, is to reject its contradictory. Belief, there- 
fore, and disbelief, are not two different states of the 
mind, but the same, only considered in reference to two 
contradictory propositions. And consequently, credu- 



CuAP. II § 3. SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 99 

lity and incredulity are not opposite habits, but the 
same ; in reference to some class of propositions, and 
to their contradictories. 

For instance, he who is \h^ most incredulous respect- 
ing a certain person's guilt, is, in other words the 
most ready to beheve him not guilty ; he who is the 
most credulous* as to certain works being within the 
reach of magic, is the most incredulous [or " slow 
of heart to believe"] that they are not within the reach 
of magic ; and so, in ail cases. 

The reverse oi believing this or that individual pro- 
position, is no doubt, to disbelieve that same proposi- 
tion ; but the reverse of belief generally, is (not disbe- 
lief; since that implies belief; but) doubt.] 

* As the Jews, in the time of Jesus, in respect of his works. 

t And there may even be cases in which doubt itself may amount 
to the most extravagant credulity. For instance, if any one should 
" doubt whether there is any such country as Egypt," he would be 
in fact believing this most incredible proposition ; that "it is posii- 
ble for many thousands of persons, unconnected with each other, to 
have agreed, for successive ages, in bearing witness to the exis- 
tence oi a fictitious country, without being detected, contradicted 
or suspected." 

All this, though self-evident, is, in practice, frequently lost sight 
X)f: the more, on account of our employing, in reference to the 
Christian Religion, the words " believer and wnbeliever ;" whence 
unthinking persons are led to take for granted that the rejection of 
Christianity implies a less easy belief than its reception. 

The only way to be safe from credulity on a given subject, is 
either to examine carefully and dispassionately, and decide accord- 
ing to the evidence, or else to withdraw your thoughts from it al- 
together. E. G. in some legal trial which does not concern or in- 
terest us, we neither pronounce that the plaintiff has a just title 
to the property he claims, nor again that he has not a just title, nor 
yet, that there is no sufficient evidence to show whether his title is 
just or not ; but we disregard the whole question. 

Hence we may perceive that ^'private judgment,^'' the right, and 
the duty of which have long been warmly debated, is a thing una- 
voidable, in any matter concerning which one takes an interest. For 
if a man resolves that he will implicitly receive, e g. in religious 
points, all the decisions of a certain pastor, church or party, he has 
in so doing, performed one act of private-judgment, which includes 
all the rest : just as if a man, distrusting his own skill in the 
management of property, should make over his whole estate to 
trustees ; in doing which he has exercised an act of ownership : 
for which act, generally and for the choice of such and such parti 



100 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. [I 

Of course the learner must remember, as above ob- 
served, that the determination of the " matter" is out of 
the province of Logic. The rules of opposition merely, 
pronounce on the truth or falsity of each proposition, 
given, the " matter." 

Of Conversion. 

§ 4. A proposition is said to be converted when its 
terms are transposed ; i. e. when the subject is made the 
predicate, and the predicate the subject. When nothing 
more is done, this is called simple conversion. 

Illative No conversion is employed for any logi- 

conversion, cal purpose, unless it be illative;'*' i. e. 
when the truth of the converse is implied by the truth of 
the exposita, (or exposition given ;) e. g. 

" No virtuous man is a rebel, therefore 

No rebel is a virtuous man." 
" No Christian is an astronomer, therefore 

No astronomer is a Christian. "f 
" Some boasters are cowards, therefore 
Some cowards are boasters." 
The " conversion" of such a proposition as this, " No 
one [is happy who] is anxious for change," would be 
effected by altering the arrangement of the words in 
brackets, into " who is happy." 

Strictly speaking, that is not a real " conversion,"— 
but only an " apparent conversion " — which is not 
*' illative." For, (as has been above said) there is not 
a mere transposition of the terms, but anet^; term intro- 
duced, when a term which was undistributed in the 

cular trustees, he is responsible. (See Essay ii. On the Kingdom 
of Christ, §26.) 

* The reader must not suppose from the use of the word " illa- 
tive," that this conversion is a process of reasoning : it is in fact 
only stating the same judgment in another form. 

tWhen Galileo's persecutors endeavoured to bring about th« 
former of these, they forgot that it implied the latter. And the 
same may be said of some opponents of Geology at the present day 



Chap. II § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. lO.t 

" exposita,'* is distributed [taken universally] in the 
converse. But as it is usual, in common discourse, to 
speak of ''an it nsoune? argument," — meaning "anap- 
parent-diTgument, which is in reality not an argument," 
so, in this case also, it is common to say, for instance, 
that "Euclid proves. first that all equilateral triangles 
are equiangular, and afterwards he proves the converse, 
that all equiangular triangles are equilateral:" or again, 
to say, " It is true that all money is wealth ; but I de- 
ny the converse, (in reality, the apparent -coiiveise) that 
all wealth is money." 

Conversion then, strictly so called — that is, " illative 
conversion," — can only take place when no term is dis- 
tributed in the converse, which was undistributed in the 
" exposita." 

Hence, since K [universal- negative] distributes both 
terms, and I, [particular-affirmative] neither, these may 
both be simply-converted illatively ; as in the examples 
above. But as A does not distribute the predicate, its 
simple-conversion would not be illative ; (e. g. from 
" all birds are animals," you cannot infer that " all ani- 
mals are birds,") as there would be a term distributed 
in the converse, which was not before. We must 
therefore limit its quantity from universal to particular, 
and the conversion will be illative : {e. g. " some an: 
mals are birds ;") this might be fairly named conversion 
by limitation ; but is commonly called 
" conversion per accidens.'' E may thus pe?^ccidens 
be converted also. But in 0, whether the 
quantity be changed or not, there will still be a term 
(the predicate of the converse) distributed, which was 
not before : you can therefore only convert it illatively, 
by changing the quality ; i. e. considering the negative 
as attached to the predicate instead of to the copula, and 
thus regarding it as I. One of the terms 
will then not be the same as before ; but position, 
the proposition will be equipollent (z. e. 
convey the same meaning ;) e. g. «« some who possess 



102 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

wealth are not happy :" you may consider " not-happy'* 
as the predicate, instead of " happy ;" the proposition 
will then he I, and of course may be simply converted ; 
" some who are not happy possess wealth :" or, (as 
such a proposition is often expressed) " one may pos- 
sess wealth without being happy."* This may be 
named conversion by negation ; or as it is commonly 
called, by contraposition,''^ 

A may be fairly converted in this way, e. g, 

fi'mh-iaiMf',, nf * ^* ^^ worth remarking by the way, that in 
^nioxgutiy oj ^^^j^ examples as the above, the words, " may," 
f?f^^7f ' ^«2/.' .<can," "cannot," &c., have no reference (is 
must, <yc. they sometimes have) to power, as exercised by 

an agent ; but merely to the distribution or non-distribution of terms | 
or to the confidence or doubtfulness we feel respecting some suppo- 
sition. 

To say, for instance, that " a man who has the plague may re- 
cover," does not mean that " it is in his power to recover if he 
chooses ;" but is is only a form of stating a. particular-proposition ; 
[I] namely, that " some who have the plague recover." And again 
to say, " there may be a bed of coal in this district," means merely 
** The existence cf a bed of coal in this district — is — a thing which 
I cannot confidently deny or afiirm." 

So also to say " a virtuous man cannot betray his country " [or 
"it is impossible that a virtuous man should betray, &c.'^] does not 
mean that he lacks the power, (for there is no virtue in not doing 
what is out of one's power) but merely that " hot betraying one's 
country " forms an essential part of the notion conveyed by the te7'm 
•* virtuous." We mean in short that it is as much out of our power 
to conceive a virtuous man who should be a traitor, as to conceive 
*' a square with unequal sides;" that is, a square which is not a 
square. The expression therefore is merely a way of stating the 
universal-proposition [E] "No virtuous man betrays his coun- 
try." 

So again, to say, " a weary traveller in the deserts of Arabia must 
eagerly drink when he comes to a spring," does not mean that Ac 
is compelled to drink, but that I cannot avoid believing that he will j 
— that there is no doubt in my mind. 

In these and many other such instances, the words " may," 
"must," "can," "impossible," &c., have reference, notto power or 
absence of power in an agent, but only to universality or absence of 
universality in the expression , or, to doubt or absence of doubt in 
our own mind, respecting what is asserted. See Appendix, No. I, 
Art. May. 

t No mention is mi.de by Aldrich of this kind of conversion ; but 
it has been thought advisable to insert it, as being in frequent use, 
and also as being employed in this treatise for the direct reduction 
9f Baroko and Bokardo. 



Chap. II. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 103 

" Every poet is a man of genius ; therefore 
He who is not a man of genius is not a poet :" 
(or, ** None but a man of genius can be a poet:" 
or, *' A man of genius alone can be a poet :" 
or, •* One cannot be a poet without being a man of 
genius." 
For (since it is the same thing to affirm some attri- 
bute of the subject, or to deny the absence of that attri- 
bute) the original proposition [exposita] is precisely 
equipollent to this, 

subj. pred, 

'' No poet is not a-man-of-genius ;" 
which, being E, may of course be simply converted. 
Thus, in one of these three ways, every proposition 
may be illatively converted : viz. E, I, simply ; A, 0^ 
by negation ; A, E, — Limitation. 

Note, that as it was remarked that, in Convertible 
some affirmatives, the whole of the predi- terms, 
cate does actually agree with the subject, so, when this 
is the case, A being converted simply, the converse 
will be true : but still, as its truth does not follow from 
that of the original proposition [" exposita"] the con- 
version is not illative. Many propositions in mathe- 
matics are of this description : e. g. 

'' All equilateral triangles are equiangular ; and 
"All equiangular triangles are equilateral," 
Though hoth these propositions are true, the one does 
not follow from the other ; and mathematicians accor- 
dingly give a distinct proof of each. 

As the simple converse of A can then only he true 
when the subject and predicate are exactly equivalent 
(or, as they are called, convertible terms ;) and as this 
must always be the case in s. just definition, so the cor- 
rectness of a definition may be tried by this test. E. G. 
*' A good government is that which has the happiness 
of the governed for its object ;" if this be a right defi- 
nition, ii will follow that " a government which has 



.ia4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. II 

the happiness of the governed for its object is a good 
one." 6ut to assert a proposition, and to add, or imply, 
that it is a just definition, is to make,nof one assertion, 
but two. 



Chap. IlL — Of Arguments. 

§ 1. The third operation of the mind, viz. reasoning, 

[or " discourse "] expressed in words, is argument ; and 

an argument stated at full length, and in its regular 

form, is called a syllogism. The third part of Logic 

therefore, treats of the syllogism. Every 

y ogisms. g^pg^j^gj^^ * consists of two parts ; that 
which is proved ; and that hy means of which it is proved. 
The former is called, before it is proved, the question ; 
when proved, the conclusion [or inference ;] that which 
is used to prove it, if stated last (as is often done in 
common discourse,) is called the reason, and is introduced 
by '[because,'' or some other causal conjunction; e. g. 
"Caesar deserved death, because he was a tyrant, and 
all tyrants deserve death." If the conclusion be stated 
last (which is the strict logical form, to which all rea- 
soning may be reduced) then, that which is employed 
to prove it is called the premises, -f and the conclusion is 
then introduced by some illative conjunction, as " there 
fore," e. g. 

" All tyrants deserve death : 
Caesar was a tyrant ; 
therefore he deserved death. "4: 

♦ I mean, in the strict technical sense 3 for in popular use th« 
word argument is often employed to denote the latter of these two 
parts alone : e. g, " This is an argument to prove so and so j" " this 
conclusion is established by the argument :" i. c. premises. — See 
Appendix, No. 1. art. argument. 

t Both the premises together are sometimes called the antecedent. 

i It may be observed that the definition here given of an argument, 



Chap. III. § 1. SYNTHETICAL COMFE INDIUM. 105 

Since, then, an argument is an expres- 
sion in which "from something laid down "^al-ffument*^* 
and granted as true (e, e. the premises) 
something else {i. e. the conclusion) beyond this rnust be 
admitted to be true, as following necessarily [resulting'] 
from the other; and since Logic is wholly concerned in 
the use of language, it follows that a syllogism (which 
is an argument stated in a regular logical form) must be 
"an argument so expressed, that the con- 
clusiveness of it is manifest from the mere ■^^s^^iwi^^^ 
force of the expression" i. e. without con- 
sidering the meaning of the terms : e. g. in this syllo- 
gism, " Every Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X :" the 
conclusion is inevitable, whatever terms X, Y, and Z, 
respectively are understood to stand for. And to this 
form all legitimate arguments may ultimately be 
brought. 

One circumstance which has misled some persons into 
the notion that there may be reasoning that is not, sub- 
stantially, syllogistic, is this ; that in a syllogism we 
see the conclusion following certainly [or Necessary and 
necessarily] from the premises ; and again, probable con- 
in any apparent- syllogism which on ex- d^^sions. 

is in the common treatises of Logic laid down as the definition of a 
syllogism ; a word which I have confined to a more restricted sense. 
There cannot evidently be any argument, whether regularly or ir- 
regularly expressed, to which the definition given by Aldrich, for 
instance, would not apply ; so that he appears to employ " syllo- 
gism " as synonymous with " argument. ' But besides that it is 
clearer and more convenient, when we have these two words at 
hand, to employ them in the two senses respectively whirh w^e 
want to express, the truth is, that in so doing I have actually con- 
formed to Aldrich's practice : for he generally, if not always, em- 
ploys the term "syllogism" in the very sense to which 1 have 
confined it : viz. to denote an argument stated in regular logical 
form ; as, e. g, in a part of his work (omitted in the late editions) in 
which he is objecting to a certain pretended syllogism in the work 
ol another writer, he says, " valet certe argumentum; syllogismus 
tamen est falsissimus," &c. Now (waiving the exception that might 
be taken at this use of ''falsissimus,^' nothing being, strictly, true 
or false, but a proposition) it is plain that he limits the word " syl- 
logism " to the sense in which it is here defined, and is consequently 
inconsistent with his own definition of it. 
9 



106 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

amination is found to be (as we have seen in some of the 
examples) not a real one [not " valid "] the conclusion 
does not follow at all ; and the whole is a mere deception. 
And yet we often hear of arguments which have some 
weight, and yet are not quite decisive ; — of conclusions 
which are rendered 'probable, but not absolutely certain, 
&c. And hence some are apt to imagine that the con- 
clusiveness of an argument admits of degrees ; and that 
sometimes a conclusion may, probably and phrtially — 
though not certainly and completely — follow from its 
premises. 

This mistake arises from men's forgetting that the 
premises themselves will very often be doubtful; and. 
then, the conclusion also will be doubtful. 

As was shown formerly, one or both of the premises 
of a perfectly valid syllogism may be utterly false and 
absurd: and then, the conclusion, though inevitably 
following from them, may be either true or false, we 
cannot tell which. And if one or both of the premises 
be merely probable, we can infer from them only a 
probable conclusion ; though the conclusiveness — that is, 
the connexion between the premises and the conclusion 
— is perfectly certain. 

For instance, assuming that " every month has 30 
days " (which is palpably false) then, from the minor- 
premise that " April is a month," it follows (which 
happens to be true) that '* April has 30 days :" and from 
the minor- premiss that " February is a month," it fol- 
lows that " February has 30 days ;" which is false. In 
each case the conclusiveness of the argument is the 
same ; but in every case, when we have ascertained the 
falsity of one of the premises, we know nothing (as far 
as that argument is concerned) of the truth or falsity 
of the conclusion. 

When however we are satisfied of the falsity of some 
conclusion, we may, of course, be sure that (at least) 
one of the premises is false ; since if they had both 
been true, the conclusion would have been true 



Chap. III. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 107 

And this — which is called the " indirect " mode ol 
proof — is^ often employed (even in mathematics) for 
establishing what we maintain : that is, we prove the 
^alsity of some proposition, (in other words, the truth 
of its contradictory) by showing that if assumed as a 
premiss, along with another premiss known to be true, 
it leads to a conclusion manifestly false. For though, 
from a false assumption, either falsehood or truth may 
follow, from a true assumption, truth only can follow, 

§ 2. The rule of maxim (commonly called " dictum 
de omni et nullo ") by which Aristotle ex- Aristotle's 
plains the validity of the above argument dictum, 
(every Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X,) is this : what- 
ever is predicated of a term distributed, whether affirma- 
tively or negatively, may he predicated in like manner 
of every thing contained under it" Thus, in the ex- 
amples above, X is predicated of Y distributed, and Z 
is contained under Y {i. e. is its subject ;) therefore X 
is predicated of Z: so "all tyrants," &c. (§ 1.) This 
rule may be ultimately applied to all arguments ; (and 
their validity ultimately rests on their conformity there- 
to) but it cannot be directly and immediately applied to 
all even of pure categorical syllogisms ; for the sake of 
brevity, therefore, some other axioms are commonly ap- 
plied in practice, to avoid the occasional tediousness of 
reducing all syllogisms to that form in which Aristo- 
tle's dictum is gtpplicable.* 

"^ Instead of following the usual arrangement, in laying down 
lirst the canons which apply to all the figures of categorical syllo- 
gisms, and then going back to the " dictum of Aristotle" which 
applies to only one of them, I have pursued what appears a simpler 
and more philosophical arrangement, and more likely to impress 
on the learner's mind a just view of the science : viz. 1st. to give 
the rule (Aristotle's dictum) which applies to the most clearly and 
regularly-constructed argument, the syllogism in the first figure, 
to which all reasoning may be reduced : then, the canons applica- 
ble to all categoricals ; then, those belonging to the hypotheticals ; 
and lastlj^ to treat of the sorites ; which is improperly placed by 
Aidrich before the hypotheticals. By this plan the province of 
strict logic is extended as far as it can be ; every kind of argument 
which is of a syZZo/jis^tc character, and accordingly, directly cog 
ni^able by the rules of logic, being enumerated iu natural order. 



i08 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book r 

Canons of ca- ^^ ^^^^ speak first of pure categorical 
tegorical-syl- Syllogisms ; and the axioms or canons by 
logism. which their validity is to be explained : viz. 

first, if^ two terms agree with one and the same third, 
they agree with each other: secondly , if one term agrees 
and another disagrees with one and the same third, these 
two disagree with each other. On the former of these 
canons rests the validity of affirmative conclusions ; on 
the latter, of negative : for no categorical syllogism can 
be faulty v^hich does not violate these canons; none 
correct which does : hence on these two canons are 
built the rules or cautions which are to be observed 
with respect to syllogisms^ for the purpose of ascertain- 
ing whether those canons have been strictly observed 
or not. 

1st. Every syllogism has three, and only three terms t 
viz. the middle-term, and the two terms (or extremes, 
as they are commonly called) of the conclusion [or 
question.] Of these, 1st, the subject of the conclusion 
is called the minor 4erm ; 2d, its predicate, ihe major- 
term ; and 3d, the middle-term, (called by the older logi- 
cians " argumentum,") is that with which each of them 
is separately compared, in order to judge of their agree- 
ment or disagreement with each other. If therefore 
there were two middle-terms, the extremes {or terms of 
conclusion) not being both compared to the same^ could 
not be conclusively compared to each other. 

2d. Every syllogism has three, and only three propo- 
sitions ; viz. 1st, the major-premiss (in which the major 
term is compared with the middle ; 2d, the minor-pre- 
miss (in which the minor-term is compared with the 
middle ;) and 3d, the conclusion, in which the minor- term 
is compared with the major.* 

3d. Note, that if the middle-term is ambiguous, there 

s-ome logical treatises the major premiss is called simply 
*' propositio ;" and the minor, •' assumptio." In ordinary discourse, 
the word " principle" is often used to denote the major-premiss', 
and ' reason, ' the minor. 



^HAP. III. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 109 

are in reality two middle-terms, in sense, though but one 
in sound. An ambiguous middle-term is either an 
equivocal term used in different senses in the two prem- 
ises : {e. g. 

** Light is contrary lo darkness ; 

Feathers are light ; therefore 

Feathers are contrary to darkness:") 
or a term ^ of distributed: for as it is then used to stand 
for a part only of its significates, it may happen that 
one of the extremes may have been compared with one 
part of it, and the other with another part, of it ; e. g. 
** White is a colour, 

Black is a colour ; therefore 

Black is white." Again, 

" Soitie animals are beasts, 

Some animals are birds; therefore 

Some birds are beasts." 
The middle-term therefore must be distributed once, 
at least, in the premises ; {i. c. by being the subject of 
an universal, or predicate of a negative, chap. ii. § 2,) 
and once is sufficient ; since if one extreme has been 
compared to a part of the middle-term, and another to 
the whole of it, they must have been both compared to 
the same. 

4th. No term must be distributed in the conclusion 
which was not distributed in one of the premises; for 
that (which is called sm illicit process, either of the ma- 
jor or the minor term) would be to employ the whole of 
a term in the conclusion, when you had employed only 
a part of it in the premiss ; and thus, in reality, to intro- 
duce a fourth term : e. g. 

"All quadrupeds are animals, 

A bird is not a quadruped ; therefore 

It is not an animal." — Illicit process of the majoi. 

Again, " what is related in the Talmud is unworthy 

of credit : miraculous stories are related in the Talmud ; 

therefore miraculous stories are unworthy of credit." 

H this conclusion be taken as A, there will be an " illi- 



110 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book II 

cit process of the minor- term ;" (since every one would 
understand the minor-premiss as particular) but a 'par- 
ticular conclusion may fairly be inferred. In the case 
of an illicit-process of the major, on the contrary, the 
premises do not warrant any conclusion at all. 

5th. Frorn negative premises you can infer nothing. 
For in them the middle is pronounced to disagree with 
both extremes; not, to agree with both ; or, to agree 
with one, and disagree with the other ; therefore they 
cannot be compared together ; e. g. 

" A fish is not a quadruped ;" 

"A bird is not a quadruped," proves nothing. 

6th. If one premiss be negative, the conclusion must 
be negative ; for in that premiss the middle-term is pro- 
nounced to disagree with one of the extremes, and in 
the other premiss (which of course is affirmative by the 
preceding rule) to agree with the other extreme ; there- 
fore the extremes disagreeing with each other the conclu- 
sion is negative. In the same manner it may be shown, 
that to prove a negative conclusion one of tfie premises 
must be a negative. 

* By these six rules all categorical syllogisms are to 
be tried; and from them it will be evident; 1st, that 
nothing can be proved from two particular premises ; 
(since you will then have either the middle term undis- 
tributed, or an illicit process. For if each premiss were 
1, there would be no distribution of any term at all : and 
if the premises were I and 0, as 

" Some animals are sagacious: 
Some beasts are not sagacious : 
Some beasts are not animals," 

* Others have given twelve rules, which I found might mor« 
conveniently be reduced to six. No syllogism can be faulty which 
violates none of these six rules. It is much less perplexing to a 
learner not to lay down as a distinct rule, that, e. g. against 'parti- 
cular -premises ; which is properly a result of the foregoing ; since a 
syllogism with two particular premises would oftend against either 
R. 3. or R. 4. 



Chap. III. ^ 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. Ill 

there would be but one term — the predicate of — dis- 
tributed ; and supposing that one to be the middle, then, 
the conclusion (being of course negative, by rule 6th,) 
would have its predicate— the major-term — distributed, 
which was undistributed in the premiss. And, for the 
same reason, 2dly, that if one of the premises be parti- 
cular, the conclusion must be particular ; e. g. 

*' All who fight bravely deserve reward ; 

Some soldiers fight bravely ;" you can only infer that 
" Some soldiers deserve reward :" 

for to infer a universal conclusion would be an " illicit- 
process of the minor." But from two universal pre- 
mises you cannot always infer a universal conclusion ; 

^' g- 

" All gold is precious ; 
All gold is a mineral : therefore 
Some mineral is precious." 

And even when we can infer a universal, we are al- 
ways at liberty to infer a particular; since what is pre- 
dicated of all may of course be predicated of some.* 

Of Moods. 

5 3. When we designate the three propositions of a 
syllogism in their order, according to their respective 
" quantity " and " quality" (indicated by their symbols) 
we are said to determine the mood of the syllogism. E. 
G. the example just above, '•' all gold, &c." is in the 
mood A, A, I. 

As there are four kinds of propositions, and three 
propositions in each syllogism, all the possible ways of 

" The memorial-lines in which some of the Logical-writers sum- 
'sned up the foregoing rules, were, 

" Distribus Medium, nee quartus terminus adsit ;" 
" Ulraque nee prcemissa negans, nee particularis ;" 
* Seetetur partem Conclusio deteriorem ;^^ (i. e. the particular being 

regarded as inferior to the universal ; and the negative, to 

the affirmative) 
" Einon distribuai nisi cum Pramissa, negeive.^- 



112 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IL 

combining these four, (A, E, I, 0,) by threes, are sixty- 
four. For, any one of these four may be the majqr- 
premiss ; each of these four majors may have four dif- 
ferent minors ; and of these sixteen pairs of premises, 
each may have four different conclusions. 4 X 4 (= 1 6) 
X 4 = 64. This is a mere arithmetical calculation of 
the moods, without any regard to the logical rules ; for 
many of these moods are inadmissible in practice, from 
violating some of those rules ; e. g. the mood E, E, E, 
must be rejected as having negative premises ; T, 0, 0, 
for particular premises ; and many others for the same 
faults; to vsrhich must be added I,E, 0, for an " illicit- 
process of the major," in every figure ; since the con- 
clusion, behig negative, would distribute the major-term, 
while the major-premiss, being I, would distribute no 
term. By examination then of all, it will be found that, 
of the sixty-four there remain but eleven moods which 
can be used in a legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A, 
A, A, 1, A, E, E, A, E, 0, A, I, I, A. 0, 0, 
E, A, E, E, A, 0, E, I, 0, I, A, I, 0, A, 0. 

Of Figure. 

§ 4. The figure of a syllogism consists in the situa- 
tion of the middle-term with respect to the extremes oi 
the conclusion, \i. e the major and minor term.] When 
the middle4erm is made the subject of the major premiss^ 
and the predicate of the minor, that is called the first 
figure ; which is far the most natural and clear of all, 
as to this alone Aristotle's dictum may be at once ap- 
plied. In the second-figure the middle- term is the pre- 
dicate of both premises : in the third, the subject of both . 
in the fourth, the predicate of the major premiss , and 
the subject of the minor ; This figure is the most awk- 
ward and unnatural of all, being the very reverse of the 
first. 

Note, that the proper order* is to to place the major 

* Proper, i, e. in a treatise on Logic, or in a logical analysis ; not, 



Chap. III. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 113 

■piemiss first, and the minor second, but this does not 
constitute the major and minor premises; for that pre- 
miss (wherever placed) is the major, which contains 
the major term, and the minor, the minor (v. H. 2 
§ 2.) 

Each of the allowable moods mentioned above will 
not be allowable in every figure ; since it may violate 
some of the foregoing rules, in one figure, though not 
in another: e. g. I, A, I, is an allowable mood in the 
third figure ; but in the first it would have an undis- 
tributed middle.* So A, E, E, would in the first figute 
have an illicit process of the major, but is allowable in 
the second ; and A, A, A, which in the first figure is 
allowable, would in the third have an illicit process of 
the minor : all which may be ascertained by trying the 
different moods in each figure, as per scheme. 

Let X represent the major term, Z the minor, Y the 
middle. 

1st Fig. 2d Fig. 3d Fig. 4th Fig. 

Y, X, X,Y, Y,X, X,Y, 

Z, Y, Z, Y, Y, Z, Y,Z, 

Z, A., Z, Jl, Z, X, Z, jL. 

The terms alone being here stated, the quantity and 
quality of each proposition (and consequently the mood 
of the whole syllogism) is left to be filled up : {i. e. be- 
tween Y and X, we may place either a negative or 
affirmative copula : and we may prefix either a uni- 
versal or particular sign to Y. ) By applying the moods 

necessarily in ordinary discourse. This remark may appear super- 
fluous, but that I have known a writer, generally acute and intelli- 
gent, fall into the strange misapprehension alluded to. The propei 
collocation of plants in abotanical herbarium, and in a flower-gar- 
den, and again, on a farm, would be widely different. 

I 1 I 1 

I A 

* €. ^. Some restraint is salutary • all restraint is unpleasant 
I 1 

something unpleasant is salutary. Again : some herbs are fit for 

A X 

food : nightshade is an herb : some nightshade is fit for ft>od. 



114 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book li. 

then to each figure, it will be found that each figure 
will admit six moods only, as not violating the vviles 
against undistributed middle, and against illicii process, 
and of the moods so admitted, several (thougli valid) are 
useless, as having a particular conclusion, when a 
universal might have been drawn ; e. g. A, A, I, in the 
first fiigure, 

" All human creatures are entitled to liberty ; 
All slaves are human creatures ; therefore 
jSome slaves are entitled to liberty." 

Of the twenty-four moods, then, (six in each figure.) 
five are for this reason neglected: for the remaining 
nineteen, logicians have devised names to distinguish 
both the mood itself, and the figure in which it is found ; 
since when one mood (i. e. one in itself, without regard 
to figure) occurs in two diflferent figures, (as E, A, E, in 
the first and second) the mere letters denoting the mood 
would not inform us concerning the figure. In these 
names, then, the three vowels denote the propositions of 
which the syllogism is composed : the consonants (be 
sides their other uses, of which hereafter) serve to keep 
in mind the figure of the syllogism. 

p. ^ CbArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, fErlOque prio- 

^^* ' \ ris. 
„. 2 5 cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO,* se- 
^^ I cundae. 

C tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtlsI, fElApiOn, 
Fig. 3. < bOkArdO,t fErlsO, habet : quarta insuper 

^ addit. 
-CI- . C brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArls, fEsApO 
^^^•^- I frEsIsOn. 

By a careful study of these mnemonic lines (which 
must be committed to memory) you will perceive that 
A can only be proved in the first-figure, in which also 
every other proposition may be proved ; that the second 
proves only negatives : the third only particulars • that 

♦ Or, Fakoro, see § 7. f Or, Dokamo, see ^ 7. 



Chap. JIL § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 115 

che first figure requires the major-premiss to be univer- 
sal, and the minor, affirmative, ^c. ; with many other 
such observations, which will readily be made, (on trial 
of several syllogisms, in different moods) and the rea- 
sons for which will be found in the foregoing rules. 
E. G. to show why the second figure has only negative 
conclusions, we have only to consider, that in it the 
middle-term being the predicate in hotli premises, would 
not be dsitributed unless one premiss were negative 
(Chap. ii. § 2.) therefore the conclusion must be nega- 
tive also, by Chap. iii. § 2, rule 6. One mood in each 
figure may suffice in this place by way of example : 

First, Barbara, viz. (bAr.) " Every Y is X ; (bA) 
eyery Z is Y ; therefore (rA) every Z is X :" e. g. let 
the major-term (which is represented by X) be " one 
who possesses all virtue ;" the minor-term (Z) " every 
man who possesses one virtue ;" and the middle- term 
(Y) " every one who possesses prudence ;" and you will 
have the celebrated argument of Aristotle, Etii. sixth 
book, to prove that the virtues are inseparable ; viz. 
" He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue ; 

He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence ; 
therefore 

He who possesses one, possesses all." 

Second, Camestres, (cAm) " every X is Y ; (Es) no 
Z is Y ; (trEs) no Z is X." Let the major- term (X) be 
"true philosophers," the minor (Z) "the Epicureans;" 
the middle (Y) "reckoning virtue a good in itself;" 
and this will be part of the reasoning of Cicero, off. 
book first and third, against the Epicureans. 

Third, Darapti, viz. {dA) " every Y is X ; (rAp) 
every Y is Z ; therefore {tl) some Z is X : e. g. 

" Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals ; 

but prudence is a virtue : therefore some virtue has 

for its object the benefit of the individual." 

js part of Adam Smith's reasoning {moral sentiments) 

against Hutcheson and others, who placed all virtue in 

benevolence. 



116 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book li 

Fourth, Camenes, viz. (cAm) " every X is Y : (En) 
■no Y is Z ; therefore (Es) no Z is X :" e. g. 
. " Whatever is expedient, is conformable to nature ; 

Whatever is conformable to nature, is not hurful to 
society ; therefore 

What is hurtful to society is never expedient ;" 
is part of Cicero's argument in Of. Lib. iii. ; but it is 
an inverted and clumsy way of stating what would 
much more naturally fall into the first-figure ; for if 
you examine the proposition^ of a syllogism in the 
fourth figure, beginning at the conclusion, you will see 
that as the major-term is predicated of the minor, so 
is the minor of the middle, and that again of the major ; so 
that the major appears to be mevelj predicated of itself. 
Hence the five moods in this figure are seldom or nev- 
er used; some one of the fourteen (rnoods with names) 
in the first three figures, being the forms into which all 
arguments may most readily be thrown : but of these, 
the four in the first-figure are the clearest and most na- 
tural ; as to them Aristotle's dictum will immediately 
apply. 

With respect to the use of the first three figures (for 
the fourth is never employed but by an accidental awk- 
wardness of expression) it may be remarked, that the 
first is that into which an argument will be found to 
fall the most naturally, except in the following cases : 
— first. When we have to disprove some- 
second^figure. ^^^^g ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ maintained, or is like- 
' ly to be believed, our arguments will usu- 
ally be found to take most conveniently the form of the 
second figure: viz. we prove that the thing we are 
speaking of cannot belong to such a class, either be- 
cause it wants what belongs to the whole of that class, 
(Cesare) or because it has something of which that 
class is destitute ; (Camestres) e. g. " No imposter 
would have warned his followers (as Jesus did) of the 
persecutions they would have to submit to ;" and again, 
" An enthusiast would have expatiated (which Jesus 



Chap. HI. §4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 117 

and his followers did not) on the particulars of a future 
state. 

The same observations will £ipply, mutatis mutandis^ 
when a particular conclusion is sought ; as in Festino 
and Baroko. - 

The arguments used in the process called the " Ab- 
scissio Intiniti," will in general be the most easily re- 
ferred to this figure. (See Chap. v. § 1. subs^iction 6.) 
The phrase was applied by some logical writers to a 
series of arguments used in any inquiry in which we 
go on excluding, one by one, certain suppositions, or 
certain classes of things, from that whose real nature 
we are seeking to ascertain. 

Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude ''small 
pox ;" that is, prove this not to be the patient's disor- 
der ; other symptoms, suppose, exclude, " scarlatina,^' 
&c., and so one may proceed by gradually narrowing 
the range of possible suppositions. Hence, the second 
figure might be called the *' exclusive" figure. 

The third figure is, of course, the one 
"employed when the middle-term is singu- tiS^-figure^ 
lar, since a singular term can only be a 
subject. This is also the form into which most argu- 
ments will naturally fall that are used to establish an 
objection (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent's pre- 
miss, when his argument is such as to require that pre- 
miss to be universal. It might be called, therefore, the 
" Enstatic" figure. E. G. If any one contends that 
" this or that doctrine ought not to be admitted, because 
it cannot be explained or comprehended," his suppress- 
ed major premiss may be refuted by the argument that 
** the connexion of the body and soul cannot be ex- 
plained or comprehended." Thus again you might 
prove by the example of a certain individual,* the con- 
tradictory of a proposition (which would seem to most 
persons a very probable conjecture) that a deaf and 
dumb person, born blind, cannot be taught language, 
* Laura Bridgeman, alluded to above. 



118 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 11. 

A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy 
may be exhibited in this form. 

As it is on the dictum above-mentioned Reduction of 
that all reasoning ultimately depends, so, syllogisms, 
all arguments may be in one way or other brought 
into some one of the four moods m the first-figure : and 
a syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced : {i. e. 
to the first-figure.) These four are called the perfect 
moods, and all the resiimperfect. 

Ostensive Reduction, 

§ 5. In reducing a syllogism, we are not, of course, 
allowed to introduce any new term or proposition, hav- 
ing nothing granted but the truth of the premises ; but 
these premises are allowed to be illatively converted 
(because the truth of any proposition implies that of its 
illative converse) or transposed : by taking advantage 
of this liberty, where there is need, we deduce (in 
figure 1st,) from the premises originally given, either 
the very same conclusion as the original one, or another 
from which the original conclusion -follows by illative 
conversion. E. G. Darapti, 
" All wits are dreaded ; 
All wits are admired ; 
Some who are admired are dreaded," 

is reduced into Darii. by converting " by limitation" 
{per accidens) the miiiOTi^iemiss. 
"All wits are dreaded ; 
Some who are admired are wits ; therefore 
Some who are admired are dreaded." 

And Camestres — e. g. 
" All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself; 
The advocates of pleasure do not account, &c. 
Therefore they are not true philosophers," 

is reduced to Celarent, by simply converting the minor, 
^nd then transposing the premises 



Chap. JII. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 119 

*' Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not 
advocates of pleasure ; 
All true philosophers account virtue, &c. ; therefore 
No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure." 

This conclusion may be illatively converted into the 
original one. 

So. Baroko ;* e. g. 
"Every true patriot is a friend to religion ; Reduction by 

Some great statesmen are not friends_^to re- means of con- 
Ugion ; version by ne- 

Some great statesmen are not truj^ patriots," S^^^^"- 
to Ferio, by converting the major by negation, ['' con- 
traposition,"] vide Chap. ii. § 4. 
" He who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot ; 

Some great statesmen," &c. 

and the rest of the syllogism remains the same : only 
that the minor premiss must be considered as affirmative, 
because you take " not-a- friend-to-religion," as the 
middle term. In the same manner Bokardo\ to Darii ; 
e. g. 

" Some slaves are not discontented ; 
All slaves are wronged ; therefore 
Some who are wronged are not discontented." 

Convert the major " by negation" (" contraposition") 
and then transpose them ; the conclusion will be the 
converse by negation of the original one, which there- 
fore may be inferred from it ; e. g. 
"All slaves are wronged ; 
Some who are not discontented are slaves. 
Some who are not discontented are wronged." 
In these ways (by what is called ostensive reduction, 
oticause you prove, in the first figure, either the very 
same conclusion as before, or one which implies it) all 
the imperfect moods may be reduced to the four perfect 

* Or Fakoro, considered i. c. as Festino. See note at the end of 
this chapter. 

t Or Dokamo, considered i. e as Disamis. See note at the end o( 
this chapter. 



120 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Booe. 11 

ones. But there is another way, called indirect reduc- 
tion, or 

Reductio ad impossibile 

§ 6. By which we prove (in the first-figure) not, di- 
rectly, that the original conclusion is true, but ihat it 
cannot be false ; i. e. that an absurdity would follow from 
the supposition of its being false ; e. g. 

" All true patriots are friends to religion ; 

Some great statesmen are not friends to rehgion : 
Some great statesmen are not true patriots i" 

if this conclusion be not true, its contradictory must be 
true ; viz. 

** All great statesnien are true patriots, 
let this then be assumed, in the place of the minorpre- 
miss of the original syllogism, and a fcdse conclusion 
will be proved \ e. g. 

bAr ** All true patriots are friends to religion ; 
bA, Ail gieat statesmen are true patriots ; 
rA, All great statesmen are friends to religion ;" 
for as this conclusion is the contradictory of the origin- 
al minor premiss, it must be false, since the premises 
are always supposed to be granted ; therefore one of 
the premises (by which it has been correctly proved) 
must be false also ; but the major premiss (being one 
of those originally granted) is true ; therefore the falsity 
must be in the minor premiss ; which is the contradic- 
tory of the original-conclusion ; therefore the original- 
conclusion must be true. This is the indirect mode of 
reasoning. (See Rhetoric, Part L Ch. ii. § L) 
_ § 7. This kind of reduction is seldom employed but 
for Baroko and Bokardo, which are thus reduced by 
those who confine themselves to simple conversion, and 
siffnification conversion by limitation, {per accidens :) 
of the names of and they framed the names of their moods, 
the moods ^jth a view to point out the manner ir? 



Chap. IV. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 121 

which each is to be reduced ; viz. B, C, D, F, which 
are the initial letters of all the moods, indicate to which 
mood of the first figure {Barbara, Celarent, Darii, and 
Ferio) each of the others is to be reduced : m indicates 
that the premises are to be transposed ; s and p, that 
the proposition denoted by the vowel immediately pre 
ceding, is to be converted ; s, simply, p. per accidens, 
[by limitation :] thus, in Camestres, (see example,) the 
C indicates that it must be reduced to Celarent ; the 
two ss, that the minor premiss and conclusion must be 
converted simply; the m, that the premises must be 
transposed. The P, in the mood Bramantip, denotes 
that the premises warrant a universal -conclusion in 
place of a particular. The I. though of course it can- 
not be illatively converted per accidens, viz. : so as to 
become A, yet is thus converted in the conclusion, be- 
cause as soon as the premises are transposed (as denoted 
by m,) it appears that a universal conclusion follows 
from them. 

jK^ (which indicates the reduction ad impossibile) is a 
sign that the proposition, denoted by the vowel imme- 
diately before it, must be left out, and the contradictory 
of the conclusion substituted ; viz. for the minor premiss 
in BaroJco and the major in Bokardo. But it has been 
already shown (§5) that the conversion by " contra- 
position" [by "negation"] wdll enable us to reduce 
these two moods, ostensively.* 

^ * If any one should choose that the names of these moods should 
indicate this, he might make K the index of conversion by nega- 
tion ; and then the names would be, by a slight change, Fakoro and 
Jiokamo, 

10 



122 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book H 

Chap. IV 

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. 111. 

Ot Modal Syllogisms, and of all Arguments besides 
regular and pure Categorical Syllogisms 

OfModals. 

§ 1. Hitherto we have treated of pure categorical 
propositions, and the syllogisms composed of such. A 
pure categorical proposition is styled by some logicians a 
proposition " de inesse,'' from its asserting simply that 
the predicate is or is not (in our conception) contained 
in the subject; as "John killed Thomas." A modal 
proposition asserts that the predicate is or is not con- 
tained in the subject in a certain mode, or manner ; as> 
" accidentally," " wilfully," &c. 

A modal proposition may be stated as a pure one, by 
attaching the mode to one of the term^ : and the propo- 
sition will in all respects fall under the foregoing rules ; 
e. g. " John killed Thomas wilfully and maliciously /' 
here the mode is to be regarded as part of the predicate. 
" It is probable that all knowledge is useful ;" " probably 
useful" is here the predicate. But when the mode is 
only used to express the necessary, contingent, or im- 
possible connexion of the terms, it may as well be at- 
tached to the subject: e. g. " man is necessarily mortal;" 
is the same as " all men are mortal :" " injustice is in no 
case expedient," corresponds to " no injustice is expe- 
dient :" and " this man is occasionally intemperate," has 
the force of a particular : (vide Chap. ii. § 2. note.) It is 
thus, and thus only, that two singular propositions may 
be contradictories ; e. g. " this man is never intemperate," 
will be the contradictory of the foregoing. Indeed every 
sign (of universality or particularity) may be considered 
as a mode. 



Chap. IV. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 123 

Since, however, in all modal propositions, you assert 

that the dictum {i. e. the assertion itself) and the mode, 

agree together, or disagree, so, in some cases, this may 

be the most convenient way of stating a modal, purely : 

subj, cop. pred. subject 

€. g. " It is impossible that all men should be virtuous." 

sub. cop. 

Such is a proposition of the Apostle Paul's: " This is 

pred. subject. 

a faithful saying, &c. that Jesus Christ came into the 

subj. 

world to save sinners."* In these cases one of your 
terms (the subject) is itself an entire proposition. 

In English, the word in is often used in expressing 
one proposition combined with another in such a man- 
ner as to make the two, one proposition : e. g. " You 
will have a formidable opponent to encounter in the 
emperor:" this involves two propositions ; 1st, "You 
will have to encounter the emperor ;" 2d, " He will 
prove a formidable opponent :" this last is implied by 
the word in, which denotes (agreeably to the expression 
of Logicians mentioned above when they speak of a 
proposition "de messe") that that predicate is co^fam- 
ed in that subject. 

It may be proper to remark in this place, 
that we may often meet with a proposition p Jg-tion^ ^^°' 
whose drift and force will be very different, 
according as we regard this or that as its predicate, f In- 
deed, properly speaking, it may be considered as several 
different propositions, each indeed implying the irtt^/i of 
all the rest, but each having a distinct predicate ; the 

* See Rhetoric, Part iii. Ch. 2. § 2. 

t On the logical analj'-sis of propositions Mr. Greenlaw has found- 
ed a very ingenious, and as it appears to me, correct and useful 
grammatical theory, of the use of the Latin Subjunctive. His work 
is well worth the notice of students of Logic as well as of Latinity. 



124 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

division of the sentence being varied in each case ; and 
the variations marked, either by the collocation of the 
words, the intonation of the voice, or by the designation 
of the emphatic words, [viz. : the predicate,] a^ scored 

under, or printed in italics. E. G. " The Organon of 

2 3 4 6 

Bacon was not designed to supersede the Organon of 

6 

Aristotle :" this might be regarded as, at least, six dif- 
ferent propositions; if the word numbered (1) were in 
italics, it would leave us at liberty to suppose that Ea- 
con might have designed to supersede by some work of 
his, the Organon of Aristotle ; but not by his own Or- 
ganon ; if No. 2 were in italics, we should understand 
the author to be contending, that whether or no any 
other author had composed an organon with such a de- 
sign, Bacon at least did not : if No. 3, then, we should 
understand him to maintain that whether Bacon's Orga- 
non does or does not supersede Aristotle's, no such de- 
sign at least was entertained : and so with the rest. 
Each of these is a distinct proposition ; and though each 
of them implies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily 
be seen by examining the example given) one of them 
may be, in one case, and another, in another, the one 
which it is important to insist on. 

We should consider in each case what question it is 
that is proposed, and what answer to it would, in the 
instance before us, be the most opposite or contrasted to 
the one to be examined. E. G. " You will find this 
doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either with, 
" You will find in Bacon a different doctrine," or with, 
" You will find this doctrine in a different author.'' 

And observe, that when a proposition is 

w?rds^^^^ contrasted with one which has a different 

predicate^ the predicate is the emphatic 

word ; as ** this man is 3. murderer /' i. e. not one who 

nas slain another accidentally, or in self-defence : " this 

man is a murderer," with the copula for the emphatic 



Chap. IV. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 125 

word, stands opposed to " he is not a murderer ;" a 
proposition with the same termSyhuX a different copula.* 
It will often happen that several of the propositions 
which are thus stated in a single sentence, may require, 
each, to he distinctly stated and proved : e. g. the ad- 
vocate may have to prove, first the fact, that " John 
killed Thomas ;" and then, the character of the act, that 
" the killing was wdlful and malicious." See Praxis, 
at the end of the vol. See also Elements of Rhetoric, 
Part 1. Ch. iii. ^ 5. 

Of Hypotheticals. 

§ 2. A hypotheticalf proposition is defined to be two 
or more categoricals united by a copula [conjunction :] 
and the different kinds of hypothetical propositions are 
named from their respective conjunctions ; viz. condi- 
tional, disjunctive, causal, &c. 

When a hypothetical conclusion is inferred from a 
hypothetical premiss, so that the force of the reasoning 
does not turn on the hypothesis, then the hypothesis 
(as in modals) must be considered as part of one of 
the terms; so that the reasoning will be, in effect, ca- 
tegorical : e, g. 

predicate. 

" Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain : 
Caesar was a conqueror ; therefore 
predicate. 

He was either a hero or a villain.^' 

* Thus if any one reads (as many are apt to do,) " Thou shoAt not 
steal,"—'* Thou shalt not commit adultery," he implies the question 
to he, whether we are commanded to steal or to forbear : but the 
question really is, what things are forbidden ; and the answer is, 
•« Thou shalt not steal ,•" " Thou shalt not commit adultery," &c. 

Tho connexion between Logic and correct delivery is farther 
pointed out in Rhei. App. 1. 

Strictly speaking, the two cases I have mentioned coincide ; for 
when the " is " or the " not " is emphatic, it becomes properly the 
predicate : viz. " the statement of this man's being a murderer, is 
true,"" or *' is /oisc." 

t Compound, according to some writers. 



126 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

** Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence 5 

subject. 

If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come 
from God ; 

If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to rev- 
erence." 

But when the reasoning itself rests on the hypothesis 
(in which way a categorical conclusion may be drawn 
from a hypothetical premiss,) this is what is called a 
hypothetical syllogism ; and rules have been devised for 
ascertaining the validity of such arguments at once, 
without bringing them into the categorical form. (And 
note, that in these syllogisms, the hypothetical premiss 
is called the major, and the categorical one the minor ) 
They are of two kinds, conditional and disjunctive 

Of Conditionals. 

§ 3. A conditional* proposition has in it an illative 
^orce; i. e. it contains two, and only two categorical 
propositions, whereof one results from the other [or 
follows from it,] e. g. 

antecedent. 



" If the Scriptures are not wholly false, 
consequent. 

they are entitled to respect." 
That from which the other results is called the antece- 
dent; that which results from it, the consequent {conse- 
quens ;) and the connexion between the two (express- 
ed by the word " if") the consequence (consequentia.) 

The natural order is, that the antecedent should come 
before the consequent ; but this is frequently reversed ; 
e. g. " The husbandman is well off if he knows his 
own advantages." (Virg. Geor.) 

* Called hypothetical by those writers who use the word com 
vound to denote what I have called hypothetical. 



Chaf IV. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 127 

Every ^conditional proposition may be considered as 
an universal -tt^rma^zve, whether the members of which 
it consists be universal or particular, negative or affir- 
mative. And the truth or falsity of a conditional pro- 
position depends entirely on the consequence: e. g. " if 
logic is useless, it deserves to be neglected;" here both 
antecedent and consequent are false : yet the whole 
proposition is true ; i. e. it is true that the consequent 
follows from the antecedent. *' If Cromwell was an 
Englishman, he was an usurper,'' is just the reverse 
case ; for though it is true that *' Cromwell w^as an Eng- 
lishman," and also that '' he was an usurper," yet it is 
not true that the latter of these propositions depends On 
the former ; the whole proposition, therefore, is false, 
(or at least absurd — -see next section) though both an- 
tecedent and consequent are true. 

It is to be observed, however, that a false, or at least 
nugatory, conditional proposition of this kind, viz. : in 
which each member is a true categorical — is such, that, 
though itself absurd, no false conclusion can be drawn 
from it ; as may be seen froni the instance just given. 

A conditional proposition, in short, may be consid- 
ered as an assertion of the validity oi a certain argu- 
ment ; since to assert that an argument is valid, is to as- 
sert that the conclusion necessarily results from the 
premises, whether those premises be true or not. 

The meaning, then, of a conditional proposition — 
which is, that the antecedent being granted, the conse- 
quent is granted, may be considered in two points of 
view : first, ** il the antecedent be true, the consequent 
mwit be true;" hence the first rule ; the anteceder.t de- 
ing granted, the consequent may be ii-f erred: second- 
ly) ** if the antecedent were true, the consequent would 
be true ;" hence the second rule ; the consequent being 
denied the antecedent may be denied ; for the antece- 
dent must in that case be false; since if it were true, 
the consequent (which is granted to be false) would be 
true also. E. G "If this man has a fever, he is not 



128 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

fit to travel ;" here if you grant the antecedent, the first 
rule applies, and you infer the truth of the consequent; 
Constructive " he has a fever ; therefore he is not fit to 
and destruc- travel." Tf A is B, C is D ; but A is B, 
^^^'®' therefore C is D ; and this is called a con" 

structive conditional syllogism. But if you deny the 
consequent {i. e. grant its contradictory) the second 
rule applies, and you infer the contradictory of the an- 
tecedent ; " he is fit to travel ; therefore he has no fe- 
ver;" this is the destructive conditional syllogism. Jf 
A is B, C is D ; C is not D, therefore A is not B. Again, 
" If the crops are not bad-, corn must be cheap," for a 
major ; then, " but the crops are not bad, therefore corn 
must be cheap," is constructive. " Corn is not cheap, 
therefore the crops are bad," is destructive. " If every 
increase of population is desirable, some misery is de- 
sirable ; but no misery is desirable ; therefore some in- 
crease of population is not desirable," is destructive. 

Bui if you affirm the consequent or deny the ante- 
cedent, you can infer nothing J for the same conse- 
quent may follow from other antecedents : e. g. in 
the example above, a man may be unfit to travel from 
other disorders besides a fever ; therefore it does not fol- 
low, from his being unfit to travel, that he has a fever ; 
or (for the same reason) from his not having a fever, 
that he is not unfit to travel. 

And it is to be observed that these falla- 
ca^effodcai^'^ ^^^® correspond respectively with those 
and in hypo- mentioned in treating of categorical syllo- 
theticai form gignis. The assertion of the consequent, 
correspon . ^^^^ inferring thence the truth of the ante- 
cedent, answers to the fallacy of " undistributed-mid- 
dle," or to that of " negative premises." E. G, " He 
who has a fever is unfit to travel ;" (or, " is not fit to 
travel.") " This man is unfit" (or, " is not fit") " to 
travel ; therefore he has a fever." The fallacy again 
of denying the antecedent, and thence inferring the con- 
tradictory of the consequent, corresponds either to that 



Chap. IV. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 125 

of negative premises, or to " illicit process of the ma- 
jor," or that of introducing, palpably," " more than 
three terms." E. G. " He who has a fever is unfit to 
travel ; this man has not a fever," &c.* 

There are, then, two, and only two, kinds of condi- 
tional syllogisms ; the constructive, founded on the first 
rule, and answering to direct reasoning ; and the de- 
structive, on the second, answering to indirect ; being 
in fact a mode of throwing the indirect form of reason- 
ing into the direct : e. g. If C be not the centre of the 
circle, some other point must be ; which is impossible 
therefore C is the centre. (Euclid, B. III. Pr. 1.) 

And note^ that a conditional proposition may (like 
the categorical A) be converted by nega- conversion ol 
tion ; i. e. you may take the contradictory conditionals. 
of the consequent, as an antecedent, and the contradic 
tory of the antecedent, as a consequent : e. g. " If this 
man is fit to travel, he has not a fever." By this con- 
version of the major premiss, a constructive syllogism 
may be reduced to a destructive, and vice versa. {See 
§ 6. Ch. iii ) 

Of Disjunctives. 

^ 4. A disjunctive proposition is one that consists of 
two or more categoricals, connected by the conjunctions 
*' either " and " or," the force of which is, to state an 
alternative ; i. e. to imply that some one of the catego- 
ricals thus connected must be true : e. g. " either A is 
B, or C is D " will not be a true proposition unless one 
of the two members of it be true. 

On the other hand, one of the members may be true, 
and yet they may have no such natural connexion to- 
gether as to warrant their being proposed as an alterna- 
tive ; as " either Britain is an island, or a triangle is a 
square." Such a proposition would rather be called 

* Virtually, all these fallacies do really amount to the introduc- 
tion of a fourth term. See § 2. Ch. iii. 

u 



130 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book:. 11 

nugatory and absurd, than false ; since no false concliX* 
sion could be deduced from it ; as was remarked in the 
last section concerning such a conditional as this might 
be reduced to : e. g. "If Britain is not an island," &c. 
Such propositions are often colloquially uttered in a 
kind of jest. 

If 5 therefore, one or more of these categoricals be de- 
nied {i- e. granted to be false) you may infer that the 
remaining one, or (if several) some one of the remaining 
ones, is true. E. G. '* Either the world is eternal, or 
the work of chance, or the work of an intelligent being ; 
it is not eternal, nor the work of chance, therefore it is 
the work of an intelligent being." " It is either spring, 
summer, autumn, or winter ; but it is neither spring nor 
summer ; therefore it is either autumn or winter." 
Either A is B, or C is D ; but A is not B, therefore C 
isD. 

Observe, that in these examples (as well as in most 
others) it is implied not only that one of the members 
(the categorical propositions) must be truey but that 
only one can be true ; so that, in such cases, if one or 
more members be affirmed, the rest may be denied ; 

Exclusive [the members may then be called exdu- 
disjunctives, sive :] e. g. " It is summer, therefore it is 
neither spring, autumn, nor winter ;" " either A is B, 
or C is D ; but A is B, therefore C is not D." But this 
is by no means universally the case ; e. g. " Virtue 
tends to procure us either the esteem of mankind, or the 
favour of God :" here both members are true, and con- 
sequently from one being affirmed we are not authorized 
to deny the other. Of course we are left to conjecture 
in each case, from the context, whether it is meant to 
be implied that the members are or are not '* exclusive." 

Disjunctive ^^ ^^ evident that a disjunctive syllogism 
reducible to may easily be reduced to a conditional , by 
conditional, taking as an antecedent the co7itradictory 
of one or more of the members : e. g. if it is not spring 
^ summer, it is either autumn or winter, &c. 



Chap. IV. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 131 

It is to be observed of hypothetical [com- 
pound] propositions, whether conditional cal ^proposL 
or disjunctive, that they are always af- tions always 
nrmative: I e. it is always affirmed, not ^^^"^ative 
denied, that the connexion between the several catego- 
rical members, denoted, respectively, by the conjunctions 
employed, does exist. Accordingly, the contradiction 
of any hypothetical proposition is not made by a hypo 
thetical. If I assert that " if A is B, C is D," you might 
deny that, by saying " it does not follow that if A is B, 
C must be D •" or m some such expression. So the 
contradiction of this, " either A is B or C is D," would 
be by two categorical negatives ; " neither is A, B, nor 
is C, D :" or, it is possible that neither A is B, nor C, D. 
The conjunctions "neither" and "nor," it should be 
observed, do not correspond in their nature with 
" either " and " or ;" since these last are disjunctive, 
which the others are not. 

The Dilemma, 

§ 5 : Is a complex kind of conditional syllogism. The 
account usually given of the dilemma in logical treatises 
is singularly perplexed and unscientific. And it is re- 
markable that all the rules they usually give respecting 
it, and the faults against which they caution us, relate 
exclusively to the subject-matter : as if one were to lay 
down as rules respecting a syllogism in Barbara, " 1st. 
Care must be taken that the major premiss be true: 
2dly that the minor premiss be true !" 

Most, if not all, writers on this point either omit to 
tell us whether the dilemma is a kind of conditional, or 
of disjunctive argument ; or else refer it to the latter class, 
on account of its having one disjunctive premiss ; though 
it clearly belongs to the class of conditionals. 

1st. If you have in the major premiss several a^itece- 
dents all with the same consequent, then, these antece- 
dents, being (in the minor) disjunctively granted {i e. 



132 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 11 

it being granted that some one of them is true,) the one 
common consequent may be inferred, (as in the case of 
a simple constructive syllogism : e. g. if A is B, C is D ; 
and if X is Y, C is D ; but either A is B, or X is Y ; 
therefore C is D. "If the blest in heaven have no 
desires, they will be perfectly content : so they v^ill, if 
their desires are fully gratified ; but either they will have 
no desires, or have them fully gratified ; therefore they 
will be perfectly content." Note, in this case, the two 

Simple con- conditionals which make up the major 
structive Chi- premiss may be united into one proposition 
lemma. ^y j^gans of the word ''whether:'' e. g 

" whether the blest, &c. have no desires, or have their 
desires gratified, they will be content." 

Complex con. ^^' But if the setJ^raZ antecedents have 
Ktructive di- each a different consequent y then the ante- 
lemma. cedents, being, as before, disjunctively 

granted, you can only disjunctively infer the conse- 
quents : e. g. if A is B, C is D ; and if X is Y, E is F ; 
but either A is B, or X is Y ; therefore either C is D, or 
E is F. " If ^schines joined in the public rejoicings, 
he is inconsistent ; if he did not, he is unpatriotic : but 
he either joined, or not : therefore he is either inconsis 
tent or unpatriotic."* This case, as well as the fore- 
going, is evidently constructive. 

In the destructive form, whether you 
that ^f?e"^^not have one antecedent with several conse- 
properiy di- quents, or several antecedents, either with 
lemmas. ^^^^ ^^ ^^^l^ several consequents ; in all 

these cases, if you deny the whole of the consequent, or 
consequents, you may in the conclusion deny the whole 
of the antecedent or antecedents : e. g. " If the world 
were eternal, the most useful arts, such as printing, &c. 
would be of unknown antiquity : and on the same sup- 
position, there would be records long prior to the Mosaic ; 
and likewise the sea and land, in all parts of the globe, 
might be expected to maintain the same relative situa- 

* Demost. /or the crown. 



Chap. IV § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 133 

tions now as formerly : but none of these is the fact : 
therefore the world is not eternal." Again, "If the 
world existed from eternity, there would be records prior 
to the Mosaic ; and if it were produced by chance, it 
would not bear marks of design : there are no records 
prior to the Mosaic : and the world does bear marks of 
design : therefore it neither existed from eternity, nor is 
the work of chance." These are sometimes called 
dilemmas, but hardly differ from simple conditional 
syllogisms, two or more being expressed together. 

Nor is the case different if you have one antecedent 
with several consequents, which consequents you dis- 
junctively deny ; for that comes to the same thing as 
wholly denying them ; since if they be not ail true, the 
one antecedent must equally fall to the ground ; and the 
syllogism will be equally simple : e. g. *' If we admit 
the popular objections against Political Economy, we 
must admit that it tends to an excessive increase of 
wealth ; and also, that it tends to impoverishment: but 
it cannot do both of these ; {i. e. either not the one, or 
not the other) therefore we cannot admit the popular 
objections," &c. ; which is evidently a simple destruc- 
tive. 

The true dilemma is, "a conditional syllogism with 
several* antecedents in the major , and a disjunctive mi" 
nor ;" hence, 

3d. That is most properly called di. de- 
structive dilemma, which has (like the con- ^diiemmal^ 
structive ones) ^.disjunctive minor premiss ; 
i e. when you have several antecedents with each a 
different consequent; which consequents (instead of 
wholly denying them, as in the case lately mentioned) 
you disjunctively deny : and thence in the conclusion, 
deny disjunctively the antecedents ; e. g. if A is B, C is 
D ; and if X is Y, E is F : but either C is not D, or E is 

* The name dilemma implies precisely two antecedents ; and 
hence it is common to speak of "the horns of a dilemma i" but 
it is evident there may he either two or more. 



134 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. II. 

not F ; therefore, either A is not B, or X is not Y. " If 
this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently 
of Scripture in jest ; and if he were good, he would not 
do so in earnest; but he does it, either in jest, or in 
earnest ; therefore he is either not wise, or not good." 
Or again, you may have a dilemma partly constructive 
and partly destructive: as the above example would be, 
if yoa were to convert one of the conditionals, (see § 3.) 
into "if C is not D, A is not B :" for the minor pre- 
miss would then assert that either the antecedent of one 
of the conditionals is true, or the consequent of the 
other, false. 

Every dilemma may be reduced into two 
■^a dilemma?^ or more simple conditional syllogisms : e. g. 
"li iEschines joined, &c. he is inconsis- 
tent ; he did join, &c. therefore he is inconsistent ;" and 
again, " If ^schines did not join, &c. he is unpatriotic ; 
he did not, &c. therefore he is unpatriotic." Now 
an opponent might deny either of the minor premises in 
the above syllogisms, but he could not deny both ; and 
therefore he must admit one or the other of the conclu 
sions ; for when a dilemma is employed, it is supposed 
that some one of the antecedents must be true (or, in 
the destructive kind, some one,oi the consequents false,) 
but that we cannot tell which of them is so ; and this is 
the reason why the argument is stated in the form of a 
dilemma. 

Sometimes it may happen that both antecedents may 
be true, and that we may be aware of this ; and yet 
there may be an advantage in stating (either separately 
or conjointly) both arguments, even when each proves 
the same conclusion, so as not to derive any additional 
confirmation from the other ; — still, I say, it may some- 
times be advisable to state both, because, of two propo- 
sitions equally true, one man may deny or be ignorant 
of the one, while he admits the other ; and another man 
vice versa. 

From what has been said, it may easily be seen that 



Chap IV. § 6] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 135 

ail dilemmas are in fact conditional syllogisms ; and that 
disjunctive syllogisms may also be reduced to the form 
of conditionals ; but as it has been remarked, that all 
. reasoning whatever may ultimately be brought to the 
one test of Aristotle's "dictum," it remains to show 
how a conditional syllogism may be thrown into such 
a form, that that test will at once apply to it ; and this 
is called the 

Reduction af Hypotketicah.* 

§ 6. For this purpose we must consider every con- 
ditional proposition as a universal-affirmative categori- 
cal proposition, of which the terms are entire proposi- 

* AMrich has stated, somewhat rashly, that Aristotle utterly de 
Bpised hypothetical syllogisms, and thence made no mention of 
them. We cannot, however, considering how large a portio n of hi* 
works is lost, draw any conclusion from the mere absence of a trea- 
tise on this branch, in the portion which has come down to us. 

Aldrich observes, that no hypothetical argument is valid which 
cannot be reduced to a categorical form ; and this is evidently 
agreeable to what has been said at the beginning of Chap. iii. ; but 
then he has unfortunately omitted to teach us how to reduce hypo 
theticals to this form ; except in the case where the antecedent and 
consequent chance to have each the same subject ; in which case, 
he tells us to take the minor premiss and conclusion as an Enthy- 
meme, and fill that up categorically j e.g. " If Caesar was a tyrant, 
he de erved death : he was a tyrant, therefore he deserved death j" 
which may easily be reduced to a categorical lorm, by taking as a 
major premiss, " all tyrants deserve death." But when (as is often 
the case) the antecedent and consequent have not each the same 
subject, (as in the very example he gives, " if A isJB, C is D,") he 
gives no rule for reducing such a syllogism as has a premiss of this 
kind ; and indeed leads us to suppose that it is to be rejected as in- 
valid, though he has just before demonstrated its validity. 

And this is likely to have been one among the various causes 
which occasion many learners to regard the whole system of Logic 
jBis a string of idle reveries, having: nothing true, substantial, or 
practically useful in it ; but of the same character with the dreams 
of Alchymy, Demonology, and Judicial- Astrology. Such a mis- 
take is surely the less inexcusable in a learner, when his master 
first demonstrates the validity of a certain argument, and then tells 
iiim that after all it is good for nothing ; {prorsus repudiandum.) 

In the late editions of Aldrich's Logic, all that he says of the re- 
duction of hypotheticals is omitted ; which certainly would have 
been an improvement, if a more correct one had been substituted j 
fettt as it is, there is a complete hiatus in the system. 



136 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

tions, viz. the antecedent answering to the subject, and 
the consequent to thepredicate. E. G. The proposition 
" if A is B, X is Y," may be considered as amounting 
to this ; " The case [or supposition] of A being B, is a 
case of X being Y." And then, to say (as in the minor- 
premiss^and the conclusion, of a constructive-condition- 
al syllogism) "A is B; and therefore X is Y," is 
equivalent to saying, *-' the present [or the existing J 
case is a case of A being B : therefore this is a case of 
X being Y." Again, to say, " if Louis is a good king,, 
France is likely to prosper," is equivalent to saying, 
*' The case of Louis being a good king, is a case of 
France being likely to prosper :" and if it be granted a& 
a minor premiss to the conditional syllogism, that 
" Louis is a good king ;" that is equivalent to saying,. 
*' the present case is the case of Louis being a good 
king ;" from which you will draw a conclusion in Bar- 
bara, {viz. " the present case is a case of France being 
likely to prosper,") exactly equivalent to the original; 
conclusion of the conditional syllogism : viz. " France 
is likely to prosper." As the constructive conditional 
may thus be reduced to Barbara, so may the destructive, 
in like manner, to Celarent : e. g. " If the Stoics are- 
right, pain is no evil : but pain is an evil ; therefore 
the Stoics are not right ;" is equivalent to—'' The case 
of the Stoics being right, is the case of pain being no 
evil ; the present case is not the case of pain being no 
evil ; therefore the present case is not the case of the 
Stoics being right." This is Camestres, which, of 
course, is easily reduced to Celarent. Or, if ymi will,, 
all conditional syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, 
by considering them all as constructive ; which may be 
done, as mentioned above, by " converting by nega^ 
tion" [contraposition] the mrijor premiss. (See § 3.) 
Abridged '^^^ reduction of hypotheticals may al- 
forms of reduc ways be effected in the manner above sta- 
tion of hypo- ted ; but as it produces a circuitous awk- 
theticais. wardness of expression, a more convenient 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICaIi COMPENDIUM. 137 

form may in some cases be substituted. E. G. in the 
example above, it may be convenient to take " true'* 
for one of the terms ; " that pain is no evil is not true ; 
that pain is no evil is asserted by the Stoics; therefore 
something asserted by the Stoics is not true." Some- 
times again it may be better to unfold the argument in- 
to two syllogisms: e. g. in a former example; first, 
" Louis is a good king : the governor of France is Louis ; 
therefore the governor of France is a good king." And 
then, second^ " every country governed by a good king 
is likely to prosper," &c. 

^ A dilemma may of course (see § 5,) be reduced inta 
two or more categorical syllogisms. 

When the antecedent and consequent of a conditional 
have each the same subject, you may sometimes reduce 
the conditional by merely substituting a categorical ma- 
jor-premiss for the conditional one : e. g. instead of " if 
Caesar was a tyrant, he deserved death ; he w^as a tyrant, 
therefore he deserved death ;" you may put for a major, 
" all tyrants deserve death ;" &c. But it is of no great 
consequence* whether hypotheticals are reduced in the 
most neat and concise manner or not; since it is not in- 
tended that they should be reduced to categoricals, in 
ordinary practice, Sisihe readiest way of trying their va- 
lidity, (their own rules being quite sufficient for that pur- 
pose ;) but only that we should he able, if required, to sub- 
ject any argument whatever to the test of Aristotle's dic- 
tum, in order to show that all reasoning turns upon one 
simple principle. 

Of Enthymeme, Soiites^ cj'c. 

§ 7. There are Vctrious abridged forms of argument 

which may be easily expanded into regular ^ ,, 

11 • 1 -« SrrM. -n< ^T_ * Enthymcme. 

syllogisms ; such as 1st. The Enthymeme,* 

* The word Enthymeme is employed in a diflerent sense from 
this, by Aristotle, iii Rhet. B. i Se e Elements of Rheto^*>, Part I 
ch. ii. ^ 2. 



us ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book II, 

which is a syllogism with one premiss suppressed. As 
all the terms will be found in the remaining premiss and 
conclusion, it will be easy to fill up the syllogism by 
supplying the premiss that is wanting, whether major or 
minor : e. g. " Caesar was a tyrant ; therefore he de- 
served death." " a free nation must be happy j therefore 
the English are happy." 

This is the ordinary form of speaking and writing. 
It is evident that Enthymemes may be filled up hypo- 
thetically. 

It is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is not strictly 
syllogistic ; i. €. its conclusiveness is not apparent from 
the mere form of expression, till the suppressed premiss 
shall have been, either actually or mentally, supplied. 
The expressed premiss may be true, and yet the conclu- 
sion false. 

The Sorites, on the other hand, is strictly syllogistic ; 
as may be seen by the examples. If the premises stated 
be true, the conclusion must be true. For, 

2d. When you have a string of syllogisms, in the first 
figure, in which the conclusion of each is made the pre- 
miss of the next, till you arrive at the main or ultimate 
conclusion of all, you may sometimes state these briefly, 
in the form called Sorites ; in which the 
predicate of the first proposition is made 
the subject of the next; and so on, to any length, till 
finally the predicate of the last of the premises is predi- 
cated (in the conclusion) of the subject of the first : e. g. 
A (either every A, or some A) is B, every B is C, every 
C is D, every D is E ; therefore A is E ; or else " no I) 
is E ; therefore A is not E." " The English are a brave 
people ; a brave people are free ; a free people are hap- 
py ; therefore the English are happy." A Sorites, then, 
has as many middle-terms as there are intermediate pro- 
positions between the first and the last ; and conse- 
quently, it may be drawn out into as many separate 
syllogisms ; of which the first will have, for its major 
prsmiss the second, and for its minor y the firsts of the 



Chap iV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 139 

propositions of the Sorites ; as may be seen by the ex- 
ample. The reader will perceive also by examination 
of that example, and by framing others, that the first 
proposition in the Sorites is the only minor premiss 
that is expressed ; when the whole is resolved into dis- 
tinct syllogisms, each conclusion becomes the minor 
premiss of the succeeding syllogism. Hence in a So- 
rites, the first proposition, and that alone, of all the 
premises, may be particular ; because in the first figure 
the minor may be particular, but not the major ; (see 
chap. iii. § 4.) and all the other propositions, prior to 
the conclusion are major premises. It is also evident 
that there may be, in a Sorites, one, and only one, neg- 
ative premiss, viz. the last : for if any of the others 
were negative, the result would be that one of the syl- 
logisms of the Sorites would have a negative minor 
premiss; which is (in the 1st fig.) incompatible with 
correctness. See chap. iii. § 4. 

To the Sorites the " dictum " formerly Application of 
treated of may be applied, with one small the dictum to 
addition, which is self-evident. " What- ^^^ Sorites, 
ever is affirmed or denied of a whole class, may be af- 
firmed or denied of whatever is comprehended in [any 
class that is vjkolly comprehended in] that class." 
This sentence, omitting the portion enclosed in brackets, 
you will recognise as the "dictum" originally laid 
down : and the words in brackets supply that extension 
of it which makes it applicable to a " Sorites," of what- 
ever length ; since it is manifest that that clause might 
be enlarged as far as you will, into " a class that is 
wholly comprehended in a class, which again is wholly 
comprehended in another class, &c. 

A string of conditional syllogisms* may 
m like manner be abridged into a Sorites ; Hypothetical 
e.g if A :s B, C is D; if C is D, E is F ; 

♦ Hence it is evident how injudicious an arrangement has been 
adopted by former writers on Logic, who have treated of the Sorites 
and Enthymeme before they entered on the subject of Hypotheti 
cais. 



140 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC [Book. II. 

if E is F, G is H ; but A is B, therefore G is H. « If 
the Scriptures are the word of God, it is important that 
they should be well explained; if it is important, &c. 
they deserve to be diligently studied ; if they deserve, 
&c. an order of men should be set aside for that pur- 
pose ; but the Scriptures are the word, &c. ; therefore 
an order of men should be set aside for the purpose, 
&c." In a destructive Sorites, you, of course, go back 
from the denial of the last consequent to the denial of 
the first antecedent : " G is not H ; therefore A is not 
B." 

The foregoing are all the forms m which reasoning 
can be exhibited syllogistically ; i. e. so that its validity 
shall he manifest from the mere form of expression. 

Induction. Those who have spoken of induction 
or of example, as a distinct kind of argu- 

Example. ^^^^ ^^ ^ Logical point of view, have 
fallen into the common error of confounding Logical 
with Rhetorical distinctions, and have wandered from 
their subject as much as a writer on the orders of Archi- 
tecture would do who should introduce the distinction 
between buildings of brick and of marble. Logic takes 
no cognizance of induction, for instance, or of a priori 
reasoning, &c., as distinct /orms of argument; for when 
thrown into the syllogistic form, and when letters of 
the alphabet are substituted for the terms (and it is thus 
that an argument is properly to be brought under the 
cognizance of Logic,) there is no distinction between 
them. E. G. " a property which belongs to the ox, 
sheep, deer, goat, and antelope, belongs to all horned 
animals ; rumination belongs to these ; therefore to all." 
This, which is an inductive argument, is evidently a 
syllogism in Barbara. The essence of an inductive ar- 
gument, as well as of the other kinds which are distin- 
guished from it, consists not in the form of the argu- 
ment, but in the relation which the subject-matter of 
the premises bears to that of the conclusion.* 

* See RhetoriCi Part I. Ch. ii. § 6. Nothing probably has tended 



Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 141 

3d. There are various other abbrevia- .,, ^. .. 
tions commonly used, wnicn are so obvi- 
ous as hardly to call for explanation : as where one of 
the premises of a syllogism is itself the conclusion of 
an Enthymeme, which is expressed at the same time ; 
e. g. "All useful studies deserve encouragement; Lo- 
gic is such (since it helps us to reason accurately) there- 
fore it deserves encouragement ;" here the minor pre- 
miss is what is called an Enthymematic sentence * 

And it may be added, that such a sen- jjj^^s sug- 
tence will sometimes be in the form, not of gesting argu- 
a proposition, but of an exclamation — a "^^^^s. 
question — or a command ; and yet will be such as rea- 
dily to suggest to the mind a proposition. 

For instance, in some of the examples lately given, 
one might say (in place of one of the propositions) 
" Choose which you will of these two suppositions ;" 
or " Who can doubt that so and so follows?" 

The message to Pilate from his wife f furnishes an 
instance of a single word {''just ") suggesting a major- 
premiss, while the conclusion is stated in the form of 
an exhortation : *' Have thou nothing to do with that 
rust man." And the succeeding sentence must have 
been designed to convey a hint of arguments for the 
proof of each of the premises on which that conclusion 
rested. 

And here it may be observed, that the usual practice 
of selecting for examples, in Logical treatises, such ar- 
guments as hardly even an ignorant clown, or a child, 
would need to state at full length, and which the slight- 
est hint would sufficiently suggest to any one, has con- 
tributed to the prevailing mistake of supposing that syl- 

more to foster the prevailing error of considering syllogism as a 
particular kind of argument, than the inaccuracy just noticed 
which appears in all or most of the logical works extant. See Dis 
ttrtation on the Province of Reasoning, Ch. i. 

♦ The antecedent in that minor premiss {i. e. that which makes i 
Enthymematic) is called by Aristotle the prosyllogism. 

t Matt, xxvii. 19. 



142 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

logisms, universally, are mere trifling ; the fact that all 

arguments are, substantially, syllogistic, 

ing ^pfoof^^o being overlooked. It is worth remarking 

one man may however in this place, that the further any 

!!f .^^iltli^®^* one advances, in intellectual cultivation, 
to anotner ,, . • i i 

generally, or many particular department, 

he will have less and less need (not, of argumentation 
altogether, but) of siiok arguments as are needful for a 
beginner. To this last, many propositions may need to 
be proved at full length, which, to one further advanced, 
require only to have the proofs hinted at, and which to 
one still more advanced, need merely to be stated as 
propositions, or ultimately, not even that ; being suffi- 
ciently suggested to the mind by the mere mention of 
one of the terms. And hence the proverbial expres- 
sion, that " a word is enough to the wise." 

It is evident that you may, for brevity. Equivalents, 
substitute for any term an equivalent : as 
in an example above, " if' for " Logic ;" " suchy' for 
"a useful study," &c. The doctrine of conversion, 
laid down in the second chapter, furnishes many equi- 
valent propositions, since each is equivalent to its illa- 
tive converse. The division of nouns also (for which 
see chap, v.) supplies many equivalents ; e. g. if A is 
the genus of B, B must be a species of A : if A is the 
cause of B, B must be the effect of A, &c. 
Syllogisms ^^' ^^^ many syllogisms, which at 
apparently first sight appear faulty, will often be 
incorrect. found, on examination to contain correct 
reasoning, and consequently, to be reducible to a regu- 
lar form ; e. g. when you have, apparently, negative 
'premises, it may happen, that by considering one of them 
as affirmative, (see Chap. ii. § 4,) the syllogism will be 
regular : e. g. " no man is happy who is not secure : 
no tyrant is secure ; therefore no tyrant is nappy," is a 
syllogism in Celarent. If this experiment be tried on a 
syllogism which has really negative premises, the on- 
ly effect will be to change that fault into another : viz. 



C iP. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 143 

an excess of terms, or (which is substantially the same) 
an undistributed middle ; e. g. " an enslav^ed people is 
not happy ;" the English are not enslaved ; therefore 
they are happy :" if " enslaved " be regarded as one of 
the terms, and " not enslaved " as another, there w^ill 
manifestly be four. Hence one may see how very lit- 
tle difference there is in reality between the different 
faults which are enumerated. 

Sometimes there will appear to be too many terms ; 
and yet there will be no fault in the reasoning, only an 
irregularity in the expression : e. g. " no irrational 
agent could produce a work which manifests design ; 
the universe is a work which manifests design ; there- 
fore no irrational agent could have produced the uni- 
verse." Strictly speaking, this syllogism has five terms ; 
but if you look to the meaning, you will see that in the 
first premiss (considering it as apart of this argument) 
it is not properly, "an irrational agent" that you are 
speaking of, and of which you predicate that it could 
not produce a work manifesting design; but rather it is 
this " work," &c„ of which you are speaking, and of 
which it is predicated that it could not be produced by 
an irrational agent ; if, then, you state the propositions 
in that form, the syllogism will be perfectly regular. 
vSee above, § 1.) 

Thus, such a syllogism as ^his, " every true patriot 
is disinterested; few men are disinterested; therefore 
few men are true patriots ;" might appear at first sight 
to be in the second figure, and faulty ; whereas it is 
Barbara, with the premises transposed : for you do not 
really predicate of " few men," that they are " disin- 
terested," but of " disinterested persons" that they are 
" few." Again, " none but candid men are good rea- 
soners ; few infidels are candid ; few infidels are good 
reasoners." In this it will be most convenient to con- 
sider the major-premiss as being, " all good reasoners 
are candid," (which of course is precisely equipollent 
to its illative converse by negation ;) and the minor- 



144 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book U 

premiss and conclusion may in like manner be fairly 
expressed thus — " most infidels are not candid ; there- 
fore most infidels are not good reasoners :" which is a 
regular syllogism m Camestres.* Or, if you would state 
it in the first figure, thus : " those who are not candid 
[or uncandid] are not good reasoners : most infidels ai^ 
not candid ; most infidels are not good reasoners." 



Chap. V 

SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 

XThis Supplement may he studied either before or after the preceding- 
three Chapters.] 

Uni vocal, § 1- The usual divisions of nouns 

Equivocal, into univocaly equivocal, and analo- 
Analogous. ^.^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ nouns of the first and 
second intention, are not, strictly speakings divisions of 
words, but divisions of the manner of employing them ; 
the same word may be employed either univocally, 
equivocally, or analogously ; either in the first-inten- 
tion, or in the second. The ordinary logical treatises 
often occasion great perplexity to the learner, by not 
noticing this circumstance, but rather leading him to 
suppose the contrary. ^(See Book IIL § 8.) Some of 
those other divisions of nouns, which are the most com- 
monly in use, though not appropriately and exclusively 
belonging to the Logical system— z. e. to the theory oi 
reasoning — it may be worth while briefly to notice ir 
this place. 

Let it be observed, then, that a term expresses thf 
view we take of an object. And its being viewed a? 
a7i object, ^. e. as one, or again as several, depends on 

♦ The reader is to observe that the term employed as the subjec* 
of the minor-premiss, and of the conclusion, is " most-infidels :" ht 
is not to suppose that " most " is a sign of distribution ; it is mere 
Ij a compeudious expression for ** the greater part of." 



Chap V. § 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. 1 145 

our arbitrary choice ; e. g. we may consider a " troop 
of cavalry" as one object ; or we may make any single 
" horse with its rider," or any " separate man " or 
horse, or any limb of either, the subject of our thoughig 

1. When then anyone object is considered according 
to its actual existence, as numerically 07ie, sinscuiar and 
the name denoting it is called singular ; ^ommonterms. 
as, " this tree," the " city of London," &c. When it 
IS considered as to its nature and character only, as 
being of such a description as might equally apply to 
other single objects, the inadequate or incomplete view 
(see B. L' § 3, and § 6.) thus taken of an individual, is 
expressed by a common term ; as " tree," " city," " min- 
ister-of-state." 

2. When any object is considered as a part of a 
whole, viewed in reference to the whole or Absolute and 
to another part, of a more complex object relative, 
of thought, the name expressing this view is called re- 
lative: and to relative term is opposed absolute; as 
denoting an object considered as a whole, and without 
reference to any thing of which it is a part, or to any 
other part distinguished from it. Thus, " father," and 

* son," " rider," " commander," &c. are relatives ; being 
regarded, each as a part of the complex objects, father- 
and-son, &c. ; the same object designated absolutely, 
would be termed a man, living-being, &c. 
Nouns are correlative to each other, 
which denote objects related to each other, 
and viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a kmg is 
a ruler of men, " king " and " man " are not correlative, 
but " king " and subject, are. 

3. When there are two views which compatible 
cannot be taken of one single object at the and opposite, 
same time, the terms expressing these views are said to 
be opposite, or inconsistent [repugnantia ;] as, " black," 
and "white;" when both maybe taken of the same 
object at the same time, they are called consistent, or 
co?npatible [convenientia ;] as "white," and "cold." 

12 



146 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II. 

Relative terms are opposite, only when applied with 
reference to the same subject : as, one may be both 
master and servant ; but not at the same time to the 
same person. 

Concrete and 4. When the notion derived from the 
abstract. view taken of any object, is expressed with 
a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object that 
furnished the notion, it is expressed by a concrete term ^ 
as, " foolish," or '* fool ;" when without any such re- 
ference, by an abstract* term ; as^ " folly." 

....... 5. When a term applied to some objert 

Attributive or . , . • i -^ • -. • •/» .• 

connotative, IS such as to imply in its sjgnitication 
and absolute some " attribute " belonging to that object, 
tative!^'°°^^°" ^^^^ ^ ^^^^ is called by some of the early 
logical writers " connotative ;" but would 
perhaps be more conveniently called " attributive." It 
"connotes," i. e. "notes along with" the object [or 
implies'] something considered as inherent therein : aa 
" the capital of France ;" " the founder of Rome." Tha 
founding of Rome, is, by that appellation, " attributed " 
to the person to whom it is applied. 

A term which merely denotes an object without im- 
plying any attribute of that object, is called " absolute'* 
or " non-connotative ;" as " Paris ;" " Romulus." The 
last terms denote respectively the same objects as the 
two former ; but do not, like them, connote [imply in 
their signification] any attribute of those individuals. 

Every concrete-common-term is " attributive," [con- 
notative] whether in the adjective f or substantive 
form ; as " man," human," " triangle," " triangular," 
" saint," " holy :" for, " man " e. g. or " human," are 
appellations denoting, not the attribute itself which we 
call " human-nature," but a being to which such a term 

*Itis unfortunate that some writers have introduced the fashion 
of calling all " common terms " abstract-terms. 

t Some logical writers confine the word to adjectives ; but there 
seems no essential difference in reference to the present subject. 
Indeed, in Greek and in Latin it often happens that a v^ord may be 
reckoned either adjective or substantive • as stultus ;" hospes." 



Chap. V. §1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP I. 14/ 

is applied in reference to, and by virtue of, its possess* 
ing that attribute. An abstract-common-terin, being 
the name of an attribute-itself — as "human-nature," 
triangularity," "holiness," — is "absolute" [non con- 
notative] except where there is an attribute of an at- 
tribute implied in the term ; as the term " fear " e. g. may 
be considered as implying some ho'pe of escape ; with- 
out which the apprehension of evil would be called 
" despair." 

It is to be observed that many a term is employed — 
and to a certain degree, correctly employed, i e. not 
Tnzsapplied — by persons who do not clearly and fully 
take in its signification ;— who do not know, or do not 
bring before their minds, exactly what is implied [con- 
noted] by it. E. G. a child learns to apply the term 
" money " to the bits of metal he sees pass from hand 
to hand, long before he has any clear notion (which 
some never fully attain) of what it is that constitutes 
" money," and is implied [connoted] by the term. So 
also it is conceivable that a person might, under certain 
circumstances, know perfectly what individuals are 
aldermen, senators, &c. while he had but a very vague 
and imperfect notion of the office which such a term 
implies. And such di familiarity d^s this with any term, 
(together w^ith one's being able to comprehend processes 
of reasoning in w^hich it occurs) tends to conceal from 
men their imperfect apprehension of its signification, 
and thus often leads to confusion of thought, and error 
(See B. iv. ch. iv. § 2. 

6. A term which denotes a certain view Positive, pri- 
of an obiect as beins: actually taken of it, vative and 

Ti J u- rr / „ ,, negative. 

IS called positive: as, '^ speecri" "a man 

speaking ;" a term denoting that this view might con 

ceivably be taken of the object, hnt is not, is privative ., 

as " dumbness,'' a " man silent,'' &c.* That which 

* Many privative epithets are such that by a little ingenuity the 
application of them may be represented as an absurdity. Thus, 
Wallis's remark (introduced in this treatise) that a jest is gencrallj^ 
ajnock-fallacy, i. e. a fallacy not designed to deceive, but so pai- 



148 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book 1L 

denotes that such a notion is not and could not be f orrnea 
of the object, is called negative ; as, " a dumb statue," 
a " lifeless carcase," &c. 

]Many negative-terms which are such in sense only, 
have led to confusion of thought, from their real charac- 
ter being imperfectly perceived. E. G. " liberty," which 
is a purely negative Xtim, denoting merely " absence of 
restraint," is sometimes confounded with " power."* 

It is to be observed that the same term may be regard- 
ed either as positive, or as privative or negative, ac- 
cording to the quality or character which we are refer- 
ring to in our minds : thus, of " happy " and " misera- 
ble," we may regard the former as positive, and the 
latter (ttr^happy) as privative ; or vice versa ; according 
as we are thinking of enjoyment or of suffering. 

7. A privative or negative term is also 
^ndefinite^^ Called mcZ^mfe [infinitum] in respect of 
its not defining and marking out an object ; 
in contradistinction to this, the positive term is called 
definite [finitum] because it does thus define or mark 
out. Thus, ** organized being," or " Gaesar," are called 
definite, as marking out, and limiting our view to, oiie 
particular class of beings, or one single person ; *' unor- 
ganised," or " not-Caesar," are called indefinite, as not 
restricting our view to any class or individual, but only 
excluding one, and leaving it undetermined, what other 
individual the thing so spoken of may be, or what other 
class it may belong to. 

It is to be observed, that the most perfect opposition 

pable as only to furnish amusement, might be speciousty condemn- 
ed as involvinff a contradiction : for " the design to deceive,''^ it 
might be said, " is essential to a fallacy." In the same way it might 
be argued that it is absurd to speak of " a dead man ;" e. g. " every 
SBanis a living creature ; nothing dead is a living creature 3 there- 
ipre no man is dead I" 

* An extension of a man's power (as Tucker has observed in his 
" Light of Nature") may be the m«ans of diminishing his " liberty ;" 
M the liberty of a helpless paralytic is not abridged by locking the 
door of his room; though it would be, if he were to recover the 
use of his limbs. See a notice of the word " aperture " in ^ 5. Essay 
i 1st Series. 



Chap. V. § 2.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 149 

Contradictory between terms exists between any two 
poposition of which differ only in respectively wanting 
terms . ^^^ having the particle not [either express- 

ly, or in sense) attached to them ; as, " organized," and 
*' not organized ; " corporeal," and incorporeal." For 
not only is it impossible for both these views to be taken 
at once of the same thing, but also it is impossible bu^ 
that one or other should be applicable to every object ; as 
there is nothing that can be both, so there is nothing that 
can be neither. Every thing that can be even conceived 
must be either " Caesar," or " not Caesar ;"— either " cor- 
poreal," or " incorporeal." And in this way a complete 
twofold division may be made of any subject, being cer- 
tain (as the expression is) to exhaust it. And the re- 
petition of this process, so as to carry on a subdivision 
as far as there is occasion, is thence called by Logicians 
" Abscissio infiniti ;" i. e. the repeated cutting off of that 
which the object to be examined is not ; e. g. 1. This 
disorder either is or is is not, a dropsy; and for this or 
that reason, it is not ; 2. any other disease either is or is 
not, gout ; this is not ;. then, 3. It either is oris not, con- 
sumption, &c." This procedure is very common in Ar- 
istotle's works. (See B. ii. ch. 3. § 4.) 

Such terms may be .said to be in contradictory- oppo- 
sition to each other. 

On the other hand, contrary terms, i. e. 

^t^vmlJ those which, coming under some one class, 
ai"e the most different of all that belong to 
that class, as " wise" and " foolish" both denoting men- 
tal habits, are opposed, but in a different manner : for 
though both cannot be applied to the same object, there 
may be other objects to which neither cdiXi be applied ; no- 
thing can be at once both " wise" and " foolish ;" but a 
stone cannot be either. 

§ 2. The notions expressed by common- terms, w^e 
are enabled (as has been remarked in the analytical 
outline) to form, by the faculty of abstraction : for by 
U, in contemplating any object (or objects,) we can at- 



150 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. II 

tend exclusively to some particular circumstances be- 
longing to it, [some certain parts of its nature as it 

■were,] and quite withhold our attention 
^^"uon!^^" ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^' When, therefore, we are 

thus contemplating several individuals 
which resemble each other in some part of their nature, 
we can (by attending to that part alone, and not to those 
points wherein they differ) assign them one commo7i 
name, which will express or stand for them merely as 
far as they all agree ; and which, of course, will be 
applicable to all or any of them ; (w^hich process is 
called generalization) and each of these names is called 

a common-term, from its belonging to them 
Predicables. ^^ ^^^-^^ , ^^ ^ predicable, because it may 

be predicated-affirmatively of them, or of any of them 
(See B. i. § 3.) 

Generalization (as has been remarked) implies ab- 
straction ; but it is not the same thing ; for there may 
be abstraction without generalization. When we are 
speaking of an individual, it is usually an abstract no- 
tion that we form; e. g. suppose we are speaking of 
the present King of France ; he must actually be either 
at Paris or elsewhere ; sitting, standing, or in some 
other posture ; and in such and such a dress, &c. Yet 
many of these circumstances, (which are separable ac- 
cidents,* and consequently) which are regarded as non- 
essential to the individual, are quite disregarded by us ; 
and we abstract from them what we consider as essen- 
tial ; thus forming an abstract notion of the individual. 
Yet there is here no generalization. 

§ 3. The following is the account usually given in 
logical treatises of the different kinds [heads] of predi- 
cables ; but it cannot be admitted without some consid- 
erable modifications, explanations and corrections, which 
will be subjoined. 

Whatever term can be affirmed of sever 

Species. ^1 things, must express either their whole 

* See ^ 6. 



Chap. V. § 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 



151 



essence, which is called the species ; or a part of their 
essence {viz. either the material part, which 
is called the Genus, or Xh^ formal and dis- Genus. 
tin guishing part which is called Differ en- Differentia 
tia, or in common discourse, ckaracteristic) 
or something /omecZ to the essence ; whether necessarily 
{i. e. to the whole species, or, in other words, univer- 
sally, to every individual of it,) which is called a 
property ; oi contingently (i. e. to some property, 
individuals only of the species,) which is 
an accident. 



Accident. 



Every predicable expresses either 



The whole essence 
of its subject : 
viz. : 



or part of its 
essence 



Genus — Difference 



or something 

joined to its 

essence. 



Property 



Accident 



universal [peculiar universal 

but not but not and pe- 

peculiar universal]* culiar 



inseparable — separable. 



Of these predicahles, genus and species are commonly 
said, in the language of logicians, to he predicated in 
quid; (rl) i.e. to answer to the question, "what?" 
as, " what is Ceesar ?" Answer, ** a man ;" " what is 
a man ?" Answer, " an animal ;" difference, in " quale 
quid ;" {tzoZov tl) property and accident in quale {nolov.) 

It is evident from what has heen said. Genus and 
that the genus and difference put together species, each, a 
makeup the species. E. G. " rational " whole, in difle 

J cc • i« ^-j. 1 . „ ^T- .L rent senses. 

and " animal" constitute " man ;" so that, 

in reality, the species contains the genus [i. e. implies 

See below, ^j 4. 



152 ELEMENTS OB^ LOGIC. [Book 11 

it ;] and when the genus is called a whole, and is said 
to contain the species, this is only a metaphorical ex- 
pression, signifying that it comprehends the species, in 
its own more extensive signification. If for instance I 
predicate the term " animal" of an individual man, as 
Alexander, I speak truth indeed, but only such a portion 
of the truth that I might equally predicate the same 
term of his horse Bucephalus. If I predicate the term^ 
" man" and " horse" of Alexander and of Bucephalus 
respectively, I use a more full and complete expression 
for each than the term '* animal;" and this last is ac- 
cordingly the more extensive, as It contain^; for, more 
properly speaking, comprehends] and may be applied 
to, several different species; viz.: "bird," "beast," 
" fish," &c. 

In the same manner the name of a species is a more 
extensive \i. e. comprehensive] but less full and com- 
plete term than that of an individual (viz. a singular- 
term ;) since the species may be predicated of each of 
these. 

" The impression produced on the mind by a singular 
term, may be compared to the distinct view taken in by 
the eye, of any object (suppose some particular man) 
near at hand, in a clear light, which enables us to dis- 
tinguish the features of the individual : in a fainter 
light, or rather further off, we merely perceive that the 
object is a man: this corresponds with the idea con- 
veyed by the name of the species : yet farther off, or in 
a still feebler light, w'e can distinguish merely some 
living object ; and at length, merely some object ; these 
views corresponding respectively with the terms deno- 
ting the genera, less or more remote."* 

Hence it is plain that when logicians speak of " spe- 
cies " as " expressing the whole essence of its subjects," 
this is not strictly correct, unless we understand by the 
" whole essence " the " whole that any common-terra 

* Rhet. Part III. Chap. ii. § 1 



Uhap. V. § 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 153 

mn express ;" — the " nearest approach to the whole 
essence of the individual that any term (not synony- 
mous with the subject) can denote." No predicate can 
express, strictly, the whole essence of its subject, unless 
it be merely another name, of the very same import, 
md CO- extensive with it ; as " Caesar was the conqueror 
Df Pompey." 

But when logicians speak of species as a *' whole," 
this is, properly, in reference to the genus and the dif- 
ference ; each of which denotes a " part" of that spe- 
cies which we constitute by joining those two together 
But then, it should be remembered that a species is not 
a predicable in respect of its genus and difference (since 
it cannot be predicated of them) but only in respect of 
the individuals, or lower species, of which it can be pre- 
dicated. 

§ 4. A species then, it is plain, when predicated of 
individuals, stands in the same relation to subaltern 
them, as the genus to the species ; and genus and spe- 
when predicated of other (lower) species, ^^^^' 
it is then, in respect of these, a genus, while it is a spe- 
cies in respect of a higher genus; as "quadruped," 
which is a species of " animal," is a genus in respect 
of " horse ;" which latter again may be predicated of 
Bucephalus and of other individuals. Such a term is 
called a subaltern species or genus ; being each, in re- 
spect of diiferent other terms, respectively. 

A genus that is not considered as a species of any- 
thing, is called summum (the highest) ge- Highest 
nus ; a species that is not considered as a genus and 
genus of any thing — i. e. is regarded as ^®^®^* species 
containing under it only individuals — is called infirna 
(the lowest) species. 

When I say of a magnet, that it is " a kind of iron- 
dre" that is called its proximum-geims, because it is 
the closest [or lowest] genus that is predicated of it 
• ' mineral " is its more remote genus. 

When I say that the differentia of a magnet s ita 



154 ELEMENTS OF LOGlO. ^Book It 

Specific dif- " attracting iron" and that its property 
ference and ig " polarity ^'^ these are called respectively 
property. a specific difference and property ; because 
magnet is (I have supposed) 3Xi injima species [i. e. only 
a species.] 

When I say that the differentia of iron ore is its 
" containing iron,'' and its property, " being attracted 
Generic by the magnet," these are called respec- 
difference and tively, a generic difference and property, 
property. because " iron-ore " is a subaltern species 
or genus ; being both the genus of magnet, and a spe- 
cies of mineral. 

It should be observed here, that when logicians speak 
of property and accident as predicables expressing, not 
the essence or part of the essence of a subject, but some- 
thing united to the essence, this must be understood as 
having reference not to the nature of things as they are 
in themselves, but to our conceptions of them. '* Po- 
larity " for instance is as much a part of the real nature 
of the substance v^^e call " magnet," as its " attraction 
of iron ;" and again, a certain shape, colour, or specific 
gravity, as much belongs in reality to those magnets 
which are of that description, as either polarity, or at- 
traction. But our modes of conceiving, and of express- 
ing our conceptions, have reference to the relations in 
which objects stand to our own minds; and are in- 
fluenced in each instance by the particular end we have 
in view. That, accordingly, is accounted a part of the 
essence of any thing, which is essential to the notion 
of it formed in our minds. Thus, if we have annexed 
such a notion to the term, man, that "rationality" 
stands prominent in our minds, in distinguishing man 
from other animals, we call this, the " difference," and 
a part of the " essence " of the term_ man ; though 
" risibility" be an attribute which does not less really 
belong to man. So, \hQprimary and prominent distinc- 
tion in our minds of a triangle from other plane recti- 
lineal figures, is its having three sides ; though the 



Chap. V. § 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 155 

equality of its three angles to two right angles, be, in 
reality, no less essential to a triangle. But that this 
last is the fact, is demonstrated to the learner not till 
]ong after he is supposed to have become familiar with 
the notion of a triangle. 

Hence, in different sciences or arts, different attributes 
are fixed on, as essentially characterizing each species, 
according as this or that is the most important in refer- 
ence to the matter we are engaged in. In Navigation, 
for instance, the 'polarity of the magnet is the essential 
quality; since if there could beany other substance 
which could possess this, withont attracting iron, it 
would answer the same purpose ; but to those manu- 
facturers \vho employ magnets for the purpose of more 
expeditiously picking up small bits of iron, and for 
shielding their faces from the noxious steel-dust, in the 
grinding of needles, the attracting power of the mag- 
net is the essential point 

Under the head of property, logicians have enume- 
rated, as may be seen in the preceding table, not only 
such as are strictly called properties, as belonging each 
to the whole species of which it is predicated, and to 
that alone, but also, such as belong to the whole species, 
and to others besides ; in other words, properties which 
are universal, but not peculiar : as " to breathe air " 
belongs to every man ; but not to man alone ; and it is, 
therefore, strictly speaking, not so much a property of 
the species, "man," as of the higher, (2 e. more com- 
prehensive,) species, which is the genus of that, viz. 
of " land-animal." And it is this that logicians mean 
by g^nem-property. 

Other properties, as some logicians call 
them, are peculiar to a species, but do not accident 
belong to the whole of it ; e. g. man alone 
can be a poet, but it is not every man that is so. These, 
however, are more commonly and more properly reck- 
oned as accidents. 

Some have also added a fourth kind of property ; viz 



156 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. II 

that which is peculiar to a species, and helongsto ei'ory 
individual of it, but not at every time. But this is, in 
fact, a contradiction ; since whatever does not always 
belong to a species, does not belong to it universally. 
It is through the ambiguity of words that they have 
fallen into this confusion of thought ; e. g. the examph 
commonly given is, " homini canescere ;" " to become 
grey " being, they say, (though it is not) peculiar to 
man, and belonging to every individual, though not al- 
ways, but only in old age, &c. Now, if by " canes- 
cere " he meant the very state of becoming grey, this 
manifestly does not belong to every man : if again it be 
meant to signify the liability to become grey at some 
time or other, this does belong always to man. And 
the same in other instances. Indeed the very proprium 
fixed on by Aldrich, " risibility ," is nearly parallel to 
the above. Man is " always capable of laughing ;" 
but he is not " capable of laughing always." 
Accidents se- That is most properly called an " acci- 
parabie and in- dent/' w^hich may be absent or present, 
separable. ^^^ essence of the species continuing the 
same ; as, for a man to be " walking" or a " native 
of Paris ." Of these two examples, the former is what 
logicians call a separable accident, because it may be 
separated from the individual ; {e. g. he may sit down ;) 
the latter is an inseparable accident, being not separa- 
ble from the individual, (i. e. he w^ho is a native of 
Paris can never be otherwise ;) " from the individual " 
I say, because every accident must be separable irom 
the species, else it would be a property.* 

This seems to me a clearer and more correct descrip- 

* In the Portuguese language there are two words, " ser " and 
"estar," both answering to the English " to be ;" and foreigners, 
I have been told, are often much perplexed about the proper use of 
each. I soon found, however, that the rule is a logical one, easily- 
remembered ; " estar " furnishes the copula when the predicate is 
a separable-accident, and " ser," inall other cases. E. G. " Estar in 
inghilterra" is "to be in England ;" " iser Inglez " is "to be an 
Englishman ;" " Quern c V " who is he ?" " Quern esta la ?'' " who 
is there?" &c. 



Chap. V.§4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. T. 157 

tion of the two kinds of accident than the one given by 
Aldrich ; viz. that a separable-accident may be actually 
separated, and an inseparable, only in thought, " ut 
Mantuanum esse, a Virgilio." For surely " to be the 
author of the iEneid" was another inseparable-accident 
of the same individual ; " to be a Roman citizen" another ; 
and *'to live in the days of Augustus" another; now 
can we in thought separate all these things from the 
essence of that individual ? To do so would be to form 
the idea of a different individual. We can indeed con- 
ceive a man, and one who might chance to bear the 
name of Virgil, without any of these accidents; but 
then it would plainly not be the same man. But Virgil, 
whether sitting or standing, &c. we regard as the same 
man ; the abstract notion which we have formed of that 
individual being unaltered by the absence or presence 
of these separable accidents. (See above, § 2.) 
' Let it here be observed, that both the predicables 
general name " predicable," and each of relatively so 
the classes of predicables, {viz. genus, called, 
species, &c.) are relative ; i. e. we cannot say what 
predicable any term is, or whether it is any at all, unless 
it be specified of what it is to be predicated : e. g. the 
term *' red " would be considered a genus, in relation to 
the terms " pink," " scarlet," &c. : it might be regarded 
as the differentia, in relation to "red rose;" — as a 
property of "blood," — as an accident of "a house," 
&c. And in all cases accordingly, the differences or 
properties of any lower species will be accidents in 
reference to the class they come under. E. G. " mal- 
leability" is an "accident" in reference to the term 
" metal ;" but it is a " property " of gold and most other 
metals; as the absence of it— brittleness— is of anti- 
mony and arsenic, and several others, formerly called 
semimetals. 

And universally, it is to be steadily kept A common, 
in mind, that no " common-terms " have, *f "l ^^f ^\^?® 
as the names oi individuals [" singular- i^ai thing. 



158 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book II 

terms "] have, any real thing existmg in nature corres- 
ponding to each of them,* but that each of them is 
merely a sign denoting a certain inadeqaate notion which 
our minds have formed of an individual, and which, 
consequently, not including the notion of *' individu- 
ality " [numerical'UmXy'] nor any thing wherein that in- 
dividual diifers from certain others, is applicable equally 
well to all, or any of them. Thus " man " denotes 
no real thing (as the sect of the reahsts maintained) 
distinct from each individual, but merely any man, 
viewed inadequately, i. e. so as to omit, and abstract 
from, all that is peculiar to each individual : by which 
means the term becomes applicable' alike to any one of 
several individuals, or (in the pliu'al) to several together. 
The unity Isingleness] or sameness of 
Unity of a y^-j^^i [q denoted by a common-teYm, does 

common - term . , •^ „ , ' 

belongs to the not, as in the case oi a si7igular'teim, 
term itself consist in the object itself being (in the 
°^ ^' primary sense) one and the same,t but in 

the oneness of the sign itself ; which is like a stamp 
(for marking bales of goods, or cattle,) that impresses on 
each a similar mark, called, thence, in the secondary 
sense, 07ie and the same mark. And just such a stamp, 
to the mind, is a common-term; which being, itself, 
one, conveys to each of an indefinite number of minds 
an impression precisely similar, and thence called — ^in 
the transferred sense, one and the same idea. 

And we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we 
in each instance choose to abstract and consider sepa- 
rately, disregarding all the rest ; so that the same indi- 
vidual may thus be referred to any of several difierent 
Different species, and the same species, to several 
modes of cias- genera, as suits our purpose. Thus, it 
sification. g^-^g ^Yie farmer's purpose to class his cattle 
with his ploughs, carts, and other possessions, under the 

* ToSs Ti, as Aristotle expresses it ; though he has been repre 
sented as the champion of the opposite opinion : vide Catag. c. 3. 
^ See Book IV. Chap. v. ^ 2. and Append. Art. *' Same." 



Chap. V. § 5.J SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 159 

name of " stock ;" the naturalist, suitably to his purpose, 
classes them as ''quadrupeds" which term would 
include wolves, deer, &c., which to the farmer would 
be a most improper classification : the commissary, 
again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish, &c., as 
•' provision ;" that which is most essential in one view, 
being subordinate in another. 

§ 5. An individual is so called because -p,- • • 
it is incapable of logical division ; which 
is a metaphorical expression, to signify " the distinct 
[z. e. separate] enumeration of several things signified 
by one common name." 

This operation is directly opposite to generalization ^ 
(which is performed by means of " abstraction ;") for 
as, in that, you lay aside the differences by which 
several things are distinguished, so as to call them all 
by one common name, so, in division, you add on the 
differences, so as to enumerate them by their several 
distinct names. Thus, " mineral " is said to be divided 
into " stones, metals," &c. ; and metals again into " gold, 
iron," &c. ; and these are called the parts [or members] 
of the division. 

" Division," in its primary sense, means Logical di 
separating from each other (either actually, vision, meta- 
or in enumeration) the parts of which ^^"Jed.^"^ "'' 
some really-existing single object consists : 
as when you divide " an animal " (that is, any single 
animal) into its several members ; or again, into its 
" bones, muscles, nerves, blood-vessels," &c. And so, 
with any single vegetable, &c. 

Now, each of the parts into which you thus " physi- 
cally" (as it is called) divide "an animal," is strictl)' 
and properly a " part," and is really les&than the whole . 
for you could not say of a bone, for instance, or of a 
limb, that it is " an animal." 

But w^hen you " divide " — in the secondary sense o\ 
the w^ord (or, as it is called, "metaphysically") — 
•* animal," that is* ih^ genus " animal," into beast, bird, 



160 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book P 

fish, reptile, insect, &c. each of the parts [or " mern» 
bers"] is metaphorically called a "part," and is, m 
another sense, more than the whole [the genus] that is 
thus divided. For you may say of a beast or bird that 
it is an " animal ;" and the term " beast " implies not 
only the term "animal," but something more besides; 
namely, whatever " difference " characterizes " beast," 
and separates it from " bird," " fish," &c. 

And so also any singular- term [denoting one indi- 
vidual] implies not only the whole of what is understood 
by the species it belongs to, but also more ; namely, 
whatever distinguishes that single object from others of 
the same species: as "London" implies all that is de- 
noted by the term " city," and also all that distinguishes 
that individual- city. 

The " parts" [" members"] in that figurative sense 
with w^hich we are now occupied, are each of thera less 
than the whole, in another sense ; that is, of less com- 
prehensive signification. Thus, the singular-term " £0- 
mulus " embracing only an individual-king, is less ex- 
tensive than the species " King ;" and that, again, less 
extensive than the genus " Magistrate," &c. 

An " mdividual" then is so called from its being in- 
capable of being (in this figurative sense) divided. 

And though the two senses of the word " division" 
are easily distinguishable when explained, it is so com- 
monly employed in each sense, that through inattention, 
confusion often ensues. 

We speak as familiarly of the " division " of mankind 
into the several races of " Europeans, Tartars, Hindoos, 
Negroes," &c. as of the "division" of the earth into 
" Europe, Asia, Africa," &c. though " the earth " [or 
" the world"] is a singular- term, and denotes what we 
call one individual. And it is plain we could not say 
of Europe, for instance, or of Asia, that it is " a world." 
But we can predicate " man " of every individual Eu 
ropean, Hindoo, &c. 

And heie observe that there is a common colloquia 



Chap. V. § 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 161 

incorrectness (increasing the liability to contusion) in 
the use of the word ** division," in each of these cases, 
to denote one of the " parts " into which the whole is 
divided. Thus you will sometimes hear a person speak 
of Europe as one " division" of the earth ; or of such 
and such a " division " of an army : meaning "portion." 
And so again a person will sometimes speak of " ani- 
mals that belong to the feline division of the Carnivora'* 
[flesh -eating-animals] meaning, that portion of the class 
** Carnivora." 

It is usual when a long and complex schemes oi 
course of division is to be stated, to draw division, 
it out, for the sake of clearness and brevity, in a form 
like that of a genealogical '* tree."* And by carefully 
examining any specimen of such a " tree " (going over 
it repeatedly, and comparing each portion of it with the 
explanations above given) you will be able perfectly to 
fix in your mind the technical terms we have been ex- 
plaining. 

Take for instance as a " summum-genus " the mathe- 
matical-term 

" Plane-superficial-figure" 



Mixed figure Rectilinear CurviUnear 

(of rect. and curv.) Figure Figure 

L l__ 

Triangle; Quadrilateral, &c. Circle; Ellipse, &c. 

Such a *« tree of division " the student may easily fill 
up for himself. And the employment of such a form 
will be found exceedingly useful in obtaining clear 
views in any study you are engaged in. 

For instance, in the one we have been now occupied 
with, take for a summum-genus, '' expression ;" {i, e. 
" expression-in-language " of any such mental-opera- 
tion as those formerly noticed) you may then exhibit, 
thus, the division and subdivision of — 

* See the Division of Fallacies, Book III. § 4 
13 



I5d 



ELEMENTS OT LOGIC. 



[BodX 1 







1 


«g« 




fi.|5 




6 

t,*bb 




••^ '3 




1 


ci 










fl-^-S^ 




.Sro£ 




[ity, Irregular 

r of in form t 

e 


1 


-T3.^ 


"2 


•S«»te 


Argum* 


of the Categc 
nto 


ri** lM> 


II 

— ^*-s 






Qua] 

eithe 

th 


- II 




i 


Proposition 
divided according to 


iS o 


(rpo- Uni- Parti- m 
tical versal cular 


1 


Substance, Qnan 
e, regarded as inl 
entences) into 

1 




K| 






•4% 
S 

1 

o 

-i 


il 


. 


^ 

^ 




— S 











^Ai». T, § 5.] STJFPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 163 

The rules ordinarily given for division 
are three : 1st. each of the parts, or any of ?JrSk,n.'' 
them short of all, must contain less {i. e. 
have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. 
2d. All the parts together must be exactly equal to the 
thing divided ; therefore we must be careful to ascertain 
that the summum genus may be predicated of every term 
placed under it, and of nothing else. 3d. The parts or 
members must be opposed [contradistinguished] i. e. 
must not be contained in one another : e. g. if you were 
to divide " book " into " poetical, historical, folio, 
quarto, French, Latin," &c. the members would be con- 
tained in each other ; for a French book may be a quar- 
to, or octavo, and a quarto, French, English, &c. &c. 
You must be careful, therefore, to keep in mind the 
principle of division with which you set out: e. g, 
whether you begin dividing books according to their 
matter^ their language, or their size, &c. all these being 
so many cross-divisions. And when any- 
thing is capable (as in the above instance) ^jonT^*^^' 
of being divided in several different ways, 
we are not to reckon one of these as the true, or real, or 
right one, without specifying what the object is which 
we have in view : for one mode of dividing may be the 
most suitable for one purpose, and another for another : 
as e. g. one of the above modes of dividing books would 
be the most suitable to a book-binder ; another in a 
philosophical, and the other in a philological view. 

It is a useful practical rule, whenever you find a dis- 
cussion of any subject very perplexing, and seemingly 
confused, to examine whether some *' cross-division" 
has not crept in unobserved. For this is very apt to 
take place ; (though of course such a glaring instance 
as that in the above example could not occur in prac- 
tice) and there is no more fruitful source of indistinct- 
ness and confusion of thought. 

When you have occasion to divide anything in seve- 
ral different ways — that is, " on several principles-of- 



164 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IT 

division " — you should take care to state distinctly how 
many divisions you are making, and on what principle 
each proceeds. 

For instance, in the " tree " above given, it is stated, 

that " propositions " are divided in different ways, " ac* 

cording to " this and that, &c. And thus the perplexity 

of cross-division is avoided. 

Additional Two Other rules in addition to those 

caution. above given, are needful to be kept in 
mind : viz. 4thly, A division should not be " arbitrary/* 
that is, its members should be distinguished from each 
other by " differences" either expressed or readily un- 
derstood ; instead of being set apart from each other at 
random, or without any sufficient ground. For in- 
stance, if any one should divide '« coins " into " gold- 
coins," " silver," and *' copper," the ground of this dis- 
tinction would be intelligible : but if he should, in pro- 
ceeding to subdivide silver coin, distinguish as two 
branches, on the one side, " shillings," and on the other 
*« all silver coins except shilhngs," this would be an 
arbitrary division. 

5thly, A division should be clearly arranged as to 
its members : that is, there should be as much sw6divi- 
sion as the occasion may require ; and not a mere cata- 
logue of the '• lowest species," omitting intermediate 
classes [" subaltern "] between these and the " highest 
genus:" nor again an intermixture of the " subaltern," 
and '• lowest species," so as to have, in any two 
branches of the division, species contradistinguished 
and placed opposite, of which the one ought naturally 
to be placed higher up [nearer the " summum "] and 
the other, lower down in the tree. 

For instance, to divide " plane figure " at once, into 
" equilateral -triangles, squares, circles, ellipses," &c., or 
again " vegetable," into " elms, pear-trees, turnips, 
mush-rooms," &c., or again to divide "animal" into 
" birds, fishes, reptiles, horses, lions," &c. would be a 
transgression of this rule. 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 165 

And observe that, (as has been formerly remarked) 
although such glaring cases as are given by way of 
examples could not occur^an practice, errors precisely 
corresponding lo them, may, and often do occur ; and 
produce much confusion of thought and error. 

§ 6. Definition is another metaphorical Definition, 
word, which literally signifies, "laying 
down a boundary ;" and is used in logic to signify ** an 
expression which explains any term, so as to separate 
it from every thing else," as a boundary separates fields. 

In reference to the several modes adopt- Essential and 
ed for furnishing such explanation, Logi- accidental de- 
cians distinguish [divide] definitions into fini^ions. 
essential and accidental. They call that an " essential 
definition " which states what are regarded as the " con- 
stituent parts of the essence " of that which is to be 
defined ; and an " acczVienfaZ-definition" [or descriptioni 
one which lays down what are regarded as " circum- 
stances belonging to it;" viz. properties or accidents; 
such as causes, effects, &c. 

Accidents in the narrowest sense, (as defined above, 
§ 3) cannot, it is plain, be employed in a description 
[accidental-definition] of any species ; since no accident 
(in that sense) can belong to the whole of a species, nor 
consequently furnish an adequate definition thereof. 

in the " description " of an individual. Definition of 
on the contrary, we employ, not properties, individuals. 
(which as they do belong to the whole of a species, 
cannot serve to distinguish one individual of that spe- 
cies from another) but accidents — generally, insepara- 
ble accidents — in conjunction with the species : as 

Sp. 

*« Philip was a king of Macedon, who subdued Greece ;" 

Sp. 

** Britain is an Island, situated so and so," kc. 

The essential-definition again is divided physical and 
iRio physical [natural] and logical [meta- logical defini- 
physical] definition : the physical-definition *^^"^* 



1^ ELEMENTS OF liOGIC [Boofe 11 

3»eing made by an enumeration of such parts as are ac- 
tually separable — such as are the hull, masts, &c. of a 
*' ship ;" — the root, trunk, branches, bark, &c. of a 
** tree ;" the subject, predicate, and copula of a " pro- 
position." 

The "Zog-xcaZ definition" consists of the "genus" 
and " difference ;" which are called by some writers the 
"metaphysical" [ideal] parts; as being not two real 
parts into which an individual-ohject can (as in the 
former case) be actually divided, but only different views 
taken [notions formed] of a class of objects, by one 
mind. E. G. "A proposition " would be defined lo- 

Genus Difference. 



gically, " a sentence alfirming-or-denying :" A " mag- 
G. D. 



jiet" "an Iron-ore having attraction for iron;" a 
"square," a "rectangle" [right-angled parallelogram] 

D. 



having equal sides. 

Nominal and Definitions again have been divided by 
real defini- Logicians into the nominal, which explains 
tions. merely the meaning of the term defined ;* 

and real, which explains the nature of the thing signi- 
fied by that term. 

This division is evidently according to the object de- 
signed to be effected by each definition : the former di- 
vision, on the other hand — into accidental, physical 
and logical — being a division according to the means 
em-ployed by each to effect its object. These therefore 
are evidently two " cross-divisions ;"t a circumstance 

* Aldrich having given as an instance of a nominal definition the 
absurd one of " homo, qui ex humo," has led some to conclude that 
the nominal definition must be founded on the etymology ; or at least 
that such was his meaning. But that it was not, is sufficiently plain 
from the circumstance that Wallis (from whose work his is almost 
entirely abridged) expressly says the contrary. Be this as it may, 
however, it is plain that the etymology of a term has nothing to da 
with any logical consideration of it. See § 8, Book III. 

t See preceding §. 



Chap. V. 4 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 167 

which has been generally over-looked by logical 
writers, who have thus introduced confrsion and per- 
plexity. 

And here the question may naturally occur to the 
reader, v/hether there be properly any distinction be- 
tween no/wma/ and reaZ-definition ; — whether the mean- 
ing of a commori'termi and the nature of the thing sig- 
nified by it, are not one and the same ; since the object 
of our thoughts when we employ a common- term, is — 
not any such " abstract idea" as some talk of, but— 
the term itself, regarded as a sign &c. as was formerly 
explained. 

And in truth there are many cases in which there 
does exist this exact coincidence between the meaning 
of the term and the nature of the thing ; so that the 
same definition which would be rightly styled " nomi- 
nal," as explaining nothing beyond the exact meaning 
of the term, might also be considered as entitled to be 
called a "real-definition," as implying every attribute 
that can belong to the thing signified. Such are all 
definitions of mathematical and logical 
terms, and other technical terms of science. J^r^g"**^^^ 
There cannot e. g. be any property of a 
" circle," or a *' square," that is not implied in the de- 
finitions of those terms. Some of these properties may 
not indeed at once occur to a beginner in mathematics; 
and others, not even to one somewhat farther advanced : 
but they must all be implied in the definitions : and it 
would be reckoned an impropriety to add e g. to the 
definition of a square that it is bisected by its diagonal: 
because though this might not at once occur to a begin- 
ner, and needs to be demonstrated, it is demonstrated 
from the definition : to sT)eak of '* a square divided by 
its diagonal into unequal parts," w^ould be absurd — 
unmeaning — inconceivable. And the same, with othei 
mathematical terms. 

But it is otherwise with terms of a different charac 
ter, which are the names of actually existing substan- 



168 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. I! 

ces. There may be attributes of the thing signified that 
are not at all implied in the signification of the term. 
E. G, The term " laurel- water" is used by us in the 
same sense as by our ancestors, to signify " a liquor 
distilled from laurel leaves ;" though the poisonous quali- 
ty of it was unknown a century ago. And^so also 
many discoveries have been made, and others probably 
will be made, respecting several metals, heavenly bodies 
&c. though the words " iron," " gold," " star," are em- 
ployed in the same sense as formerly ; — a sense which 
does not imply the properties that have been discovered 

And any definition which goes heyoiid a " nominal- 
definition," i. e. which explains any thing more of the 
nature of the thing than is implied in the name, may 
be regarded, strictly speaking, as, so far, a "real de- 
finition." 

The very word *'• definition" however is not usually 
employed in this sen«e ; but rather, " description" 
Logic is con. Logic is concerned with wommaZ-defini- 
cerned with tion alone ; with a view to guard ag-ainst 
nominal defi- aiubig-uitv in the use of terms.* 
mtions alone. rrt i. • £ ^^ xi. 

To ascertam lully the various proper 
ties of animals and vegetables, belongs to physiology ; 
— of metals, earths, &c. to Chemistry; and so, with 
other things, 

It is to be observad that the word '* definition" is 
sbmetimes used to denote the whole sentence, in which 
the term is defined is conjoined with the explanation 
given of it ; as when we say " a triangle is a three-si- 
ded figure :" sometimes it is used to signify merely that 
which gives the explanation ; as when w^e say " three- 
sided figure" is the definition of " triangle." 

* And for this purpose it will often happen that a definition wilV 
be sufficient in reference to the existing occasion, even though it 
it may fall short of expressing all that is implied by the term. See 
Book III. §10. 

We should however carefully guard against the common mistake 
of supposing that any one who applies a term correctly in several 
instances, must of course understand fuUj its sls^nification. 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I 16d 

In the former case, the sentence has the form of a 
proposition ; but what it is that such a proposition as- 
serts, is not always implied in the mere expression, but 
is left to be collected from the supposed intention of the 
speaker. 

Real existence is not necessarily impli- Real exist- 
ed ; e. g. "A phcenix is a bird fabled to live ence not as- 
a thousand years," &c. implies merely that ^^^}^\. ^^ ^ 
this is the meaning in which the word 
phoenix has been used ; not that any such bird ever 
did or could exist. 

Sometimes again it is not implied even that the uni- 
Tersal, or the ordinary, sense of the term is such as 
corresponds to the definition given; but merely that 
such is the sense in which the author intends to em- 
ploy it. 

And in this case, the definition is some- imperative 
times stated in the imperative instead of the form of defi 
indicative form ; as is frequently done in nitions- 
the works of Aristotle, who is accustomed thus to 
waive, in some cases, all questions as to the ordinary 
employment of a term by others ; saying " Let so and 
so be taken to signify this or that." 

In mathematical and other scientific definitions, 
whether expressed in the form of propositions, or ia 
the imperative (or, as it might be called, postulate) form, 
it is understood to be implied that the definition involves 
no self-contradiction — no absurdity ; but that the thing 
denoted by the term defined — whether believed actually 
to exist or not — is coiiceivable, and may, not irration- 
ally, be made a subject of thought. E. G. Though a 
" mathematical-line" cannot be conceived to be actu- 
ally drawn on paper — though nothing could be exhibit- 
ed to the senses as having length and no breadth, every 
one can make the distance e. g. between two towns, a 
separate subject of his thoughts, having his mind wholly 
withdrawn from the w4dth of the road. 

A mathematical definition accordingly may be consid- 
14 



170 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book I| 

ered as involving a postulate ; and it would be very easy 
lo express any of them in the form of postulates. E, 
G. ** Let a plane figure bounded by a curve-line every- 
where equidistant from a certain point within it, be 
called a circle ;" this would be understood to imply that 
such a figure is conceivable, and that the writer intended 
to employ that term to signify such a figure ; which is 
precisely all that is meant to be asserted in the definition 
of a circle. 

The rules or cautions usually laid down 
Sfinkion! by logical writers for framing a definition, 

are very obvious : viz. 1st. The definition 
must be adequate ; i. e. neither too extensive nor too 
narrow for the thing defined ; e. g. to define " fish," ** an 
animal that lives in the water," would be too extensive, 
because many insects, &c. live in the water ; to define 
it, " an animal that has an air-bladder," would be too 
narrow ; because many fish are without any Or again, 
if in a definition of " money " you should specify its 
being " made of metal," that would be too narrow, as 
excluding the shells used as money in some parts of 
Africa : if again you would define it as an " article of 
value given in exchange for something else," that would 
be too wide, as it would include things exchanged by 
barter ; as when a shoemaker who wants coals, makes 
an exchange with a collier who wants shoes. 

And observe, that such a defect in a 
exc^'^tkms definition cannot be remedied by making 

an arbitrary exception; (such as was allu- 
ded to above, § 5) as if for instance (and it is an instance 
which actually occurred) a person should give such a 
definition of *' capital" as should include (which he did 
not mean to do") " land ;" and should then propose to 
remedy this by defining *' capital," any " property of 
such and such a description, except land." 

2d. The definition must be in itself plainer than the 
thing defined, else it would not explain it : I say, " in 
itself/' {i. e. generally) because, to some particular 



Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 17^ 

person, the term defined may happen to he even more 
familiar and better understood, than the language of the 
definition. 

And this rule may be considered as including that 
which is usually given by Logicians as a third rule; 
viz. that a definition should be couched in a convenient 
number of appropriate words (if such "can be found 
suitable for the purpose :) since figurative vrords (w^hich 
are opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce ambiguity 
or indistinctness ; too great brevity may occasion ob- 
scurity ; and too great prolixity, confusion. But this 
perhaps is rather an admonition with respect to style, 
than a strictly logical rule; nor can we accordingly de- 
termine with precision, in each case, whether it has been 
complied with or not ; there is no drawing the line be- 
tween " too long " and " too concise,*' &c. Nor would 
a definition annecessarily prolix be censured as incorrect^ 
but as inelegant^ inconvenient, &c. 

If, however, a definition be chargeable . 

with tautology, (which is a distinct fault ^" ^ °^^' 
from prolixity or verbosity) it may justly be called in- 
correct, though without offending against the first two 
rules. Tautology consists in inserting too much, not in 
mere words, but in sense ; yet not so as too much to 
narrow the definition (in opposition to rule 1.) by ex- 
cluding some things which belong to the class of the 
thing defined ; but only, so as to state something which 
has been already implied. Thus, to define a parallelo- 
gram " a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are 
parallel and equal" would be tautological; because, 
though it is true that such a figure, and such alone, is a 
parallelogram, the equality of the sides is implied in 
their being parallel, and may be proved from it. • Now 
the insertion of the words " and equal," leaves, and 
indeed leads, a reader to suppose that there may be a 
four-sided figure whose opposite sides are parallel but 
not equal. Though, therefore, siich a definition asserts 
nothing false, it leads to a vsupposition of what is false 



172 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. 11 

and consequently is to be regarded as an incorrect 
definition. 

The inference just mentioned — viz. : that you im- 
plied that a quadrangle might have its opposite sides 
parallel, and not equal — would be drawn from such a 
definition, according to the principle of " exceptio pro- 
bat regulam,'' an exception proves a rule* The force 
of the maxim (which is not properly confined to the 
case of an exception^ strictly so called) is this ; that 
** the mention of any circumstance introduced into the 
statement either of a definition, or of a precept, law, 
remark, &c. is to be presumed necessary to be inserted ; 
so that the precept, &c. would not hold good if this cir- 
cumstance were absent." In short, the word " only,'* 
or some such expression, is supposed to be understood. 
If e. g. it be laid down that he who breaks into an 
empty house shall receive a certain punishment, it would 
be inferred that this punishment would not be incurred 
by breaking into an occupied house : if it were told us 
that some celestial phenomenon could not be seen by the 
naked eye, it would be inferred that it would or might 
be visible through a telescope : if we are told that we 
are not to teach doctrines unwarranted by Scripture, 
and vjhich ivere not held by the early Fathers, this would 
usually be understood to imply that any doctrine they 
did hold, might be taught, on their authority, even 
though not scriptural :] &c. 

* Thus it has been inferred— and not without reason— that the 
occasional forms of prayer and thanksgivings which are put forth 
from time to time under the authority of " Orders in Council,'' are 
illegal and at variance with the " Act of Uniformity ;" inasmuch as 
in that Act (prefixed to our Prayer-books) not only in conformity 
to the book of Common-prayer enjoined, and no authority to make 
alterations or additions to the service recognized, but there is an 
excf.plion, which, it is maintained, proves the rule; the King in 
Council being expressly authorized to insert and alter from time to 
time the " names oi such of the royal-family as are to be prayed 
for :" which plainly implies that no other alterations made by that 
authority were contemplated as allowable. See "Appeal on be 
half of Church Government." Houlston and Co. 

t ** The maxim of ' abundans cautela nocet nemini ' is by no 
meaiM a safe one if applied without limitation. If is sometimes im 



Chap. V. §6.] SUPFl.EMENT TO CHAP. I. 173 

And much is often inferred in this manner, which 
was by no means in the author's mind; from his hav- 
ing inaccurately inserted what chanced to be present to 
his thoughts. Thus, he who says that it is a crime for 
people to violate the property of a humane landlord 
who lives among tkem,, may perhaps not mean to imply 
that it is no crime to violate the property of an absentee- 
landlord, or of one who is not humane ; but he leaves 
an opening for being so understood. Thus again in 
saying that " an animal which breathes through gills 
and is scaly, is a fish," though nothing false is asserted, 
a presumption is afforded that you mean to give a defi- 
nition such as would be too narrow ; in violation of 
Rule 1. 

And tautology, as above described, is sure to mis- 
lead any one who interprets what is said, comformably 
to the maxim that "an exception proves a rule." 

It often happens that one or more of the ^ •:, ^ i 
above rules is violated through men's circumstances 
proneness to introduce into their defini- mistaken for 
tions, along with, or instead of, essential ^^^^^^'^l- 
circumstances, such as are in the strict sense, accidental. 
I mearf; that the notion they attach to each term, and 
the explanation they would give of it, shall embrace 
some circumstances, generally, hut not always, connect- 
ed with the thing they are speaking of ; and which 
might, accordingly, (by the strict account of an " ac- 
cident ") be " absent or present, the essential character 
of the subject remaining the same." A definition framed 
from such circumstances, though of course incorrect, 
and likely at some time or other to mislead us, will not 

prudent (and some of our divines have, I think, committed this im- 
prudence-) to attempt to ' make assurance doubly sure ' by bring- 
ing forward confirmatory reasons, which, though in themselves 
perfectly fair, may be interpreted unfairly, by representing them 
as an acknowledged indispensable U}\iMdLi\on :— by assuming for in 
stance, that an appeal to such and such of the ancient Fathers or 
Councils, in confirmation of some doctrine or practice, is to be un- 
derstood as an admission that it would fall to the ground if not so 
confirmed."— JfiSn^dow of Christ, Essay II. ^ 33, note. 



174 ELExMENTS OF LOGIC, [Book 11. 

unfrequently obtain reception, from its answering the 
purpose of a correct one, at a particular time and place. 

" For instance, the Latin woid meridies, to denote the 
southern quarter, is etymologically suitable (and so 
would a definition founded on that etymology) in our 
hemisphere ; while in the other, it would be found just 
the reverse. Or if any one should define the North 
Pole, that which is * inclined towards the sun,' this 
would,/or half the year, answer the purpose of a cor- 
rect definition ; and would be the opposite of the truth 
for the other half. 

" Such glaring instances as these, which are nevei 
likely to occur in practice, serve best perhaps to illus- 
trate the character of &uch mistakes as do occur. A 
specimen of that introduction of accidental circumstan- 
ces which I have been describing, may be found, I think, 
in the language of a great number of writers, respecting 
wealth and value ; who have usually made labour an 
essential ingredient in their definitions. Now it is true, 
it so happens, by the appointment of providence, that 
valuable articles are in almost all instances obtained by 
labour ; but still, this is an accidental, not an essential 
circumstance, ff the aerolites which occasionally fall, 
were diamonds and pearls, and if these articles could 
be obtained in no other way, but were casually picked 
up, to the same amount as is now obtained by digging 
and diving, they would be of precisely the same value 
as now. In this, as in many other points in political 
economy, men are prone to confound cause and effects 
It is not that pearls fetch a high price because men have 
dived for them ; but on the contrary, men dive for them 
because they fetch a high price."* 

♦ Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 251—353. 



BOOK II . 

OF FALLACIES. 

Introduction^ 

Although sundry instances of Fallacies have been 
from time to time noticed in the foregoing Books, it will 
be worth while to devote a more particular attention to 
the subject. 

By a Fallacy is commonly understood, 
" any unsound mode of arguing, which "^F^nacy °^ 
appears to demand our conviction, and to 
be decisive of the question in hand, when in fairness it 
is not." Considering the ready detection and clear ex- 
posure of Fallacies to be both more extensively impor- 
tant, and also more difficult, than many are aware of, 
I propose to take a logical view of the subject ; refer- 
ring the diifereft Fallacies to the most convenient heads, 
and giving a scientific analysis of the procedure which 
takes place in each. 

After all, indeed, in the practical detection of each 
individual Fallacy, much must depend on natural and 
acquired acuteness ; nor can any rules be given, the 
mere learning of which will enable us to apply them 
with mechanical certainty and readiness : but still we 
* shall find that to take correct general views of the sub- 
ject, and to be familiarized with scientific discussions of 
it, will tend above all things, to engender such a habit 
of mind, as will best fit us for practiQe. 

Indeed the case is the same with respect to Logic in 
general. Scarcely any one would, in ordinary practice 
state to himself either his own or another's reasoning, 
in syllogisms in Barbara at full length ; yet a familiarity 
with logical principles tends very much (as all feel, who 
are really well acquainted with them) to beget a habit 
of clear and sound reasoning. The truth is, in this, as 
in many other things, there are processes going on in the 



176 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IH 

mind (when we are practising anything quite familiar 
to us) with such rapidity as to leave no trace in the 
memory ; and w^e often apply principles which did not, 
as far as we are conscious, even occur to us at the time. 
Inaccurate Ian- It would be foreign, how^ever, to the pre- 
guage of for- sent purpose to investigate fully the man- 
eign writers, j^^j. ^^^ which certain studies operate in re- 
motely producing cevtam effects on the mind : it is suf- 
ficient to establish the fact, that habits of scientific an- 
alysis (besides the intrinsic beauty and dignity of such 
studies) lead to practical advantage. It is on logical 
principles therefore that I propose to discuss the sub- 
ject of Fallacies ; and it may, indeed, seem to have been 
unnecessary to make any apology for so doing, after 
what has been formerly said, generally, in the defence of 
Logic ; but that the generality of logical writers have 
usually followed so opposite a plan. Whenever they 
have to treat of any thing that is beyond the mere ele- 
ments of Logic, they totally lay aside all reference to 
the principles they have been occupie^in establishing 
and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, vague, 
and popular kind of language ; such as would be the 
best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but seems 
strangely incongruous in a professional logical treatise. 
What should we think of a geometrical writer, who, 
after having gone through the Elements, with strict defi- 
nitions and demonstrations, should, on proceeding to 
Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference to scientific * 
principles — all use of technical terms — and treat of the 
subject in undefined terms, and with probable and pop- 
ular arguments ^ It would be thought strange if even 
a Botanist, when addressing those whom he had been 
instructing in the principles and terms of his system, 
should totally lay these aside when he came to describe 
plants, and should adopt the language of the vulgar. 
Suiely it affords but too much plausibility to the cavils 
of those who scoff at Logic altogether, that the very 
writers who profess to teach it should never themselves 
make any application of, or reference to, its principles 



Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 177 

on those very occasions, when, and when only, such 
application and reference are to be expected. If the 
principles of any system are ivell laid down — if its 
technical language is judiciously framed — then, surely, 
those principles and that language will afford (for those 
who have once thoroughly learned them) the best, the 
most clear, simple, and concise method of treating any 
subject connected with that system. Yet even writers 
generally acute in treating of the Dilemma and of the 
Fallacies, have very much forgotten the Logician, and 
assumed a loose and rhetorical style of writing, with- 
out making any application of the principles they had 
formerly laid down, but, on the contrary, sometimes 
departing widely from them.* 

The most experienced teachers, when addressing 
those who are familiar with the elementary principles 
of Logic, think it requisite, not indeed to lead them on 
each occasion, through the whole detail of those princi- 
ples, when the process is quite obvious, but always to 
•put them on the road, as it were to those principles, that 
they may plainly see their own w^ay to the end, and 
take a scientific view of the subject: in the same man- 
ner as mathematical w^riters avoid indeed the occasion- 
al tediousness of going all through a very simple de- 
monstration, which the learner, if he will, may easily 
supply ; but yet always speak in strict mathematical 
language, and w^ith reference to mathematical princi- 
ples, though they do not always state them at full length. 
I would not profess, therefore, any more than they do 
to write (on subjects connected with the science) in a 
language intelligible to those who are ignorant of its 
first rudiments. To do so, indeed, would imply that 

* Aldrich (and the same may be said of several other writers) is 
far more confused in his discussion of Fallacies than in any other 
part of his treatise ; of which this one instance may serve : alter 
having distinguished Fallacies into those in the expession, and those 
in W\(t matter ('• jn dictione," and " extra dictionem,") he observes 
of one or two of these last, that thoy are not properly called Failaciea 
as not being syllogisms faulty in form ; (" syllogisimi forma peccan- 
tes ;") as if any one, that was such, could be " Fallacia extra die 



ITS ELEMENTS OF LOOIC. Book III. 

one was not taking a scientific view of the subject, noi 
availing one's-self of the principles that had been estab- 
lished, and the accurate and concise technical language 
that had been framed. 

Mistakes as '^^^ ^^^^® already given enable us to de- 
to the office velope the principles on which all reason 
of Logic. ij^g js conducted, whatever oe tne sunject- 
matter of it, and to ascertain the validity or fallacious- 
ness of any apparent argument, as far as the form of 
expression is concerned ; that being alone the proper 
province of Logic. 

But it is evident that we may nevertheless remain li- 
able to be deceived or perplexed in argument by the as- 
sumption of false or doubtful premises, or by the em- 
ployment of indistinct or ambiguous terms ; and, accor- 
dingly, many logical writers wishing to make their 
systems appear as perfect as possible, have undertaken 
to give rules " for attaining clear ideas," and for" guid- 
ing the judgment ;" and fancying or professing them- 
selves successful in this, have consistently enough de- 
nominated Logic, the *' Art of using the Reason;" 
which in truth it would be, and would nearly super- 
sede all other studies, if it could of itself ascertain the 
meaning of every term, and the truth or falsity of every 
proposition ; in the same manner as it actually can, the 
validity of every argument. And they have been led 
into this, partly by the consideration that Logic is con- 
cerned about the " three operations" of the mind — simple 
apprehension, judgment, and reasoning : not observing 
that it is not equally concerned about all : the last ope- 
ration being alone its appropriate province ; and the rest 
being treated of only in reference to that. 

The coi. tempt justly due to such pretensions has most 
Discredit unjustly fallen on the science itself; much 
brought upon in the same manner as Chemistry was 
Logic. brought into disrepute among the un- 

thinking, by the extravagant pretensions of the Alchy- 
mists. And those logical writers have been censured, 
not Cas they should have been) for making such pro- 



$ 1.] OF FALLACIES. 179 

fessions, but for not fulfilling them. It has been ob- 
jected, especially, that the rules of Logic leave us still 
at a loss as to the most important and difficult point in 
reasoning ; viz. the ascertaining the sense of the terms 
employed, and removing their ambiguity: a complaint 
resembling that made (according to a story told by 
Warburton,* and before alluded to) by a man who found 
fault with all the reading-glasses presented to him by 
the shopkeeper ; the fact being that he had never learnt 
to read. In the present case, the complaint is the more 
unreasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor ever 
can 'possibly be, any such system devised as will effect 
the proposed object of clearing* up the ambiguity of 
terms. It is, however, no small advantage, that the 
rules of Logic, though they cannot, alone, ascertain and 
clear up ambiguity in any term, yet do point out in 
whick term of an argument it is to be sought for : direct- 
ing our attention to the middle-term, as the one on the 
ambiguity of which a fallacy is likely to be built 

It w411 be useful, however, to class and describe the 
different kinds of ambiguity which are to be met with ; 
and also the various ways in which the insertion of 
false, or, at least, unduly assumed, premises, is most 
likely to elude observation. And though the remarks 
which will be offered on these points may not be con- 
sidered as strictly forming a part of Logic, they cannot 
be thought out of place, when it is consiuered how 
essentially they are connected with the application of it. 

§1. The division of Fallacies into those Division of 
in the words (IN DICTIONE,) and those fallacies- 
in the matter (EXTRA DICT[ONEM) has not been, 
by any writers hitherto, grounded on any distinct prin- 
ciple: at least, not on any that they have themselves 
adhered to. The confounding together, however, of 
these two classes is highly detrimental to all clear 
notions concerning LDgic ; being obviously allied to the 
prevailing erroneous views which make Logic the art 
qf employing the intellectual faculties in general, having 
♦ In his Div. Le£. 



180 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. fiooK IH 

the discovery of truth for its object, and all kinds of 
knowledge for its proper subject-matter ; with all that 
train of vague and groundless speculations which have 
led to such interminable confusion and mistakes, and 
afforded a pretext for such clamorous censures. 

It is important, therefore, that rules should be ^iven 
for a division of Fallacies into logical and non-logical, 
on such a principle as shall keep clear of all this indis- 
tinctness and perplexity. 

If any one should object, that the division about to 
be adopted is in some degree arbitrary, placing undei 
the one head, fallacies which many niight be disposed 
to place under the other, let him consider not only the 
indistinctness of all former divisions, but the utter im- 
possibility of framing any that shall be completely 
secure from the objection urged, in a case where men 
have formed such various and vague notions, from the 
very want of some clear principle of division. Nay, 
from the elliptical form in w^hich all reasoning is usu- 
ally expressed, and the pecuharly involved and oblique 
form in which fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it 
must of course be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of 
arbitrary choice, not only to which genus each kind of 
fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to 
Indetermi- refer any one individual fallacy. For, 
nate character siiice, in any argument, one premiss is 
of fallacies. usually suppressed, it frequently happens, 
in the case of a fallacy, that the hearers are left to the 
alternative of supplying either a premiss which is not 
true, or else, one which does not prove the conclusion. 
E. G. if a man expatiates on the distress of the country, 
and thence argues that the government is tyrannical, 
we must suppose him to assume either that '* every 
distressed country is under a tyranny," wh'ich is a 
manifest falsehood, or, merely that " every country 
under a tyranny is distressed," which, however true, 
proves nothing, the middle- term being undistributed. 
NoWj in the former case, the fallacy would be referred 
to the head of ** extra dictionem ;" in the latter to that of 



§ 2] OF FALLACIES. IHl 

** in dictione.'* Which are we to suj pose the speaker 
meant us to understand? Surely just whichever each 
of his hearers might happen to prefer : some might as- 
sent to the false premiss ; others, allow the unsound 
syllogism ; to the sophist himself it is indifferent, as long 
as they can but be brought to admit the conclusion. 

Without pretending, th^.n, to conform to every one's 
mode of speaking on the subject, or to lay down rules 
which shall be in themselves (without any call for labour 
or skill in the person who employs them) readily appli- 
cable to, and decisive on, each individual case, I shall pro- 
pose a division which is at least perfectly clear in its main 
principle, and coincides, perhaps, as nearly as possible, 
with the established notions of Logicians on the subject. 

§ 2. In every Fallacy, the conclusion 
either does, or does not follow from the pre- Fafiacies. 
mises. Where the conclusion does not 
follow from the premises, it is manifest that the fault is 
in the reasoning, and in that alone ; these, therefore, 
we call Logical Fallacies,* as being properly, violations 
of those rules of reasoning which it is the provmce of 
Logic to lay down. 

Of these, however, one kind are more purely Logical, 
as exhibiting their fallaciousness by the bare form of 
the expression, without any regard to the meaning of 
the terms : to which class belong : 1st. undistributed 
middle; 2. illicit process; 3d. negative premises, or 
affirmative conclusion from a negative premiss, and 
vice versa : to which may be added 4th, those which 
have palpably {i. e. expressed) more than three terms. 

The other kind may be most properly 
called semi-logical; viz, ^W the cases of p^Xcks^'''^ 
ambiguous middle-term except its non-dis- 
tribution : for though in such cases the conclusion does 
not follow, and though the rules of Logic show that it 
does not, as soon as the ambiguity of the middle term is 

* In the same manner as we call that a criminal coart in which 
crimes are judged. 



132 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III 

ascertained^ yet the discovery and ascertainment of this 
ambiguity requires attention to the sense of the terrrii and 
knowledge of the subject-matter ; so that here, Logic 
teaches us not how to find the Fallacy, but only where 
to search for it, and on what principles to condemn it. 

Accordingly it has been made a subject of bitter com- 
plaint against Logic, that it presupposes the most diffi- 
cult point to be already accomplished, viz. the sense of 
the terms to be ascertained. A similar objection might 
be urged against every other art in existence ; e. g. 
against Agriculture, that all the precepts for the culti- 
vation of land presuppose the possession of a farm ; or 
against perspective, that its rules are useless to a blind 
man. The objection is indeed peculiarly absurd when 
urged against Logic, becBUse the object which it is 
blamed for not accomplishing cannot possibly be with- 
in the province of any one art whatever. Is it indeed 
possible or conceivable that there should be any meth- 
od, science or system that should enable one to knqw 
the full and exact meaning of every term in existence ? 
The utmost that can be done is to give some general 
rules that may assist us in this work ; which is done 
in the first two chapters of Book IL* 

Familiarity Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal 
with a term from men their imperfect conception of the 
ciea?*^' appJ-r. "leaning of a term, than the circumstance 
hension of its of their being able fully to comprehend a 
meaning. process of reasoning in which it is involv- 
ed, without attaching any distinct meaning at all to that 
term; as is evident when X Y Z are used to stand for 
terms, in a regular syllogism. Thus a man may be 
familiarized with a term, and never tind himself at a 
loss from not comprehending it ; from which he will be 
very likely to infer that he does comprehend it, when per- 

* The very author of the objection says, " This (the comprehen- 
sion of the meaning of general terms) is a study which every indi 
vidual must carry on for himself ; and of which no rules of Logic 
(bow useful soever they may be in directing our labours) can su 
persede the necessity." D. Stewart, PkiL Vol. If, chap, ii; 8.2. 



§3.1 OF FALLACIES. ia| 

haps he does not, but employs it vaguely and incorrectly ; 
which leads to fallacious reasoning and confusion. It 
must be owned, however, that many logical writers 
have, in great measure, brought on themselves the re- 
proach in question, by calling Logic ** the right use of 
reason,'* laying down " rules for gaining clear ideas," 
and such-like akai^wveia, as Aristotle calls it; {Rhet, 
Book I. Chap, ii.) 

§ 3. The remaining class {viz. where 
the conclusion does follow from the pre- ^nacies. 
mises) may be called the Material, or Non- 
logical Fallacies : of these there are two kinds ;* 1 st. 
when the premises are such as ought not to have been 
assumed ; 2d. when the conclusion is not the one re- 
quired, but irrelevant ; which Fallacy is commonly call- 
ed ** ignoratio elenchi" because your argument is not 
the "elenchus" (z. e. proof of the contradictory) oi 
your opponent's assertion, which it should be ; but 
proves, instead of ihat, some other proposition resemb- 
ling it. Hence, since Logic defines what contradiction 
is, some may choose rather to range this with the logi- 
cal Fallacies, as it seems, so far, to come under the juris- 
diction of that art. Nevertheless, it is perhaps better 
to adhere to the original division, both on account of 
is clearness and also because few would be inclined 
to apply to the Fallacy in question the accusation of 
being inconclusive, and consequently " illogical " rea- 
soning ; besides which, it seems an artificial and cir- 
cuitous way of speaking, to suppose in all cases an 
opponent and a contradiction; the simple statement of 
the matter being this — I am required, by the circum- 
Btances of the case, (no matter why) to prove a certain 
conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely 
to be mistaken for it ; in this lies the Fallacy. 

It might be desirable therefore to lay aside the ijame 

* For it is manifest that the fault, if there be any, must be either 
1st. in the premises, or 2dly. in the conclusion, or Sdly. in the con- 
'.exwn between them. 



184 ELEMENTS OF LOGK;. Book IJI 

ignoratio of " ignoTOtio elenchi,'" but that it is sci ge* 
elenchi. nerally adopted as to require some men- 
tion to he made of it. The other kind of Fallacies in 
the matter will comprehend (as far as the vague and 
obscure language of logical writers will allow us tt 
Non causa conjecture) the fallacy of " non causa pro 
pro causa, causa" SiXid theX oi ^' petitio principii. Of 
these, the former is by them distinguished mto " a non 
vera pro vera,^ and *' a non tali pro tali ;" this last 
would appear to mean arguing from a case not parallel 
as if it were so ; which, in logical language, is, having 
the suppressed premiss false ; for it is in that the paral- 
lelism is affirmed ; and the " non vera pro vera " will 
in like manner signify the expressed premiss being false ; 
so that this Fallacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, 
neither more nor less than falsity (or unfair assump- 
tion) of a premiss. 

Begging the The remaining kind, " petitio principii" 
question. [<« begging the question,"] takes place 
when a premiss, whether true or false, is either plainly 
equivalent to the conclusion, or depends on it for its 
own reception. It is to be observed, however, that in 
all correct reasoning the premises must, virtually, imply 
the conclusion ; so thas it is not possible to mark pre- 
cisely the distinction between the Fallacy in question 
and fair argument ; since that may be correct and fail 
reasoning to one person, which would be, to another, 
" begging the question ;" inasmuch as to one, the con 
elusion might be more evident than the premiss, and to 
the other, the reverse. The most plausible form of this 
Fallacy is arguing in a circle ; and the greater the circle, 
the harder to detect. 

§ 4. There is no Fallacy that may not properly be in 
eluded under some of the foregoing heads : those which 
in the logical treatises are separately enumerated, and 
eontra-distinguished from these, being in reality in- 
stances of them, and therefore more properly enumerated 
in the subdivision thereol ; as in the scheme annexed : — 



M.] 



OF FALLACIES. 



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186 ELEMENT^ 6f tOmC, [Book III 

§ 5. On each of the fallacies which hav- been thus 
enumerated and distinguished, I propose to offer some 
more particular remarks; but before I proceed to this, 
it will be proper to premise two general observations, 
1st. on the importance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detecting 
and describing fallacies. Both have been already 
slightly alluded to ; but it is requisite that they should 
here be somewhat more fully and distinctly set forth. 

irnpoTtaRce 1st. It seems by most persons to be taken 
of detecting for granted that a fallacy is to be dreaded 
fallacies. merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded 

by a skilful sophist ; or, if they allow that a man may 
with honest intentions slide into one unconsciously, ii> 
the heat of argument, still they seem to suppose vhat 
where there is no disputey there is no Cause to dread 
fallacy y whereas there is much danger, even in what 
may be called solitary rectsoning,. of sliding unawares 
into some fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived 
as even to act upon the conclusion thus obtained. By 
" solitary reasoning" I mean the case in which one is 
not seeking for arguments to prove a given question, 
but labouring to elicit from one s previous stock of 
knowledge some useful inference.* 

Influence of To select one from innumerable exam- 
words on pies that might be cited, and of which some 
thoughts. more will occur in the subsequent part of 
this essay ; it is not improbable that many indifferent 
sermons have been produced by the ambiguity of the 
word ''plain.'' A young divine perceives the truth of 
the maxim, that ^'^for the lower orders one's language 
cannot be too plain /" {i. e. clear and perspicua-us, so aa 
to require no learning nor ingenuity to understand it,) 
and when he proceeds to practise, the word ^' plain" 
indistinctly flit& before him, as it were, and often checks 
him in the use of ornaments oi style, such as metaphor, 
epithet, antithesis, &c., which are opposed to '* plain- 

* See thechapter on *' inferring and proving," (Book IV. ch. iii.) 
in the di&s«rtatu>n on tae pr&Vinceo-f reasoni]^ 



i 5.] OF FALLACIES. Ig- 

ness" m a totally different sense of the word ; Deing by 
no means necessarily adverse to perspicuity, but rather, 
in many cases, conducive to it ; as may be seen in 
several of the clearest of our Lord's discourses, which 
are the very ones that are the most richly adorned with 
figurative language. So far indeed is an ornamented 
style from being unfit for the vulgar, that they are 
pleased with it even in excess. Yet the desire to be 
"plain," combined with that dim and confused* notion 
which the ambiguity of the word produces in such as 
do not separate in their minds, and set before them- 
selves, the two meanings, often causes them to write in 
a dry and bald style, which has no advantage in point 
of perspicuity, and is least of all suited to the taste of 
the vulgar. The above instance is not drawn from 
mere conjecture, but from actual experience of the 
fact. 

Another instance of the strong influence of words on 
our ideas may be adduced from a widely different sub- 
ject : most persons feel a certain degree of surprise on 
first hearing of the result of some late experiments of 
the agricultural-chemists, by which they have ascer- 
tained that universally what are called heavy soils are 
specifically the lightest ; and vice versa. Whence this 
surprise 7 for no one ever distinctly believed the esta- 
blished names to be used in the literal and primary 
sense, in consequence of the respective soils having 
befen weighed together; indeed it is obvious on a mo- 
ment's reflection that tenacious clay-soils (as well as 
muddy roads) are figuratively called heavy, from the 
difl5culty of ploughing, or passing over them, which 
produces an effect like that of bearing or dragging a 
heavy weight ; yet still the terms ** light" and " heavy" 
though used figuratively, have most undoubtedly intro- 
duced into men's minds something of the ideas express- 
ed by them in their primitive sense. The same words, 
when applied to articles of diet, have produced impor- 
tant errors ; many supposing some article of food to be 



188 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. Ill 

hght of digestion from its being specifically light. So 
true is the ingenious observation of Hobbs, that " words 
are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools." 
" Men imagine," says Bacon, " that their minds have 
the command of language ; but it often happens that 
language bears rule over their mind." Some of the 
weak and absurd arguments which are often urged 
against suicide may be traced to the influence of words 
on thoughts. When a Christian moralist is called on for 
a direct Scriptural precept against suicide, instead of re- 
plying that the Bible is not meant for a complete code 
of laws, but for a system of motives and principles, the 
answer frequently given is " thou shalt do no murder ;" 
and it is assumed in the arguments drawn from reason, 
as well as in those from revelation, that suicide is a 
species of murder ; viz. because it is called seli-murder; 
and thus, deluded by a name, many are led lo rest on an 
unsound argument ; which, like all other fallacies, does 
more harm than good, in the end, to the cause of truth. 
Suicide, if any one considers the nature and not the 
name of it, evidently wants the most essential charac- 
teristic of murder, viz. the hurt and injury done to 
one's neighbour, in depriving him of life, as well as to 
others by the insecurity they are in consequence liable 
to feel. And since no one can, strictly speaking, do 
injustice to himself, he cannot, in the literal and primary 
acceptation of the words, be said either to rob or to 
murder himself. He who deserts the post to which he 
is appointed by his great master, and presumptuously 
cuts short the state of probation graciously allowed him 
for " working out his salvation," (whether by action or 
by patient endurance,) is guilty indeed of a grievous sin, 
but of one not the least analogous in its character to 
murder. It implies no inhumanity. It is much more 
closely allied to the sin of wasting life in indolence, or 
in trifling pursuits — that life which is bestowed as a 
seed-time for the harvest of immortality. What is 
called in familiar phrase " kiUing time," is, in truth, aa 



§5.] OP FALt.ACIES. 189 

approach, as far as it goes, to the destruction of one's 
own life : for " time is the stuff life is mace of." 

" Time destroyed 
Is suicide, where more than blood is spilt." — Young.* 

More especially deservina; of attention ^ 
., . n^ -^ £ 1 • 1 ^ • Errors aris* 

IS tfee miluence oi analogical terms m j^g from the 

leading men into erroneous notions in u e of analo- 
theology ; where the most important terms ^^^^^ terms. 
are analogical ; and yet they are continually employed 
in reasoning, without due attention (oftener through 
want of caution than by unfair design) to their analo- 
gical nature ; and most of the errors into which theolo- 
gians have fallen may be traced, in part, to this 
cause, t 

In speaking of the importance of refut- Twofold 
ing fallacies, (under which name J include^ danger from 
as will be seen, any false assumption em- any false as- 
ployed as a premiss) this consideration ^^"^^ ^^°' 
ought not to be overlooked ; that an unsound principle, 
which has been employed to establish some mischiev- 
ously false conclusion, does not at once become harm- 
less, and too insignificant to be worth refuting, as soon 
as that conclusion is given up, and the false principle 
is no longer employed for that particular use. It may 
equally well lead to some other no less mischievous 
result. " A false premiss, according as it is combined 
with this, or with that, true one, will lead to two dif- 
ferent false conclusions. Thus, if the principle be ad- 
mitted, that any important religious errors ought to be 
forcibly suppressed, this may lead either to persecution 
on the one side, or to latitudinarian indifference on the 

♦ It is surely wiser and safer to confine ourselves to such argu- 
ments as will bear the test of a close examination, than to resort to 
such as may indeed at the first glance be more specious and appear 
stronger, but which, when exposed, will too often leave a man a 
dupe to the fallacies on the opposite side. But it is especially the 
error of controversialists to urge every thing that can be urged ; 
to snatch up the first weapon that comes to hand ; (" furor arma 
ministrat ;") without waiting to consider what is TRUE. 

t See the notes to Ch. v. § 1 of the dissertation subjoined. 



190 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book HI. 

other. Some may be led to justify the suppression of 
heresies by the civil sword; and others, whose ieelings 
revolt at such a procedure, and who see persecution 
reprobated and discountenanced by those around them, 
may be led by the same principle to regard religious 
errors as of little or no importance, ar' '^1 religious 
persuasions as equally acceptable ii> the sight oi God."* 
Over-estimate I^ ought ho wever to be observed on the 
of the effect of other hand, that such effects are often at- 
some fallacies, tributed to some fallacy as it does not in 
fact produce. It shall have been perhaps triumphantly 
urged, and repeated again and agaiQ,and referred to by 
many as irrefragable ; and yet shall have never convinc- 
ed any one ; but have been merely assented to by those 
already convinced. To many persons any two well- 
sounding phrases, which have a few words the same, 
and are in some manner connected with the same sub- 
ject, will serve for a premiss and conclusion : and w^hen 
we hear a man profess to derive conviction from such 
arguments, w^e are naturally disposed to regard his case 
as hopeless. But it will often happen that in reahty 
his reasoning faculties shall have been totally dormant ; 
and equally so perhaps in another case, where he gives 
his assent to a process of sound reasoning, leading to a 
conclusion which he has already admitted. '* The pue- 
rile fallacies which you may sometimes hear a man ad- 
duce on some subjects, are perhaps in reality no more 
his own than the sound arguments he employs on others ; 
he may have given an indolent unthinking acquiescence 
to each ; and if he can be excited to exertion of thought, 
he may be very capable of distinguishing the sound 
from the unsound. "f 

Thus much, as to the extensive practical influence of 
Fallacies, and the consequent high importance oi detect- 
ing and exposing them. 

§ 6. 2dly. The second remark :s, that while sound 

♦ See Essays, 3d Series, Ch. v § 2. p. 229. 
t Pol. Econ. Lect. I. p . 15. 



5 tl OF FALLACIES. ^1 

reasoning is ever the more readily admit- pifficuity of 
ted, the more clearly it is perceived to be ctetefcting lalla- 
such. Fallacy, on the contrary, being re- ^^^: 
jected as soon as perceived, will, of course, be the mojre 
likely to obtain reception, the more it is obsdired and 
■disguised by obliquity and complexity of expression. 
It is thus that it is the most likely either to slip acciden- 
itall)^ from the careless reasoner, or to be brought for- 
ward deliberately by the sophist. Not that he ever 
wishes this obscurity and :Complexity to be perceived ; 
on the contrary, it is for his purpose that the expression 
should appear as clear and simple as possible, while in 
reality it is the most tangled net he can contrive. 

Thus, whereas it is usual to express our Fallacies 

reasoning ellipticaliy, so that a premiss (or concealed by- 
even two or thcee entire steps in a course «liipti<ia'l laa- 
of argument) which may be readily sup- 
plied, as being perfectly obvious, shall be left to be un 
derstood, the sophist in like manner suppresses what is 
not obvious, but is in reality the weakest part of the argu- 
ment : and uses every other contrivance to withdraw our 
attention (his art closely resembling the juggler's) from 
the quarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence the uncer- 
tainty before mentioned,- to which class any individual 
Fallacy is to be referred : and hence it is that the diffi- 
culty of detecting and exposing Fallacy, is so much 
greater than that of comprehending and developing a 
process of sound argument. It is like the detection 
and apprehension of a criminal in spite of all his arts 
of concealment and disguise ; when this is accomplish- 
ed, and he is brought to trial with all the evidence of 
his guilt produced, his conviction and punishment* are 
easy; and this is precisely the case with those fallacies 
w^hich are given as examples in logical treatises; they 
are in fact already detected, by being stated in a plain 
and regular form, and are, as it were, only brought up 
to receive sentence. Or a^ain, fallacious reasoning may 
be compared to a perplexed and entangled mass of ac' 



192 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book HI. 

counts, which it requires much sagacity and close atten- 
tion to clear up, and display in a regular and intelligi- 
ble form ; though when this is once accomplished, the 
whole appears so perfectly simple, that the unthinking 
are apt to undervalue the skill and pains which have 
been employed upon it. 

Moreover, it should be remembered, 
concealed by that a very long discussion is one of the 
lengtiiy dis- most effectual veils of Fallacy. Sophistry, 
cussion. j'l^g poison, is at once detected, and nau- 

seated, when presented to us in a concenti-ated form ; 
but a fallacy which when stated barely, in a few sen- 
tences, would not deceive a child, may deceive half the 
world, if diluted in a quarto volume. For, as in a 
calculation, one single figure incorrectly stated will 
enable us to arrive at any result whatever, though every 
other figure, and the whole of the operations, be correct, 
so, a single false assumption in any process of reason- 
ing, though every other be true, will enable us to draw 
what conclusion we please ; and the greater the number 
of true assumptions, the more likely it is that the false 
one will pass unnoticed. But when you single out one 
step in the course of the reasoning, and exhibit it as a 
syllogism with one premiss true and the other false, the 
sophistry is easily perceived. I have seen a long ar- 
gument to proYe that the potato is not a cheap article 
of food ; in which there was an elaborate, and perhaps 
correct, calculation of the produce per acre, of potatoes, 
and of wheat — the quantity lost in bran — expense of 
grinding, dressing, &c., and an assumption slipped in, 
as it were incidentally, thsX a given quantity of potatoes 
coyftains but one-tenth 'part of nutritive matter equal to 
bread : from ail which (and there is probably but one 
groundless assertion in the whole) a most triumphant 
result was deduced.* 

To use another illustration ; it is true in a course of 

♦ Tliis^lloweve^, gained the undoubting assent of a review by no 
means friendly to the author, and usually noted more for scepticism 



J 6.) OF FALLACIES. 193 

argument, as in Mechanics, that "notkng is stronger 
than its weakest part ;" and consequently a chain which 
has one faulty link will break : but though the number 
of the sound links adds nothing to the strength of the 
chain, it adds much to the chance of the faulty one's 
escaping observation. In such cases as I have been 
alluding to, one may often hear it observed that " there 
is a great deal of truth in what such a one has said :'* 
i. e. perhaps it is a// true, except one essential point. 

To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies 
that have ever been enumerated as too supposLg aU 
glaring and obvious to need even being Fallacies to be 
mentioned, because the simple instances ^.^^y o^ detec- 
given in logical treatises, and there stated 
in the plainest and consequently most easily detected 
form, are such as would (in that form) deceive no one ; 
— this, surely, shows extreme weakness, or else un- 
fairness. It may readily be allowed, indeed, that to 
detect individual Fallacies, and bring them under the 
general rules, is a harder task than to lay dotvn those 
general rules ; but this does not prove that the latter 
ojffice is trifling or useless, or that it does not essentially 
conduce to the performance of the other. There may 
be more ingenuity shown in detecting and arresting a ; 
malefactor, and convicting him of the fact, than in laying 
down a law for the trial and punishment of such 
persons ; but the latter office, i. e. that of a legislator, j 
is surely neither unnecessary nor trifling. 

It should be added that a close observation and logi- 
cal analysis of fallacious arguments, as it tends (accord- 
ing to what has been already said) to form a habit of 
mind well suited for the practical detection of Fallacies ; 
so, for that very reason, it will make us the more care- 

tlian for ready assent ! " All things," says an apocryphal writer, 
"are double, one against another, and nothing is made in vain:" 
unblushing asserters of falsehood seem to have a race of easy be- 
lievers provided on purpose for their use : men who will not indeed 
believe the best established truths of religion, but are ready to 
believe any thing else. 



It4 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Sooit HI 

ful in making allowance for them : L e. to bear in mind 
how much men in general are liable to be. influenced by 
them. E. G. a refuted argument ought to go for no- 
thing, (except where there is some ground for assum- 
ing that no st7vngeT one could be adduced :)* but in/«c^ 
it will generally prove detrimental to the cause, from 
the fallacy which w411 be presently explained. Now, 
no one is more likely to be. practically aware of this, 
and to take precautions accordingly, than he who is most 
versed in the whole theory of Fallacies ; for the best Lo- 
gician is the least likely to calculate on men in general 
being such. 

Of Fallacies inform^ 

§ 7. Enough perhaps has already been said in the 
preceding compendium : and it has been remarked above 
that it is often left to our choice to refer an individual 
Fallacy to this head or to another. 

It may be worth observing, however, that to the pre- 
sent class we may the most conveniently refer those 
Fallacies, so common in practice, of supposing the con- 
clusion false, because the premiss is false, or because 
the argument is unsound ; and of inferring the truth ol 
the premiss from that of the conclusion. E. G. if any 
one argues for the existence of a God, from its being 
universally believed, a man might perhaps be able to 
refute the argument by producing an instance of some 
nation destitute of such behef ; the argument ought then 
(as has been observed above) to go for nothing : but 
many would go further, and think that this refutation 
had disproved the existence of a God; in which they 
would be guilty of an illicit process of the major-term : 
viz. *' whatever is universally believed must be true ; 
the existence of a God is not universally beheved, 
therefore it is not true." Others again, from being con- 
vinced of the truth of the conclusion, w^ould infer thai 
* See Essay 11. on Kinffdoin of Christ, ^22, ^ot^, 



i 7.] OF FALLACIES. ||^ 

of the premises ; which would amount to the Fallacy 
of an undistributed middle : viz. " what is universally 
believed is true ; the existence of a God is true ; there- 
fore it is universally believed." Or, these Fallacies 
might be stated in the hypothetical form ; since the 
one evidently proceeds from the denial of the antece- 
dent to the denial of the consequent ; and the other from 
the establishing of the consequent to the inferring of the 
antecedent ; which two Fallacies will usually be found 
to correspond respectively with those of illicit process 
of the major and undistributed middle. 

Fallacies of this class are very much kept 
out of sight, being seldom perceived even by m^tr^prlf til 
those who employ them ; but of their prac- caily detrimen- 
tical importance there can be no doubt, since ^^l- 
it is notorious that a weak argument is always, in prac- 
tice, detrimental ,* and that there is no absurdity so gross 
which men will not readily admit, if it appears to lead 
to a conclusion of which they are already convinced. ^ 
Even a candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to be, 
by this means, misled, when he is seeking for arguments 
to support a conclusion which he has long been fully 
convinced of himself ; i. e. he will often use such argu- 
ments as would never have convinced himself, and are 
not likely to convince others, but rather (by the opera- 
tion of the converse Fallacy) to confirm in their dissent 
those who before disagreed with him. 

It is best therefore to endeavor to put yourself in the 
place of an opponent to your own arguments, and con- 
sider whether you could not find some objection to 
them. The applause of one's own party is a very un- 
safe ground for judging of the real force of an argu- 
mentative work, and consequently of its utility. To 
satisfy those who were doubting, and to convince those 
who were opposed, are much better tests ;* but these 

♦ The strongest, perhaps, of all external indications of the 
strength of an argument, is the implied admission of those who 
nevertheless resolve not to admit the conclusion. See Appendix j 
Art. P^$on, last clause. 



196 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. lH. 

persons are seldom very loud in their applause, or verf 
forward in bearing their testimony. 

Of Ambiguous Middle. 

§ 8. That case in which the middle is undistributed 
belongs of course to the preceding head ; the fault being 
perfectly manifest from the mere form of the expres- 
sion : in that case the extremes are compared with two 
'parts of the same term ; but in the Fallacy which has 
been called semi-logical, (which we are now to speak 
of ) the extremes are compared with two different terms, 
the middle being used in two different senses in the two 
premises.* 

And here it may be remarked, that when the argu- 
ment is brought into the form of a regular syllogism, 
the contrast between these two senses will usually ap- 
pear very striking, from the two premises being placed 
together ; and hence the scorn with which many have 
treated the very mention of the fallacy of equivocation, 
deriving their only notion of it from the exposure of it 
in logical treatises ; whereas, in practice it is common 
for the two premises to be placed very far apart, and 
discussed in different parts of the discourse ; by which 
means the inattentive hearej overlooks any ambiguity 
that may exist in the middle term. Hence the ad^^an- 
tage of logical habits, in fixing onr attention strongly 
and steadily on the important terms of an argument. 

And here it should be observed, that when we mean 
to charge any argument with the fault of " equivocsd 
mindle," it is not enough to say that the middle term is 
a word or phrase which admits of more than one 
meaning ; (for there are few that do not) but we must 
show, that in order for each premiss to be admitted, 
the term in question must be understood in one sense 
(pointing out what that sense is) in one of the premi- 
ses, and in another sense in the other. 

* For some instances of importaiu t i iguities, see Appendix. 



§8.] OF FALLACIES. l^f 

Importance ^^^ ^^ ^^Y ^"^ speaks ccntemptuously 
of minute dis- of " over exactness" in fixing the precise 
tinctions. sense in which some term is used — of at- 
tending to minute and subtle distinctions, &c. we may 
reply that these minute distinctions are exactly those 
which call for careful attention ; since it is only through 
the neglect of thef^e that Fallacies ever escape detection. 

For, a very glaring and palpable equivocation could 
nevei mislead any one. To argue that " feathers dispel 
darkness, because they are light," or that " this man is 
agreeable, because he is riding, and riding is agreea- 
ble," is an equivocation which could never be employ 
ed but in jest. And yet however slight in any case 
may be the distinction between the two senses of a 
middle- term in the two premises, the apparent-argument 
will be equally inconclusive ; though its fallaciousness 
will be more likely to escape notice. 

Even so, it is for want of attention to minute points, 
that houses are robbed, or set on fire. Burglars do not 
in general come and batter down the front-door ; but 
climb in at some window whose fastenings have been 
neglected. And an incendiary, or a careless servant, 
does not kindle a tar-barrel in the middle of a room, but 
leaves a lighted turf, or a candle snuff, in the thatch, or 
in a heap of shavings. 

f n many cases, it is a good maxim, to " take care of 
little things, and great ones will take care of them- 
selves." 

One case, which may be regarded as 
coming under the head of ambiguous mid- ^^Jrj/"^^^'* 
die, is, (what I believe logical writers mean 
by " Fallacia Figures Dictionis,'') the Fallacy built on 
the grammatical structure of language, from men's usu- 
ally taking for granted that paronymotis [or conjugate"] 
words — i. e. those belonging to each other, as the sub- 
stantive, adjective, verb, &c. of the same root, have a 
precisely correspondent meaning ; which is by no 
means universally the case. Such a fallacy could not 



t9B ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. tBooKlll. 

indeed be even exhibited in strict logical f c rm, which 
would preclude even the attempt at it, since it has two 
middle terms in sound as well as sense. But nothing 
is more common in practice than to vary continually 
the terms employed, with a view to grammatical con- 
venience ; nor is there anything unfair in such a prac- 
tice, as long as the meaning is preserved unaltered : e. g. 
" murder should be punished with death ; this man is 
a murderer; therefore he deserves to die," &c. &c. 
Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case just) 
that to commit murder and to be a murderer —to deserve 
death and to be one who ought to die, are, respectively, 
equivalent expressions : and it would frequently prove 
a heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind of 
liberty ; but the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in 
question : e. g. '' projectors are unfit to be trusted ; this 
man has formed a project, therefore he is unfit to be 
trusted :"* here the sophist proceeds on the hypothesis 
that he who forms a project must be a projector : where- 
as the bad sense that commonly attaches to the latter 
word, is not at all implied in the fornier. 

This Fallacy may often be considered as lying not 
in the middle, but in one of the terms of the conclusion ; 
so that the conclusion drawn shall not be,^in reahty,at 
all warranted by the premises, though it w'ill appear to 
be so, by means of the grammatical alfinity of the 
words : e. g. " to be acquainted with the guilty is a 
presumption of guilt ; this man is so acquainted ; there- 
fore we may presume that he is guilty :" this argument 
proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence 
between ''presume'' and ''presumption" which, how- 
ever, docs not really exist ; for " presumption " is com- 
monly used to express a kind of sligkt suspicion, 
whereas " to presume " amounts to actual belief. 

The above remark will apply to some other cases oi 
ambiguity of term ; viz. the conclusion will often con- 
tain a term, which (though not, as here, different {n eX' 
♦ Adain Smith's Wealth nf Nations: Usttry. 



§ 8.] OF FALLACIES. lUf 

pression Irom the corresponding one in the premiss, 
yet) is liable to be understood in a sense diiFeient from 
what it bears to the premiss ; though, of course, such 
a Fallacy is less common, because less likely to deceive, 
in those cases than in this ; where the term used in the 
conclusion, though professing to correspond with one 
in the premiss, is not the Yevy ^ame in expression, and 
therefore is more certain to convey a difterent sense ; 
which is what the sophist wishes. 

There are innumerable instances of a non -correspon- 
dence in paronymous words, similar to that above in- 
stanced ; as between art and artful, design and design- 
ing, faith and faithfvl, Sfc. ; and the more slight the 
variation of meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to 
be successful ; for when the words have become so 
widely removed in sense as " pity " and " pitiful," 
every one would perceive such a Fallacy, nor could it 
be employed but in jest. 

This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, (except 
when you are addressing regular Logicians,) by stating 
merely the impossibility of reducing such an argument 
to the strict logical form. You must find some way of 
pointing out the non-correspon'dence of the terms in 
question; e. g. w^ith respect to the example above, it 
might be remarked, that we gpeak of strong or faint 
** presumption," but We use no such expression in con- 
junction with the verb *' presume," because the word 
itself implies strength. 

No Fallacy is more common in controversy than the 
present ; since in this way the sophist will often be able 
to misinterpret the propositions which his opponent ad- 
mits or maintains, and so employ them against him. 
Thus in the examples just given, it is natural to con- 
ceive one of the sophist's premises to have been bor« 
rowed from his opponent,* 

* Perhaps a dictionary of such paronymous [conjugate] words as 
\o not regularly correspond in meaning, would be nearly as useful 
as on© of syuonyms j i. e. properly spe^ng, oipseudotyfionymA 



200 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book ID 

Etymology. '^^^ present Fallacy is nearly allied to, 
or rather perhaps may be regarded a» a 
branch of that founded on ^jti/mo/ogY/ ; viz. when a term 
is used at one time, in its customjiry, and at another, in 
its etymological sense. Perhaps uo ex^ample of this can 
be found that is more extensively and mischievously 
employed than in the case of the word representative : 
assuming that its righf meaning must correspond ex- 
actly with the strict and original sense of the verb, 
" represent " the sophist persuades the multitude, that 
a member of the House of Commons is bound to be 
guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents : 
and, in short, to be merely their spokesman: whereas 
law, and custom, w^hich in this case may be considered 
as fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, 
but enjoin the representative to act according to the best 
of his own judgment, and on his own responsibility. 

Home Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such 
weapons for any sophist who may need them ; and has 
furnished some specimens of the employment of them. 
He contends, that it is idle to speak of eternal or immu- 
table " Truths'' because the word is derived from to 
** trow," ii e. believe. He might on as good grounds 
have censured the absurdity of speaking of sending a 
letter by the "post,'' because a post, in its primary 
sense, is a pillar ; or have insisted that •' sycophant," 
can never mean anything but " fig-shewer." 

§ 9. It is to be observed, that to the head 
tJrrogatio^ns!"" ^^ ambiguous middle should be referred 
what i s call ed * * Fallacia plu rium Inte rrO" 
gationum" which may be named, simply, " the Fal- 
lacy of Interrogation ;" viz. the Fallacy of asking seve- 
ral questions which appear to be but one; so that 
whatever one answer is given, being of course applica- 
ble to one only of the implied questions, may be inter- 
preted as applied to the other : the refutation is, of 
course, to reply separately to each question, u e» to de» 
tect the ambiguity. 



f *.3 OF FALLACIES. 201 

I hare said, several " questions which appear to be 
but one" for else there is no Fallacy ; such an example, 
therefore, as " estne homo animal et lapis ?" which Al- 
drich gives, is foreign to the matter in hand ; for there 
is nothing unfair in asking two distinct questions (any 
more than in asserting two distinct propositions) dis- 
tinctly and avowedly. 

This Fallacy may be eferred, as has been said, to the 
head of ambiguous middle. In all reasoning it is very 
common to state one of the premises in form of a ques- 
tion, and when that is admitted, or supposed to be ad- 
mitted, then to fill up the rest : if then one of the terms 
of that question be ambiguous, whichever sense the 
opponent replies to, the sophist assumes the other sense 
of the term in the remaining premiss. It is therefore 
very common to state an equivocal argument, in form 
of a question so worded, that there shall be Itttle doubt 
which reply will be given ; but if there be such doubt, 
the sophist must have two Fallacies of equivocation 
ready; E. G. the question *' whether anything vicious 
is expedient," discussed in Cic. Off. Book III. (where, 
by the by, he seems not a little perplexed with it him* 
self) i«i of the character in question, from the ambiguity 
of the ,vord, " expedient,' which means sometimes,, 
"conducive to temporal prosperity," sometimes *« con- 
ducive to the greatest good :" whichever answer there- 
fore was given, the sophist might have a Fallacy of 
equivocation founded on this term ; viz. if the answer 
be in the negative, his argument, logically developed, 
will stand thus — " what is vicious is not expedient ; 
whatever conduces tn the acquisition of wealth and ag- 
grandizement is expedient; therefore it cannot be vi- 
cious :" if in the affirmative, then thus — " whatever is 
expedient is desirable ; something vicious is expedient, 
therefore desirable."* 

♦ Much of the declamation by which popular assemblies are often 
misled, against what is called, without any distinct meaning, the 
•• doctrine of «xp«dieacy,'; (as if the "right " and the " expedient,'' 
16 



202 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IH. 

Again, a witness was once asked by a parliamentary 
committee (in 1832) whether he knew " how long tho 
practice had ceased in Ireland of dividing the tithes into 
four portions, one for the poor," &c. This resembles 
the hackneyed instance of asking a man " whether ht 
had left off beating his father." [See Vol. of Chargeb 
and Tracts, p. 379.] King Charles II.'s celebrated in- 
quiry — of the Royal Society (noticed below, § 14) may 
be referred to this head. He asked the cause why a 
dead fish does not (though a live fish does add to the 
weight of a vessel of water. This implies two questions ; 
the first of which many of the philosophers for a time 
overlooked : viz. 1st. is it 3, fact ? 2dly. if it be a fact, 
what can cause it ?* 

Distribution ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ Fallacy is frequently em- 
and non-distri- ployed in such a manner, that the uncer- 
bution. tainty shall be, not about the meanings 

but the extent of a term, i. e. whether it is distributed 
or not : ^- g- " did A B in this case act from such and 
such a motive .^" which may imply cither, " was it his 
sole motive ?" or ** was it one of his motives ?" in the 
former case the term [" that-which-actuated-A B "] is 
distributed ; in the latter, not : now if he acted from a 
mixture of motives, whichever answer you give, may 
'be misrepresented, and your conclusion thus dis- 
proved. 

Again, those who dispute the right of a state to en- 
force the profession of a certain religion, have been met 
by the question, " has a state a right to enforce laws?" 
If we answer in the negative, we maybe interpreted as 
denying that any laws can rightfully be enforced; 
which would of course go to destroy the very existence 
of a political-community : if, in the affirmative, we may 
be interpreted as sanctioning the enforcement of any 

were in opposition) might be silenced by asking the simple ques* 
tion, '* Do you then admit that the course you recommend is inex 
^dieat ?" ' 

* See Historic DouWs relative to Napoleon^. 



§10] OF FALLACIES. 203 

laws whatever that the legislature may see fit to enact : 
whether enjoining men to adore a crucifix, or to trample 
on it; — to reverence Christ, or Mahomet, &c. The 
ambiguity of the question lies in " laws;'' understood 
either as " some laws," or, as " any laws without ex- 
ception."* 

§ 10. In some cases of ambiguous intrinsic and 

middle, the term in question may be con- incidental 
sidered as having in itself, from its own equivocations, 
equivocal nature, two significations ; (which apparently 
constitutes the " Fallacia equivocationis " of logical 
writers ;) others again have a middle-term which is 
ambiguous from the context, i. e. from what is under- 
stood in conjunction with it. This division will be 
found useful, though it is impossible to draw the line 
accurately in it. 

The elliptical character of ordinary discourse causes 
many terms to become practically ambiguous, which 
yet are not themselves employed in different senses, but 
with different applications, which are understood. Thus, 
*' The Faith," would be used by a Christian writer to 
denote the Christian Faith, and by a Mussulman, the 
Mahometan ; yet the word Faith, has not in these cases, 
of itself, two dififerent significations. So eKleKTol, 
** elect," or *' chosen," is sometimes applied to such as 
are " chosen," to certain privileges and advantages ; 
(as the Israelites were, though " they were overthrown 
in the wilderness " for their disobedience ; and as all 
Christians are frequently called in the New Testament) 
sometimes again to those who are '' chosen," as fit to 
receive di final reward, having made a right use of those 
advantages ; as when our Lord says, " many are called, 
but few chosen." 

What logicians have mentioned under Amphibolia. 
the title of " Fallacia amphibolise" is re- 
ferable to this last class ; though in real practice it is 
not very hkely to occur. An amphibolous sentence ia 

* See << Essays on the Kingdom of Christ.'' Note A. to Essay I 



31^ ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book m 

one that is capable of two meanings, not from the dou, 
ble sense of any of the words, but from its admitting oy 
a double construction : as in the instance Aldrich gives, 
ivhich is untranslatable ; '* quod tangitur a Socrate, il 
lud sentit;" where " illud" may be taken either as thi 
nominative or accusative. So also the celebrated re 
sponse of the oracle ; " Aio te, iEacida, Romanos vin 
cere posse :*' " Pyrrhus the Romans shall, I say, sub 
due :" which closely resembles (as Shakspeare remarks) 
the witch-prophecy, " The duke yet lives that Henry 
shall depose." This effect is produced by what the 
French call " construction louche," a squinting con- 
struction ; i.e. w^here some word or words may be re- 
ferred either to the former or latter clause of the sentence; 
of which an instance occurs in the rubric prefixed to 
the service for the 30th January. " If this day shall 
happen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be used] 
and the fast kept the next day following :" the clause 
in brackets may belong either to the former or the latter 
part of the sentence. In the Nicene Creed, the words, 
" by v^hom all things were made," are grammatically 
referable either to the Father or the Son. And in the 
2d Commandment, the clause " of them that hate me/ 
is a genitive governed either by " children," or by, 
" generation :" the latter being indicated by the ordinary 
mode of punctuation and of reading; which totally 
changes the real sense.* The following clause of a 
sentence from a newspaper, is a curious specimen of 
Amphibolia: — "For protecting and upholding such 
electors as refused, contrary to their desires and con- 
sciences, to vote for Messrs. A and B, regardless of 
threats, and unmindful of intimidation." 

There ai'e various ways in which words 
eqS^^ocauin. ^ome to have two meanings : ^ 

1st. By accident; (?. e. when there is 
no perceptible connexion between the tw^o meanings) 
as "ligkf* signifies both the contrary to " heavy ,»» 

♦ See Rhetoric, Appendix. 



§10.J OF FALLACIES. 8<MI 

and the contrary to " dark." Thus, such proper-names 
as John or Thomas, &c., which happen to belong to 
several different persons, are ambiguous, because they 
have a different signification in each case where they 
are applied. Words which fall under this first head are 
what are the most strictly called equivocal. 

2dly. There are several terms in the p|j,st and 
use of which it is necessary to notice the second inten. 
distinction between ^r^^ and second inten- *^*^"* 
fzon.* The " first-intention," of a term, (according to 
the usual acceptation of this phrase) is a certain vague 
and general signification of it, as opposed to one more 
pi-ecise and limitedy which it bears in some particular 
art, science, or system, and which is called its " second- 
intention." Thus, among farmers, in some parts, the 
word " beast " is applied particularly and especially to 
the ox kind; and "bird," in the language of many 
sportsmen, is in like manner appropriated to the par- 
tridge: the common and general acceptation (which 
every one is well acquainted with) of each of those two 
words, is the first-intention of each ; the other, its se- 
cond-intention. 

For some remarks on the second- intention of the word 
" species," when applied to organized beings {viz, as 
denoting those plants or animals, which it is conceived 
may have descended from a common stock,) see the 
subjoined dissertation. Book IV. Chap. v. § 1. 

It is evident that a term may have several second-in- 
tentions, according to the several systems into w^hich it 

* I am awarethat there exists another opinion as to the meaning 
of the phrase " second intention 5" and that Aldrich is understood 
by some persons to mean (aw indeed his expression may very well 
be understood to imply) that ^very ft'cdicahle must necessarily be 
employed in the second-intention. J do not undertake to combat 
the doctrine alluded to, because I must confess that, after the most 
patient attention devoted to the explanations given of it, I have never 
been able to comprehend what it is that is meant by it. It is one, 
however, which, whether sound or unsound, appears not to be con- 
nected with any logical processes, and ttfrefore may be safely 
i>assed by on the present occasio n. 



m€ KLEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book It! 

is introduced, and of which it is one of" the technicai 
terms : thus " line," signifies in the art military, a cer- 
tain form of drawing up ships or troops : in Geography, 
a certain division of the earth ; to the iisherman,,a string 
to catch fish, &c. &c. ; all which are so many distinct 
second-intentions, in each of which there is a certain 
signification " of extension in length" which constitutes 
the first-intention, and which corresponds pretty nearly 
with the employment of the term in Mathematics. 

In a few instances the second-intention, or philoso- 
phical employment of a term, is more extensive than the 
first-intention, or popular use : thus *' affection" is lim- 
ited in popular use to " love ;" ** charity," to ** almsgiv- 
ing ;" " flower," to those flowers, which have conspicu- 
ous petals : and fruit, to such as are eatable. 

It will sometimes happen, that a term shall be em- 
ployed always in some one or other of its second inten- 
tions ; and never, strictly in the first, though that first 
intention is apart of its signification in each case. It 
is evident, that the utmost care is requisite to avoid con- 
founding together, either the first and second intentions, 
or the different second intentions with each other. 

3dly. When two or more things are con- 
?nra^alogy^ nected by resemblance or analogy, they will 
frequently have the same name. Thus a 
" blade of grass," and the contrivance in building called 
a *' dove-tail,'' are so called from their resemblance to the 
blade* of a sword, and the tail of a real dove. But two 
things may be connected by analogy, though they have 
in themselves no resemblance : for analogy is the resem- 
blance of ratios (or relations : thus, as a sweet taste 
gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the 
ear ; and hence the same word " sweet" is applied to 
both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself 

♦ Unless, indeed, the primary application of the term be to th« 
leaf of grass, and the secondary to cutting instruments, which is 
perhaps more probable ; but the question is unimportant in the pre- 
sent case. 



$ lO.J OF FALLACIES. 207 

So, the leg of a table does not resemble that of E.n ani- 
mal ; nor the foot of a mountain that of an animal,- but 
the leg answers the same purpose to the table, as the leg 
of an animal to that animal ; the foot of a mountain 
has the same situation relatively to the mountain, as the 
foot of an animal to the animal. This analogy there- 
fore may be expressed like a mathematical analogy (or 
proportion ;) " leg : animal : supporting- stick : table." 

The words pertaining to mind may in general be tra- 
ced up, as borrowed (which no doubt they all were, 
originally) by analogy, from those pertaining to matter : 
though in many cases the primary sense has become 
obsolete. 

Thus, ** edify"* in its primary sense of " build up"t 
is disused, and the origin of it often forgotten ; although 
the substantive " edifice" remains in common use in a 
corresponding sense. 

When however we speak of "weighing" the reasons 
on both sides — of " seeing," or " feeling " the force of 
an argument — " imprinting" anything on the memory, 
&c. we are aware of these words being used analogi- 
cally. 

In all these cases (of this 3d head) one 

of the meaninors of the word is called by ^ ^"'^^^?' j*"^ 
P . . ^ . . . -, . ■^ secondary sen- 

Logicians |?roper, i. e. original or primary ; scs. 

the other improper, secondary, or transfer- 
red : thus, sweet is originally and properly applied to 
tastes ; secondarily and improperly {L e. by analogy) to 
sounds : thus also, dove-tail is applied secondarily 
(though not by analogy, but by direct resemblance) to 
the contrivance in building so called. 

When the secondary meaning of a word is founded 
on some fanciful analogy, and especially when it is in- 
troduced for ornament's sake, we call this a metaphor : 
as when we speak of " a ship's ploughing the deep ;" 
the turning up of the surface being essential indeed to 
the plough, but accidental only, to the ship. But if the 

• See I Peter ii. 6 f See Johnson's f)ictionarf 



mn ELEMENTS OF LODIC. [Bo(^ II! 

analogy be a more important and essential one, and 
especially if we have no other word to express our 
meaning but this transferred one, we then call it merely 
an analogous word (though the metaphor is analogous 
also) e. g. one would hardly call it metaphorical or 
figurative language to speak of the " leg of a table," 
or " mouth of a riVer."* 

There are two kinds of error, each very common- 
which lead to confusion of thought in our use of ana- 
logical words : 

i. The error of supposing the things themselves to be 
similar, from their having similar relations to other 
things. 

ii. The still commoner error of supposing the ana- 
logy to extend further than it does ; [or, to be more 
complete than it really is ;] from not considering in what 
the analogy in each case consists. 

For instance, the "servants" that we read of in the 
bible, and in other translations of ancient books, are so 
called by analogy to servants among us : and that ana- 
logy consists in the otfices which a " servant" performs, 
in waiting on his master, and doing h^s bidding. It is 
in this respect that the one description of " servant " 
" corresponds " ['•' answers "] to the other. And hence 
some persons have been led to apply all that is said in 
Scripture respecting masters and servants, to these 
times, and this country ; forgetting that the analogy is 
not complete, and extends no further than the point 
above-mentioned. For the ancient " servants " (except 
when expressly spoken of as /izr^<i-servants) were 
slaves ; a part of the master's possessions. 

4thly. Several things may be called by 
time^or'piace^ ^^^ ^^"^^ name (though they have no con- 
ic. * nexion of resemblance or analogy) from 
being connected by vicinity of time 01 
flace ; under which head will come the connexion of 

* See Bp. Copleston's account of analogy in the notes to hif 
•• FoUr-DigcoUries." " 



§ 10.] OF FALLACIES. 209 

eause and effect, or of part and whole, Sfc. / and the 
transference of words in this way from the primary to 
a secondary meaning, is what grammarians call Meto- 
nymy. Thus, a door signifies both an opening in the 
wall (more strictly called the door-way) and a board 
which closes it; which are things"^ neither similar nor 
analogous. When I say, " the rose smells sweet ;'* and 
*' I smell the rose;" the word " smell" has two mean- 
ings : in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a certain 
sensation in my own mind ; in the former, of a certain 
quality in the flower, which produces that sensation, 
but which of course cannot in the least resemble it ; 
and here the word smell is applied with equal propriety 
to both. On this ambiguity have been founded the 
striking paradoxes of those who have maintained that 
there is no heat in fire, no cold in ice, &c. The sensa- 
tions of heat, cold, &c. can of course only belong to a 
sentient being. Thus again the word " certainty," de- 
notes either, primarily, the state of our own mind when 
we are free from doubt, or secondarily, the character of 
the event about which we feel certain. [See Appendix, 
No. I.] Thus, we speak of Homer, for " the w^orks of 
Homer ;" and this is a secondary or transferred mean- 
ing : and so it is when we say, " a good shot," for a 
good marksman: but the word ''shot" has two other 
meanings, which are both equally proper ; viz. the thing 
put into a gun in order to be discharged from it, and 
the act of discharging it 

Thus, *' learning" signifies either the act of acquir- 
ing knowledge, or the knowledge itself; e. g. "he 
neglects his learning ;" " Johnson was a man of learn- 
ing." '* Possession " is ambiguous in the same manner ; 
and a multitude of others A remarkable and most 
important instance is the ambiguity of such words as 
"same," " one" &c. (See the articles on those words in 
AppeiT lix, and also Book IV. Ch. v. § 1 and 2.) 

Mu .h confusion often arises from ambiguity of this 
kind, when unperceived ; nor is there any point in which 
17 



210 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book m 

the copiousness and consequent precision of the Greek 
language, is more to be admired than in its distinct terms 
for expressing an act, and the result of that act ; e. g 
npa^t^, "the doing of anything;" npayfia, the "thing 
done ;" so, Soatc, and Scjpov — XTjipi^ and ATj/ijua. 

It will very often happen, that two of the meanings 
of a word will have no connexion with one another, 
but will each have some connexion with the third. 
Thus, "martyr" originally signified a witness; thence 
it was applied to those who svffered in bearing testimony 
to Christianity ; and thence again it is often applied to 
" sufferers " in general : the first and third significations 
are not the least connected. Thus "post" signifies 
originally a pillar, {postitm, from pono) then, a distance 
marked out by posts; and then, the carriages, messen-^ 
gers, &c. that travelled over this distance. Thus 
** clerk," originally one in Holy Orders, came to be used 
as it is at present, from the " clergy " having been, 
during the dark ages, almost the only persons who 
could read. 

It would puzzle any one, proceeding on mere conjec- 
ture, to make out how the w^ord "premises" should 
have come to signify " a building." 

Ambiguities of this kind belong practically to the 

first head: there hemg no perceived connexion between 

the different senses. 

Another source of practical ambiguity 

S^^!?^^^^^ (as has been just observed) " is, that, in 

language. ^ „ J i • ^ • , . , 

respect oi any subject concernmg which 

the generality of men are accustomed to speak much 
and familiarly, in their conversation relative to that, 
they usually introduce elliptical expressions; very 
clearly understood in the outset, but whose elliptical 
character comes, in lime, to be so far lost sight of, that 
eorifusion of language, and thence, of thought, is some- 
times the result. Thus, the expression of a person's 
possessing a fortune of £ 1 0,000 is an elliptical phrase : 
meaning, at full length, that all his property if sold 



510.1 OF FALLACIES. 211 

would excnange for that sum of money. And in 
nmety-nine instances out of a hundred, no error or con- 
fusion of thought arises from this language ; but there 
is no doubt that it mainly contributed to introduce and 
foster the notion that wealth consists especially of gold 
and silver (these being used to measure and express its 
amount ;) and that the sure way to enrich a country is 
to promote the importation, and prevent the export, of 
the precious metals ; with all the other absurdities of 
what is commonly called ' the mercantile system.' So 
also we speak commonly of ' the example of such a one's 
punishment serving to deter others from crime.' And 
usually, no misapprehension results from this, which 
is, in truth, an elliptical expression. But sometimes 
sophistical reasoners take advantage of it, and men who 
are not clear-headed are led into confusion of thought. 
Strictly speaking, what deters a man from crime in such 
cases as those alluded to, is, the apprehension of him- 
self suffering punishment. Tliat apprehension may be 
excited by the example of another's being punished ; or 
it may be excited without that example, if punishment 
be denounced, and there is good reason to expect that 
the threat w^ill not be an empty one. And on the other 
hand, the example of others' suffering punishment does 
not deter any one, if it fail to excite this ap|)rehension 
for himself ; if for instance he consider himself as an 
exempt person, as is the case w^ith a despot in barbarian 
countries, or with a madman who expects to be acquit- 
ted on the plea of insanity. 

" Again, when a man complains of being • out of 
work ' — is * looking out for employment,' — and hopes 
for subsistence by labour, this is elliptical language ; 
well enough understood in general. We know that 
what man lives on, is food ; and that he who is said to 
be looking out for work, is in want of food and other 
necessaries, which he hopes to procure in exchange for 
his labour, and has no hope of obtaining withoui it. 
But there is no doubt that this elliptical language ha* 



tn ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book HI- 

contributed to lead those who were not attentive to the 
character of the expression, to regard every thing as 
beneficial to the labouring classes ^which furnishes em- 
ployment, i. e. gives trouble; even though no conse- 
quent increase should take place in the country, of the 
food and other commodities destined for their support."* 
A snow-drift Which obstructs a road, and a vein of 
valuable ore, may conceivably each furnish employ- 
ment for an equal number of labourers. 

The remedy for ambiguity is a definition of the term 
which is suspected of being used in two senses ; viz> a 
nominal, not necessarily a real definition : as was re- 
marked in Book IL Chap. v. 

Definition ^^ ^^ important to observe that the very 
when most circumstance which in any case " makes 
needed. a definition the more necessary, is apt to 

lead to the omission of it : for when any terms are em- 
ployed that are not familiarly introduced into ordinary 
discourse, such as ' parallelogram,' or * sphere,' or 
* tangent,' * pencil of rays,' or refraction,' — ' oxygen,' 
. or « alkali,' — the learner is ready to inquire, and the 
writer to anticipate the inquiry, what is meant by this 
or that term ? And though in such cases it is undoubt- 
edly a correct procedure to answer this inquiry by a 
definition#yet of the two cases, a definition is even more 
necessary in the other, where it is not so likely to be 
called for ; — where the v/ord, not being new to the 
student, but familiar to his ear, from its employment in 
every-day discourse, is liable to the ambiguity which 
is almost always the result. For in respect of words 
that sound something new and strange, though it is, as 
I have said, much better to define them in the outset, 
yet even without this, the student would gradually col- 
lect their meaning pretty correctly, as he proceeded in 
his study of any treatise ; from having nothing to mis- 
lead him — nothing from which to form his notions al 
all, except the manner in which the terms were employ- 

♦ Pol. Econ. Lect IX. 



$ lO.J OF FALLACIES. 21S 

ed in the work itself that is before him. And tl le very 
desire he had felt of a definition would lead him m this 
way to form one, and generally a sufficiently correct 
one, for himself. 

*' It is otherwise with terms to which we are fami- 
liarly accustomed. Of these, the student does not usu- 
ally crave dehnitions, from supposing, for that reason, 
that he understands them well enough : though perhaps 
(without suspecting it) he has in reality been accustom- 
ed to hear them employed in various senses, and to 
attach but a vague and inaccurate notion to them. If 
you speak to an uninstructed hearer, of anything that 
is spkerical, or circular, or cylindrical, he will probably 
beg for an explanation of your meaning ; but if you 
teli him of anything that is round, it will not strike him 
that any explanation is needed : though he has been 
accustomed to employ the w^ord, indiscriminately, in all 
the senses denoted by the other three."* 

But here it may be proper to remark,t Definitions, 
that for the avoiding of Fallacy, or of ver- how far to be 
bal- controversy, it is only requisite that 
the term should be employed uniformly in the same 
sense as far as the existing question is concerned.^ Thus, 
two persons might, in discussing the question whether 
Augustus was a great man, have some such difference 
in their acceptation of the epithet " great," as would be 
non-essential to that question ; e. g. one of them might 
understand by it nothing more than eminent intellectual 
and moral qualities ; while the other might conceive it 
to imply the performance of splendid actions: this ab- 
stract difference of meaning would not produce any dis- 
agreement in the existing question, because both those 
circumstances are united in the case of Augustus ; but 
if one (and not the other) of the parties understood the 
epithet " great" to imply pure patriotism — generosity 
of character, &c , then there would be a disagreemen ai 

* Pol, Econ. Lect. IX. 
t See Book IL Ch. v. ^ 6 



tU ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III. 

to the application of the term, even between those who 
might think alike of Augustus's character, as w^anting 
in those qualities.* Dehnition, the specilic for ambi- 
g'uity, is to be employed, and demanded, with a view to 
this principle ; it is sufficient on each occasion to define 
a term as far as regards the question in hand. 

If, for example, we were remonstrating w^ith any one 
for quitting the church of which he was a member, wan- 
tonly, and not from strong and deliberate conscientious 
conviction, but from motives of taste or fancy, and he 
were to reply by asking, how do you define a church ? 
the demand would be quite irrelevant, unless he meant 
to deny that the community he quits is a church. But 
if we were to insist on designating any one religious- 
community on earth to which we might belong, as the 
universal or catholic church — in demanding from all 
Christians submission to its ordinances and decisions, 
and denouncing all who should not belong to it, as be- 
ing out of the pale of Christ's churcli. then indeed we 
might fairly be called on to give a definition, and one 
which should be consistent with facts. f 

§ 11. Of those cases where the ambiguity arises 
from the context, there are several species ; some of 
which Logicians have enumerated, but have neglected 
to refer them, in the first place, to one common class 
{viz. the one under which they are here placed ;) and 
have even arranged some under the head of Fallacies 
^'dictione" and others under that of ^^ extra die- 
tionem'' 

Fallacy of di- ^^ ^^Y consider, as the first of these 
Tision and species, the Fallacy of ** division," and 
composition, ii^at of ''Composition," taken together; 
since in each of these the middle-term is used in one 
premiss collectively, in the other, distributively ; if the 
former of these is the major premiss, and the latter, the 
minor, this is called the " fallacy of division ;" the term 

» See Book iv. Ch. 4. § 1. 

t See ^pendix, Article '' Truth." 



J 11 J OF FALLACIES. 215 

which IS first taken collectively being afterwards divid- 
ed ; and vice versa. The ordinary examples are ,such 
as these ; *' All the angles of a triangle are equal to two 
right angles : A B C isan angle of a triangle ; therefore 
A B C is equal to two right angles." " Five is one 
number ; three and two are are five : therefore three 
and two are one number:" or; " three and two are two 
numbers, five is three and two, therefore five is two 
numbers :" it is manifest that the middle-term, three 
and two (in this last example) is ambiguous, signifying 
in the major premiss, " taken distinctly ;" in the minor, 
" taken together :" and so of the rest. 

To this head may be referred the common Fallacy ol 
over-rating, where each premiss of an argument is only 
probable, the probability of the conclusion ; which, in 
that case, is less than that of the less probable of the 
premises.* For, suppose the probability of one of these 
to be y^, and of the other y^^, (each more likely than 
not) the probability of the conclusion will be only 
j^Q or a little more than | ; which is less than an even 
chance. This Fallacy may be most easily stated as 
a conditional ; a form in which any fallacy of ambigu- 
ous middle may easily be exhibited. E. G, " If it is 
more likely than not, that these premises are true : {i. e 

* See below, § 14. Some persons profess contempt for all such 
calculations, on the ground that we cannot be quite sure of the ex- 
act degree of probability ol each premiss. And this is true ; but this 
unavoidable uncertainty is no reason why we should not guard 
against an additional source of uncertainty which can be avoided 
It is some advantage to have no more doubt as to the degree of pro 
bability of the conclusion, than we have respecting that of the pre- 
mises. 

And in fact there are offices, kept by persons whose trade it is, 
in which calct:lations of this nature aie made, in the purchase ol 
contingent reversions, depending, sometimes, on a great variety ot 
risks, wliich can only be conjecturally estimated ; and in insuran- 
ces, not only against ordinary rivsks (the calculations of which are 
to be drawn from statistical-tables) but also against every variety 
and degree of extraordinary risk ; the exact amount of which, no one 
can confident! i j^ronounce upon. But the calculations are based 
•a the best e&r ^a^te that can be fonned. 



216 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book: 01. 

that they are both true) it is more likely than not, that 
the conclusion is true : but it is more likely than not 
that the premises are true : (^. e. that each of them is so) 
therefore it is more likely than not that the conclusion 
is true." Here, a term in the antecedent, viz, — " that 
the premises are more likely than not to be true" — is 
taken jointly in the major, and dividedly in the minor. 

To the same class we may refer the Fallacy by which 
men have sometimes been led to admit, or pretend to 
admit, the doctrine of necessity ; e. g. " he who neces- 
sarily goes or stays (i. e. in reality, * who necessarilif 
goes, or who necessarily stays ') is not a free agent ; you 
must necessarily go or stay (i e. ' you must necessarily 
take the alternative,') therefore you are not a free agent." . 
Such also is the Fallacy which probably operates on 
most adventurers in lotteries ; e. g. " the gaining of a 
high prize is no uncommon occurrence ; and what is no 
uncommon occurrence may reasonably be expected : 
therefore the gaining of a high prize may reasonably be 
expected;" the conclusion, when applied to the indi- 
vidual (as in practice it is,) must be understood in the 
sense of " reasonably expected by a certain individual ;" 
therefore for the major- premiss to be true, the middle- 
term must be understood to mean, " no uncommon oc- 
currence to some one 'particular person ;" whereas for 
the minor (which has been placed first) to be true, you 
must understand it of " no uncommon occurrence to 
some one or other ;" and thus you will have the Fallacy 
of composition. 

There is no Fallacy more commori, or more likely to 
deceive, than the one now before us. The form in 
which it is most usually employed, is to establish some 
truth, separately, concerning each single member of a 
certain class, and thence to infer the same of the whole 
collectively. Thus, some intidels have laboured to prove 
concerning some one of our Lord's miracles, that it might 
have been the result of an accidental conjecture of na- 
tural circumstances ; next, they endeavour to prove th^ 



§11.] OF FALLACIES. 217 

same concerning another ; and so on ; and thence infei 
that all of them occurring as a series might have been 
so. They might argue in like manner, that because it 
.IS not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one 
out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no more impro- 
Dable that one may throw sixes a hundred times run- 
ning. 

[t will often happen that when two ob- / 

jects are incompatible, though either of ^607.^^"^°^^" 
them, separately, may be attained, the in- 
compatibihty is disguised by a rapid and frequent tran- 
sition from the one to the other alternately. E. G 
You may prove that £ 100 would accomplish this object ; 
and then, that it would accomplish that : and then, you 
recur to the former ; and back again : till at length a 
notion is generated of the possibility of accomplishing 
both by this jG 100. "Two distinct objects may, by 
being dexterously presented, again and again in quick 
succession, to the mind of a cursory reader, be so asso- 
ciated together in his thoughts, as to be conceived capa* 
ble, v/hen in fact they are not, of being actually com- 
bined in practice. The fallacious belief thus induced 
bears a striking resemblance to the optical illusion 
effected by that ingenious and philosophical toy called 
the Thaumatrope ; in which two objects painted on 
opposite sides of a card — for instance a man, and a 
horse — a bird, and a cage — are, by a quick rotatory 
motion, made to impress the eye in combination, so as 
to form one picture, of the man on the horse's back, the 
bird in the cage, &c. As soon as the card is allowed to 
remain at rest, the figures, of course, appear as they ' 
really are, separate and on opposite sides. A mental 
illusion closely analogous to this, is produced, when by 
a rapid and repeated transition from one subject to an- 
other alternately, the mind is deluded into an idea of 
the actual combination of things that are really incom- 
patible. The chief part of the defence which various 
writers have advanced in favour of tlie system of penai 



218 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IH. 

colonies, consists, in truth, of a sort of intellectual Thau- 
matrope. The prosperity of the colony, and the repreS' 
sion of crime, are, by a sort of rapid whirl, presented to 
the mind as combined in one picture. A very moderate 
degree of calm and fixed attention soon shows that the 
two objects are painted on opposite sides of the card."* 
Ambiguity '^^^ Fallacy ol division may often be 
of the word considered as turnins: on the ambiguity of 
" ^ll-" • the word " all ;'' which may easily be dis- 
pelled by substituting for it the word ** each " or 
" every," where that is its signification ; e. g. " all these 
trees make a thick shade," is ambiguous; meaning, 
either, " every one of them," or " all together." 

This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt 
to deceive themselves: for when a multitude of particu- 
lars are presented to the mind, many are too weak or 
too indolent to take a comprehensive view of them ; 
but confine their attention to each single point, by turn^ ; 
and then decide, infer, and act, accordingly ; e. g. the 
imprudent spendthrift, finding that he is able to afford 
this, or that, or the other expense, forgets that all of 
th£m together will ruin him. 

To the same head may be reduced that fallacious 
reasoning by which men vindicate themselves to their 
own conscience and to others, for the neglect of those 
undefined duties, which though indispensable, and 
therefore not left to our choice whether we will practise 
them or not, are left to our discretion as to the modc^ 
and the particular occasions, of practising them ; e. g 
" I am not bound to contribute to this charity in parti- 
cular ; nor to that ; nor to the other :" the practical con- 
clusion which they draw, is, that all charity may be 
dispensed with- 

As men ave apt to forget that any two circumstances 

(not naturally connected) are more rarely to be met 

with combined than separate, though they be Hot at all 

incompatible ; so also they are apt to imagine, irom 

♦ Remarks on Transportation, pp. 25, 06. 



^ 12.] OF FALLACIES. - 219 

finding that they are rarely combined, that there is an 
incompatibility; e. g, if the chances are ten to one 
against a man's possessing strong reasoning powers, 
and ten to one against exquisite taste, the chances 
against the combination of the two (supposing them 
neither connected nor opposed) will be a hundred to 
one. Many, therefore, from finding them so rarely 
united, will infer that they are in some measure incom- 
patible; which fallacy may easily be exposed in the 
form of undistributed middle : " qualities unfriendly to 
each other are rarely combined ; excellence in the rea- 
soning powers, and in taste, are rarely combined ; there- 
fore they are qualities unfriendly to each other." 

§ 12. The other kind of ambiguity aris- 
ing from the context, and which is the last cfdluUs. ^^ 
case of ambiguous middle that I shall 
notice, is the "fallacia accidentis ;" together with its 
converse, ^'fallacia a dido secundum quid ad dictum 
simpliciter ;" in each of which the middle-term is used, 
in one premiss to signify something considered simply, 
in itself, and as to its essence ; and in the other premiss, 
so as to imply that its accidents are taken into account 
with it : as in the well-known example, *« what is bought 
in the market is eaten; raw meat is bought in the 
market ; therefore raw meat is eaten." Here the middle 
has understood in conjunction with it, in the major- 
premiss, " as to its substance merely:'' in the minor, " as 
to its condition and circumstances." 

To this head, perhaps, as well as to any, may be 
referred the Fallacies which are frequently founded on 
the occasional, partial, and temporary variations in the 
acceptation of some term, arising from circumstances of 
person, time, and place, which will occasion something 
to be understood in conjunction with it beyond its strict 
literal signification. E. G. The word *' loyalty," which 
properly denotes attachment to lawful government — 
whether of a kin^, president, senate, &c., according to 
the r(5«pective institutions of each nation — has often been 



220 ' ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IH 

nsed to signify exclusively, attachment to regal au- 
thority ; and that, even when carried beyond the boun- 
daries of law. So, ** reformer" has sometimes been 
limited to the protestant reformers of religion ; some- 
times, to the advocates of some particular j?ar/2amenfari/ 
reform, &c. And whenever any phrase of this kind 
has become a kind of w^atch-word or gathering-cry of a 
party, the employment of it would commonly imply 
certain sentiments not literally expressed by the words. 
To assume, therefore, that one is friendly or unfriendly 
to *' loyalty" or to " reform" in one sense, because he 
has declared himself friendly or unfriendly to it in 
another ^^nse, when implying and connected with such 
and such other sentiments, is a Fallacy, such as may 
fairly be referred to the present head. 

§ 13. On the non -logical (or material) Fallacies: and 
first, of " begging the question ;" Petitio Principii. 

The indistinct and unphilosophical- 

aufftion ^^^ account w^hich has been given by logical 
writers of the fallacy of " 7ion causa" and 
that of *^ petitio principii" makes it very difficult to 
ascertain wherein they conceived them to differ, and 
w^hat, according to them, is the nature of each. With- 
out, therefore, professing to conform exactly to their 
meaning, and with a view to distinctness only, which 
is the main point, let us confine the name ''petitio 
principii" to those cases in w^hich the premiss either 
appears manifestly to be the same as the conclusion, or 
is actually proved from the conclusion, or is such as 
would naturally and properly so be proved ; i. e. such 
as the persons you are addressing * are not likely to 
know, or to admit, except as inferred from an admission 
of the conclusion ; as e. g. if any one should infer the 
actual occurrence of the eclipses recorded in the Chinese 
annals, from an assumption of the authenticity of those 
annals. And to the other class may be referred all 

♦ For it should be remembered that of two propositions, the on« 
may be the more evident to some, and the other, to others. 



§ 13 OF FALLACIES. 221 

other cases, in which the premiss (whether the expressed 
or the suppressed one) is either proved false, or has no 
suificient claim to be received as true. 

Let it however be observed, that in such cases (ap- 
parently) as this, we must not too hastily pronounce 
the argument fallacious ; for it may be perfectly fair at 
the commencement of an argument to assume a premiss 
that is not more evident than the conclusion, or is even 
ever so parodoxical, provided you proceed to prove 
fairly that premiss ; and in like manner it is both usual 
and fair to begin by deducing your conclusion from a 
premiss exactly equivalent to it ; which is merely throw- 
ing the proposition in question into the form in which 
it will be most conveniently proved. 

Arguing in a circle, however, must ne- 
cessarily be unfair ; though it frequently f"cfrcie^ *^ 
is practised undesignedly ; e. g*. some Me- 
chanicians attempt to prove, (what they ought to have 
laid down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis,) that 
every particle of matter gravitates equally; "why?" 
because those bodies which contain more particles ever 
gravitate more strongly, i. e. are heavier ; " but (it may 
be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more 
hulky ;" " no, but still they contain more particles, 
though more closely condensed ;" *•' how" do you know 
that ?" " because they are heavier ;" " how does that 
prove it ?" " because all particles of matter gravitating 
equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier must 
needs have the more of them in the same space." 

Of course the narrower the circle, the less likely it is 
to escape the detection, either of the reasoner himself, 
(for men often deceive themselves in this way) or of his 
hearers When there is a long circuit of many inter- 
vening propositions before you come back to the origin- 
al conclusion, it will often not be perceived that the ar- 
guments really do proceed in a " circle :" just as whei 
any one is advancing in a straight line (as w^e are ac- 
customed to call it) along a plain on this earth's surface. 



222 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book HI 

it escapes our notice that we are really moving along 
the circumference of a circle, (since the earth isagl^be) 
and that if we couid go on without interruption in the 
same line, we should at length arrive at the very spot 
we set out from. But this we readily perceive, when 
we are walking round a small hill. 

For instance, if any one argues that you ought to 
submit to the guidance of himself., or his leader, or his 
party, &c., because these maintain what is right; and 
then argues that what is so maintained is right, because 
it is maintained by persons whom you ought to submit 
to ; and that these are, himself and his party ; or again, 
if any one maintains that so and so must be a thing 
morally wrong, because it is prohibited in the moral 
portion of the Mosaic-law, and then, that the prohibi- 
tion of it does form a part of the moral (not the cere- 
monial, or the civil) portion of that law, because it is a 
thing morally wrong — either of these would be too nar- 
row a circle to escape detection, unless several inter- 
mediate steps were interposed. And if the form of ex- 
pression of each proposition be varied every time it 
recurs — the sense of it remaining the same — this will 
greatly aid the deception. 

Of course, the way to expose the Fallacy, is to reverse 
this procedure : to narrow the circle, by cutting off the 
intermediate steps; and to exhibit the same proposition 
— when it comes round the second time — in the same 
words. 

Obliquity and disguise being of course 
?™2^c?L^^ niost important to the success of the petitio 

expression. , . , , i-i <» i "i~> n • t 

princi'pii as well as of other Fallacies, the 
sophist will in general either have recourse to the " cir- 
cle," or else not venture to state distinctly his assump- 
tion of the point in question, but will rather assert some 
other proposition which implies it ;* thus keeping out 

♦ Gibbon aflbrds the most remarkable instances of this kind of 
ityle. That which ho really means to speak of, is hardly ever 
made the subject ot his proposition. His way of writing reminds 
oae of those lo^rsons whc never dare look vou hill in the face. 



f 14.] OF FALLACIES. 223 

of sight (as a dexterous thief does stolen goods) the 
point in question, at the very moment when he is taking 
It for granted. Hence the frequent union of this Fallacy 
with '' ignoratio elenchir' [vide § 15.] The English 
language is perhaps the more suitable for the Fallacy 
of petitio principii, from its being formed from two dis- 
tinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous ex- 
pressions, which have no resemblance in sound, and no 
connexion in etymology ; so that a sophist may bring 
forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon ori- 
gin, and give as a reason for it, the very same proposition 
stated in words of Norman origin ; e. g. " to allow every 
man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, 
on the whole, advantageous to the State ; for it is highly 
conducive to the interests of the community, that each 
individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of 
expressing his sentiments." 

§ 14. The next head is, the falsity, or, at undue as- 
least, undue assumption, of a premiss that sumption, 
is not equivalent to, or dependent on, the conclusion; 
whichj as has been before said, seems to correspond 
nearly with the meaning of Logicians, when they speak 
of " non causa pro causa.'' This name indeed would 
seem to imply a much narrower c4ass : there being one 
species of arguments which are from cause to effect ; in 
which, of course, two things are necessary; 1st, the 
sufficiency of the cause; 2d, its establishment; these 
are the two premises ; if therefore Xho^ former be unduly 
assumed, we are arguing from that which is not a 
sufficient cause as if it were so : e. g. as if one should 
contend irom such a man's having been unjust or cruel, 
that he will certainly be visited with some heavy tem- 
poral judgment, and come to an untimely end. In this 
instance the sophist, from having assumed, in the pre- 
miss, the (granted) existence of a pretended cause, 
infers, in the conclusion, the existence of the pretended 
effect, which we have supposed to be the question. Oi 
vice versa, the pretended effect may be employed to e& 



224 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book. HI. 

tablish the cause ; e, g. inferring sinfulness from tem- 
poral calamity. But when both the pretended cause 
and ellect are granted, i. e. granted to exist, then the 
sophist will infer something from their pretended con- 
nexion; i. e. he will assume as a premiss, that "of 
these two admitted facts, the one is the cause of the 
other :" as Whitfield attributed his being overtaken by 
a hail-storm to his having not preached at the last town ; 
or as the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it 
was the cause of the troubles which took place at that 
period, and thence inferred that it was an evil. 

Sign put Many are the cases in which a sign (see 

for cause. Rhet. Part L) from which one might fairly 
infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for the cause 
of it : (as if one should suppose the falling of the mer- 
cury to be a cause of rain ; of which it certainly is an 
indication) whereas the fact will often be the very 
reverse. E. G. a great deal of money in a country is 
a pretty sure proof of its wealth ; and thence has been 
often regarded as the cause of it ; whereas in truth it is 
an effect. The same, with a numerous and increasing 
population. Again, The labour bestowed on any com- 
modity has often been represented as the cause of its 
value; though every one would call a fine pearl an 
article of value, even though he should meet with it 
accidentally in eating an oyster. Pearls are indeed ge* 
nerally obtained by laborious diving : but they do not 
fetch a high price from that cause ; but on the contrary, 
men dive for them because they fetch a high price.* 
So also exposure to want and hardship in youth, has 
been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of 
those men and brutes which have been brought up in 
barren countries of uncongenial climate. Yet the most 
experienced cattle-breeders know that animals are, ccete- 
ris paribus, the more hardy for having been well fed 
and sheltered in youth ; but early hardships, by destroy- 
ing all the tender, ensure the hardiness of the survivors; 
Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 353, 



f 14.J OF FALLACIES. 225 

which is the cause, not the effect, of their having lived 
through such k training. So, loading a gun-barrel to 
the muzzle, and firing it, does not give it strength ; 
though it proves, if it escape, that it was strong. 

In like manner, nothing is more com- Appeal to sup- 
mon than to hear a person state confident- posed experi- 
iy, as from his own experience, that such ®"^®- 
and such a patient mas cured by this or that medicine : 
whereas all that he absolutely knows, is that he took 
the medicine, and that he recovered. 

Similar is the procedure of many who are no theorists 
forsooth, but have found by experience that the diffusion 
of education disqualifies the lower classes for humble 
toil. They have perhaps experienced really a deteriora- 
tion in this last respect ; and having a dislike to educa- 
tion, they shut their eyes to the increase of pauperism; 
z. e. of the habit of depending on parish-pay, rather than 
on independent exertions ; w^hich, to any unprejudiced 
eye would seem the most natural mode of explaining the 
relaxation of those exertions. But such men require 
us, on the ground that they are practical men, to adopt 
the results of their experience ; i. e. to acquiesce in 
their crude guesses as to cause and effect, (like that of 
the rustic who made Tenterden-steeple the cause of 
Goodwin Sands,) precisely because they are not accus- 
tomed to reason. 

I believe we may refer to the same head Huitful chan- 
the apprehensions so often entertained, that ges attributed 
a change, however small, and however in ^° harmless 
itself harmless, is necessarily a dangerous 
thing, as tending to produce extensive and hurtful in- 
novations. Many instances may be found of small 
alterations being followed by great and mischievous 
ones ;* but I doubt whether all history can furnish an 
instance of the greater innovation having been, proper- 
ly speaking, caused by the lesser. Of course the first 
change will always precede the second j and many mia- 
* *' i^ost hoc ; ergo, propter hoc.** 
IS 



22$ ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book m 

chievous innovations have taken place; but these may 
all I think be referred to a mistaken effort to obtain^ 
some good, or get rid of some evil ; not to the love of 
innovation for its own sake. The mass of mankind 
are, in the serious concerns of life, wedded to what is 
established and customary ; and when they make rash 
changes, this may often be explained by the too long 
postponement of the requisite changes; which allow^s 
(as in the case of the Reformation) evils to reach an 
intolerable height, before any remedy is thought of. 
And even then, the remedy is often so violently resisted 
by many, as to drive others into dangerous extremes. 
And when this^^ occurs, we are triumphantly told that 
experience shows what mischievous excesses are caused 
by once beginning to innovate. " I told you that if 
once you began to repair your house, you would have? 
to pull it all dow^n." " Yes ; but you told me wrong ; 
for if I had begun sooner, the replacing of a few tile9 
might have sufficed^ The mischief was, not in taking 
dov^rn the first stone, but in letting it stand too long." 

Cause and ^^ch an argument as any of these might 
reason con- Strictly be called " now cawsa p'O caiisa;'' 
^Tthe?^ *°' ^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^ probable that the logical wri^ 
f^ ^^' ters intended any such limitation (whicb 

indeed would be wholly unnecessary and impertinent,) 
but rather that they were confounding together cause 
and reason ; the sequence of conclusion from premises 
being perpetually mistaken for that of effect from phy- 
sical cause.* It may be better, therefore, to drop the 
name which tends to perpetuate this confusion, and 
simply to state (when such is the case) that the premiss 
is " unduly assumed ;" i. e. without being either self- 
evident, or satisfactorily proved. 

The contrivances by which men may deceive them* 
selves or others, in assuming premises unduly, so that 
tliat undue assumption shall not be perceived, (for it ig 
ifi this the Fallacy consists) are of course infinite 



§ U.] OF FALLACIES. 22T 

Sometimes (as was before observed) the doubtful pre" 
miss is suppressed, as if it were too evident to need 
being proved, or even stated, and as if the whole ques- 
tion turned on the establishment of the other premiss. 
Thus Home Tooke proves, by an immense induction, 
that all particles were originally nouns or verbs ; and 
thence concludes, that in reality they are so still, and 
that the ordinary division of the parts of speech is ab- 
surd ; keeping out of sight, as self-evident, the other 
premiss, which is absolutely false ; viz. that the mean- 
ing and force of a word, now, and for ever, must be that 
which it, or its root, originally bore. 

Sometimes men are shamed into admit- indirect as^ 
ting an unfounded assertion, by being con- sumption, 
fidently told, that it is so evident, that it would argue 
great weakness to doubt it. In general, however, the 
more skilful sophist will avoid a direct assertion of what 
he means unduly to assume ; because that might direct 
the reader's attention to the consideration of the ques- 
tion whether it be true or not ; since that which is in- 
disputable does not so often need to be asserted. It 
succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the proposition, 
as something curious and remarkable ; just as the Royal 
Society weie imposed on by being asked to account for 
the fact that a vessel of water received no addition to 
its weight by a live fish put into it ; while they were 
seeking for the cause, they forgot to ascertain ihe fact ; 
and thus admitted without suspicion a mere fiction 
Thus an eminent Scotch writer,* instead of asserting 
that the " advocates of Logic have been worsted and 
driven from the field in every controversy," (an assertion 
which, if made, would have been the more readily as- 
certained to be perfectly groundless,) merely observes, 
that " it is a circumstance not a little remarkable." 

Again, any one who is decrying all appeal to evidence 
in behalf of Christianity, (see Appendix iii. Note) will 
hardly venture to assert plainly that such was the 
% * Dugald Stewart. 



^2B ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. Book III 

practice of the Apostles, and that they called on men to 
believe what they preached, without any reason for 
believing. That would present too glaring a contrast 
to the truth. He will succeed better by nierely dwelling 
on the earnest demand of " faith " made by the Apos- 
tles ; trusting that the inadvertent reader will forget that 
the basis on which this demand was made to rest, was, 
the evidence of miracles and prophecies ; and will thus 
be led to infer that we are to imitate the Apostles by a 
procedure which is in fact the opposite of theirs. - 

One of the many contrivances employed 
r^felSes!^ for this purpose, is what may be called the 
" Fallacy of references ;" which is particu- 
larly common in popular theological works. It is of 
course a circumstance which adds great weight to any 
assertion, that it shall seem to be supported by many 
passages of Scripture, or of the fathers and other ancient 
writers, whose works are not in many people's hands. 
Now when a writer can find few or none of these, that 
distinctly and decidedly favour his opinion, he may at 
least find many which may be conceived capable of 
being so understood, or which, in some way or other, 
remotely relate to the subject ; but if these texts were 
inserted at length, it would be at once perceived how 
little they bear on the question ; the usual artifice, 
therefore, is, to give merely references to them ; trusting 
that nineteen out of twenty readers will never take the 
trouble of turning to the passages, but, taking for 
granted that they afford, each, some degree of confirma- 
tion to what is maintained, will be overawed by seeing 
every assertion supported, as they suppose, by five oi 
six Scripture-texts — as many from the fathers, &c. 

Great force is often added to the employment in a de- 
clamatory work, of the fallacy now before us, by 
bitterly reproaching or deriding an opponent, as deny- 
ing some sacred truth, or some evident axiom ; assum- 
ing, that is, that he denies the true premiss, and keeping 
out of sight the one on which the question reaUy t\3n)^ 



5 14.] OF FALLACIES. 22d 

E. G. a declaimer who is maintaining some doctrine as 
being taught in Scripture, may impute to his opponents 
a contempt for the authority of Scripture, and reproach 
them for impiety ; when the qu \stion really is, whether 
the doctrine be scriptural or not. 

Frequently the Fallacy of irrelevant- combination 
conclusion, [ignoratio-elenchi] is called of this Fallacy 
in to the aid of this ; i. e. the premiss is J^^**? ^^^^ ^^^ 
assumed on the ground of another 
proposition, somewhat like it. having been proved. 
Thus, in arguing by example, &c., the parallelism 
of two cases is often assumed from their being in some 
respects alike, though perhaps they diflfer in the very 
point which is essential to the argument. E. G. From 
the circumstance that some men of humble station, who 
have been well educated, are apt to think themselves 
above low drudgery, it is argued, that universal educa- 
tion of the lower orders would beget general idleness : 
this argument rests, of course, on the assumption o^' 
'parallelism in the two cases, 'viz> the past and the fu- 
ture ; whereas there is a circumstance that is absolutely 
essential, in which they differ; for. when education is 
universal, it must cease to be a distinction ; which is 
probably the very circumstance that renders men too 
proud for their work. 

Again, parallels have been drawn by Hume, (in his 
Essay on Miracles) and by Christian writers, between 
the miracles recorded in the New Testament, and those 
in the legends of pretended saints ; which last were re- 
ceived just as counterfeit coin is, from its resemblance 
to genuine, 

This^ very same Fallacy is often resorted to on the 
opposite side ; an attempt is made to invalidate some 
argument from example, by pointing out a difference 
between the two cases : though they agree in everything 
that is essential to the question. 

It should be added that we may often calculations of 
be deceived, not only by admittins: a pre- probabilities. 



tm ELEMENTS OP LOGIC. [Booi fiL 

miss which is absolutely uusupported, but also by attri- 
buting to one which really is probable, a greater degree 
of probability than rightly belongs to it. And this ef- 
fect will often be produced by our omitting to calculate 
the probability in each successive step of a long chain 
of argument, and being, in each, (see § 1 1,) deceived by 
the fallacy of division. Each premiss successively in- 
troduced, may have, as was above explained, an excess 
of chances in its favour, and yet the ultimate conclusion 
may have a greater preponderance against it ; e. g. "All 

Y is (probably) X : all Z is (probably) Y : therefore Z 
is (probably) X :" now suppose the truth of the major 
premiss to he more probable than not ; in other words, 
that the chances for it are more than ^ ; say ^ ; and 
for the truth of the minor, let the chances be greater 
still ; say | ; then by multiplying together the numer- 
ators, and also the denominators of these two fractions, 

Y X §j we obtain ^j, as indicating the degree of pro- 
bability of the conclusion ; which is less than | ; i. e, 
the conclusion is less likely to be true than not. E. G. 
*' The reports this author heard are (probably) true ; 
this (something which he records) is a report which 
(probably) he heard ; therefore it is true ;" suppose, first. 
The majority of the reports he heard — as 4 out of 7, 
(or 12 of 21,) — to be true ; and, next, That he gener- 
ally — as twice in three times — (or 8 in 12,) — repeats 
faithfully what he heard ; it follows that of 21 of his 
reports, only 8 are true. 

Of course, the results are proportionably striking 
when there is a long series of arguments of this descrip- 
tion. And yet weak and thoughtless reasoners are of- 
ten influenced by hearing a great deal urged — a great 
number of probabilities brought forward — in support of 
some conclusion ; i. e. a long chain, of which each suc- 
cessive link is weaker than the foregoing ; instead of 
(what they mistake it for) a cumulation of arguoxeuts* 



f 14.1 <^^ FALLACIES. S^| 

each, separately, proving the certainty or probabilit}'-, o( 
ihe same conclusion.* 

Lastly, it may be here remarked, conformably with 
what has been formerly said, that it will often be left to 
5''o*ur choice whether to refer this or that fallacious ar- 
gument to the present h^ad,or that of ambiguous raid- 
die ; " 7f the middle term is here used in this sense, 
there is an ambiguity; if in that sense, the proposition 
is false.'' 

* The converse fallacy is treated of below in § 18. 

When there really are several distinct and independent ar^u* 
ments, not incompatible, and not connected, each separately prov- 
ing the probability of the same conclusion, we compute, from our 
estimate of the degree of probability of each, the joint [cumulative] 
force of them, by the same sort of calculation as the above, only 
reversed: viz. as, in the case of two probable premises, the conclu- 
sion is not established except onthe supposition of their being 6ofA 
true, so, in the case of two (and the like holds good with any num- 
ber) distinct and independent indications of the truth of some pro- 
position, unless hoth o£ them J^ail, the proposition must be true : we 
therefore multiply together the fractions indicating the probability 
oi failure of each— the chances af^mnst it : — and the result being the 
total chances against the establishment of the conclnsion by these 
arguments, this fraction being deducted from unity, the remainder 
gives the probability for it. E G & certain book is conjectured to 
be by such and such an author partly, 1st. from its resemblance in 
style to his known works, partly (2dly) from its being attributed to 
hi'm by some one likely to be pretty well-informed : let the proba 
bility of the conclusion, as deduced from one of these arguments by 

2 3 

itself, be supposed, -^ and, in the other case ?jr ; then the opposite 

probabilities will be, respectively, 5 and y ; which multiplied 
together give ^.J, as the probability against the conclusion ; t. e 
the chance that the work may not be his, notwithstanding those 
reasons for believing that it is : and consequently the probability 

in favour of that conclusion will be ^ g ; or nearly ^. 

Observe however, that, in some cases, a perfectly distinct argu- 
ment arirjfts from the comhination of certain circumstances, which 
have, each separately, no force at all, or very little, towards es- 
tablishing a conclusion which yet may be inferred, perhaps with a 
.Doral certainty, from that combination, when those circumstances 
are such that the chances are very great against their accidental 
concuirenrie E G when two or more persons, undeserving ot 
^reJit, coincide (where collusion would be impossible) in a full and 
eircumstautial detail of some transaction. (Sec Rhet. Part. 1. Cli 



232 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book HI 

§ 15. The last kind of Fallacy to be noticed is that 
Irrelevant of irrelevant conclusion, cojnmonly called 
conclusion. ignoratlo elenchu 

Various kinds of propositions are, according to the 
occasion, substituted for the one of which proof is re- 
quired. Sometimes the particular for the universal; 
sometimes a proposition with different terms : and vari- 
ous are the contrivances employed to effect and to con- 
ceal this substitution, and to make the conclusion which 
the sophist has drawn, answer, practically, the same 
purpose as the one he ought to have established. I 
say, " practically the same purpose," because it will 
very often happen that some emotion will be excited — 
some sentiment impressed on the mind — (by a dexterous 
employment of this Fallacy) such as shall bring men 
into the disposition requisite for your purpose, though 
they may not have assented to, or even stated distinctly 
in their own minds, the proposition which it was your 
business to establish.* Thus if a sophist has to defend 
one who has been guilty of some serious offence, which 
he wishes to extenuate, though he is unable distinctly 
to prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed in 
making the audience laugh at some casual matter, he 
has gained practically the same point. 

So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating 
circumstances in some particular case of offence, so as 
to show that it differs widely from the generality of the 
same class, the sophist, if he hnd himself unable to dis- 
prove these circumstances, may do away the force of 
them, by simply referring the action to that very class, 
which no one can deny that it belongs to, and the very 
name of which will excite a feeling of disgust sufficient 
to counteract the extenuation ; e. g- let it be a case of 
peculation; and that many mitigating circumstances 
have been brought forward which cannot be denied ; 
the sophistical opponent will reply, " Well, but after 
all, the man is a rogue, and there is an end of it ;'* now 
♦ See Rhetoric, Part IL 



§15.] OF FALLACIES. 233 

ft 

in reality this was (by hypothesis) never the question; 
and the mere assertion of what was never denied, ought 
not, in fairness, to be regarded as decisive ; but practi- 
cally, the odiousness of the word, arising in great mea- 
sure from the association of those very circumstances 
which belong to most of the class, but which we have 
supposed to be absent in this particular instance, excites 
precisely ih<it feeling of disgust, which in effect destroys 
the force of the defence. In like manner we may refei 
to this head, all cases of improper appeals to the pas- 
sions, and everything else which is mentioned by Aris- 
totle as extraneous to the matter in hand {e^u tov 
TrpdyfxaTog .) 

In all these cases, as has been before observed, if the 
fallacy we are now treating of be employed for the 
apparent establishment, not of the ultimate conclusion, 
but (as it very commonly happens) of a premiss^ {i. e, 
if the premiss required be assumed on the ground that 
some proposition resembling it has been proved) then 
there will be a combination of this fallacy with the last 
mentioned. 

For instance, instead of provinpj that ^ v ^. 
cc*u- • il ..4^ J X • Combination 

" this prisoner has committed an atrocious of this fallacy 

fraud," you prove that " the fraud he is with the fore- 
accused of is atrocious ;" instead of proving S^^^S- 
(as in the well-known tale of Cyrus and the two coats) 
that " the taller boy had a right to force the other boy 
to exchange coats with him," you prove that " the 
exchange would have been advantageous to both." 
instead of proving that " a man has not a right to 
educate his children or to dispose of his property, in the 
way he thinks best" you show that the way in which 
he educates his children, or disposes of his property is 
not really the best: instead of proving that "■ the poor 
ought to be relieved in this way rather than in that,' 
you prove that " the poor ought to be relieved:'' instead 
of proving that " an irrational-agent — whether a brute 
or a madman — can never be deterred from any act by 



tm ELEMENTS OF LOC^IC. [Book HI. 

apprehension of punishment," (as for instance, a do^, 
from sheep-biting, by fear of being beaten) you prove 
that " the beating of one dog does not operate as an 
example to other dogs," &c. and then you proceed to 
assume as premises, conclusions different from what 
have really been established. 

A good instance of the employment and exposure of 
this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of 
Cleon and Diodotus concerning the Mitylenasans ; the 
former (over and above his appeal to the angry passions 
of his audience) urges the justice of putting the revolters 
to death ; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to 
the purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting in 
judgment, but in deliberation ; of which the proper end 
is expediency' And to prove that they had a right to put 
them to death, did not prove this to be an advisable step. 

This fallacy ^^ ^^ evident, that ignoratio elenchi may 
used in refuta- be employed as well for the apparent refu- 
^^^^' tation of your opponent's proposition, as 

for the apparent establishment of your ow^n ; for it is 
substantially the same thing, to prove what was not 
denied, or to disprove what was not asserted. The latter 
practice is not less common ; and it is more oifensivCj 
because it frequently amounts to a personal affront, irx 
attributing to a person opinions, &c. which he perhaps 
holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a discussion one 
party vindicates, on the ground of general expediency^ 
a particular instance of resistance to government in a 
case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may gravely 
maintain, that " we ought not to do evil that good may 
come :" a proposition which of course had never been 
denied ; the point in dispute being " whether resistance 
in this particular case were doing evil or not.*' Or again, 
by way of disproving the assertion of the " right of 
private-judgment in religion," one may hear a grave 
argument to prove that " it is impossible every one can 
be right in his judgment .'' In these examples, it is to 
be remarked^ (as well as in some given just above,) that 



-§ 15.1 OF FALLACIES. 2^5 

ike fallacy of petitio pmicipii is combined with that of 
ignoratio elenchi ; which is a very common and often 
successful practice ; viz. the sophist proves, or dis- 
proves, not the proposition which is really in question, 
but one which is so dependent on it as to proceed on the 
supposition that it is already decided, and can admit of 
no doubt ; by this means his " assumption of the point 
in question " is so indirect and oblique, that it may 
easily escape notice ; and he thus establishes, practi- 
cally, his conclusion, at the very moment he is with- 
drawing your attention from it to another question. E. 
G. An advocate will prove, and dwell on the high crimi- 
nality of a certain act, and the propriety of severely pun- 
ishing it ; assuming (instead of proving) the commission. 
There are certain kinds of argument recounted and 
named by logical writers, which we should by no means 
universally call Fallacies ; but whfch when unfairly 
used, and so far as they are fallacious, may very welL 
be referred to the present head ; such as Argumentum 
the " argumentum ad hominem,'" [" or per- ad hominem, 
eonal argument"] " argumentum ad vere- ^' 
cundiam," " argumentum ad populum,'' ^c. all of them 
regarded as contradistinguished from " argumentum ad 
rem ;" or, accor^mg to others (meaning probably the 
very same thing) " ad judicium" These have all been 
described in the lax and popular language before al- 
luded to, but not scientifically: the ''argumentum ad 
hominem," they say, " is addressed to the peculiar cir* 
cumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past con- 
duct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to 
him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on 
the real question, as the ' argumentum ad rem' does •/' 
in like manner, the " argumentum ad verecundiam" is 
described as an appeal to our reverence for some re- 
spected authority, some venerable institution," &c. and 
the " argumentum ad populum" as an appeal to the 
prejudices, passions, &c. of the multitude ; and so of 
the rest. Along with these is usually enumerated " ar^ 



236 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book III 

gumentiim ad ignorantiam,'" which is here omitted as 
being evidently nothing more than the employment of 
some kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, 
toward such as are likely to be deceived by it. 

Technical ^^ appears then (to speak rather more 
analysis of technically) that in the " argumentum 
^^^^^^^ ^^^^' ad hominem" the conclusion which actu- 
^" ' ^' ally is established, is not the absolute and 
general one in question, but relative and particular ; 
viz. not that such and such is the fact," but that *' this 
man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his princi- 
ples of reasoning, or in consistency with his own con- 
duct, situation," &c.* Such a conclusion it is often 
both allowable and necessary to establish, in order to 
silence those who will not yield to fair general argu- 
ment ; or to convince those whose weakness and preju- 
dices would not allow them to assign to it its due weight. 
Jt is thus that our Lord on many occasions silences the 
cavils of the Jews ; as in the vindication of healing on 
the Sabbath, which is paralleled by the authorized 
practice of drawing out a beast that has fallen into a 

* The " argumentum ad hominem," will often have the eifect of 
shifting the burden of proof , not unjustly to the adversary. (See 
Rhet. Part I. chap. iii. § 2.) A common instance is the defence, cer- 
tainly the readiest and most concise, frequently urged by the sports 
man, when accused of barbarity in sacrificing unoffending hares or 
trout to his amusement : he replies, as he may safely do, to most of 
his assailants, " why do you feed on the flesh of the harmless sheep 
and ox ?" and that this answer presses hard, is manifested by its be- 
ing usually opposed by -a. palpable falsehood ; viz. that the animals 
which are killed for food are sacrificed to our necessities; though 
not only men can, but a large proportion (probably a great majority) 
of the human race actually do, subsist in health and vigour without 
flesh-diet ; and the earth would support a much greater human 
population were such a practice universal. 

When shamed out of this argument they sometimes urge that the 
brute creation would overrun the earth, if we did not kill them for 
food ; an argument, which, if it were valid at all, would not justify 
their feeding on fish; though, if fairly followed up, it would jusiiff 
Swift's proposal* for keeping down the excessive population of Ire- 
land. The true reason, viz. that they eat flesh for the gratification 
of the palate, and have a taste for the pleasures of the table, though 
not for the sports of the field, is one which they do not like to At 
iign. 



J 15. J OF FALLACIES. 237 

pit. All this, as we hare said, is perfectly fair, provi- 
ded it be done plainly, and avowedly ; but if you at- 
tempt to substitute this partial and relative conclusion 
for a more general one — if you triumph as having es- 
tablished your proposition absolutely and universally, 
from having established it, in reality, only as far as it 
relates to your opponent, then you are guilty of a Fal- 
lacy of the kind which we are now treating of ; your 
conclusion is not in reality that which was, by your 
own account, proposed to be proved. The fallacious- 
ness depends upon the deceit, or attempt to deceive. 
The same observations will apply to " argwnentum ad 
verecundiam" and the rest. 

It is very common to employ an ambi- Ambiguous 
guoiis term for the purpose of introducing terms employ- 
the fallacy of irrelevant conclusion : i. e. ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^* 
when you cannot prove your proposition ^^' 
in the sense in which it was maintained, to prove it in 
some other sense ; e. g, those who contend against the 
efficacy of faith, usually employ that word in their ar- 
guments in the sense of mere belief, unaccompanied 
with any moral or practical result, but considered as a 
mere intellectual process ; and when they have ihus 
proved their conclusion, they oppose it to one in which 
the word is used in a widely different sense.* 

♦*• When the occasion or object in question is not such as calls 
for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers or hearers, 
the emotions required, it is a common rhetorical artifice to turn 
their attention to some object which will call forth these feelings ; 
and when they are too much excited to be capable of judging 
calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their passions, once roused, 
in the direction required, and to make them view the case before 
them in a very different light. When the metal is heated it may 
easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus vehement indigna- 
tion against some cHme, may be directed against a, person who has 
not been proved guilty of it ; and vague declamations against cor- 
ruption, oppression, &c. or against the mischiefs of anarchy ; with 
high-flown panegyrics on liberty, rights of man, &c. or on social 
order, justice, the constitution, law, religion, &c. will gradually 
lead the hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the mea- 
•ure proposed will lead to these evils, or to these advantages ; and 
It wiU in consequence become the object of groundless abaorr«nc« 



%BB ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book IH. 

Shifting § 16. The Fallacy of "irrelevant con' 
ground. clusion" [ignoratio elenchi\ is nowhere 
more common than in protracted controversy, when one 
of the parties, after having attempted in vain to main- 
tain his position, shifts his ground as covertly as possi- 
ble to another, instead of honestly giving up the point 
An instance occurs in an attack made on the system 
pursued at one of our universities. The objectors, 
linding themselves unable to maintain their charge of 
the present neglect {viz. in the year 1810) of mathe- 
matics in that place, (to which neglect they attributed 
the " late general decline " in those studies) shifted their 
ground, and contended that that university "was never 
famous for mathematicians :' which not only docs not 
establish, but absolutely overthrows, their own original 
assertion ; for if it never succeeded in those pursuits, it 
could not have caused their late decline. 

A practice of this nature is common in oral contro- 
versy especially ; viz. that of combating both your op- 
Fallacy of poiiGnt's premises alternately, and shifting 
combating the the attack from the one to the other, with 
IhernatS™*^^^ out waiting to have either of them decided 

ernaey. ^p^j^ before you quit it. '' And besides " 
is an expression one may often hear from a disputant 
who is proceeding to a fresh argument, when he cannot 
establish, and yet will not abandon, his first. 

It has been remarked above, that one class of the 
propositions that may be, in this Fallacy, substituted 
for the one required, is the particular for the universal ; 
similar to this, is the substitution of a conditional with 
a universal antecedent, for one with a particular ante- 
cedent ; which will usually be the harder to prove : e g. 

or admiration. For the very utterance of such words as have a 
multitude of what may be called stimulating ideas associated with 
them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially of the 
ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will 
eft'ectjfally blind their judgment ; so that a string of vague abuse 
or panegyriCrWill often have the efTect of a-teaia Q^ so^ad ar^B' 
mraf i^<<dric> Paii II. Ohap. ii« 4^ 



i 17.] GF FALLAGIES. ^^ 

you are called on, suppose, to prove that ** if any {i. e> 
some) private interests are hurt by a proposed measure, 
it is inexpedient ;" and you pretend to have done so by 
showing that ** if all private interests are hurt b\ it, it 
must be inexpedient." Nearly akin to this is the very 
common case of proving something to be possible when 
it ought to have been proved highly probable; or 
probable, Avhen it ought to have been proved necessary ; 
or, which comes to the very same, proving it to be not 
necessary, when it should have been proved not prob- 
able; or improbable, when it should have been proved 
impossible. Aristotle {in Rhet, Book II.) complains of 
this last branch of the Fallacy, as giving an undue 
advantage to the respondent ; many a guilty person owes 
his acquittal to this ; the jury considering that the 
evidence brought does not demonstrate the complete 
impossibility of his being innocent; though perhaps 
the chances are innumerable against it. 

§ 17. Similar to this case is that which Fallacy of 
may be called the Fallacy of objections : objections. 
i. e. showing that there are objections against some plan, 
theory, or system, and thence inferring that it should be 
rejected ; when that which ought to have been proved 
is, that there are more, or stronger objections, against 
the receiving than the rejecting of it. This is the main, 
and almost universal Fallacy of anti- christians ; and is 
that of which a young christian should be first and 
principally warned.* They find numerous *' objec- 
tions " against various parts of Scripture ; to some of 
which no satisfactory answer can be given ; and the 
incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on 
these, 10 forget that there are infinitely more, and 
stronger objections against the supposition that the 
Christian Religion is of human origin ; and that where 
we cannot answer all objections, we are bound in 
reason and in candour to adopt the hypothesis which 
labours under the least. That the case is as I have 
* S«i« A(^ at t]» And of i^peiidix^ No lU 



240 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [Book ID 

etated, I am authorized to assume, from this circum 
stance ; that no complete and consistent account has ever 
been given of the manner in which the Christian reli- 
gion, supposing it a human contrivaiice, could have 
arisen and prevailed as it did. And yet this may 
obviously be demanded with the utmost fairness, of 
those who deny its divine origin. The religion exists : 
that is the phenomenon ; those who will not allow it 
to have come from God, are bound to solve the pheno- 
menon on some other hypothesis less open to objections. 
They are not indeed called on to prove that it actually 
did arise in this or that way ; but to suggest (consis- 
tently with acknowledged facts) some probable way in 
which it may have arisen, reconcileable with all the 
'circumstances of the case. That infidels have never 
done this, though they have had 1800 years to try, 
amounts to a confession that no such hypothesis can be 
devised, which will not be open to greater objections 
than lie against Christianity.* 

Reforms are The fallacy of objections is also the 
open to objec- stronghold of bigoted anti-innovators, who 
tions. oppose all reforms and alterations indis- 

criminately ; for there never was. or will be, any plan 
executed or proposed, against which strong and even 
imanswerable objections may not be urged ; so that 
unless the opposite objections be set in the balance on 
the other side, we can never advance a step. E. G. 
The defenders of the transportation-system — a system 
which, as an eminent writer has observed, was *' begun 
in defiance of all reason, and persevered in, in defiance 
of all experience," — are accustomed to ask " what kind 
of secondary-punishment would you substitute ?" and 
if any one is suggested, they adduce the objections, and 
difficulties, real and apparent, to which it is exposed , 

♦ In an " Essay on the Omissions of our Sacred Writers," I hare 
pointed out some circumstances which no one has ever attempted 
to account for on any supposition of their being other than, not 
only trut witASSses, but supernaturally inspirtd^ 



§ 18.] OF FALLACIES. 241 

if another is proposed, they proceed in tne «=;ame manner; 
and so on, without end. For of all the otner plans of 
secondary-punishment that have ever been tried, or 
imagined, the best must be open to some objections, 
thougii the very worst is much less objectionable than 
transportation.* " There are objections," said Dr. 
Johnson, " against a plenum, and objections against a 
vacuum ; but one of them must be true." 

The very same Fallacy indeed is employed (as has 
been said) on the other side, by those vrho are for 
overthrowing whatever is established as soon as they 
can prove an objection against it; without considering 
whether more and weightier objections may not lie 
against their own schemes ; but their opponents have 
this decided advantage over them, that they can urge 
with great plausibility, " we do not call upon you to 
reject at once whatever is objected to, but merely to 
suspend your judgment, and not come to a decision as 
long as there are reasons on both sides :" now since 
there always will be reasons on both sides, this non- 
decision is practically the very same thing as a decision 
in favour of the existing state of things. " Not to 
resolve, is to resolve."t The delay of trial becomes 
equivalent to an acquittal 4 

^18. Another ioimol ignoratioelenchi, Fallacy of 
which is also rather the more serviceable proving a part 
on the side of the respondent, is, to- prove ^.^ *^® ^^^^' 
or disprove some part of that which is 
required, and dwell on that, suppressing all the rest. 

Thus, if a university is charged with cultivating only 
the mere elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list 
of the books studied there is produced, should even 

• See Letters to Earl Grey on Transportation 

t Bacon. 

X How happy it is for mankind that in many of the most momen- 
tous concerns of life their decision is generally formed/or them by 
external circumstances 5 which thns saves them not only from the 
perplexity of doubt and the danger of delay, but also from the pain 
of regret j since we acquiesce much more cheerfully in that which 
is unavoidab.!^ 

19 



242 ELEMENTS OP LOGIC. [Booain. 

any one of those books be not elementary, the charge 
is in fairness refuted; but the sophist may then ear- 
nestly contend that some of those books are elementary ; 
and thus keep out of sight the real question, viz 
whether they arc all so.* 

So also, one may maintain (with perfect truth) that 
mere intellectual ability — the reasoning powers alone — 
are insufficient for the attainment of truth in religious 
questions ; (see Appendix III. note) and may thence 
proceed to assume (as if it were the same proposition) 
that all employment of reasoning — all intellectual culti- 
vation — are perfectly useless on such questions, and 
are to be discarded as foreign from the subject. 
Art of framing This is the great art of the o-nswerer of 
a reply. ^ book ; suppose the main positions in any 

work to be irrefragable, it will be strange if some 
illustration of them, or some subordinate part, in short, 
will not admit of a plausible objection ; the opponent 
then joins issue on one of these incidental questions, 
and comes forward with " a reply " to such and such a 
work. And such a ** reply " is still easier and more 
plausible, when it happens — as it often will — that a real 
and satisfactory refutation can be found of some one, 
or more, of several arguments, each, singly, proving 
completely the same conclusion ; (as many a theorem 
of Euclid admits of several different demonstrations) or 
an answer to one 6r more of several objections, each, 
separately, decisive against a certain scheme or theory; 
though it is evident on reflection, that if the rest, or 
any one of them, remain unrefuted and unanswerable, 
the conclusion is established, and stands as iirm as if 
the answerer had urged nothing 

He who thus replies to the arguments urged, is in 
the condition of a commander defending all the practi- 
cable breaches in a fortification, except one. This kind 
of partial " reply" is properly available only in a case 

♦ *• Reply to calumnies of Edinburgh Review against Oxford," 
1810. 



f 18.1 OF FALLACIES. 243 

where each of the arguments does not go to establish 
the certainty, but only the probability of the conclusion. 
Then indeed, the conclusion resting not wholly on the 
force of any one of the arguments, but on the combina- 
tion of them, is proportionably weakened by the refu- 
tation of any of them. The fallacy I am now speaking 
of consists in the confounding of the preceding case 
either with this latter, or with the case formerly noticed 
[§ 14] of a chain of arguments, each proving, not the 
same conclusion, but a premiss of the succeeding. 

Hence 'the danger of ever advancing Danger of 
more than can be well maintained, since maintaining 
the refutation of that will often quash the ^''^ °'"^^- 
whole. The Quakers would perhaps before now have 
succeeded in doing aw^ay our superfluous and irrever- 
ent oaths, if they had not, besides many valid and strong 
arguments, adduced so many that are weak and easily 
refuted. Thus also, a guilty person may often escape 
by having too much laid to his charge ; so he may also, 
by having too much evidence against him, i. e. some 
that is not in itself satisfactory. Accordingly, a prison- 
er may sometimes obtain acquittal by showing that one 
of the witnesses against him is an infamous informer 
and spy ; though perhaps if that part of the evidence 
had been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient 
for conviction. 

Cases of this nature might very well be referred also 
to the Fallacy formerly mentioned, of inferring the fal- 
sity of the conclusion from the falsity of a premiss ; 
which indeed is very closely allied to the present Fal- 
lacy : the real question is, " whether or not this con- 
clusion ought to be admitted ;" the sophist confines him- 
self to the question, " whether or not it is established 
by this particular argurnent ;" leaving it to be inferred 
by the audience, if he has carried his point as to the 
latter question, that the former is thereby decided; 
which is then, and then only, a correct inference, \vhen 
there is good reason for believing that other and bettei 



tU ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooK. Ill 

arguments would have been adduced, if there had been 
any. (See above, at the end of § 6.) 

§ 19. It will readily be perceived that 
conchfskfn. nothing is less conducive to the success of 
the Fallacy in question, than to state clear- 
ly, in the outset, either the proposition you are about 
to prove, or that which you ought to prove. It answers 
best to begin with the premises, and to introduce a pretty 
long chain of argument before you arrive at the conclu- 
sion. The careless hearer takes for granted, at the be- 
ginning, that this chain will lead to the conclusion re- 
quired : and by the time you are come to the end, he is 
ready to take for granted that the conclusion which you 
draw is the one required ; his idea of the question hav- 
ing gradually become indistinct. This Fallacy is greatly 
aided by the common practice of suppressing the conclu- 
sion and leaving it to be supplied by the hearer ; who is 
of course less hkely to perceive whether it be really that 
" which was to be proved," than if it were distinctly 
stated. The practice therefore is at best suspicious ; 
and it is better in general to avoid it, and to give and 
require a distinct statement of the conclusion intended. 
The Fallacy now before us is, perhaps, the most 
common form of that confusion of thought to which 
those are liable who have been irregularly and unskil- 
fully educated; — who have collected perhaps a consi- 
derable amount of knowledge, without arrangement, 
and without cultivation of logical habits ; — who have 
learned (as I have heard it expressed) a good many 
answers without the questions. Most of the erroneous 
views in morals, and in other subjects, which prevail 
among such persons, may be exhibited in the form of 
" Fallacies of irrelevant conclusion."* E. G. The well 

♦ " The fallacy consists in confounding together the unbroken 
Apostolical succession of a christian ministry, generally, and th«i 
same succession in an unbraken line, of this or that individual mi' 
nister. ****** If each man's christian hope is made to rest on hiiJ 
receiving the christian ordinances at the hands of a minister to 
whom the sacramental virtue "] of ordination] ** that gives efficacy 



$ 19.] OF FALLACIES. 245 

known wrong decision respecting the two boys and 
their coats, for which Cyrus was punished by his pre- 
ceptor, was a mistake of the real question : which was, 
not, " which co'dt fitted each boy the best," but " who 
had the right to dispose of them." And similar cases 
to this occur every day. An exact parallel is to be 
found in the questions relative to the imposition of re- 
strictions or other penalties on those of a different creed 
from our own. They are usually argued as if the point 
to be decided were " which religion is the better," or, 
" whether the differences between them are important ;" 
instead of being, " whether one man has a right to 
compel others to profess his religion," or, " whether 
the professors of the true Faith have a right to mono- 
polize secular power and civil privileges." Or again 
(to put the same principles into another form) the ques- 
tions " whether it be allowable for a Christian to fight 
in defending himself from oppression and outrage,"* 
and " whether a Christian magistrate may employ phy- 
sical coercion and inflict secular punishment on evil 
doers," — these, are perpetually confounded with the 
questions " whether Christians are allowed to fight as 
SUCH ; i. e. to fight /or their religion, against those who 
corrupt or reject the Faith ;" and, '^ whether a Christian 
magistrate may employ coercion on behalf of Chris- 
tianity, and indict punishment on heretics as evil doers."t 
Again, such propositions as the following, one may 
often hear, sophistically or negligently, confounded 

to those ordinances, has been transmitted in unbroken succession 
from hand to hand, every thing must depend on that particular 
minister ; and his claim is by no means established from our merely 
establishing the uninterrupted existence of such a class of men as 
Christian ministers. You teach me — a man might say — that my sal- 
vation depends on the possession by you — the 'particular pastor un- 
der whom I am placed — of a ceitain qualification ; and when I ask 
for the proof that you possess it, you prove to me that it is possess- 
ed generally, hy a certain class of persons of whom you are one, and 
probably by a large majority of them '"—On the Kingdom of Christ, 
Essay II. §30. ^ 

* See Essay 1st, on the Kingdom of Christ. 

t See Essays on the Dangers, &c. Notes E. and F 



246 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. [BooKra. 

together: "The Apostles held religious assemblies on 
the first day of the week," with " They transferred the 
Sabbath from the seventh day to the first :"* " A Jew, 
Mahometan, or Roman Cathohc, is not the most eligible 
person to hold office in a Protestant- christian country," 
with " Such persons ought not to be legally eligible ;" 
"The Apostles established such and such a form oi 
government in the churches they founded," with " They 
designed this form to be binding on all Christians as an 
ordinance for ever" c^cf 

§ 20. Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it 
may not be improper to mention the just 
and ingenious remark, thdct jests are mock 
fallacies ; i. e. fallacies so palpable as not to be likely 
to deceive any one, but yet bearing just that resem- 
blance of argument which is calculated to amuse by the 
contrast ; in the same manner that a parody does, by 
the contrast of its levity with the serious production 
which it imitates. There is indeed something laugh- 
able even in fallacies which are intended for serious 
conviction, when they are thoroughly exposed-^ 

There are several different kinds of joke and raillery, 
which will be found to correspond with the different 
kinds of Fallacy. The pun (to take the simplest and 
most obvious case) is evidently, in most instances, a 
mock-argument founded on a palpable equivocation of 
the middle-term: and others in like manner will be 
found to correspond to the respective Fallacies, and to 
be imitations of serious argument. 

It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, or games 
(TTaLdiai) properly so called, will be found on examina- 
tion, to be imitative of serious transactions ; as of war, 
or commerce.! But to enter fully into this subject 
would be unsuitable to the present occasion. 

♦ See thoughts on the Sabbath, 
t See Kingdom of Christ, Essay II. % 9. 

% Sec Wallis's Logic, and also Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. iii. § 7. p. ISl 
^ See some excellent remarks on " Imitation," in Dr. A. Smith'! 
posthumous Essays. 



BookIV.] the province OF REASONING. 247 

1 shall subjoin some general remarks on the legitimate 
province of reasoning, and on its connexion with induc- 
tive philosophy, and with Rhetoric ; on which points 
much misapprehension has prevailed, tending to throw 
obscurity over the design and use of the science under 
consideration. 

A treatise on what are called the " laws of evidence " 
— the different kinds, strictly speaking, of arguments — 
and the occasions for which they are respectively suit- 
ed, &c., which is what some would expect in a logical 
work, will be found in the 1st part of the "Elements 
of Rhetoric." 



BOOK IV. 

DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 

Logic being concerned with the theory of reasoning, 
it is evidently necessary, in order to take a correct view 
of this science, that all misapprehensions should be re- 
moved relative to the occasions on which the reason- 
ing-piocess is employed — the purposes it has in view — 
and the limits within which it is confined. 

Simple and obvious as such questions may appear to 
those who have not thought much on the subject, they 
will appear on farther consideration to be involved in 
much perplexity and obscurity, from the vague and in- 
accurate language of many popular writers. To the 
confused and incorrect notions that prevail respecting 
the reasoning- process may be traced most of the com- 
mon mistakes respecting the science of Logic, and much 
of the unsound and unphilosophical argumentation 
which is so often to be met with in the works of inge- 
nious writers. 

These errors have been incidentally adverted to in the 
foregoing part of this work ; but it may be desirable, 



248 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book. IV. 

before we dismiss the subject, to offer on tliv3se pointa 
some further remarks, which could not have been there 
introduced without too great an interruption to the de- 
velopment of the system. Little or nothing indeed re- 
mains to be said that is not implied in the principles 
which have been already laid down ; but the results 
and applications of those principles are liable in many 
instances to be overlooked, if not distinctly pointed out 
These supplementary observations will neither require, 
nor admit of, so systematic an arrangement as has hitherto 
been aimed at; since they will be such as are suggest- 
ed principally by the objections and mistakes of those 
who have misunderstood, partially or entirely, the na- 
ture of the logical system. 

Let it be observed, however, that as I am not writing 
a review or commentary on any logical works, but an 
introduction to the science, I shall not deem it necessary 
to point out in all cases the agreement or disagreement 
between other writers and myself, in respect of the 
views maintained, or the terms employed, by each. 



Chap. I. — Of Induction^ 



§ 1. Much has been said by some writers 
opposiifg ^ In- of the superiority of the inductive to the 
duction to syl- syllogistic method of seeking truth ; as if 
logism. ^YiQ two stood opposed to each other ; and 

of the advantage of substituting the Organon of Bacon 
for that of Aristotle, &c. which indicates a total miscon- 
ception of the nature of both. There is, however, the 
more excuse for the confusion of thought which pre- 
vails on this subject, because eminent logical writers 
have treated, or at least have appeared to treat, of induc- 
tion as a kind of argument distinct from the syllogism; 
which if it were, it certainly might be contrasted with 
the syllogism : or rather, the whole syllogistic theory 



Chap. 1. § 1.] OF INDUCTION. 249 

would fall to the ground, since one of the very first 
principles it establishes, is that all reasoning, on what- 
ever subject, is one and the same process, which ma;y 
be clearly exhibited in the form of syllogisms. It is 
hardly to be supposed, therefore, that this was the 
deliberate meaning of those writers ; though it must be 
admitted that they have countenanced the error in 
question, by their inaccurate expressions. 

This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have r^^^^ senses 
arisen from a vagueness in the use of the of the word 
word induction ; which is sometimes em- induction. 
ployed to designate the process of investigation and of 
collecting facts ; sometimes, the deducing of an inference 
from those facts. The former of these processes {viz. 
that of observation and experiment) is undoubtedly 
distinct from that w^hich takes place in the syllogism ; 
but then it is not a process of argumentation; the 
latter again is an argumentative process ; but then it is, 
like all other arguments, capable of being syllogistically 
expressed. And hence Induction has come to be 
regarded as a distinct kind of argument from the 
syllogism. This fallacy cannot be more concisely or 
clearly stated, than in the technical form with which we 
may now presume our readers to be familiar. 
"Induction is distinct from syllogism : 

Induction is a process of reasoning ;" therefore 
" There is a process of reasoning distinct from 
syllogism." 

Here " induction," which is the middle-term, is usec^ 
in different senses in the two premises. 

Induction, so far forth as it is an argument, may, of 
course, be stated syllogistically : but so far forth as it 
is a process of inquiry with a view to obtain the 
premises of that argument, it is, of course, out of the 
province of logic : and the latter is the original and 
strict sense of the word. Induction means properly, 
not the inferring of the conclusion, but the bringing in, 
one by one, of instances, bearing on the point in ques- 
20 



250 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Booa: itT* 

tion, till a sufScient number has been collected. The 
ambiguity, therefore, above alluded to, and which has 
led to much confusion, would be best avoided by 
saying that we do not, strictly speaking, reason by 
Proper sense induction, but reason from induction: 
of induction. {^ q from our observations on one, or on 
several individuals, (e/c, rCdv KaO' sKaarov) we draw a 
conclusion respecting the class {to kuOoTiov) they come 
under : or, in like manner, from several species, to 
the genus which comprehends them : — in logical lan- 
guage, what we have predicated of certain singular- 
terms, we proceed to predicate of a common-term which 
comprehends them ; —or proceed in the same manner 
from species to genus. E, G. *' The earth moves 
round the Sun in an elliptical orbit; so does Mercury; 
and Venus ; and Mars, &c. : therefore a planet (the 
common-term comprehending these singulars) moves 
round," &c. "Philip was reckless of human life; so 
was Alexander; and J. Caesar; and Augustus, &c. : 
therefore this is the general character of a conqueror,^' 
Now it appears as if the most obvious and simplest 
way of filling up such enthymemes as these, expressed 
as they are, would be, in the third figure ; having of 
course a particular conclusion : 

Inductive « Earth, Mercury, Verms, &c. move, &c. 
'^\l^^T\ix\ ^^^ '^'^^'^^^ ^^^ planets ; therefore 
syllogism. Some planets move, &c." 

But when we argue from Induction we generally mean 
to infer more than a particular conclusion ; and accor- 
dingly most logical writers present to us the argument 
in the form of a syllogism in Barbara ; inserting, of 
course, a different minor premiss from the foregoing. 
In the first ^^^r. ; the simple converse of it. And if I 
figure. am allowed to assume, not merely that 

" Mercury, Venus, and whatever others I may have 
named, are planets," but also, that " All planets are 
these," — that these are the whole of the individuals com- 



CaAjp. I, § 1.3 OF INDUCTION. 251 

prehended under the term planet — lam, no doubt, au- 
thorized to draw a universal conclusion. But such an 
assumption would, in a very great majority of cases 
where induction is employed, amount to a perfect in- 
palpable falsehood, if understood literally, duction. 
For it is but seldom that we find an instance of what 
logicians call a " perfect induction ;" viz. where there 
is a complete enumeration of all the individuals, respect- 
ing which we assert collectively what we had before 
asserted separately; as " John is in England; and so 
is Thomas ; and so is William ; and all the sons of such 
a one are John, Thomas, and William ; therefore all his 
sons are in England." Such cases, I say, seldom occur ; 
and still more rarely can such an induction (which 
Bacon characterizes as " res puerilis "*) — ^since it does 
not lead the mind from what is better known to what 
is less known — serve any important purpose. 

But in such inductions as are commonly employed, 
the assumption of such a minor-premiss as in the above 
example, would be, as I have said, strictly speaking, a 
false as«umption. And accordingly those logicians who 
state an argument from induction in the above form, 
mean, I apprehend, that it is to be understood with a 
certain latitude ; i. e. that, in such propositions as " all 
planets are Mercury, Venus, &c." or " all conquerors 
are Philip, Alexander, and Caesar," they mean, (by a 
kind of logical fiction) to denote that " all conquerors 
are adequately represented by Philip, Alexander, &c.^' — 
that these individual persons or cases are a sufficient 
sample, in respect of the matter in question, of the class 
they belong to. 

I think it clearer, therefore, to state sim- T^e m^'or. 
ply and precisely what it is that we do ^l^' '''^^'^'^' 

* It may very well happen too, that (as in the example above) 4| 
certain circumstance may, in fact, belong to each individua 5? a 
certain class, and yet may have no connexion, except accidentally 
with the class itself ^ as such ; i. e. with the description of it, and that 
which constitutes it a class, (See Appen. II. Ex. 118.) 



252 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book. IV 

mean to assert. And in doing- this, we shall find 
that the expressed premiss of the enthymeme — viz. 
that which contains the statement respecting the 
individuals — is the minor ; and that it is the major 
that is suppressed, as being in all cases substantially the 
same : viz. that what belongs to the individual or indi- 
viduals we have examined, belongs (certainly, or proba- 
bly, as the case may be) to the whole class under which 
they come. E. G. From finding on examination of 
several sheep, that they each ruminate, we conclude 
that the same is the case with the whole species of sheep : 
and from finding on examination of the sheep, ox, deer, 
and other animals deficient in upper cutting- teeth, that 
they each ruminate, we conclude (with more or less 
certainty) that quadrupeds thus deficient are rumi- 
nants : the hearer readily supplying, in sense, the sup- 
pressed major premiss ; viz. that " what belongs to the 
individual sheep we have examined, is likely to belong 
to the whole species ;" &c. 

Whether that which is properly called Induction (viz 
the inquiry respecting the several individuals or species) 
be sufficiently ample, i. e. takes in a sufficient number 
of individual, or of specific cases — whether the charac- 
ter of those cases has been correctly ascertained — and 
how far the individuals we have examined are likely to 
resemble, in this or that circumstance, the rest of the 
class, &c. &c., are points that require indeed great judg- 
ment and caution ; but this judgment and caution are 
not to be aided by Logic ; because they are, in reality, 
employed in deciding whether or not it is fair and al- 
lowable to lay down your premises ; i. e. whether you 
are authorized or not, to assert, that " what is true of 
the individuals you have examined, is true of the whole 
class :" and that this or that is true of those individuals. 
Now, the rules of Logic have nothing to do with the 
truth or falsity of the premises ; except, of course, when 
they are the conclusions of former arguments; but 
merely teach us to decide, not, whether the premises 



Chap. I. H-] OF INDUCTION. 25B 

axe fairly laid down,hui whether the conchision follows 
fairly from the premises or not. 

It has however been urged that what Necessity 
are described as the major-premises in of assuming a 
drawing inferences from inductions, are inaJo'^-premiss. 
resolvable ultimately into an assertion of the " Uni- 
formity of the laws of Nature," or some eqvivalent 
proposition ; and that this is, itself, obtained by Induc- 
tion ; whence it is concluded that there must be at least 
one induction — and that, the one on which all others de- 
pend — incapable of being exhibited in a syllogistic form. 

But it is evident, and is universally admitted, that in 
everyc3.se where an inference is drawn from Induction 
(unless that name is to be given to a mere random guess 
without any grounds at all) we must form a judgment 
that the instance or instances adduced are " sufficient 
to authorize the conclusion ;" — that it is '^allowable'* 
to take these instances as a sample w^arranting an in- 
ference respecting the whole class. Now the expres- 
sion of this judgment in words, is the very major-pre- 
miss alluded to. To acknowledge this, therefore, is to 
acknowledge that all reasoning from Induction without 
exception does admit of being exhibited in a syllogistic 
form ; and consequently that to speak of one induction 
that does not admit of it, is a contradiction. 

Whether the belief m the constancy of nature's laws 
— a belief of which no one can divest hiuiself — be in- 
tuitive and a part of the constitution of the human mind, 
as some eminent- metaphysicians hold, or acquired, and 
in what way acquired, is a question foreign to our pre- 
sent purpose. For thai, it is sufficient to have pointed 
out that the necessity of assuming a universal major- 
premiss, expressed or understood, in order to draw any 
legitimate inference from induction, is virtually acknow- 
ledged even by those who endeavour to dispute it 

§ 2. Whethei' then the premiss may fairly Assumption 
be assumed, or not, is a point which cannot of premises in 
be decided without a competent knowledge induction. 



g54 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

of the nature of the subject. E. G. in most branches 
of natural philosophy, in which the circumstances that 
in any case affect the result, are usually far more clearly 
asciertained than in human affairs, a single instance i& 
usually accounted a sufficient induction ; e. g. having 
once ascertained that an individual magnet will attract 
iroUj^we are authorized to conclude that this property 
is universal. In Meteorology, however, and some other 
branches of natural philosophy, in which less advance- 
ment has been made, a much more copious induction 
would be required. And in respect of the affairs of 
human life, an inference from a single instance would 
hardly ever be deemed allowable. 

But it is worth remarking^ that in all cases alike, of 
reasoning from Induction, the greater or less degree oi 
confidence we feel is always proportioned to the belief 
of our having more or less completely ascertained all 
the circumstances that bear upon the question. All men 
practically acknowledge this to hold good in all cases 
alike, physical or moral, by invariably attributing any 
"failure in their anticipations in any case, to some igno- 
rance or miscalculation respecting some circumstances 
connected with the case. (See Append. I. Art. " Im- 
possible.") 

In some subjects, however, there will usually be more 
of these circumstances difficult to be accurately ascer- 
tained, than in others; and the degree of certainty be- 
longing to the major premiss, will vary accordingly. 
But universally, the degree of evidence for any proposi> 
tion we set out with as a premiss (whether the express- 
ed or the suppressed one) is not to be learned from mere 
Logic, nor indeed from any one distinct science ; but is 
the province of whatever science furnishes the subject 
inatter of your argument. None but a politician can 
judge rightly of the degree of evidence of a proposition 
in politics ; a naturalist, in natural history, &c. 
. . . E. G. from examination of many horned 

igaion. j^j^j^als>a5 sheep, cows, &€., a naturalist 



Chap, 1. § 2.] OF INDUCTION 255 

finds that they have cloven feet ; now his skill as a 
naturalist is to be shown in judging whether these 
animals are likely to resemble in the form of their feet 
all other horned animals ; and it is the exercise of this 
judgment, together with the examination of individuals, 
that constitutes what is usually meant by the inductive 
'process ; which is that by which we gain, what are 
properly, netf; truths ; and which is not connected with 
Logic ; being not what is strictly called reasonings but 
investigation^ But when this major premiss is granted 
him, and is combined with the vmwox, viz. that the ani- 
mals he has examined have cloven feet, then he draws 
the conclusion logically ; viz. that " the feet of all horn- 
ed animals are cloven."* Again, if from several times 
meeting with ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded 
that Friday, universally, is an unlucky day, one would 
object to his induction ; and yet it would not be, as an 
argument, illogical ; since the conclusion follows fairly, 
if you grant his implied premiss ; viz. that the events 
which happened on those particular Fridays are such 
as must happen, or are especially likely to happen, on 
all Fridays; but we should object to his laying doivn 
this premiss ; and therefore should justly say that his 
i7iduction is faulty, though his argument is correct. 

And here it may be remarked, that the The more 
ordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that <^out)tful pre- 

•^ ,, ^1 ^ T . miss suppress- 

in an enthymeme the suppressed premiss ed in induc- 
should be always the one of whose truth tion. 
least doubt can exist, is not observed in induction : for 
the premiss which is usually the more doubtful of the 
two, is, in this case, the major ; it being in many cases 
not quite certain that the individuals, respecting which 
some point has been ascertained, are to be fairly regard- 
ed as a sample of the whole class : and yet the major 
premiss is seldom expressed ; for the reason just given, 

* I have selected an instance in which induction is the only 
ground we have to rest od ; no reason, that I know of, having ever 
been assigned that could have led us to conjecture this curious fact 
it priori. 



t56 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

that it is easily understood ; as being (mutatis mutan* 
dis) the same in every induction. 

What has been said of induction will equally apply 
to example ; which dijfFers from it only in having a sin- 
gular, instead of a general, conclusion ; and that, from 
a single case. E. G. in one of the instances above, if 
the conclusion had been drawn, not respecting conquer- 
ors in general, but respecting this or that conqueror, that 
he was not likely to be careful of human life, each of 
the cases adduced to prove this would have been called 
an example. (See Elements of Rhetoric, Part I. ch. ii. 
§6.] 

Some have maintained that in employing an example 
we proceed at once from one individual case to another, 
without the intervention of any universal premiss. But 
whether we are fairly authorized or not to draw an in- 
ference from any example, must depend on what is call- 
ed the PARALLELISM of the two cases ; i. e. their being 
likely to agree in respect of the point in question : and 
the assertion, in words, of this parallelism, is auniver- 
sal proposition. He who has in his mind this proposi- 
tion, has virtually asserted such a major-premiss as I 
have been speaking of : and he who has it not, if he 
should be right in the inference itself that he draws, is, 
conlessedly, right only by chance. 



Chap. II. — On the Discovery of Truth. 

§ 1. Whetheh it is by a process of reasoning that 
new truths are brought to light, is a question which 
geems to be decided in the negative by what has been 
already said ; though many eminent writers seem to 
have taken for granted the affirmative. It is, perhaps, 
in ^. great measure, a dispute concerning the use of 
words ; but it is not, for that reason, either uninterest- 
ing or unimportant ; since an inaccurate use of language 
may often, in matters of science, lead to confusion of 



Chap. II. § I.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 257 

thought, and to erroneous conclusions. And, in the 
present instance, much of the undeserved contempt 
which has been bestowed on the logical system may- 
be traced to this source. For M^hen any one has laid 
down, that " Reasoning is important in the discovery 
of Truth," and that " Logic is of no service in the dis- 
covery of Truth," (each of which propositions is true 
in a certain sense of the terms employed, bat not in the 
same sense) he is naturally led to conclude, that there 
are processes of reasoning to which the syllogistic the- 
ory does not appl}^ ; and, of course, to misconceive al- 
together the nature of the science. 

In maintaining the negative side of the Different uses 
above question, three things are to be pre- of the words 
mised : first, that it is not contended that ^nd '^^ nlw '» 
discoveries of any kind of truth beyond as applied to 
what actually falls under the senses, can truths. 
be made (or at least are usually made) without reason- 
ing ; only, that reasoning is not the whole of the pro- 
cess, nor the whole of that which is important therein ; 
secondly, that reasoning shall be taken in the sense, not 
of every exercise of the reason, but of argumentation^ 
in which we have all along used it, and in which it 
has been defined by all the logical writers, viz. " from 
certain granted propositions to infer another proposition 
as the consequence of them :" thirdly, that by a " new 
truth," be understood, something neither expressly nor 
virtually asserted before — not implied [involved] in 
anything already known. 

To prove, then, this point demonstratively, becomes, 
on these data, perfectly easy ; for since all reasoning 
(in the sense above defined) may be resolved into syllo- 
gisms ; and since even the objectors to Logic make it a 
subject of complaint, that in a syllogism the premises 
do virtually assert the conclusion, it f dUows at once 
that no new truth (as above defined) can be elicited by 
any process of reasoning. 

Tt is on this ground, indeed, that the justly celebrated 



258 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, and many others, 
have objected to the syllogism altogether, as necessarily 
involving a petitio pnncipii; an objection vrhich, of 
course, he would not have been disposed to bring 
forward, had he perceived that, whether well or ill- 
founded, it lies against all arguments whatever. Had 
he been aware that a syllogism is no distinct kind of 
argument otherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any 
argument whatever,* stated regularly and at full length, 
he would have obtained a more correct view of the 
object of all reasoning ; which is merely to expand and 
unfold the assertions w^apt up, as it were, and implied 
in those with which we set out, and to bring a person 
to perceive and acknowledge the full force of that which 
he has admitted ; — to contemplate it in various points oi 
view ;— to admit in one shape what he has already 
admitted in another — and to give up and disallow 
whatever is inconsistent with it. 

Bevelopment , ^or is it always a very easy task to 
of the mean- bring beiore the mmd the several bearings 
ingofaterm. — the various applications — of even any 
one proposition. A common term comprehends an 
indefinite — sometimes a very great — number of indi- 
viduals, and often of classes ; and these, often, in some 
respects, widely differing from each other: and no one 
can be, on each occasion of his employing such a term, 
attending to and fixing his mind on each of the indi- 
viduals, or even of the species, so comprehended. It is 
to be remembered, too, that both division and generali- 
zation are in a great degree arbitrary ; i. e. that we may 
both divide the same genus on several different princi- 
ples, and may refer the same individuals or species to 
several different classes, according to the nature of the 
discourse and drift of the argument; each of w^hich 
classes will furnish a distinct middle-term for an argu- 
ment, according to the question. E, G. ff w^e wished 

* Which Dugald Stewart admits, though he adopts Campbell'i 
objection. 



Chap. II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 259 

to prove that ",a horse feels," (to adopt an ill-chosen 
example from the above writer,) we might refer it to 
the genus " animal ;" to prove that " it has only a single 
stomach," to the genus of " non-ruminants;" to prove 
that it is *' likely to degenerate in a very cold climate," 
we should class it with " original productions of a hoi 
climate," &c. &c. Now, each of these, and numberless 
others to which the same thing might be referred, are 
implied by the very term, " horse ;" yet it cannot he 
expected that they can all be at once present to the 
mind whenever that term is uttered. Much less, when, 
instead of such a term as that, we are employing terms 
of a very abstract and, perhaps, complex signification,* 
as " government, justice." &c. 

When then we say " every Y is Z. and X is Y," 
there may be an nidefinite, and perhaps a great number 
of other terms of which " Z " might be afiirmed ; but 
we fix our minds on one, viz. " Y ;" of which again an 
indefinite number of other predicates besides " Z " 
might be affirmed ; and then again out of an indefinite 
number of things of which " Y " might be affirmed, we 
fix on " X;" thus bringing before the mind — where it 
is needful to express both premises — what must in 
every case be assumed — whether stated in words, or 
understood — in order to draw the conclusion. , And 
usually this process has to be repeated for the proof of 
one or both of the premises : and perhaps again, for the 
premises by which they are proved : &c. 

But one cause which has led the above-mentioned 
writers into their error, is, their selecting examples 
(such as, it must be owned, are abundant in logical 
treatises) in which the conclusion is merely a portion 
of what one of the premises by itself has already im- 
plied in the very signification of the term that is taken 
as its subject, so plainly as to be present to the mind 
of every one who utters it : as, in the above example, 

• On this point there are some valuable remarks in the Philosopkg 
of Rhetoric itself, Book IV. Chap. vii. 



260 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. Book IV. 

Evil conse- ^^^ ^^^T ^^^^ " horse " ^implies [" con ' 
quence of se- notes"] " animal " to every one who ut- 
^ex^^^\ ^l^^^^^ ^e^'s those words and understands their 
examp es, meaning.* And hence it is that some 
writers not destitute of intelligence have been led tc 
imagine that in reasoning we draw a conclusion from a 
single premiss. 

But suppose, instead of such an example as Camp- 
bell, &c. hx on, we take that of the inference drawn by 
some naturalist respecting a fossil-animal, which he 
concludes to be a " ruminant" from its having horns 
on the skull. The labourers perhaps who dug up the 
remains, may be ignorant that " all horned animals are 
ruminant ;" and a naturalist again who is not on the 
spot, and has heard but an imperfect account of the 
skeleton, may be ignorant that " this animal was horn- 
ed." , Now neither of these parties could arrive at the 
conclusion that " it was a ruminant." But when the 
two premises are combined, they do, jointly imply and 
virtually- assert the conclusion ; though, separately, 
neither of them does so. 

Syllogism re- "^^^^ hence a syllogism has been re- 
presented as a presented (even by those who acknow- 
snare. ledge that all sound reasoning may be ex- 

hibited in that form) as a contrivance for ensnaring men 
in a trap from which they cannot afterwards escape. 
But a man ca7i escape admitting the truth of a conclu- 
sion : he may perceive its falsity ; and may thus be 
taught the falsity of one of the premises. But in a 
case where neither of these alternatives is necessary — 
where, after admitting the whole of what is assumed to 
be certain or probable, you are left free to admit or deny 
what is inferred, and have no more knowledge of its 
certainty or of its probability than you had before — 
this, every one would perceive to be no real, but only 
an apparent argument. 

But, as I have said, the flat truisms commonly given 

"^ See Book 11. Chap. v. ^ 3 



Chap, II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 261 

as examples by logical writers, have led those who have 
not carefully analysed the reasoning-process generally, 
into the notion that a syllogism is necessarily of that 
trifling character. He who has asserted that the two 
items of a certain account are 3 and 2, has virtually 
asserted that the sum-total is 5 : and of this few w^ould 
need even to be reminded : but it is equally certain that 
he who has stated the items when they amount to some 
hundreds, has virtually asserted that the sum-total is 
so and so ; and yet the readiest accountant requires, in 
this case, some time to bring these items together before 
his mind. 

A subject concerning which something is to be 
proved, is referred, as has been above remarked, to this 
or to that class, according to what it is^ that is to be 
proved. 

The Categories* or Predicaments, which 
Aristotle and other -logical writers have 
treated of, being certain general-heads or summa genera, 
to one or more of which every term may be referred, 
serve the purpose of marking out certain tracks, as it 
were, which are to be pursued in searching for middle 
terms, in each argument respectively ; it being essential 
that we should generalize on a right principle, with a 
view to the question before us ; or, in other words, that 
we should abstract that portion of any object presented 
to the mind, w^hich is important to the argument in 
hand. There are expressions in common use which 
have a reference to this caution : such as, " this is a 
question, not as to the nature of the object, but the 

♦ The Categories enumerated by Aristotle, are ohala, rroaov, rrolov» 
irp6GTi, TTOo, rroTe, Keladai, ex^^v, ttoiev, 7rdcr%£tj/ ; which are usually 
rendered, as adequately as, perhaps, they can be in our language, 
substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, posses- 
sion, action, suffering. The catalogue (which certainly is but a 
very crude one) has been by some writers enlarged, as it is evident 
may easily be done by subdividing some of the heads ; and by 
others curtailed, as it is no less evident that all may ultimately bf 
referred to the two heads of substance, and attHbute, or (in the Ian 
guage of some logicians) accident. 



262 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

magnitvde of it :" ** this is a question of time, or of 
place,'' ^c, i. e. " the subject must be referred to this or 
to that category." 

With respect to the meaning of the terms in question, 
" discovery," and " new truth ;" it matters not whether 
we confine ourselves to the narrowest sense, or admit 
the widest, provided we do but distinguish. There cer- 
Two kinds of tainly are two kinds of " new truth " and 
discovery, of " discovery," if we take those words in 
the widest sense in which they are ever used. First, 
such truths as were, before they were discovered, o6so- 
lutely unknow n, being not implied by anything we pre- 
viously knew, though we might perhaps suspect them 
as probable. Such are all matters of fact strictly so 
called, when iirst made known to one who had not any 
such previous knowledge, as would enable him to as- 
certain them a priori; i. e. by reasoning; as if we in- 
form a man that we have a colony in New-South- 
Wales ; or that the earth is at such a distance from the 
sun ; or that platina is heavier than gold. The com- 
munication of this kind of knowledge is most usually, 

, ^ ,. and most strictly, called information. We 
Information. ••. r ? *• j £ x*- 

gam It from observation, B,na irom testimo- 
ny. No mere internal workings of our own minds 
(except when the mind itself is the very object to be 
observed,) or mere discussions in words, will make a 
fact known to us ; though there is great room for saga- 
city in judging what testimony to admit, and in the 
forming of conjectures that may lead to profitable obser- 
vation, and to experiments with a view to it. 

The other class of discoveries is of a 
very different nature. That which may be 
elicited by reasoning, and consequently is implied in 
that which we already know, we assent to on that 
ground, and not from observation or testimony. To 
take a geometrical truth upon trust, or to attempt to 
ascertain it by observation, would betray a total igno- 
rance of the nature of the science In the longest de- 



Chap. II. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 263 

monstration, the mathematical teacher seems only to 
lead us to make use of our ovrn stores, and point out to 
us how much we had already admitted ; and, in the 
case of many ethical propositions, we assent at first 
hearing, though perhaps we had never heard or thought 
of the proposition before. So also do we readily assent 
to the testimony of a respectable man who tells us that 
our troops have gained a victory; but how different is 
the nature of the assent in the two cases. In the latter 
we are disposed to thank the man for his information, 
as being such as no wisdom or learning would have 
enabled us to ascertain ; in the former, we usually ex- 
claim " very true .'" " that is a valuable and just remark ; 
that never struck me before !" implying at once our 
practical ignorance of it, and also our consciousness that 
we possess, in what we already know, the means to 
ascertain the truth of it ; that we have a right, in short, 
to bear our testimony to its truth. 

To all practical purposes, indeed, a truth of this de- 
scription may be as completely unknown to a man as 
the other ; but as soon as it is set before him, and the 
argument by which it is connected with his previous 
notions is made clear to him, he recognizes it as some- 
thing conformable to, and contained in, his former 
belief. 

It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine „, ^ , ^, 
£ - ' ^ J. V. J. J. Plato's theory. 

01 remniiscence arose irom a nasty exten- 
sion of what he had observed in this class, to all ac- 
quisition of knowledge whatever. His theory of ideas 
served to confound together 7na^^ers of fact respecting 
the nature of things, (which may be perfectly new to 
us) with propositions relating to our own notions^ and 
modes of thought ; (or to speak, perhaps, more correct- 
ly, our own arbitrary signs) which propositions must 
be contained and implied in those very complex notions 
themselves ; and whose truth is a conformity, not to the 
nature of things, but to our own hypothesis. Such are 
all propositions in pure n.athematics, and many Id 



264 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book. IV 

ethics, viz. those which involve no assertion as to real 
matters of fact. Tt has been rightly remarked,^ that 
mathematical propositions are not properly true or false, 
in the same sense as any proposition respecting real fact 
is so called And hence, the truth (such as it is) oi 
such propositions is necessary and eternal ; since it 
amounts cnly to a conformity with the hypothesis we set 
out with. The proposition, that " the belief in a future 
state, combined with a complete devotion to the present 
life, is not consistent with the character of prudence," 
would be not at all the less true if a future state were 
a chimera, and prudence a quality which was nowhere 
met with ; nor would the truth of the mathematician's 
conclusion be shaken, that '* circles are to each other 
as the squares of their diameters," should it be found 
that there never had been a circle, or a square, confor- 
mable to the dennition, in rerum naturce. 

And accordingly an able man, may, by patient reason- 
ing, attain any amount of mathematical truths ; because 
these are all implied in the definitions. But no degree 
of labour and ability, would give him the knowledge, 
by " reasoning " alone, of what has taken place in 
some foreign country ; nor would enable him to know, 
if he had never seen, or heard of, the experiments, 
what would become of a spoonful of salt, or a spoonful 
of chalk, if put into water, or what would be the appear- 
ance of a ray of light when passed through a prism. 

Facts, not Hence the futility of the attempt of 
demonstrable. CJarke, and others, to demonstrate (in the 
mathematical sense) the existence of a deity. This can 
only be (apparently) done by covertly assuming in the 
premises the very point to be proved No matter of fact 
can be mathematically demonstrated; though it maybe 
proved in such a manner as to leave no doubt on the 
mind. E. G. I have no more doubt that I met such 
and such a man, in this or that place, yesterday, than 
that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
♦ Dugald Stewart's Philosophy, Vol. II. 



Chap. U. § l.} DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 26b 

angles : but ike kind of certainty I have of these two 
truths is widely different ; to say, that I did not meet 
the man, would be false indeed, but it would not be 
anything inconceivable, self -contradictory, and absurd; 
but it would be so, to deny the equality of the angles 
of a triangle to two right angles. 

It is of the utmost importance to dis*in- information 
guish these two kinds of discovery of truth. ^.^^ instruc- 
{n relation to the former, as I have said, ^^^' »stmct. 
the word " information " is most strictly applied ; the 
communication of the latter is more properly called 
•* instruction,'' I speak of the usual practice ; for it 
would be ^o^n^ too far to pretend that writers are 
finiform and consistent in the use of these, or of any 
ather term. We say that the historian gives us infor- 
nation respecting past times ; the traveller, respecting 
foreign countries : on the other hand, the mathematician 
gives instruction in the principles of his science ; the 
moralist instructs us in our duties, &c. However, let 
the words be used as they may, the things are evidently 
different, and ought to be distinguished. It is a question 
comparatively unimportant, whether the term '* disco- 
Very" shall or shall not Be extended to the eliciting of 
those truths, which, being implied in our previous 
knowledge, may be established by mere strict reasoning. 

Similar verbal questions, indeed, might be raised re- 
specting many other cases : e. g. one has forgotten {i. e. 
cannot recollect) the name of some person or place ; per- 
haps we even try to think of it, but in vain ; at last 
some one reminds us, and we instantly recognize it as 
the one we wanted to recollect : it may be asked, was 
this in our mind, or not ? The answer is, that in one 
sense it was, and in another sense, it was not. Or, 
^gain, suppose there is a vein of metal on a man's es- 
tate, which he does not know of ; is it part of his pos- 
sessions or not? and when he finds it out and works 
it, does he then acquire a new possession or not ? Cer- 
tainly not, in the same sense as if he has a fresh estate 
21 



266 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.^ 

bequeathed to him, which he had formerly no right io^ 
but to all practical purposes it is a new possession- 
This case, indeed, may serve as an illustration of the 
one we have been considering ; and in all these cases, 
if the real distinction be understood, the verbal question 
will not be of much consequence. 

To use one more illustration. Reasoning ha& been 
aptly compared to- the piling together blocks of stone ^ 
on each of which, as on a pedestal, a man can raise 
himself a small, and but a small height above the plain ; 
but which,- w^hen skilfully built up, will form a flight 
of steps, which will raise him to a great elevation 
Now (to pursue this analogy) when the materials are 
all ready ta the builder's hand, the blocks ready dug 
and brought, his work resembles one of the two kinds 
of discovery just mentioned, viz. that to which we have 
assigned the name of instruction :■ but if his materials 
are to be entirely, or in part, provided by himself — \i 
he himself is forced to dig fresh blocks from, the quarry 
— this corresponds to the other kind of discovery.* 

§ 2. I have hithcFto spoken of the em- 

^ coverie?^' pl^Ji^^i^t of argument in the establishment 

of those hypothetical truths (as they may 

* *' The fundamental differences between these two great branch- 
es of human knowledge, as well as their consequences, cannot per* 
haps be more strikingly illustrated than in the follo-wing iamiliar 
exposition by a celebrated writer. ' A clever man,' says Sir J. 
Herschel, * shut up alone and allowed all unlimited time, might 
reason out for himself all the truths of mEEthematics, by proceeding 
from those simple notions of space and number of which he cannot 
divest himself without ceasing to think j but he would never tell 
by any effort of reasoning what would become of a lump of sugar, 
if immersed in water, or w^hat impression would be produced on 
his eye by mixing the colours yellow and blue,' results which can 
be learnt only from experience. 

" Thus then the extremes of human knowledge may be consid- 
ered as founded on the one hand purely upon reason, and on the 
other purely upon sense. Now, a very large portion of our know- 
ledge, and what in fact may be considered as the most important 
part of it, lies between these two extremes, and results from a un- 
ion or mixture of iliem,, that is to say, consists of the application of 
rational principles to the phenomena presented by the objects of 
nature."— iVoui's Bridgewater Treatise^ p. 2. 



CttAP. II. 5 2.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. HS'^ 

be called) which relate only to our own abstract notions. 
^ It is not, however, meant to be insinuated that there is 
no room for reasoning in the establishment of a matter 
of fact : but the other class of truths have first been 
treated of, because, in discussing subjects of that kind, 
the process of reasoning is always the principal, and 
often the only thing to be attended to, if we are but 
certain and clear as to the meaning of the terms ; where- 
as, when assertions respecting real existence are intro- 
di^^ed, we have the additional and more important busi- 
ness of ascertaining and keeping in mind the degree of 
evidence for those facts ; since, otherwise, our conclu- 
sions could not be relied on, however accurate our rea- 
soning. But, undoubtedly, we may by reasoning ar- 
rive at knowledge concerning matters of fact, if we 
have /acfs to set out with as data ; only that it will very 
often happen that, " from certain facts," as Campbell 
remarks, " we draw only probable conclusions ;" 
because the other premiss introduced (which he 
overlooked) is only probable. And the maxim of 
mechanics holds good in arguments; that "no- 
thing is stronger than its weakest part." He ob- 
served that in such an instance, for example, as the 
one lately given, we infer from the certainty that 
such and such tyrannies have been short-lived, the 
probability that others will be so ; and he did not con- 
sider that there is an understood premiss which is 
essential to the argument ; {viz. that " all tyrannies 
will resemble those we have already observed ") which 
being only of a probable character, must attach the same 
degree of uncertainty to the conclusion. And the doubt- 
fulness is multiplied, if both premises are uncertain. For 
since it is only on the supposition of both premises being 
true, that we can calculate on the truth of the conclusion, 
we must state in fractional numbers the chances of each 
premiss being true, and then multiply these together, to 
judge of the degree of evidence of the conclusion.* . 
♦ See Book III. § 14 



268 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

An individual fact is not unfrequently elicited by 

skilfully combining, and reasoning from, those already 

known; of which many curious cases occur in the 

detection of criminals by officers of justice, and by 

barristers, who acquire by practice such dexterity in 

that particular department, as to draw sometimes the 

right conclusion from data, which might be in the 

possession of others, without being applied to the same 

use. But in all cases of the inferring: of a 
General laws 7 i j? • j i.- ^1,^1 

established by general law irom mduction, that concgi- 

teasoning from sion (as has been formerly remarked) is 
induction. uZfma?% established by reasoning. E, G. 
Bakewell, the celebrated cattle-dealer, observed, in a 
great number of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten 
readily ; and in a great number of others, the absence 
of this constitution : in every individual of the former 
description, he observed a certain peculiar make, though 
they differed widely in size, colour, &c. Those of the 
latter description differed no less in various points, but 
agreed in being of a different make from the others : 
these facts were his data ; from which, combining them 
with the general principle, that nature is steady and 
uniform in her proceedings, he logically drew the 
conclusion that beasts of the specified make have 
universally a peculiar tendency to fattening. But then 
his principal merit consisted in making the observa- 
tions, and in so combining them as to abstract from 
each of a multitude of cases, differing widely in many 
respects, the circumstances in which they all agreed ; 
and also in conjecturing skilfully how far those circum- 
stances were likely to be found in the whole class. 
The making of such observations, and still more the 
combination, abstraction, and judgment employed,* are 
what men commonly mean (as was above observed) 
when they speak of mduction ; and these operations 
are certainly distinct from reasoning + The same 

• See Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 229—239 
f See Book I ^ 1. Note. 



Chap.il § 2.] DISCOVEUY OF TRUTH. 269 

observations will apply to numberless other cases ; as, 
for instance, to the discovery of the law of ''vis 
inertice,'' and the other principles of Natural Philosophy. 

It may be remarked here, that even the most exten* 
sive observations of facts will often be worse than 
useless to those who are deficient in the power of 
discriminating and selecting. Their knowledge, whether 
much or little, is like food to a body whose digestive 
system is so much impaired as to be incapable of sepa- 
rating the nutritious portions. To attempt to remedy 
the defect of minds thus constituted " by imparting to 
them additional knovv^ledge — to confer the advantage 
of wider experience on those who have not the power 
of profiting by experience — is to attempt enlarging 
the prospect of a short-sighted man by bringing him 
to the top of a hill."* 

But to wha^ class, it may be asked, should be referred 
the discoveries we have been speaking of ? All would 
agree in calling them, when first ascertained, "new 
truths," in the strictest sense of the word ; which would 
seem to imply their belonging to the class which may 
be called byway of distinction, ''physical discoveries:'' 
and yet their being ultimately established by reasoning, 
would seem, according to the foregoing rule, to refer 
them to the other class, viz. what may be Logical dis. 
called " logical discoveries ;" since what- coveries 
ever is established by reasoning must have been con- 
tained and virtually asserted in the premises. In 
answer to this, I would say, that they certainly do 
belong to the latter class, relatively to a person who is 
in possession of the data: but to him who is not, they 
are new truths of the other class. For it is to be 
remembered, that the words "discovery" and "new 
truths" are necessarily relative. There may be a 
proposition which is to one person completely known : 
to another {viz. one to whom it has never occurred, 
iliough he is in possession of all the data from which 
* Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 236 



f 70 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

it may be proved) it will be (when he comes to perceive 
it, by a process of instruction) what we have called a 
logical discovery: to a third (viz. one who is ignorant 
of these data) it will be absolutely unknown, and will 
have been, when made known to him, a perfectly and 
properly new truth — a piece of information — a physical 
discovery, as we have called it.* To the philosopher, 
therefore, who arrives at the discovery by reasoning 
from his observations, and from established principles 
combined with them, the discovery is of the former 
class ; to the multitude, probably of the latter ; as they 
will have been most likely not possessed of all his data. 
Character of § ^' ^^ fo^iows from what has been said, 
scientific that in pure mathematics, and in such 
truths. ethical propositions as we were lately 

speaking of, we do not allow the possibility of any but 
a logical discovery: i. e. no proposition of that class 
can be true, which w^as not implied in the definitions 
and axioms we set out with, which are the first princi- 
ples. For since the propositions do not profess to state 
any fact, the only truth they can possess, consists in con- 
formity to the original principles. To one, therefore, 
who knows these principles, such propositions are truths 
already implied ; since they may be developed to him 
by reasoning, if he is not defective in the discursive 
faculty ; and again, to one who does not understand 
those principles {i. e. is not master of the definitions) 
such propositions are, so far unmeaning. On the other 
hand, propositions relating to matters of fact, may be, 
indeed, implied in what he already knew ; (as he who 

*.lt may be worth while in this place to define what is properly 
to be called knowledge : it implies three things ; 1st, firm beliefs 
2dly, of what is true, 3dly, on sufficient grounds. If any one, c. g 
is in doubt respecting one of Euclid's demonstrations, he cannot be 
said to know the proposition proved by it ; if, again, he is fully 
convinced of anything that is not truf, he is mistaken in supi)osing 
himself to know it ; lastly, if two persons are each fully confident, 
one that the moon is inhabited, and the other that it is not, (though 
one of these opinions must be true) neither of them could properly 
be said to know the truth, since he cannot have sufiicient j^roo/ of it 



€hap. n. § 3] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 271 

knows the climate of the Alps, the Andes, &c. &c. hats 
virtually admitted the general fact, that " the tops of 
mountains are comparatively cold ") but as these pos- 
sess an absolute and physical truth, they may also be 
absolutely " new," their truth not being implied in the 
mere terms of the propositions. The truth or falsity of 
any proposition concerning a triangle, is implied by the 
meaning of that and of the otiher geometrical terms ; 
whereas, though one may understand (in the ordinary 
sense of that word) the full meaning of the terms 
** planet," and " inhabited," and of all the other terms 
m the language, he cannot thence derive any certainty 
that the planets are, or are not, inhabited. 

As I have elsewhere observed, " Every branch of 
study, which can at all claim the character of a science 
(in the widest acceptation,) requires two things : 1 . A 
correct ascertainment of the data from which we are to 
reason ; and, 2. Correctness in the process of deducing 
conclusions from them. But these two processeSs 
though both are in every case indispensable, are, in 
different cases, extremely different in their relative diffi- 
culty and amount; — in the space, if I may so speak, 
which thev occupy in each branch of study. Jn pure 
mathematics, for instance, we set out from arbitrary de- 
finitions, and postulates, readily comprehended, which 
are the principles from which, by the help of axioms 
hardly needing even to be stated, our reasonings pro- 
ceed. No facts whatever require to be ascertained ; no 
process of induction to be carried on ; the reasoning- 
process is nearly every thing. In geology, (to take an 
instance of an opposite kind) the most extensive infor- 
mation is requisite; and though sound reasoning is 
xalled for in making use of the knowledge acquired, it 
is well known what erroneous systems have been de- 
vised, by powerful reason ers, who have satisfied them- 
selves too soon with observations not sufficiently accu- 
rate and extensive. 

" Various branches of natural-philosophy occupy, in 



272 THE PROVINCE GF REASONING- [Book 17 

this respect , various intermediate places. The two pro^- 
cesses which [ have endeavoured to describe, under the 
titles of - physical investigation ' and ' logical investiga- 
tion,' will, in different cases, differ very much in theii 
neiative importance and difficulty. The science of optics, 
for instance, furnishes an example of one approaching 
very near to pure mathematics ; since, though the foun- 
dation of it consists in facts ascertained by experiment, 
these are fewer and more easily ascertained than those 
pertaining to other branches of natural-philosophy. A 
very small number of principles, comprehensible evei> 
without being verified by the senses, being assumed, the 
deductions from them are so extensive, that, as is well 
known, a blind mathematician, who had no remembrance 
of seeing, gave an approved course of lectures on the 
subject. In the application, however, of this science to 
the explanation of many of the curious natural pheno-- 
mena that occur, a raost extensive and exact knowledge 
of facts is called for. 

** In the case of political-economy, that the facts ou 
which the science is founded are few, and simple, and 
within the range of every one's observation, would, 1 
think, never have been doubted, but for the error of con- 
founding together the theoretical and the practical 
branclies of it; — the science oi what is properly called 
political-economy — and the practical employment of it 
The theory supplies principles, which we may after- 
wards apply practically to an indefinite number of vari- 
ous cases ; and in order to make this application cor- 
rectly, of course an accurate knowledge of the circum- 
stances of each case is indispensable. But it should be 
remembered that the same may be said even with re- 
spect to Geometry. As soon as we come to the practi^ 
cal branch of it, and apply it in actual measurements, a 
minute attention to facts is requisite for an accurate 
result. And in each practical question in political 
economy that may arise, we must be prepared to ascer- 
tain, and allov/ for, various disturbing causes> which 



Ghap. II. § 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 273 

may more or less modify the results obtained from our 
general principles ; just as, in Mechanics, when we 
come to practice, we must take into account the thick- 
ness, and weight, and the degrees of flexibility, of ropes 
and levers. 

" The facts then which it may be necessary to ascer- 
tain for the practical decision of any single case that 
may arise, are, of course, in political-economy (as in 
respect of the application of the principles of any 
science,) indefinite in number, and sometimes difficult to 
collect ; the facts on which the general principles of the 
science are founded, come within the range of every 
one's experience."* 

§4. When it is asked, then, whether Ambiguity of 
such great discoveries, as have been made the word rea- 
in natural philosophy, were accomplished, sowing- 
or can be accomplished, by reasoning 7 the inquirer 
should be reminded, that the question is ambiguous. 
It may be answered in the affirmative, if by " reasoning" 
is meant to be included the assumption of premises. To 
the right performance of that work, is requisite, not only, 
in many cases, the ascertainment of facts, and of the 
degree of evidence for doubtful propositions, (in which, 
observation and experiment will often be indispensable,) 
but also a skilful selection and combination of known 
facts and principles ; such as implies, amongst other 
things, the exercise of that powerful abstraction which 
seizes the common circu.nstances — the point of agree^ 
ment — in a number of, otherwise, dissimilar individuals ; 
and it is ia this that the greatest genius is shown. But 
if " reasoning " be understood in the limited sense in 
T^'hich it is usually defined, then we must answer in the 
negative ; and reply that such discoveries are made by 
means of reasoning combined with other operations. 

In the process I have been speaking of, there is much 
reasoning throughout ; and thence the whole has been 
carelessly called a " process of reasoning." 

* Polit. EcoiL Lect. IX. p. 225, 



)274 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

It is not, indeed, any just ground of complaint that 
the word reasoning is used in two senses ; but that the 
two senses are perpetually confounded together : and 
hence it is that some logical writers fancied that reason- 
ing {viz. that which Logic treats of) was the method of 
discovering truth ; and that so many other writers have 
accordingly complained of Logic for not accomplishing 
that end; urging that "syllogism" {i. e. reasoning; 
though they overlooked the coincidence) never esta- 
blished any thing that is, strictly speaking, unknown to 
him who has granted the premises: and proposing the 
introduction of a certain " rational Logic " to accom- 
plish this purpose; i. e. to direct the mind in the pro- 
cess of investigation. Supposing that some such system 
icould be devised — that it could even be brought into a 
scientific form, (which he must be more sanguine than 
scientific who expects) — -that it were of the greatest con- 
ceivable utility— and that it should be allowed to bear 
the name of "Logic" (since it would not be worth 
while to contend about a name) still it would not, as 
these writers seem to suppose, have the same object pro- 
posed with the Aristotelian Logic ; or be in any respect 
a rival to that system. A plough may be a much more 
ingenious and valuable instrument than a flail ; but it 
never can be substituted for it. 

New truths Those discoveries of general laws of 
F^y ^Hff^^^^^f nature, &c. of which we have been speak- 
sens^e to d^lv i^^g' being of that character which we have 
rent persons, described by the name of " logical disco- 
veries," to him who is in possession of all the premises 
from which they are deduced ; but being, to the multi- 
tude (who are unacquainted with many of those pre- 
mises) strictly " new truths," hence it is, that men in 
general give to the general facts, and to them, most 
peculiarly, the name of discoveries; for to themselves 
they are such, in the strictest sense ; the premises from 
which they were inferred being not only originally un- 
known to them, but frequently remaining unknown to 



Chap. II. § 4.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 275 

the very last. E, G. the general conclusion concerning 
cattle, which Bakewell made known, is what most agri- 
culturists (and many others also) are acquainted with ; 
but the premises he set out with, viz. the facts respecting 
this, that, and the other, individual ox, (the ascertain- 
ment of which facts was his first discovery,) these are 
what few know, or care to know, with any exact 
particularity. 

And it may be added, that these disco- observation 
veries of particular facts, which are the a°d experi- 
immediate result of observation, are, in ™^^ " 
themselves, uninteresting and insignificant, till they are 
combined so as to lead to a grand general result. Those 
who on each occasion watched the motions, and regis- 
tered the times of occultation, of Jupiter's satellites, 
little thought, perhaps, themselves, what important 
results they were preparing the w^ay for.* So that 
there is an additional cause which has confined the term 
discovery to these grand general conclusions ; and, as 
was just observed, they are, to the generality of men, 
perfectly new truths in the strictest senso of the word ; 
not being implied in any previous knowledge they 
possessed. Very often it will happen, indeed, that the 
conclusion thus drawm will amount only to a probable 
conjecture ; which conjecture w^ill dictate to the inquirer 
such an experiment, or course of experiments, as will 
fully establish the fact. Thus Sir H. Davy, from finding 
that the flame of hydrogen gas was not communicated 
through a long slender tube, conjectured that a shorter 
but still slenderer tube would answer the same purpose ; 
this led him to try the experiments, in which, by 
continually shortening the tube, and at the same tinje 
lessening its bore, he arrived at last at the wire-gauze 
of his safety-lamp. 

It is to be observed also, that whatever credit is con- 

• Hence, Baeon urges us to pursue truth, without alwayi 
IMiqtiiring to peroeivo its practical application. 



276 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book If' 

veyed by the word " discovery," to him who is regarded 
as the author of it, is well deserved by those who skil- 
fully select and combine known truths {especially such 
as have been long and generally known) so as to elicit 
important, and hitherto unthought-of, conclusions. 
Theirs is the master-mind : — agxi^TSKToviKy (ppovijtjcr : 
whereas men of very inferior powers may sometimes, 
by immediate observation, discover perfectly new facts, 
empirically ; and thus be of service in furnishing mate- 
rials to the others ; to whom they stand in the same 
relation (to recur to a former illustration) as the brick- 
maker or stone-quarrier to the architect. It is peculiarly 
creditable to Adam Smith, and to Malthus, that the data 
from which they drew such important conclusions had 
been in every one's hands for centuries. 

As for mathematical discoveries, they (as we have 
before said) must always be of the description to which 
we have given the name of " logical discoveries ;" since 
to him who properly comprehends the meaning of the 
mathematical terms, (and to no other are the truths 
themselves, properly speaking, intelligible) those results 
are implied in his previous knowledge, since they are 
logically deducible therefrom. It is not, however, meant 
to be implied, that mathematical discoveries are effected 
by pure reasoning, and by that singly. For though 
there is not here, as in physics, any exercise of judg- 
ment as to the degree of evidence of the premises, nor 
any experiments and observations, yet there is the same 
call for skill in the selection and combination of the 
premises in such a manner as shall be best calculated 
to lead to a nev/— that is, unperceived and unthoughU 
of — conclusion. 

In following, indeed, and taking in a demonstration, 
nothing is called for but pure reasoning; but the 
assumption of premises is not a part of reasoning, 
in the strict and technical sense of that term. Accord- 
ingly, there are many who can follow a mathe- 
matical demonstration, or any other train of argu 



Cfap. II. § 5.] 'DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 277 

ment, who would not succeed well in framing an« 
of their own.* 

§ 5. For both kinds of discovery then, the Operations 
iogical, as well as the physical, certain connected with 
'jperations are requisite, beyond those ^^^^**^^^&- 
which can fairly be comprehended under the strict 
'iense of the word " reasoning." In the logical, is 
.equired a skilful selection and combination of known 
truths : in the physical, we must employ, in addition 
(generally speaking) to that process, observation and 
experiment. It will generally happen, that in the study 
of nature, and, universally, in all that relates to matters 
of fact, both kinds of investigation will be united: ^. e. 
eome of the facts or principles you reason from as 
premises, must be ascertained by observation ; or, as in 
the case of the safety-lamp, the ultimate conclusion 
will need confirmation from experience ; so that both 
physical and logical discovery will take place in the 
course of the same process. We need not, therefore, 
wonder, that the two are so perpetually confounded. In 
mathematics, on the other hand, and in great part of the 
discussions relating to ethics and jurisprudence, there 
being no room for any physical discovery whatever, we 
have only to make a skilful use of the propositions in 
our possession, to arrive at every attainable result. 

The investigation, however, of the latter class of sub- 
jects differs in other points also from that of the former. 
For, setting aside the circumstance of our having, in 
these, no question as to facts — no room for observa- 
tion — there is also a considerable difference in what 
may be called, in both instances, the process of logical 
investigation ; the premises on which we proceed being 
of so different a nature in the two cases. 

To take the example of mathematics, the Mathemati- 
definitions, which are the principles of our cal and other 
reasoning, are very few, and the axioms reasoning. 

♦ Hence, the student must not confine himself to thi-s passive kind 
•f employmemt, if he will truly Ixicome a mathematician. 



278 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. Book IV' 

still fewer ; and both are, for the most part, laid down 
and placed before the student in the outset ; the intro- 
duction of a new definition or axiom, being of compa- 
ratively rare occurrence, at wide intervals, and with a 
formal statement ; besides which, there is no room for 
doubt concerning either On the other hand, in all rea- 
sonings which regard matters of fact, we introduce, 
almost at every step, fresh and fresh propositions (to a 
very great number) which had not been elicited in the 
course of our reasoning, but are taken for granted ; viz, 
facts, and laws of nature, which are here the principles 
of our reasoning, and maxims, or " elements of belief," 
which answer to the axioms in mathematics. If, at the 
opening of a treatise, for example, on chemistry, on 
agriculture, on political economy, &c. the author should 
make, as in mathematics, a formal statement of all the 
propositions he intended to assume as granted, through- 
out the whole work, both he and his readers would be 
astonished at the number; and, of these, many would 
be only probable, and there would be much room for 
doubt as to the degree of probability, and for judgment 
in ascertaining that degree. 

Moreover, mathematical axioms are always employed 
precisely in the same simple form ; e. g. the axiom that 
" the things equal to the same are equal to one another," 
is cited, whenever there is need, in those very words ; 
whereas the maxims employed in the other class of sub- 
jects, admit of, and require, continual modifications in 
the application of them. E. G. " the stability of the 
laws of nature," which is our constant assumption in 
inquiries relating to natural philosophy, appears in 
many different shapes, and in some of them does not 
possess the same complete certainty as in others; e. g. 
when, from having always observed a certain sheep 
ruminating, we infer, that this individual sheep will con- 
tinue to ruminate, we assume that " the property which 
has hitherto belonged to this sheep will remain unchang 
ed ;" when we infer the same property of all sheep, we 



Chap. II. § 5.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 279 

assume that " the property which belongs to this indi- 
vidual belongs to the whole species :" if, on comparing 
sheep with some other kinds of horned animals,* and 
finding that all agree in ruminating, we infer that " all 
horned animals ruminate," we assume that " the whole 
of a genus or class are likely to agree in any point 
wherein many species of that genus agree :" or in other 
words, '* that if one of two properties, &c. has often 
been found accompanied by another, and never without 
it, the former will be universally accompanied by the 
latter :" now all these are merely different forms of the 
maxim, that *' nature is uniform in her operations,*' 
which, it is evident, varies in expression in almost every 
different case where it is applied, and the application of 
which admits of every degree of evidence, from perfect 
moral certainty, to mere conjecture.f 

The same may be said of an infinite number of prin- 
ciples and maxims appropriated to, and employed in, 
each particular branch of study. Hence, all such rea- 
sonings are, in comparison of mathematics, very com- 
plex ; requiring so much more than that does, beyond 
the process of merely deducing the conclusion logically 
from J;he premises : so that it is no wonder that the 
longest mathematical demonstration should be so much 
more easily constructed and understood, than a much 
shorter train of just reasoning concerning real facts 
The former has been aptly compared to along and steep, 
but even and regular, flight of steps, v/hich tries the 
breath, and the strength, and the perseverance only; 
while the latter resembles a short, but rugged and un- 
even, ascent up a precipice, which requires a quick eye, 
agile limbs, and a firm step ; and in which we have to 
tread now on this side, now on that — ever considering, 
as we proceed, whether this or that projection will 
afford room for our foot, or whether some loose stone 

* Viz. having horns on the skull. What are cafled the horns of 
the rhiLOceros are quite different in origin, and in structure, as 
Well as in situation, from what are properly called liarns. 

t See Append. Art. " Impossible." i 



fmO THE PROVINCE OF HEASCNING. [Book IV. 

may not slide from under us. There are probably as 
many steps of pure reasoning in one of the longer of 
Euclid's demonstrations, as in the whole of an argu- 
mentative treatise on some other subject, occupying per- 
haps a considerable volume. 

Mathematics it may be observed here that mathema- 
ps^^^i r ^^ ^^^^^ reasoning, as it calls for no exercise 
P^a^xis^ot^^rea- ^f judgment respecting probabilities, is the 
soning. best kind of introductory exercise ; and, 

from the same cause, is apt, when too exclusively pur- 
sued, to make men incorrect moral reasoners. 

As for those ethical and legal reasonings which were 
lately mentioned as in some respects resembling those 
of mathematics, {viz. such as keep clear of all assertions 
respecting facts) they have this difference ; that not only 
men are not so completely agreed respecting the maxims 
and principles of ethics and law, but the meaning also 
of each term cannot be absolutely, and for ever, fixed 
by an arbitrary definition ; on ihe contrary, a great part 
of our labour consists in distinguishing accurately the 
various senses in which men employ each term — ascer- 
taining which is the most proper — and taking care to 
avoid confounding them together.* 

Fallacious ^* ^^J ^^ Worth while to add in this 
disparagement place that as a Candid disposition — a hearty 
of reasoning, desire to judge fairly, and to attain truth — 
are evidently necessary with a view to give fair play to 
the reasoning-powers, in subjects where we are liable 
to a bias from interest or feelings, so, a fallacious per- 
version of this maxim finds a place in the minds of 
some persons : who accordingly speak disparagingly of 
all exercise of the reasoning-faculty in moral and reli- 
gious subjects ; declaiming on the insufficiency of mere 
intellectual power for the attainment of truth in such 
matters — on the necessity of appealing to the heart 
rather than \o the head, &c.t and then leading their 

♦ See Appendix on Ambiguous Terms. 
f See Appendix III. 



Chap. III. § 1.] DISCOVERY OF TRUTH. 281 

readers or themselves to the conclusion that the less we 
reason on such subjects the safer we are. 

But the proper office of candour is to Proper office 
prepare the mind not for the rejection of of candour, 
all evidence, but for the right reception of evidence ;— 
not, to be a substitute for reasons, but to enable us 
fairly to weigh the reasons on both sides. Such persons 
as I am alluding to are in fact saying that since just 
weights alone, without a just balance, will avail 
nothing, therefore we have only to take care of the 
scales, and let the weights take care of themselves. 

This kind of tone is of course most especially to be 
found in such writers as consider it expedient to incul- 
cate on the mass of mankind what — there is reason to 
Buspect — they do not themselves fully believe, and 
which they apprehend is the more likely to be rejected 
the more it is investigated.* 



Chap. III. — Of Inference and Proof 

§ 1. Since it appears, from what has been said, that 
universally a man must possess something else besides 
the reasoning- faculty, in order to apply that faculty 
properly to his own purpose, whatever that purpose 
may be ; it may be inquired whether some theory could 
not be made out, respecting those " other operations " 
and " intellectual processes, distinct from reasoning, 
which it is necessary for us sometimes to employ in 
the investigation of truth ;"t and whether rules could not 
be laid down for conducting them. 

Something has, indeed, been done in this Different appli- 
way by more than one writer ; and more cations of rea- 
might probably be accomplished by one ^^"^"S- 
who should fully comprehend and carefully bear in 
mind the principles of Logic, properly so called ; but i^ 

* See Powell's " Tradition unveiled." f D- Stewart. 

22 



2»Z THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

would hardly be possible to build up anything like a 
regular science respecting these matters, such as Logic is 
with respect to the theory of reasoning. It may be 
useful, however, to observe, that these " other operas 
tions " of which we have been speaking, and which are 
preparatory to the exercise of reasoning, are of two 
kinds, according to the nature of the end proposed ; for 
reasoning comprehends inferring and proving ; which 
are not two different things, but the same thing regarded 
in two different points of view ; like the road from 
London to York, and the road from York to London. 
He w^ho infers,* proves ; and he who proves, infers ; 
but the w^ord " infer " fixes the mind first on the premiss 
and then on the conclusion ; the word ** prove," on the 
contrary, leads the mind from the conclusion to the 
premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these 
words respectively, are often used to express that 
which, on each occasion, is loM in the mind ; inference 
being often used to signify the conclusion {i. e. propo- 
sition infer red i) and proof the premiss. We say, also, 
" How do you prove that ?" and " What do you infer 
from that ?" which sentences would not be so properly 
expressed if w^e were to transpose those verbs. One 
might, therefore, define proving, *'the assigning of a 
reason [or argument] for the support of a given propo- 
sition :" and inferring, " the deduction of a conclusion 
from given premises." In the one case our conclusion 
is giveii {i. e. set before us as the question) and we 
have to seek for arguments ; in the other, our premises 
are given, and we have to seek for a conclusion : i. e. to 
put together our own propositions, and try what will 
follow from them ; or, to speak more logically, in the 
one case, we seek to refer the subject of which we would 
predicate something, to a class f to which that pre iicate 

* I mean, of course, when the word is understood to imply torred 
inference. 

t Observe, that ** class " is used, here and elsewhere, for either 
an actual, or what may be called a potential clas^ : see BooJlL §8 



Chap. 111. § 2.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 283 

will (affirmativel)'- or negatively) apply ; in the other, 
we seek to find comprehended, in the subject of which 
we have predicated something, some other term to which 
that predicate had not been before applied.* Each of 
these is a definition of reasoning. 

§ 2. To infer, then, is the business of 
ih^ philosopher ; to prove, of the advocate; and" Advocate 
the former, from the great mass of known 
and admitted truths, wishes to elicit any valuable ad- 
ditional truth whatever, that has been hitherto unper- 
ceived ; and perhaps, without knowing, with certainty, 
what will be the terms of his conclusion. Thus the 
mathematician, e. g. seeks to ascertain what is the ra- 
tio of circles to each other, or what is the line whose 
square will be equal to a given circle. The advocate, 
on the other hand, has a proposition put before him, 
which he is to maintain as well as he can. His busi*- 
ness, therefore, is to fi7id middle-terms (which is the 
inventio of Cicero ;) the philosopher's to combine and 
select known facts or principles, suitable, for gaining 
from them conclusions which though implied in the 
premises, were before unperceived : in other words, for 
making " logical discoveries." 

It may be added that all questions may 
be considered as falling under two classes ; ce"ning"pr*edi- 
viz. ''what shall he predicated of a cer- cate, and con- 
tain subject ;" and, " which copula, affirm- ^^J^^^^^ ^^' 
ative or negative, shall connect a certain 
subject and predicate." We inquire, in short, either 
1st. "What is A?" or, 2d, " Is A, B, or is it not?" 
The former class of questions belongs to the philoso- 
pher ; the latter to the advocate. (See Rhet. Appen- 
dix G.) 

The distinction between these two classes of ques- 
tions is perhaps best illustrated by reference to some 

• M Proving" may be compared to the act of putting away any 
Article into the proper receptacle of goods of that description j 
** inferring " to that oibi-in^ing out the article vhen needed. 



284 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book HT. 

case in which our decision of each of the questions in* 
volved in some assertion, is controverted by different 
parties. E. G. Paul says, that the apostles preached 
'* Christ crucified ; to the Jews a stumbling block, and 
to the Greeks, foolishness :" that Jesus, who had suf- 
fered an ignominious death, was the Messiah, the Sa- 
viour of the world was a doctrine opposed both by- 
Jews and Gentiles : though on different grounds, ac- 
cording to their respective prejudices : the Jews who 
" required a sign" (z. e. the coming of the Messiah in 
the clouds to establish a splendid temporal kingdom) 
were " offended " — " scandalized " — at the doctrine of 
a suffering iVIessiah : the Greeks who "sought after 
philosophical wisdom'* {i. e. the mode of themselves ex- 
alting their own nature, without any divine aid) ridi- 
culed the idea of a Heavenly Saviour altogether ; which 
the Jevrs admitted. In logical language, the Gentiles 
could not comprehend the predicate ; the Jews, denied 
the copula. 

Charges of It may be added, that in modern phra- 
paradox and seology, the Operations of corresponding 
nonsense. prejudices are denoted, respectively by the 
words " paradox" (a " stumbling, block") and ** non- 
sense :" C' foolishness") which are often used, the one, 
by him who has been accustomed to hold an opposite 
opinion to what is asserted, the other, by him who has 
formed no opinion on the subject. The writer who 
proves an unwelcome truth, is censured as paradoxical ; 
he who brings to light truths, unknown or unthought 
of, as nonsensical. 
^.^ ,, §3. Such are the respective preparatory 

Different ha- ^ . ., ^ K i, *^ r * j *^ 

bits of mind proccsses m these two branches of study, 
connected the philosophical, and the rhetorical. 
S'rocesses!^^'^ They are widely different; they arise 
from, and generate, very different habits 
of mind ; and require a very different kind of training 
and precept. It is evident that the business of the ad- 
Tocate and that of the judge, are, in this point, oppos- 



Chap. III. § 3.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 285 

ed ; the one being, to find arguments for the support pf 
his client's cause; the other to ascertain the truth. 
And hence it is, that those who have excelled the most 
in the former department, sometimes manifest a defi- 
ciency in the latter, though the subject-matter, in which 
they are conversant, remains the same. The pleader or 
controversialist, or, in short, the rhetorician in general, 
who is, in his own province, the most skilful, may be 
but ill- fitted for philosophical investigation, even where 
there is no observation wanted : — -when the facts are all 
ready ascertained for him. And again, the ablest phi- 
losopher may make an indiiFerent disputant ; especially, 
since the arguments which have led him to the conclu- 
sion and have, with him, the most weight, may not, 
perhaps, be the most powerful in controversy. 

The commoner fault, however, by far, is to forget the 
philosopher or theologian, and to assume the advocate, 
improperly. It is therefore of great use to dwell on the 
distinction between these two branches. As for the 
bare process of reasoning, that is the same in both cases ; 
but the preparatory processes which are requisite, in 
order to employ reasoning profitably, these, we see, 
branch off into two distinct channels. In each of these, 
undoubtedly, useful rules may be laid down ; but they 
should not be confounded together. Bacon has chosen 
the department of philosophy ; giving philosophical 
rules in his Organon, not only for the inquiry, 
conduct of experiments to ascertain new facts, but also 
for the selection and combination of known facts and 
principles, with a view of obtaining valuable inferences ; 
and it is probable that a system of such rules is what 
some writers mean (if they have any distinct meaning) 
by their proposed " Logic." 

In the other department, precepts have Rhetorical 
been given by Aristotle and other rhetoii- inquiry. 
cal writers, as a part of their plan.* How far these 

♦ I have attempted the same in Part \. of Elements of Rhetoric ; 
although, (through some inadvertency I have, found myself men* 



286 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book. IV. 

. precepts are to be considered as belonging to the present 
system — whether " method " is to be regarded as a part 
of Logic — whether the matter of Logic (i e. general 
maxims, axioms, or common-places) is to be included in 
the system — whether Bacon's is properly to be reckon- 
ed a kind of Logic ; all these are merely verbal ques- 
tions, relating to the extension, not of the science, but of 
the 7io.me, The bare process of reasoning, i. e. deducing 
a conclusion from premises, must ever remain a distinct 
operation from the assumption of premises ; however 
useful the rules may be that have been given, or may 
be given, for conducting this^ latter process, and others 
connected with it ; and how^ever properly such rules 

,may be subjoined to the precepts of that system to 
which the name of Logic is applied in the narrowest 
sense. Such rules as I now allude to may be of emi- 
nent service ; but they must always be, as I have before 
observed, comparatively vague and general, and incapa- 
ble of being built up into a regular demonstrative theory 
like that of the syllogism ; to which theory they bear 
much the same relation as the principles and rules of^ 
poetical and rhetorical criticism to those of Grammar ; 
or those of practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. I 
find no fault with the extension of a term ; but 1 would 
suggest a caution against confounding together, by 
means of a common name, things essentially different ; 
and above all I w^ould deprecate the sophistry of striving 
to depreciate what is called " the school-Logic," by 
perpetually contrasting it with systems with which it 
has nothing in common but the name, and whose object 
is essentially different. 

Aristotle's § 4. It is remarkable that writers, whose 
Organon and expressions tend to confound together, by 
Bacon's. means of a common name, two branches 

tioned along with some other writers, as having declared that the 
thing is impossible. If I ever had made such an assertion, I shculd 
probably have been the first person that ever undertook to accoaif* 
plish9.n acknowledged im]^ossihilitY' 



Chap IH. § 4.] INFERENCE AND PROOF. 287 

of study which have nothing else in common (as if they 
were two different plans for attaining one and the same 
object,) have themselves complained of one of the ef- 
fects of this confusion, viz. the introduction, early tn the 
career of academical education, of a course of Logic ; 
under which name, they observe, " men now* univer- 
sally comprehend the works of Locke, Bacon, &c." 
which, (as is justly remarked) are unfit for beginners. 
Now this would not have happened, if men had always 
kept in mind the meaning or meanings of each name 
they used. 

And it may be added, that, however justly the word 
Logic may be thus extended, we have no ground for 
applying to the Aristotelian Logic the remarks above 
quoted respecting the Baconian ; which the ambiguity 
of the word, if not carefully kept in view, might lead 
us to do. Grant that Bacon's work is a part of Logic ; 
it no more follows, from the unfitness of that for learn- 
ers, that the Elements of the Theory of Reasoning 
should be withheld from them, than it follows that the 
elements of Euclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit 
for boys, because Newton's Principia, which also bears 
the title of mathematical, is above their grasp. Of two 
branches of study which bear the same name, or even 
of two parts of the same branch, the one may be suita- 
ble to the commencement, the other to the close of the 
academical career. 

At whatever period of that career it may be proper to 
introduce the study of such as are usually called meta- 
physical v/riters, it may be safely asserted, that those 
who have had the most experience in the business of 
giving instruction in Logic properly so called, as well 
as in other branches of knowledge, prefer and generally 
pursue the plan of letting their pupils qnter on that 
study, next in order after the Elements of Mathematics. 

♦ t. e. In the Scotch universities. 



288 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book. TV 



Chap. IV. — Of Verbal and Real Questions. 

§ 1 . The ingenious author of the Philosophy of 
Rhetoric, and other writers, having maintained, or rather 
assumed, that Logic is applicable to verbal controversy 
alone, there may be an advantage (though it has been 
my aim throughout to show the application of it to all 
reasoning) in pointing out the difference between ver- 
bal and real questions, and the probable origin of 
Campbell's mistake. For to trace any error to its 
source, will often throw more light on the subject in 
hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with mere- 
ly detecting and refuting it. 

Every question that can arise, is in fact a question 
whether a certain predicate is or is not applicable to a 
certain subject, or, what predicate is applicable;* and 
whatever other account may be given by any writer, of 
the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be 
found ultimately to resolve itself into this. But some- 
Difference be- times the question turns on the meaning and 
tween a ver- extent of the terms employed ; sometimes 
^ues^Uon^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ fA?'^g5 signified by them. U ]t be 
*^ V * made to appear, therefore, that the opposite 

sides of a certain question may be held by persons not 
differing in their opinion of the matter in hand, then, 
that question may be pronounced verbal ; as depending 
on the different senses in which they respectively em- 
ploy the terms. If, on the contrary, it appears that they 
employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to 
the application of one of them to the other, then it may 
be pronounced that the question is real ; — that they dif- 
fer as to the opinions they hold of the things in 
question. 

If, for instance, (to recur to an example formerly giv- 
en. Book III. § 10.) two persons contend whether Au- 
gustus deserved to be called a " great man," then, if it 
* See Chap. Hi. § 2. 



Ch. IV. § 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 289 

appeared that the one included, under t4ie term *' great," 
dismterested patriotism, and on that ground excluded 
Augustus from the class, as wanting in that quality ; 
and that the other also gave him no credit for that quali- 
ty, but understood no more by the term *' great," than 
high intellectual qualities, energy of character, and bril- 
liant actions, it would follow that the parties did not 
iifFer in opinion except as to the use of a term, and that 
(he question was verbal. 

If, again, it appeared that the one did give Augustus 
credit for such patriotism as the other denied him, both 
of them including that idea in the term great, then, the 
question would be real. Either kind of question, it is 
plain is to be argued according to logical principles : but 
the middle-terms employed would be different ; and for 
this reason, among others, it is important to distinguish 
verbal from real controversy. In the former case, e. g. 
it might be urged (with truth) that the common use of 
the expression " great and good" proves that the idea 
of good is not implied in the ordinary sense of the word 
great ; an argument which could have, of course, no 
place in deciding the other question.* 

§ 2. It is by no means to be supposed that ye^bal ques 
all verbal questions are trifling and frivolous, tions mis- 
It is often of the highest importance to set- taken for real. 
tie correctly the meaning of a word, either according to 
ordinary use, or according to the meaning of any par- 
ticular writer or class of men. But when vetbal ques- 
tions are mistaken for real, much confusion of thought 
and unprofitable wrangling — what is usually designated 
as Logomachy — will be generally the result. 
Nor is it always so easy and simple a task, "Somac >. 
as might at first sight appear, to distinguish them from 
each other. For, several objects to which one common 
name is applied, will often have many points of differ- 
ence ; and yet that name may perhaps be applied to 
them all [uni vocally] in the same sense, and may be 
♦ See Book III. the latter part of § 10. 
23 



290 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Bqok IV, 

fairly regarded as the genus they come under, if it ap- 
pear that they all agree in what is designated by that 
name, and that the differences between them are in 
points not essential to the character of that genus. A 
cow and a horse differ in many respects, but agree in 
all that is implied by the term " quadruped," which is 
therefore applicable to both in the same sense * So al- 
so the houses of the ancients differed in many respects 
from ours, and their ships still more ; yet no one would 
contend that the terms " house" and " ship," as applied 
to both, are ambiguous, or that ocKog might not fairly be 
rendered house, and vavg ship; because the essential 
characteristic of a house is, not its being of this or that 
form or mateirials, but its being a dwelling for men; 
these therefore w^ould be called two different kinds of 
houses ; and consequently the term " house" would be 
applied to each, without any equivocation, [univocally] 
in the same sense : and so in the other instances. 

On the other hand, two or more things may bear the 
same name, and may also have a resemblance in many 
points, nay, and may from that resemblance have come 
to bear the same name, and yet if the circumstance 
which is essential to each be wanting in the other, the 
term may be pronounced ambiguous. E. G. The word 
** plantain " is the name of a common herb in Europe, 
and of an indian fruit-tree : both are vegetables ; yet the 
term is ambiguous, because it does not denote them so 
far forth^s t/iey agree. 

Again, the word " priest" is applied to the ministers 
of the Jewish an-d of the Pagan religions, and also to 

* Yet the charge of equivocation is sometimes unjustly brought 
against a writer in consequence of a gratuitous assumption of our 
own. An Eastern writer, e. g. may be speaking of" beasts of bur- 
den ;" and the reader may chance to have the idea occur in his mind 
of horses and mules ; he thence takes for granted that these were 
meant ; and if it afterwards come out that it was camels, he per- 
haps complains of the writer for misleading him by not expressly 
mentioning the species ; saying, *' I could not know that he meant 
camels," He did not mean camels, in particular ; he meant, as he 
said, " beasts of burden :" and camels are sach, as well as horses 
aiMl mules. He is not accountable for your suppositions. 



Ch. IV. §2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 291 

those of the Christian ; and doubtless the term has been 
so transferred in consequence of their being both minis' 
iers (in some sort) of religion.* Nor would every dif- 
ference that might be found between the priests of diffe- 
rent religions constitute the term ambiguous, provided 
such ditierences were non-essential to the idea suggest- 
ed by the word priest; as e. g. the Jewish Priest served 
the true God, and the Pagan, false gods : this is a most 
important difference, but does not constitute the term 
ambiguous, because neither of these circumstances is 
implied and suggested by the term ^lepevg ; which ac- 
cordingly was applied both to Jewish and Pagan priests 
But the term 'Upevg does seem to have implied the 
office of offering sacrifice — atoning for the sins of the 
people— and acting as mediator between man and the 
object of his worship. And accordingly that term is 
never applied to any one under the Christian system, 
except to the ONE great Mediator. The Christian 
ministers not having that office which was implied aa 
essential in the term 'lepev^, [sacerdos] were never call- 
ed by that name, but by that of TrpeafSvTspoc.-f It 
may be concluded, therefore, that the term priest is am- 
biguous, as corresponding to the terms 'legevc and 
TzpEai^vTeqo^ respectively, notwithstanding that there 
are points in which these two agree. These therefore 
should be reckoned, not two different kinds of priests, 
but priests in two different senses ; since (to adopt the 
phraseology of Aristotle) the definition of them, so far 
forth as they are priests, would be different 

A " real " question again is liable to be j^^^j ^^^^^ 
mistaken for a " verbal," when different tions mistaken 
persons who are in fact using a term in ^^^ verbal, 
the same sense, are supposed to be using it in different 
senses ; sometimes, from its being erroneously taken for 

* See discourse on " the Christian Priesthood," appended to thu 
Bampton Lectures. 

t From which our word priest is derived, but which (it is re- 
markable) is never translated •* priest" incur veisiofi of the Scrip 
tureS) but " elder.** 



292 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

granted that what commonly belongs to thetAmg spoken 
of must be implied in the common acceptation of the 
name of that thing : — as e. g. if any one should con- 
clude, from the ordinary kinds of wood being lighter 
than water, that the ordinary sense of the term " wood '* 
implies floating in water: sometimes again, from its 
being rashly inferred from two persons having a diffe- 
rence of opinion respecting some thing, that they each 
denote that opinion in their use respectively, of the term 
which expresses that thing : as e. g. if two persons dif- 
fering in opinion as to the question of Episcopacy, 
should be considered as differing in their use of the 
word " Episcopahan," and implying by it, the one a 
right and the other a wrong form of church-government ; 
whereas the word itself does not express or imply [con- 
note] either the one or the other, but simply " an ad- 
herent to an episcopal form of government." They 
both mean the same thing ; their difference of opinion 
being, whether that thing be right or wrong. 

Different ap- ^^^ ^^'^^^ especially is ambiguity likely 
plications of a to be erroneously attributed to some term, 
term do not im- when different persons who employ it in 
ply ambiguity, j-gality in the same sense, are accustomed 
to apply it differently, according to circumstances, and 
thus to associate it habitually in their minds with diffe- 
rent things. E. G. '•' patriotism " is applied by each in 
reference to his own country; but the word itself has 
the same signification with each ; just as the word 
" father ;" though it is likely to recall to the mind of 
each a different individual. So also the term " true- 
believer," which is applied by Mahometans to a believer 
in the Koran, would be considered by Christians as more 
applicable to a believer in the gospel ; but it would not 
be correct to say that " the one party ?neans by this 
term, so and so, and the other, something different :" 
for they do not attach differeyit senses to the word " true " 
or to the word " believe ;" they differ only in their per- 
suasions of what is true, and ought to be believed 



Ch. IV. « 2.] VERBAL AND REAL QUESTIONS. 293 

I have noticed some instances of the above kinds of 
mistake in the Appendix to the third Series of Essays ; 
and also in the Introduction to " Political Economy," 
from which I will here cite a passage. 

*' In speaking of exchanges, I did not mean to limit 
myself to voluntary exchanges ; those in which the 
whole transactioii takes place with the full consent of 
both parties to ail the terms of it Most exchanges in- 
deed, are of this character ; but the case of taxation — 
the revenue levied from the subject in return for the pro- 
tection afforded by the sovereign, constitutes a remark- 
able exception; the payment being compulsory, and not 
adjusted by agreement with the payer. Still, whether 
in any case it he fairly and reasonably adjusted, or the 
contrary, it is not the less an exchange. And it is 
worth remarking, that it is just so far forth as it is an 
exchange — so far forth as protection, whether adequate 
or not, is afforded in exchange for this payment, that 
the payment itself comes under the cognizance of this 
science. There is nothing else that distinguishes taxa^ 
tion from avowed robbery. 

" Though the generality of exchanges are voluntary, 
this circumstance is not essential to an exchange : since 
otherwise the very expression 'voluntary exchange,' 
would be tautological and improper. But it is a com- 
mon logical error to suppose that w^hat usually belongs 
to the thing, is implied by the usual sense of the word. 
Although most noblemen possess large estates, the word 
* nobleman ' does not imply the possession of a large 
estate. Although most birds can fly, the ordinary use 
of the term ' biid' does not imply this; since the pen- 
guin and the ostrich are always admitted to be birds. 
And though, in a great majority of cases, wealth is ac- 
quired by labour, the ordinary use of the word * w^ealth* 
does not include this circumstance, since every one 
would call a pearl an article of wealth, even though a 
man should chance to meet with it in eating an 
oyster." 



294 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV 

ft is evidently of much importance to keep in mind 
the above distinctions, in order to avoid, on the one 
hand, stigmatizing, as verbal controveisies, what in re- 
ality are not such, merely because the question turns 
(as every question must) on the applicability of a cer- 
tain predicate to a certain subject ; or, on the other hand, 
falling into the opposite error of mistaking words for 
things, and judging of men's agreement or disagreement 
in opinion in every case, merely from their agreement 
or disagreement in the terms employed. 



Chap. V. — Of Realism. 

§ 1 . Nothing has a greater tendency to lead to the 
mistake just noticed, and thus to produce undetected 
verbal questions and fruitless logomachy, than the pre- 
valence of the notion of the Realists,* that genus and 
species are some real things, existing independently of 
our conceptions and expressions ; and that, as in the 
case of singular-terms there is some real individual cor- 
responding to each, so, in common-terms also, there is 
some thing corresponding to each ; which is the object 
of our thoughts when we employ any such term.f 

* It is well known what a furious controversy long existed in all 
the universities of Europe between the sects of the Realists and the 
Nominalists ; the heat of which was allayed by the Reformation^ 
which withdrew men's attention to a more important question. 

t A doctrine commonly, but falsely attributed to Aristotle, who 
expressly^contradicts it. He calls individuals " primary substan- 
ces" (iroiaTai ovGiai y) genus and species "secondary," as not de^ 
noting (toSe n) a " really-existing thing." Ilao-a Si ovaia SokeI 
T^de Ti arjuaivetv. 'Etti uiv ovv tu>v Trpioroyv ovaioiv avaiJi(p'ic(3f)T}]TOV 
Kol dX770£j iariv '6tl tSoe ti qjijxaiveL' drojjMV yda Kal ev dpKpfxo) ra 
drjXqvfiEvov iariv. 'Eri di rwv SevTsp'ov ohaicop^ t^AlNi'^TAI, (xev 
hfioioyg tQ cxny^o.'ri rrig Kpocrjyopiag Tdde Tt arjfxaivEiVy orav aVj? Siv- 
epoTTog.rtXiaov' OY MHN TE AAH0E2- aAAa fxaWov HOION TI 
ermaivei. k. t. A. Aristotle, Ccteg. ^ 3. See Appendix, Article, 
*• Same."- There is however a continual danger of sliding into 
Realism inadvertently, unless one is continually on the watch 
against it : of which Aristotle as well as many other writers not 
deliberately holding the doctrine, furnish instances. 



Chap. V. § 1.] REALISM. 295 

There is one circumstance which ought t h • i 
to be* noticed, as having probably contri- ge^gg ^of °spe- 
buted not a little to foster this error: I cies when ap- 
mean, the peculiar technical sense of the fzedVdnfff ^^" 
word " species" when applied to organ- 
ized beings. 

It has been laid down in the course of this work, 
that when several individuals are observed to resemble 
each other in some point, a common name may be as- 
signed to them indicating [implying, "or, connoting"*] 
that point — applying to all or any of them so far forth 
as respects that common attribute — and distiguishing 
them from all others ; as, e. g. the several individual 
buildings, which, however different in other respects> 
agree in being constructed for men's dwelling, are call- 
ed by the comm.on name of " house :" and it was added, 
that as we select at pleasure the circumstance that 
we choose to abstract, we may thus refer the same 
individual to any one of several different species and 
again, the same species, to one genus or to another 
according as it suits our purpose; whence it seems 
plainly to follow that genus and species are no real 
things existing independent of our thoughts, but are 
creatures of our own minds. 

Yet in the case of species of organized beings, it seems 
at first sight as if this rule did not hold good ; but that 
the species to which each individual belongs, could not 
be in any degree arbitrarily fixed by us, but must be 
something real, unalterable, and independent of our 
thoughts. Caesar or Socrates, for instance, it may be 
said, must belong — different as they may be — to the 
species Man, and can belong to no other; and the like, 
with any individual brute, or plant : e. g. a horned and 
a hornless sheep every naturalist would regard as be- 
longing to the same species. 

On the other diand, if any one utteis such a proposi- 

• See Book II. Chap. v. § 1- 



296 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [BookHT 

tion as " this apple-tree is a codlin ;" — " this dog is a 
spaniel," — " Argus was a mastiff," to what head of 
predicates would such a predicate be referred ? Surely 
our logical principles would lead us to answer, that it 
is the species ; since it could hardly be called an acci- 
dent, and is manifestly no other predicable. And yet 
every naturalist would at once pronounce that mastiff 
is no distinct species, but only a variety of the species 
dog. This however does not satisfy our inquiry as to 
the head of predicables to which it is to be referred. It 
should seem at first sight as if one needed, in the case 
of organized beings, an additional head of predicables, 
to be called "variety" or "race." 

The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the 
consideration of the peculiar technical sense [or " second 
Species distin- intention"] of the word " species," when 
guished by na- applied to organized beings : in which 
v"del^*^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ always applied (when we are 
vane y. speaking strictly, as naturalists) to such 

individuals as are supposed to be descended from a com- 
mon stock, or which might have so descended; viz. 
which resemble one another (to use M. Cuvier's eX' 
pression) as much as those of the same stock do. No\i 
this being a point on which all (not merely naturalists} 
are agreed, and since it is a/act, whether an ascertairi- 
ed fact or not) that certain individuals are 
facfand^ques- o^ are not, thus connected, it follows, tha< 
tions of ar- every question whether a certain individu 
rangement. ^^ animal or plant belongs to a certain 
species or not, is a question not of mere arrangement, 
but of fact. But in the case of questions respecting 
genus, it is otherwise. If, e. g. two naturalists differ- 
ed, in the one placing (as Linnaeus) all the species oi 
bee under one genus, which the other subdivided (as 
later writers have done) into several genera, it would 
be evident that there was no question of fact debated 
between them, and that it was only to be considered 
which was the more convenient arrangement. If, on 



Chap. V. § 1.] REALISM. 297 

the other hand, it were disputed whether the African 
and the Asiatic elephant are distinct species, or merely 
varieties, it would be equally manifest that the question 
is one of fact ; since both would allow that if they are 
descended (or might have descended) from the same 
stock, they are of the same species ; and if otherwise, 
of two : this is the fact, which they endeavour to ascer- 
tain, by such indications as are to be found. 

For it is to be further observed, that this fact being 
one which can seldom be directly known, the conse- 
quence is, that the marks by which any species of 
animal or plant is known, are not the very differentia 
which constitutes that species. Now, in the case ol 
unorganized beings, these two coincide ; m v h 
the marks by which a diamond, e. g. is ^hjcl/a spJ. 
distinguished from other minerals, being cies is known 
the very differentia that constitutes ^^^ "^J^ah^aysthe 
species diamond. And the same is the 
case in the genera even of organized beings: the 
Linnaean genus "felis," e. g. (when considered as a 
species, i. e. as falling under some more comprehensive 
class) is distiriguished from others under the same order, 
by those very marks whioh constitute its differentia. 
But in the " Infimae species " (according to the view of 
a naturalist) of plants and animals, this, as has been 
said, is not the case ; since here the differentia which 
constitutes each species includes in it a circumstance 
which cannot often be directly ascertained (viz. the 
being sprung from the same stock,) but which we 
conjecture, from certain circumstances of resemblance; 
so that the marks by which a species is known, are not 
in truth the whole of the differentia itself, but indica- 
tions of the existence of that differentia; viz. indications 
of descent from a common stock. 

There are a few, and but a few, other species to 
which the same observations will in a great degree 
apply : I mean in which the differentia which constitutes 
the species, and the mark by which the species is known. 



nS THE PROVINCE OF E.EAS0N1NG . [Book IV. 

are not the same : e. g '' murder :" the dijSerentia of 
which is that it he committed " with malice afore- 
thought ;" this cannot be directly ascertained ; and there- 
fore we distingtiish murder from any other homicide by 
circumstances of preparation, &c., which are not in 
reahty the differentia, but indications of the differentia; 
i. e. grounds for concluding that the malice did exist. 

Hence it is that species, in the case of organized 
beings, and also in a few other cases, have the appear- 
ance of being some real things, independent of our 
thoughts and language. And hence, naturally enough, 
th« same notions have been often extended to the genera 
also, and to species of other things : so that men have a 
notion that each individual of every description truly 
belongs to some one species and no other : and each 
species, in like manner, to some one genus ; whether 
we happen to be right or not in the ones to which we 
refer them. 

Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow and 
maintain this doctrine : but those who are not especially 
on their guard, are perpetually sliding into it unawares. 
Ambiguity Nothing SO much conduces to the error 
of the words of realism as the transferred and secondary 
!i s^™f/' use of the words " same,"* " one and the 

same," "identical," &c. when it is not 
clearly perceived and carefully borne in mind, that they 
are employed in a secondary sense, and that, more 
frequently even than in the primary. 

Suppose e. g. a thousand persons are thinking of the 
sun : it is evident it is one and the same individual 
object on which all these minds are employed. So far 
all is clear. But suppose all these persons are thinking 
of a triangle ; — not any individual triangle, but triangle 
in general ; — and considering, perhaps, the equality of 
its angles to two right angles : it would seem as if, in 
this case also, their minds were all employed on " one 
and the same " object : and this object of their thoughts, 
♦ See Appendix, No. 1. Art. " Same.** 



Chap. V. § 1.] REALISM. 29^ 

it may he said, cannot be the mer'^ word triangle, hut 
that which is meant by it : nor again, can it he every- 
thing that the word will apply to: for they are not 
thinking of triangles, but of one thing. Those who do 
not maintain that this "one thing" has an existence 
independent of the human mind, are in general content 
to tell us, by way of explanation, that the object of 
their thoughts is the abstract "idea" of a triangle;* 
an explanation which satisfies, or at Jeast silences 
many ; though it may be doubted whether they very 
clearly understand what sort of a thing an " idea," is; 
which may thus exist in a thousand different minds at 
once, and yet be " one and the same." 

The fact is, that " unity " and " sameness " are in 
such cases employed, not in the primary sense, but, to 
denote perfect similarity. When we say that ten thou- 
sand different persons have all "one and the same'* 
idea in their minds, or, are all ol " one and the same " 
opinion, we mean no more than that they are all 
thinking exactly alike. When we say that they are al] 
in the "same" posture, we mean that they are all 
placed alike : and so also they are said all to have the 
" same" disease, when they are all diseased alike- 
One instance of the confusion of thought Logomachy 
and endless logomachy which may spring resulting from 
from inattention to this ambiguity of the ^^is ambiguity 
words "same," &c., is afforded by the controversy 
arising- out of a sermon of Dr. King (Archbishop oi 
Dublin,) published about a century ago. He remarked 
(without expressing himself perha})s with so much 
guarded precision as the vehemence of his opponents 
rendered needful) that " the attributes of the deity (viz. 
wisdom, justice, &c.) are not to be regarded as the same 
with those human qualities which bear the same names, 
but are called so by resemtxance and analogy only.' . 

♦ Conceptualists is a name sometimes applied to those who adop* 
this explanation (if it can be called an explanation :) to which clasf 
XiOcke is referred. 



300 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV. 

For tliis he was decried by Bishop Berkeley and a host 
of other objectors, down to the present time, as an 
atheist, or little better. " If the divine attributes," they 
urged, "are not precisely the same in kind (though 
superior in degree) with the human qualities which 
bear the same name, we cannot imitate the deity as the 
Scriptures require ; — we cannot know on what princi- 
ples we shall be judged : — we cannot be sure that God 
exists at all;" with a great deal more to the same 
purpose ; all of which would have been perceived to 
be perfectly idle, had the authors but recollected to 
ascertain the meaning of the principal word employed. 
For, 1st, when any two persons (or other objects) are 
said to have the ^' same'' quality, accident, &c., what 
Sameness con- ^^ predicate of them is evidently a certain 
sisting in re- resemblance, and nothing else. One man 
semblance and ^ g^ ^Qgg j^q^ fg^j another's sickness ; but 
ana ogy, ^^^^ ^^^ ^^.^ ^^ have the " same " disease, 

(not in the sense in which two men may be killed by 
the same cannon-ball, but) if they are precisely similar 
in respect of their ailments: and so also they are 
said to have the same complexion, if the hue and 
texture of their skins be alike. 2dly, Such qualities 
as are entirely relative, which consist in the relation 
borne by the subject to certain other things — m 
these it is manifest, the only resemblance that can 
exist, is, resemblance of relations, i. e. ANALOGY 
Courage, e. g. consists in the relation in which one 
stands* towards dangers ; temperance or intemperance 
—towards bodily pleasures, &c. When it is said, 
therefore, of two courageous men, that they have 
both the same quality, the only meaning this expres- 
sion can have, is, that they are, so far completely 
analogous in their characters ; — having similar ratios 
to certain similar objects. In short, as in all qualities, 
sameness can mean only strict resemblance, go, in those 
which are of a relative nature, resemblance can mean 

* 'Ev rip 'ixf^ivnufi irfiost Arist. 



Chap. V. § 2.] REALISM. 301 

enly analogy. Thus it appears, that what Dr. King has 
been so vehemently censured for asserting respecting 
the Deity, is literally true even with respect to men 
themselves ; viz. that it is only by analogy that two 
persons can be said to possess the same virtue, or other 
such quality. 3dly. But what he means, is, plainly, 
that this analogy is far less exact and complete in the 
case of a comparison between the Deity and his crea- 
tures than between one nian and another ; which sure- 
ly no one would venture to deny. But the doctrine 
against which the attacks have been directed, is self- 
evident, the moment we consider the meaning of the term 
employed.* 

In the introduction and notes to the last edition oi 
Archbishop King's discourse, I have considered the mat- 
ters in debate more fully ; but this slight notice of them 
has been introduced in this place, as closely connected 
with the present subject. 

§ 2. The origin of this secondary sense oriein oi 
of the words. " same," " one," " identical," the ambiguity 
&c. (an attention to which would clear of ••same," &c. 
away an incalculable mass of confused reasoning and 
logomachy,) is easily to be traced to the use of lan- 
guage and of other signs, for the purposes of reasoning 
and of mutual communication. If any one utters the 
" one single" word " triangle," and gives " one single" 
definition of it, each of the persons who hears him forms 
a certain notion in his own mind, not differing in any 
respect from that of each of the rest. They are said 
therefore to have all *' one and the same" notion, be- 
cause, resulting from, and corresponding with, (that 
which is, in the primary sense) " one and the same " 
expression; and there is said to be "one single" idea 
of every triangle (considered merely as a triangle) be- 
cause one single name or definition is equally applica- 
ble to each. In like manner, all the coins struck by 

t See Dr. Copleston's excellent analysis and defence of Arch- 
bishop King's principles, in the notes to his " Four Discourses." 



302 THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. IBook IV. 

the same single die, are said to have " one and the 
same" impression, merely because the (numerically) 
** one " description which suits one of these coins 
will equally suit any other that is exactly like it. 
The expression accordingly which has only of late 
begun to prevail, *' such and such things are of the 
same description,'' is perhaps the most philosophical 
that can be employed. 

It is not intended to recommend the disuse of the 
words "same" *.' identical," &c. in this transferred 
sense; which, if it were desirable, would be utterly 
impracticable ; but merely, a steady attention to the 
ambiguity thus introduced, and watchfulness against 
the errors thence arising. " It is with words as with 
money. Those who know the value of it best are not 
therefore the least liberal. We may lend readily and 
largely ; and though this be done quietly and without 
ostentation, there is no harm in keeping an exact ac- 
count in our, private memorandum-book of the sums, 
the persons, and the occasions on which they were 
lent. It may be, we shall want them again for our 
own use ; or they may be employed by the borrower 
for a wrong purpose ; or they may have been so long 
in his possession that he begins to look upon them as 
his own. In either of which cases it is allowable, and 
even right, to call them in."* 

The difficulties and perplexities which have involved 
the questions ves^ectm^ personal-identity, among others, 
may be traced principally to the neglect of this caution. 
I mean that many writers have sought an explanation 
of the primary sense of identity {viz. personal) by look- 
ing to the secondary. Any grown man, e. g. is, in the 
primary sense the same person he was when a child : 
this sameness is, I conceive, a simple notion, w^hich it 
is vain to attempt explaining by any other more simple ; 
but when philosophers seek to gain a clearer notion of 
it by looking to the cases in which sameness is predi- 
'^^ Logic vindicated," Oxford, 1809, 



Chap. V. § 2.] REALISM. 303 

cated in another sense, viz. similarity, such as exists 
between several individuals denoted by a common name, 
(as when we say that there are growing on Lebanon 
some of the same trees with which the temple was built ; 
meaning, cedars of that species) this is surely as idle as 
if we were to attempt explaining the primary sense, 
e. g. of " rage " as it exists in the human mind, by 
directing our attention to the " rage " of the sea. What- 
ever personal identity does consist in, it is plain that it 
has no necessary connexion with similarity; since 
every one would be ready to say, '' When 1 WAS a 
child I thought as a child — [ spake as a child — I under- 
stood as a child ; but when I became a man, I put away 
childish things." 

But a full consideration of this question would .bt 
unsuitable to the subject of the present work. 



appendix- 



No. I. 

ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LJABLl 
TO BE USED AMBIGUOUSLY. 



LIST OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING AP- 
PENDIX. 



Argument. 


Gospel. 


Regeneration, 


Authority. ^ 


Hence.— Sec Reason, 


, Same. 


Can.— See May, 


Why. 


Sin. 


Must. 


Identical.— See One, 


Sincerity, 


Capable— See Possi- 


Same. 


Sincere. 


ble, Impossible. 


Impossibility. 


Tendency. 


Necessary. 


Indifference. 


Therefore.— 


Case. 


Law. 


i»'ee Why, 


Cause. — See Reason, 


May. 


Truth. 


Why. 


Necessary. 


Why. 


Certain. 


Old. 


Whence,— See Why. 


Church. 


One. 


Value. 


Election. 


Pay. 


Wealth. 


Expect. 


Person. 


Labour. 


Experience. 


Possible. 


Capital. 


Falsehood.— Sec 


Preach. 


Rent. 


Truth. 


Priest. 


Wages. 
Profits. 


God. 


Reason. 



It has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the import- 
ance of attending to the ambiguity of terms> by a greater 
number of instances than could have been conveniently 
either inserted in the context or introduced in a note, 
without too much interrupting the course of the disserta- 
tion on Fallacies. 

I have purposely selected instances from varzows subjects, 
and some, from the most important ; being convinced that 
the disregard and contempt with which logical studies are 
usually treated, may be traced, in part, to a notion, that 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 305 

the science is incapable of useful application to any mat- 
ters of real importance, and is merely calculated to afford 
an exercise of ingenuity on insignificant truisms: — syllo- 
gisms to prove that a horse is an animal, and distinctions 
of the different senses of *' canis" or of " gallus ;" a mis- 
take which is likely to derive some countenance (however 
unfairly (from the exclusive employment of such trifling 
exemplifications. 

The words and phrases which may be employed as am- 
biguous middle-terms are of course innumerable : but it 
may be, in several respects, of service to the learner, to 
explain the ambiguity o{ a few of those most frequently 
occurring in the most importani discussions, and whose 
^oabXe meaning has been the most frequently overkoked ; 
and this, not by entering into an examination of all the 
senses in which each term is ever employed, but of those 
' only which are the most liable to be confounded together. 

It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is 
the most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the 
greatest amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are 
among the commonest, and are those of whose meaning the 
generality consider there is the least room to doubt.* It 
is indeed from those very circumstances that the danger 
arises ; words in very common use are both the most liable, 
from the looseness of ordinary discourse, to slide from one 
sense into another, and also the least likely to have that 
ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquaintance is perpetually 
mistaken for accurate knowledge. ^ 

It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not 
unfrequently occurs tn the employment of the very phrase, 
** such an author uses such a word in this or that sense," 
or *' means so and so, by this word." We should not use 
these expressions (as some have inadvertently done) in 
reference, necessarily, to the notion which may exist, in 
the author's mind, of the object in question; his belief or 
opinion respecting the thing he is speaking of ; — for the 
notions conveyed to others by the word, m-ay often (even 
according to the writers own expectation) fall short of this. 
He may be convinced, e. g. that " the moon has no atmo- 
sphere," or that " the Spartans were brave ;" but he cannot 
suppose that the terms " moon" or " Spartan" imply [coa- 
* See Book III. § 10. f See Pol. Econ. Lect. IX- 

24 



306 APPENDIX I. 

note] any such thing.* Nor again, ifaould we regard the 
sense in which they understand him, as necessarily hit 
sense, though [it is theirs'] of the word employed; since 
they msiy mistake his meaning: but we must consider what 
sense [t is likely he expected and intended to convey, to those 
to whom he addressed himself. And a judicious writer 
will always expect each word to be understood, as nearly 
as the context will allow, in the sense, or in one of the sen- 
ses, which use has established ; except so far as he may 
have given some different explanation. But there are many 
who, from various causes, frequently fail of conveying the 
sense they design. And it may be added, that there are, 
it is to be feared, some persons in these days who dmgn to 
convey different senses by the same expression, to different 
men ; — to the ordinary reader, and to the initialed ; — reserv- 
ing to themselves a back-door for evasion when charged 
with any false teaching, by pleading that they have been 
misunderstood "in consequence of the reader's not being 
aware of the peculiar sense in which they use words !" 

It is but fair perhaps to add this warning to my readers ; 
that one who takes pai?ns to ascertain and explain the sense, 
of the words employed in any discussion, whatever care 
he may use to show that wh^t he is inquiring after, is, the 
received sense, is yet almost sure to be charged, by the in- 
accurate, and the.so^phisticaly with attempting to introduce 
some new sense of the words in question, in order to serve 
a purpose. 

ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has oeen de- 
fined in the foregoing treatise ; (Compendium, Book II. 
Ch. iii. §1,) in that sense it includes (as is there remark- 
ed) the conclusion as well as the premises : and thus it is, 
that we say a syllogism consists of three propositions : viz. 
the conclusion which is proved, as well as those by which 
it is proved. Arguntentum is also used by many logical 
writers lo denote the middle term. 

But in ordinary discourse, argument is very often used 
for the premises alone, in contradistinction to the conclu- 
sion ; e. g. " the conclusion which thjs argument is intend- 
ed to establish is so and so." 

' It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly 
* Sceubl^tto^ ia^t Essift^, 3d Series - and ako Book W. €h. it. § 2. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 307 

•peaking, a course or series of such Arguments ; when a 
certain conclusion is established by premises, which are 
themselves in the same dissertation, proved by other pro- 
positions, and perhaps those again, b}' others ; the whole of 
this dissertation is often called an argument to prove the 
ultimate conclusion designed to be established ; though in 
fact it is a train of arguments. It is in this sense, e. g. 
that we speak of " Warbur ton's argument to prove the di- 
vine legation of Moses," &c. 

Sometimes also the word is used to denote what maybe 
properly called a disputation ; i. e. two trains of argument, 
opposed to each other : as when we say that A and B had 
a long argument on such and such a subject ; and that A 
had the best of the argument. Doubtless the use of the 
word in this sense has contributed to foster the notion en- 
tertained by many, that Logic is the ** art of wrangling," 
that it makes men contentious, &c. : they have heard 
ihat it is employed about arguments ; and hastily conclude 
ihat it is confined to cases where there is opposition and 
contest. 

It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the vari- 
ous forms of stating an argument are sometimes spoken of 
as different kinds of argument : as when we speak of a 
categorical or hypothetical argument, or of one in the first 
or some other figure ; though every logician knows that 
the same individual argument may be stated in various 
figures, &c. 

This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those 
who speak of the syllogism as a peculiar kind of argument ; 
and of** syllogistic reasoning," as a distinct mode of rea- 
soning, instead of being only a certain form of expressing 
any argument. 

For an account of the different kinds of argument^ pro- 
perly so called, the reader is referred to the ** Elements of 
Rhetoric." 

AUTHORITY. — This word is sometimes employed in 
its primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, 
testimony, or judgment : as when e. g. we speak of correct- 
ing a reading in some book, on the authority of an ancient 
MS. — giving a statement of some fact, on the authority ©f 
•uch and such historians, 6dc. 



'^ 



30S APPENDIX I. 

In this sense the word answers pretty nearly to the Latin 
" auctoritas." It is a claim to deference. 

Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to ** potes- 
tas," power : as when we speak of the authority of a magis- 
trate, &c. This is a claim to obedience. It is in the for- 
mer sense that it is used in our 20th Article ; which speaks 
of the Church having jpoii?er to decree rites and ceremonies^ 
and " autho7'ity^^ in controversies oi faith. 

Many instances may be found in which writers have un- 
consciously slid from one sense of the word to another, so 
as to blend confusedly m their mmds the two ideas. In tio 
case perhaps has this more frequently happened than when 
we are speaking of the authority of the Church : in which 
the ambiguity of the latter word (see the Article Church) 
comes in aid of that of the former. The authority (in 
the primary sense) of the catholic, i. e. universal Church, 
at any particular period, is often appealed to, in support of 
this or that doctrine or practice : and it is, justly, suppo- 
sed that the opinion of the great mass of the Christian 
world affords o. presumption (though only a presumption) 
in favour of the correctness of any interpretation of scrip- 
ture, or the expediency, at the time, of any ceremony, re- 
gulation, &c. 

But it is to be observed that the "authority," in this 
sense, of any church or other community, is not that of 
the BODY, as such, but of the individuals composing it. 
The presumption raised is to be measured by the numbers, 
knowledge, judgment, and honesty of those individuals 
considered as individual persons, and not in their corpo- 
rate capacity. 

On the other hand, e&ch particular church has authori- 
ty in the other sense, viz. power, over its own members, 
(as long as they choose to remain members) to enforce 
anything not contrary to God's word.* But the Catholic 
or Universal Church, not being one religious community 
on earth, can have no '* authority" in the sense oi power ; 
since it is notorious there never was a time when the > 
power of the Pope, of a Council, or of any other human 
governors, over all Christians, was in fact admitted, what- 
ever arguments may be urged to prove its claim to be ad- 
mitted. 

* See Essay on the Dangers to Christian Faith, &c, Note A 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS 309 

Authority again in the sense of auctoritas (claim Xodef* 
erence) may have every degree of weight, from absolute 
infallibility, (such as, in religious matters, Christians attri- 
bute to the Scriptures) dowa to the faintest presumption. 
On the other hand " authority" in the sense of " legitimate 
power^^ does not admit of degrees. One person may indeed 
possess a greater extent of power than another : but in each = 
particular instance, he either has a rightful claim to obe- 
dience or he has none. See Hawkins on Tradition. 
Hinds's History of the Early Progress of Christianity ^ 
Vol. IT. p. 99. Hinds on Inspiration. Errors of Romanism^ 
Chap. iv. Essay on the Omission of Creeds, &c. in the 
New Testament. And Essay II. on the Kingdom of Christ. 

CAN.— See "May," "Must." 

CAPABLE. — iSee " Possible," "Impossible," and 
" Necessary." 

CASE. — Sometimes grammarians use this word to signify 
(which is its strict sense) a certain " variation in the wri- 
ting and utterance of a noun, denoting the relation in 
which it stands to some other part of the sentence ;" some- 
times to denote that relation itself : whether indicated by 
the termination, or by a proposition, or by its collocation ; 
and there is hardly any writer on the subject who does not 
occasionally employ the term in each sense, without ex- 
plaining the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous 
debate has hence resulted. Whoever would see a speci- 
men of this, may find it in the Port Royal Greek Gram- 
mar; in which the authors insist on giving the Greek lan- 
guage an Ablative case, with the same termination, how- 
ever, as the Dative : (though, by the way, they had better 
have fixed on the Genitive ; which oftener answers to the 
Latin Ablative) urging, and with great truth, that if a dis- 
tinct termination be necessary to constitute a case, many 
Latin nouns will be without an Ablative, some without a 
Genitive or without a Dative, and all Neuters without an 
Accusative. And they add, that since it is possible, in 
every instance, to render into Greek the Latin Ablative, 
consequently there must be an Ablative in Greek.* If they 

♦ It is in the same way that some of the Latin-grammarians have 
made ooe of the Moods into three ; Subjunctive Potential, and Op» 
tative. 



510 API>ENDIX I. 

had known and recollected that in the language of Laplaftrf, 
there are, as we are told, thirteen cases, they would have 
hesitated to use an argument which would prove that there 
must therefore be thirteen cases in Greek and Latin also ! 
All this confusion might have been avoided, if it had but 
been observed that the word " case" is used in two senses. 
See Book IJI. § 10. §§ 4. 

CAVSE.-^See *' Reason," and " Why." 

CERTAIN. — This is a word whose ambiguity, together 
with thai of many others of ki,ndred signification (as 
** may," " can," '* must," ** possible," &c.) has occasion- 
ed infinite perplexity in discussions on some of the most 
important subjects ; such as the freedom of human actions, 
the divine foreknowledge, &c. 

In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its ety- 
mology from cerno) to the state of a person's mind ; deno- 
ting any one's full and complete conviction ; and, gene- 
rally, though not always, implying that there is sufficient 
ground for such conviction. It was thence easily trans- 
ferred metonymically to the truths or events^ respecting 
which this conviction is rationally entertained. And " un- 
certain" (as well as the substantives and adverbs derived 
from these adjectives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, 
** it is certain that a battle has been fought :" " it is cer- 
tain that the moon will be full on such a day : " it is un- 
certain whether such a one is alive or dead : ** it is uncer- 
tain whether it will rain to morrow :" meaning, in these 
and in all other cases, that we are certain or uncertain re- 
spectively ; not indicating any difference in the character 
of the events themselves except in reference to our know- 
ledge respecting them : for the same thing may be, at the 
same time, both certain and uncertain, to different indi- 
viduals ; e. g. the life or death at a particular time, of any 
one, is certain to his friends on the spot ; uncertain or con- 
tingent, to those at a distance. 

From not attending to this circumstance, the words 
** uncertain" and " contingent" (which is employed nearly 
in the same sense as uncertain in its secondary meaning) 
have been considered by many writers* as denoting some 

* Among others, Archbishop King, in his Discourse on Fredesti* 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. ajl 

Quality in the things themselves,- and have thus become 
involved in endless seonfusion. ** Contingent" is indeed 
applied to events <5nly, n<^t to persons : bul it denotes no 
quality in the events themselves ; ^>nly as has been said, th€ 
relation in which they stand t<? a person who ha« no <iora- 
plete knowledge respecting them, it is from overlooking 
this principle, obvious as it is when once distinctly stated, 
that chance or fortune has come to be regarded as a real 
agent, and to have been, by the ancients, personified as a 
goddess, and represented by statues. 

CHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the Church, 
f. e. the Universal or Catholic Church — comprehending in 
it all Christians : who are *' members one of another," and 
who compose the Body, of which Christ is the Head ; 
which, collectively taken, has no visible supreme head or 
earthly governor, either individual, or council; and which is 
^ne^ only in reference to its one invisible Governor and Par- 
aclete, the Spirit of Christ, dwelling in it — to the one com- 
mon faith, and character, which ought to be found in all 
Christians — and the common principles on which all Chris- 
tian societies should be constituted. See Hind's History 
of the Rise of Christianity, and Ijernard's Church and 
Synagogue, an abridged translation from Vitringa. 

Sometimes again it is employed to signify a church; 
«. e. any one society, constituted on these general princi- 
ples ; having governors on earth, and existing as a com- 
munity jK)ssessing a certain power over its own members ; 
in which sense we read of the " Seven Churches in Asia ;" 
— of Paul's having ** the care of all the churches," &c. 
This ambiguity has often greatly favoured the cause of the 
Church of Rome ; which being admitted by her opponents 
to be a church, i. e. a branch, though an unsound and 

nation, has fallen into this error ; as is explained in the Notes and 
the Appendix to my edition of that work. 

It may be requisite to mention in this place, that I have been rep- 
resented as coinciding with him as to the point in question, in a note 
to Mr. Davison's work on prophecy ; through a mistake which the 
author candidly acknowledged, and promised to rectiiy. His mis- 
take arose from his having (as he himself informed me) spoken from 
conjecture only, without having read my publication. Unfortu- 
nately the error was allowed to remain uncorrected for several 
years after it had been pointed out : in fact, till the whole of the edi- 
tion containing the mis-statement had been sold off. 



312 APPENDIX I. 

corrupt one, of the Universal Church of Christy is thence 
assumed to bo the Church — the society ia which all men 
are called upon to enrol themselves ; a doctrine which, 
whether true or not^ is at least not to be taken for granted 
as admitted universally. — See the article " Truth," and U&' 
say II. on the Kingdom of Christ. 

The church is also not unfrequently used to denote the 
clergy, in contradistinction to the laity ; as, when we speak 
of any one's being educated for the church, meaning " for 
the ministry." Some would perhaps add that it is in this 
sense we speak of the endovjments of the church ; since the 
immediate emolument of these is received by clergymen. 
But if it be considered that they receive it in the capacity 
of public instructors and spiritual pastors, these endow- 
ments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a certain 
sense, to the whole body, for whose benefit they are, in 
this way, calculated ; in the same manner as we consider, 
e. g. the endowment of a professorship in a university, as a 
benefaction, not to the professors alone, but to the univer- 
sity at large. 

ELECTION.—This is one of the terms which is 
often to all practical purposes ambiguous, when not em- 
ployed strictly speaking, in two different senses, but with 
different applications, according to that which is understood 
in conjunction with it. — See Book IlL § 10. See also 
Essays on some of the Difficulties, &c. Essay III. ** On 
Election." 

EXPECT. — This word is liable to an ambiguity, which 
may sometimes lead in conjunction with other causes, 
to a practical bad effect. It is sometimes used in the sense 
of ** anticipate" — " calculate on," &c. {kTiirl^uy in short, 
" consider ecs probable ;" sometimes for " require or de- 
mand as reasonable," — "consider as right," (a^iw.) 

Thus I may fairly " expect" (a^^w) that one who has 
received kindness from me, should protect me in distress ; 
yet I may have reason to ex|>ect {e?i7rlCetv) that he will 
not. " England expects every man to do his duty ;" but 
it would be chimerical to expect, i. e. anticipate, a univer- 
sal performance of duty. Hence, when men of great rev- 
enues, whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendour 
and sensuality of Sardanapulus, they are apt to plead thai 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 313 

ihisis expected of them ; which maybe perhaps sometimes 
true, in the sense that such conduct is anticipated as prob- 
able : not true, as implying that it is required or approved. 
Thus also, because it would be romantic to expect (i. e. 
calculate upon) in public men a primary attention to the 
public good, or in men in general an adherence to the rule 
of doing as you would be done by, many are apt to flatter 
themselves that they cannot reasonably be expected (i. e. 
fairly called upon) to act on such principles. What may 
reasonably be expected (in one sense of the word) must be, 
precisely the practice of the majority ; since it is the ma- 
jority of instances that constitutes probability : what may 
reasonably be expected (in the other sense) is something 
much beyond the practice of the generality ; as long at 
least as it shall be true that " narrow is the way that lead- 
eth unto life, and few there be that find it." 

EXPERIENCE.*— -This word, in its strict sense, ap- 
plies to what has occurred within a person's own know- 
ledge. Experience, in this sense, of course, relates to the 
past alone. Thus it is that a man knows by experience 
what sufferings he has undergone in some disease ; or, 
what height the tide reached at a certain time and place. 

More frequently the word is used to denote th^t judg- 
ment which is derived from experience in the primary sense, 
by reasoning from that, in combination with other data. 
Thus, a man may' assert, on the ground of experience, that 
he was cured of a disorder by such a medicine — that that 
medicine is. generally beneficial in that disorder ; that the 
tide may always be expected, under such circumstances, 
to rise to such a height. Strictly speaking, none of these 
can be known by experience, but are conclusions derived 
from experience. It is in this sense only that experience 
can be applied to the future, or, which comes to the same 
thing, to any general fact ; as e. g. when it is said that we 
know by experience that water exposed to a certain tempe- 
rature will freeze. 

" Men are so formed as (often unconsciously) to reason, 

whether well or ill, on the phenomena they observe, and 

Co mix up their inferences with their statements of those 

phenomena, so as in fact to theorize (however scantily and 

* See Elements of Rhetoric, Book I. 



11 4 APPENDIX I. 

crudely) without knowing it. If you will be rft the paina 
carefully to analyze the simplest descriptions you hear of 
any transaction or state of things, you will find, that the 
process which almost invariably takes place is, in logical 
ian;^uage, this; that each individual has in his mind certain 
major-premises or principles, relative to the subject in ques- 
tion; that observation of what actually presents itself to 
the senses, supplies minor -j^remzses ; and that the statement 
given (and which is reported as a thing experienced) con- 
sists in fact of the conclusions drawn from the combinations 
of those premises. 

" Hence it is that several different men, who have all 
had equal or even the very same experience, i. e. have been 
witnesses or agents in the same transactions, will often be 
found to resemble so many different men looking at the 
same book : one perhaps, though he distinctly sees black 
marks on white paper, has never learned his letters; an- 
other can read, but is a stranger to the language in which 
the book is written ; another has an acquaintance with the 
ianguage, but understands it imperfectly ; another is famil- 
iar with the language, but is a stranger to the subject of the 
book and wants power, or previous instruction to enable 
kim fully to take in the author's drift ; while another ag^^u 
perfectly comprehends the whole. 

" The object that strikes the eye is to all of those per- 
sons the same ; the difference of the impressions produced 
on the mind of each is referable to the drfferences in their 
minds. 

** And this explains the fact, that we find so much dis- 
crepancy in the results of what are called experience and 
common-sense, as contra-distinguished from theory. In 
former times men knew by experience, that the earth 
stands still, and the sun rises and sets. Common-sense 
taught them that thepe could be no antipodes, since men 
could not stand with their heads downwards, like flies on 
the ceiling. Experience taught the King of Bantam that 
water could not become solid. And (to come to the con- 
sideration of human affairs) the experience and common- 
sense of one of the most observant and intelligent of histori- 
ans, Tacitus, convinced him that for a mixed government 
to be so framed, as to combine the elements of royalty, 
firistocracy, and democracy, must be next to impossible, 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 81ft 

ind that if such a one could be framed, it must inevitably 
be very speedily dissolved."* 

There are again two different applications of the word, 
{see Book III. § 10,) which, when not carefully distinguish- 
ed, lead in practice to the same confusion as the employ- 
ment of it in two senses ; viz. we sometimes understand 
our own personal experience ; sometimes, general experi- 
ence. Hume has availed himself of this (practical) ambi- 
guity in his Essay on Miracles ; in which he observes, 
that we have experience of the frequent falsity of testimo- 
ny, but that the occurrence of a miracle is contrary to our 
experience, and is consequently what no testimony ought 
to be allowed to establish. Now had he explained whose 
experience he meant, the argument would have come to 
nothing: if he means the experience of mankind univer- 
sally, i. e. that a miracle has never come under the experi- 
ence of any one, this is palpably begging the question : if 
he means the experience of each individual who has never 
himself witnessed a miracle, this would establish a rule 
{viz. that we are to believe nothing of which we have not 
ourselves experienced the like) which it would argue in- 
sanity to act upon. Not only was the King of Bantam 
justified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evi- 
dence for the existence of ice, but no one would be author- 
ized on this principle to expect his own death. His experi- 
ence informs him, directly, only that others have died. 
Every disease under which he himself moy have laboured, 
his experience must have told him Tias not terminated fa- 
tally ; if he is to judge strictly of the future by the past, 
according to this rule, what should hinder him from ex- 
pecting the like of all future diseaes'? 

Some have never been struck with this consequence of 
Hume's principles ; and some have even failed to perceive 
it when pointed out : but if the reader thinks it worth his 
while to consult the author, he will see that his principles, 
according to his own account of them, are such as I have 
stated. 

Perhaps however, he meant, if indeed he had any dis- 
tinct meaning, something intermediate between wwiversa/, 
and individual experience ; viz. the experience of the gen- 
irality, as to what is common and of ordinary occurrence • 
• Pol. Econ. Lect. III. 



316 APPENDIX I. 

in which sense the maxim will only amount to this, that 
false testimony is a thing of common occurrence, and that 
miracles are not. An obvious truth, indeed ; but too gen- 
eral to authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular 
case. In any other individual question, as to the admissi- 
bility of evidence, it would be reckoned absurd to consid- 
er merely the average chances for the truth of testimony in 
the abstract^ without inquiring what the testimony is, in 
the particular instance before us. As if e. g. any one had 
maintained that no testimony could establish Columbus's 
account of the discovery of America, because it is more 
common for travellers to lie, than for new continents to be 
discovered.* Such a procedure involves a manifest igno- 
ratio elenchi ; the two propositions brought forward as op- 
posed, being by no means incompatible : experience tells 
us that " a destructive hurricane is not a common occur- 
rence ;" certain persons tell us that " a destructive hurri- 
cane occurred in the West Indies, at such a time ;" there 
is (as Dr. Campbell has pointed out) no opposition betw«»en 
these two assertions. 

It is to be observed by the way, that there is yet an ad- 
ditional ambiguity in the entire phrase " contrary to expe- 
rience ;" in one sense, a miracle, or any other event, may 
be called contrary to the experience of any one who has 
never witnessed the like ; as the freezing of water was to 
that of the King of Bantam ; in another and stricter sense, 
that only is contrary to a man's experience, which he knows 
by experience not to be true ; as if one should be told of 
an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having seen it 
administered without effect. No testimony can establish 
what is, in this latter sense, contrary to experience. We 
need not wonder that ordinary minds should be bewildered 
by a sophistical employment of such a mass of ambiguities. 

Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and 
profound, on account of the subject on which they are em- 
ployed : if applied to the ordinary affairs of life, they would 
be deemed unworthy of serious notice. 

The reader is not to suppose that the refutation of 

Hume's Essay on Miracles was my object in this article. 

That might have been sufficiently accomplished, in the 

way of a " reductio ad absurdum," by mere reference to 

♦ See " Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon BonapartV 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 317 

the cuse of the King of Bantam adduced by the author 

himself. But this celebrated essay, though it has often per- 
haps contributed to the amusement of an and-christian so- 
phist, at the expense of those unable to expose its fallacy, 
never probably made one convert. The author himself 
seems plainly to have meant it as a specimen of his inge- 
nuity, in arguing on a given hypothesis ; for he disputes 
against miracles as contrary to the course of nature ; 
tvhereas, according to him, there is no such thing as a 
course of nature ; his scepticism extends to the whole ex- 
ternal world ; to every thing, except the ideas or impres- 
sions on the mind of the individual ; so that a miracle 
which is believed, has, in that circumstance alone, on his 
principles, as much reality as ariy thing can have. 

But my object has been to point out, by the use of this 
example, the fallacies and blunders which may result from 
inattention to the ambiguity of the word experience : and 
this cannot be done by a mere indirect argument ; which 
refutes indeed, but does not explain, an error. 

FALSEHOOD and FALSITY.— iSee " Truth." 

GOD. — The Greek and Latin words which we trans- 
late " God " having been applied by the heathen to the 
highest objects of their worship, were, naturally, employed 
by Jews and Christians to denote the object of their own 
worship. But the heathen were far from regarding any of 
these supposed beings as eternal, or as the maker and 
governor of the universe. They regarded them as the 
same kind of beings with the fairies, demons, nixes, 
bogles, genii, &c., which in various parts of the world are 
still feared, and in some places propitiated by offerings and 
other marks of reverence ; and which in fact are the very 
Gods (though no longer called by that title) which our 
Pagan forefathers worshipped ; and a superstitious dread 
of which survived the introduction of the belief in a su- 
preme creator. But Christians and also Mahometans (whose 
creed is a corrupted offset of Christianity) imply [connote] 
by the term " God" the supreme author and governor of 
the universe : as is plain from this ; that any one who 
should deny the existence of any such being, would be 
universally considered as an atheist ; i e. as maintaining 
that there is wo ** God." And he would be #H>t the less reck- 



318 APPENDIX!. 

oned an atheist, even though he should believe (which it 
conceivable) that there do exist beings superior in powef 
to man, such as fairies, &c. 

The heathen therefore, for the most part, come under 
this description. They did not believe in any God in our 
sense of the word. And accordingly the Apostle Paul ex- 
pressly designates them as atheists, ['* v^^ithout God-'] aOeot, 

The more any one studies the ancient classical writers, 
the more in error he will be respecting their notions, if he 
is not attentive to the difference between the meanings 
they attached to certain terms, and those which we, now, 
attach to corresponding terms. The present is one instance : 
and another is, " immortality of the soul." See Essay I. 
1st series. 

GOSPEL. — This is instanced as one of the words which is 
practically ambiguous, from its different applications even 
though not employed (as it sometimes is) in d ifferent senses. 

Conformably to its etymological meaning of "good-ti- 
dings," it is used to signify (and that especially and exclu- 
sively) the welcome intelligence of salvation to man, aa 
preached by our Lord and his followers. But it was after- 
wards transitively applied to each of the four histories ot 
our Lord's life, published by those who are called the 
Evangelists. And the term is often used to express col- 
lectively the Gos^eV doctrines ; i. e. the instructions given 
men how to avail themselves of the offer of salvation : and 
preaching the Gospel, is accordingly often used to include 
not only the proclaiming of the good tidings, but the teach- 
ing of what is to be believed and done in consequence.* 
This ambiguity in one source of some important theological 
errors : many supposing that gospel truth is to be found 
exclusively, or chiefly in the gospels ; to the neglect ot 
the other sacred writings. 

Again, since Jesus is said to have preached the " Gos- 
pel," and the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion 
is often hence drawn, that the discourses of our Lord and 
the apostolic epistles must exactly coincide ; and that in 
case of any apparent difference, the former must be the 
standard, and the latter must be taken to bear no ot^er 
sense than what is implied by the other ; a notion which 
* See Discourse I appended to " £siays on the Daiigors,"&c.p. S04 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 319 

leads inevitably and immediately to the negleet of the apos- 
tolic epistles, when every thing they contain must be limited 
and modified into a complete coincidence with our Lord's 
discourses. Whereas it is very conceivable, that though 
both might be m a certain sense ** good tidings," yel, one 
may contain a much more full development of the Christian 
scheme than the other. Which is confirmed by the con- 
sideration, that the principal evenrs on which the religion 
is founded (the atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ) 
had not taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our 
Lord when he .preached, saying, " the Kingdom of Heaven 
is at hand ;" not that it was actually established ; as it was, 
when his Apostles were sent forth to preach to all nations. 
See Essays on the Difficulties, &c. Essay IL 
HENCE.— -See »* Reason" and "Why." 
IDENTICAL.— .5fee " One" and " Same." 

IMPOSSIBILITY.— -According to the definition we may 
ehoose to give of this word, it may be said either that there 
are three species of it, or that it may be used in three dif- 
ierent senses. 1st. What may be called a mathematical 
impossibility, is that which involves an absurdity and self- 
contradiction ; e. g. that two straight lines should enclose 
a space, is not only impossible but inconceivable, as it 
would be at variance with the definition of a straight line. 
And it should be observed, that inability to accomplish any 
thing which is in this sense, impossible, implies no limi- 
tation oi power, and is compatible, even with omnipotence, 
in the fullest sense of the word. If it be proposed, e. g. to 
construct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the other 
two, or to find two numbers having the same ratio to each 
other as the side of a square and its diameter, it is not from 
a defect of power that we are precluded from solving such 
a problem as these ; since in fact the problem is in itself, 
unmeaning and absurd : it is, in reality, nothing, that is 
required to be done. 

It is important to observe respecting an impossibility of 
this kind, that it is always susceptible of demonstrative 
'proof. Not that every such impossibility has actually been 
proved such : or that we can be certain it ever will be ; 
but that it must be in itself capable of proof: — the materi- 
als of such proof — the data on which it may be founded— 



820 APPENDIX I 

being (whether discovered or not) within the range of our 
knowledge. This follows from the very character (as 
above described*) of such truths as the mathematical : 
mSithem'di[ca.l'impossibilities being of course included un- 
der that term. For, every such truth must be implied — • 
Jbowever tedious and difficult may be the task of eliciting 
it — in the definitions we set out with, and consequently in 
the terms, which are the exact representatives of those de- 
finitions. E. G. That any two sides of a triangle are 
greater than the third — in other words that it is impossible 
to construct a triangle, one of whose sides shall be equal 
to the other two — is a matter of easy and early demonstra- 
tion. The incommensurability of (he side and the diame- 
ter of a square — in other words the impossibility of finding 
two numbers having^o one another the ratio of the side to 
the diameter — is a truth which was probably believed some 
time before a demonstration of it was found : but it is no 
less implied in the definitions of " straight line," " square," 
&c. In the case of the circle again, tHe ratio of the di- 
ameter to the circumference has been long sought by ma- 
thematicians ; and no one has yet demonstrated, or per- 
haps ever will, either what their ratio is, or, on the other 
hand, that they are incommensurable : but one or the other 
must be within the sphere of mathematical demonstration. 

When therefore any one says that perhaps so and so may 
be an impossibility in the mathematical sense, though we 
may never be able to prove it such,t he is to keep in mind 
that at least such proof is within the scope of inquiry ^ and 
that no increase of knowledge, in the sense of " informa- 
tion respecting facts,":j: can be needed to furnish materials 
for the demonstration. Every such impossibility must be 
implied — though we may not perceive it, in the terms em- 
ployed ; in short, it must be properly a " contradiction in 
terms. ^^ 

2dly. What may be called a physical impossibility is 
something at variance with the existing laws of nature, 
and which consequently no being, subject to those laws, 
(as we are) can surmount ; but we can easily conceive a 
being capable of bringing about what in the ordinary course 

♦ Book IV, Ch. ii. \ 1. 

t See Bishop Coplestpn on FredestinatioXL 

X See Book IV. Ch. U. § 1. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 321 

cf naiure is impossible. E. G. to multiply five loaves into 
food for a multitude, or to walk on the surface of the waves, 
are things physically impossible, but imply no contradic- 
tion ; on the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the be- 
ing, if there be such an one, who created the universe, is 
able to alter at will the properties of any of the substances 
it contains.* 

And an occurrence of this character, we call miraculous. 
Not but that one person may perform without supernatural 
power what is, to another, physically impossible ; as e. g. 
a man may lift a great weight, which it would be physi- 
cally impossible for a child to raise ; because it is con- 
trary to the laws of nature that a muscle of this degree of 
strength should overcome a resistance which one of that 
degree is equal to. But if any one perform what is be- 
yond his own natural powers, or the natural powers of 
man universally, he has performed a miracle. 

Much sophistry has been founded on the neglect of the 
distinction between these two senses. It has even been 
contended, that no evidence ought to induce a man of 
sense to admit that a miracle has taken place, on the 
ground that it is a thing impossible ; in other words, that 
it is a miracle; for if it were not a thing impossible to 
man, there would be no miracle in the case : so that such 
an argument is palpably begging the question ; but it has 
often probably been admitted from an indistinct notion 
being suggested of impossibility in the first sense ; in 
which sense {viz. that of self-contradicti(jn) it is admitted 
that no evidence would justify belief. 

3dly. Moral impossibility signifies only that high de- 
gree of improbability which leaves no room for doubt. 
In this sense we often call a thing impossible, which im- 
plies no contradiction, or any violation of the laws of 
nature, but which yet we are rationally convinced will 
never occur, merely from the multitude of chances against 
it ; as e. g. that unloaded dice should turn up the same 
faces one hundred times successively. f And in this 
sense, we cannot accurately draw the line, so as to deter- 

♦ See an able disquisition on miracles, subjoined to the Life ol 
Apollonius Tyanaeus, in the JEncyclopadia Metropolitana 

f And yet why should they not ? since the chances are the very 
lame against any given 100 throws. See Rhet. Fart 1. Ch. ii. ^A, 
25 



322 APPENDIX I. 

mine at what point the improbability amounts to an iin» 
possibility ; and hence we often have occasion to speak 
of this or that as almost impossible, though not quite^ &c. 
The other impossibilities do not admit of degrees of ap- 
proach. That a certain throw should recur two or threa 
times successively, we should not call very improbable ; 
the improbability is increased at each successive step : 
but we cannot say exactly when it becomes impossible ; 
though no one would scruple to call one hundred such re- 
currences impossible. 

In the same sense we often call things impossible which 
are completely within the poiver of known agents to bring 
about, but which we are convinced they never will bring 
about. Thus, e. g. that all the civilized people in the 
world should with one accord forsake their habitations 
and wander about the world as savages, every one would 
call an impossibility ; though it is plain they have the 
power to do so, and that it depends on their choice which 
they will do ; and moreover that there even have been 
instances of some few persons doing so. In like manner, 
if we were told of a man's having disgracefully fled from 
his post, whom we knew to be possessed of the most un- 
daunted courage, we should without scruple (and with 
good reason, supposing the idea formed of his character 
to be a just one) pronounce this an impossibility ; mean- 
ing, that there»is sufficient ground for being fully con- 
vinced that the thing could never take place ; not from 
any idea of his/iot having power and liberty to fly if he 
would ; for our certainty is built on the very circumstance 
of his being free to act as he will, together with his being 
of such a disposition as never to have the will to act dis- 
gracefully. If, again, a man were bound hand and foot, 
it would be, in the other sense, impossible for him to fly; 
viz. out of his power. 

" Capable " has a corresponding ambiguity. JE. (} 
We speak of this or that man being *' capable " or " inca- 
pable '* of a cowardly act, m a different sense from that 
in which we speak of him as " capable *' or " incapable *' 
of writing a fine poem. 

The performance of anyihing that is morally impossible 
to a mere man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much aft 
if the impossibility were physical. E. G. It is morally 



AMBIGtrOUS TERMS. 32l 

impossible for poor Jewish fishermen to have framed such 
a scheme of ethical and religious doctrip.^ as the gospel 
exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretei 
distant and improbable future events with the exactitude 
of many of the prophecies in Scripture. 

Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded, 
and has interminably protracted, the discussions respecting 
the long agitated question of human freedom, has arisen 
from inattention to the ambiguity, which has been here 
noticed. If the deity, it is said, ** foresees exactly what 
I shall do on any occasion, it must be impossible for me 
to act otherwise ;" and thence it is inferred that man's 
actions cannot be free. The middle-term employed in 
such an argument as this is " impossible,*' or *' impossi- 
bility " employed in two senses. He to whom it is, in 
one sense, impossible, {viz. physically) to act otherwise 
than he does, (i. e. who has it not in his power) is not a 
free agent; correct foreknowledge implies impossibility 
(in another sense, viz. moral impossibility ; — the absence 
of all room for doubt ;) and the perplexity is aggravated by 
resorting, for the purpose of explanation, to such words as 
•'may," "can," "possible," " must," &c., all of which 
are affected by a corresponding ambiguity.* 

It should be observed, that many things which are not 
usually termed " mathematically " necessary or impos- 
sible, will at once appear such, when stated, not abstract^ 
edly, but with all tlfeir actual circumstances : e g. that 
"Brutus stabbed Caesar," is a fact, the denial of which, 
though a falsehood, would not be regarded as self-contra- 
dictory (like the denial of the equality of two right 
angles ;) because, abstractedly, we can conceive Brutus 
acting otherwise : but if we insert the circumstances 
(which of course really existed) of his having complete 
power, liberty, and also a predominant will to do so, then, 
the denial of the action amounts to a " mathematical " 
impossibility, or self-contradiction ; for to act voluntarily 

*See Tucker's "Light of Nature," in the chapters on Provi- 
dence, on Free-will, and some others. I have endeavoured to 
condense and to simplify some of the most valuable parts of hi? 
reasonings in the notes and appendix to an edition of Archbishop 
King's Discourse on Predestination, published at the end of the 
Bamptou Lectures. 



324 APPENDIX I. 

against the dictates of a predominant will, mplies an 
effect without a cause. 

Of future events, that being, and no other can have 
the same knowledge as of the past, who is acquainted 
with all the causes, remote or immediate, internal and 
external, on which each depends. 

But every one is accustomed to anticipate future events, 
in human affairs, as well as in the material world, in 
proportion to his knowledge of the several circumstances 
connected with each ; however different in amount that 
knowledge may be, in reference to different occurrences. 
And in both cases alike, we always attribute the failure 
of any anticipation to our ignorance or mistake respecting 
some of the circumstances. When e. g. we fully expect, 
from our supposed knowledge of some person's character, 
and of the circumstances he is placed in, that he will do 
something which, eventually, he does not do, we at once 
and without hesitation conclude that we were mistaken 
either as to his character, or as to his situation, or as to our 
acquaintance with human nature, generally ; and we are 
accustomed to adduce any such failure as a j^roo/" of such 
mistake ; saying " it is plain you were mistaken in your 
estimate of that man's character ; for he has done so 
and so :" and this, as unhesitatingly as we should attribute 
the non-occurrence of an eclipse we had predicted, not 
to any change in the laws of nature, but to some error in 
our calculations. • 

INDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect of the 
will and of the judgment, is subject to an ambiguity which 
some of my readers may perhaps think hardly worth notic- 
ing; the distinction between unbiassed tawc?ot*r and im" 
partiality, on the one side, and carelessness, on the other, 
being so very obvious. But these two things nevertheless 
have been, from their bearing the same name, confounded 
together ; or at least represented as inseparably connected. 
I have known a person maintain, with some plausibility, 
the inexpediency, with a view to the attainment oi truth, 
of educating people, or appointing teachers to instruct them, 
in any particular systems or theories, of astronomy, rhedi- 
cine, religion, politics, &c., on the ground, that a man 
must wish to believe, and to find good reasons for belie v- 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 325 

ing, the system in which he has been trained, and which 
he has been engaged in teaching; and this wish must pre- 
judice his understandin;^ in favour of it, and consequently 
render him an incompetent judge of truth.* 

Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as 
this could have been even plausibly stated, but for the am- 
biguity of the word indifference, and others connected 
with it. For it would follow, from such a principle, thai 
no physician is to be trusted, who has been instructed in 
a certain mode of treating any disorder, because he must 
wish to think the theory correct which he has learned : 
nay, no physician should be trusted who is not utterly in- 
different whether his patient recovers or dies ; since else, 
he must wish to find reasons for hoping favourably from 
the mode of treatment pursued. No plan for the benefit of 
the public, proposed by a philanthropist, should be listen- 
ed to ; since such a man cannot but wish it may be sue* 
cessful ; &c. 

No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclina- 
tions ; but it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, to 
guard against this bias. If a scheme be proposed to any 
one for embarking his capital in some speculation which 
promises great wealth, he will doubtless wish to find that 
the expectations held out are well founded : but every one 
would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should 
suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe, 
on insufficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him. 
But w« should not think such imprudence an inevitable 
consequence of his desire to increase his property. His 
wishes, we should say, were both natural and wise ; but 
since they could not render the event more probable, it was 
most unwise to allow them to influence his decision. In 
like manner, a good man will indeed wish to find the evi- 
dence of the Christian religion satisfactory ; but a wise 
man does not for that reason take for granted that it is sat- 
isfactory ; but weighs the evidence the more carefully on 
account of the importance of the question. 

It is curious to observe how fully aware of the operation 

of this bias, and how utterly blind to it, the same persons 

will be, in opposite cases. Such writers, e. g. as I have 

just alluded to, disparage the judgment of those who have 

* See Essay I. Second Series. 



326 APPENDIX I. 

been accustomed to study and to teach the Christitn reli' 
gion, and who derive hope and satisfaction from it, on the 
ground that they must wish to find it true. And let it be 
admitted that theh authority shall go for nothing ; and tha'. 
the question shall be tried entirely by the reasons adduced. 
But then, on the same principle, how strong must be the 
testimony of the multitudes who admit the truth of Chris- 
tianity, though it is to ihem a source of uneasiness or of 
dismay ; — who have not adopted any antinomian system 
to quiet their conscience while leading an unchristian life ; 
but, when they hear of " righteousness, temperance, and 
judgment to come, tremble," and try to dismiss such 
thoughts till *' a more convenient season." The case of 
these, who have every reason to wish Christianity untrue, 
is passed by, by the very same persons who are insisting 
on the influence of the opposite bias. According to the 
homely but expressive proverb, they are '* deaf on one 
ear." 

And it may be added, that it is utterly xi mistake to sup- 
pose that the bias is always in favour of the conclusion 
wished for : it is often in the contrary direction. The 
proverbial expression of ** too good news to be true," 
bears witness to the existence of this feeling. There is 
in some minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases 
where their wishes are strong ; — a morbid distrust of evi- 
dence which they are especially anxious to find conclu- 
sive ; e. g. groundless fears for the health or safety of an 
ardently-beloved child, will frequently distress a«xious 
parents. 

Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the 
state of health of each individual) lead towards these op- 
posite miscalculations — the over-estimate or under -esti- 
mate of the reasons for a conclusion we earnestly wish to 
find true. 

Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and 
to decide according to the evidence ; preserving the in- 
difference of the judgment, even where the will neither 
ca», nor should be indifferent. 

LAW is, etymologically, that which is «*laid" down; 
and is used, in the most appropriate sense, to signify some 
S^eneral injunction, command, or regulation, addressed to 



AMBIGUOUS TEKMS. 327 

Ct'rtain persons, who are called upon to conform to it. 
It is in this sense that we speak of " the Law of Moses," 
"the Law of the Land," &c. 

It is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the 
statement of some general fact, the several individual in- 
stances of which exhibit a conformity to that statement, 
analogous to the conduct of persons in respect to a law 
which they obey. It is in this sense that we speak of 
" the laws of nature:" when we say that "a seed in 
vegetating directs the radicle downwards and the plumule 
upwards, in compliance with a law of nature," we only 
mean that such is universally the fact ; and so, in other 
cases. 

It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the confor- 
mity of individual cases to the general rule is that which 
constitutes a law of nature. If water should henceforth 
never become solid, at any temperature, then the freezing 
of water would no longer be a law of nature : whereas in 
the other sense, a law is not the more or the less a law 
from the conformity or non-conformity of individuals to 
it : if an act of our Legislature were to be disobeyed and 
utterly disregarded by every one, it would not on that 
account be the less a law. 

This distinction may appear so obvious when plainly 
stated, as hardly to need mention : yet writers of great 
note and ability have confounded these two senses to- 
gether : I need only mention Hooker (in the opening of 
his great work) and Montesquieu : the latter of whom 
declaims on the much stricter observance in the universe 
of the laws of nature, than in mankind, of the divine and 
human laws laid down for their conduct : not considering 
that, in the former case, it is the observance that consti' 
tutes the law. 

MAY, and likewise MUST, and CAN, (as well as 
CANNOT) are each used in two senses, which are very 
often confounded together. They relate sometimes to 
power, or liberty, sometimes to contingency 

When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum 
of money, *' now he may purchase the field he was wish- 
ing for," we mean that it is in his jmiver j it is plain that 
lie may, m the same sense, hoard up the money, or spend 



328 APPENDIX I. 

it on something else ; though perhaps we are convinced, 
from our knowledge of his character and situation, that he 
will not. When again we say, *' it may rain to-morrow,'* 
ir " the vessel may have arrived in port," the expression 
vioesnot at all relate to power, but merely to contingency; 
i. e. we mean, that though we are not sure such an event 
will happen or has happened, we are not sure of the re- 
verse. 

When again, we say, ** this man, of so grateful a dis- 
position, must have eagerly embraced such an opportunity 
of requiting his benefactor," or " one who approves of 
the slave trade must be very hard-hearted," we only mean 
to imply the absence of all doubt on these points. The 
very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness exclude 
the idea of compulsion, and of yielding to irresistible pow- 
er. But when we say that " all men must die," or that 
•*a man must go to prison who is dragged by force," we 
mean ** whether they will or not" — that there is no power 
to resist. So also, if we say that a being of perfect good- 
ness *^ cannot " act wrong, we do not mean that it is out 
of his poiver ; since that would imply no goodness of char- 
acter ; but that there is sufficient reason for feeling sure 
that He will not. It is in a very different sense that we 
say of a man fettered in a prison, that he " cannot " escape : 
meaning, that though he has the will, he wants the ability. 

These words are commonly introduced, in questions 
connected with fatalism and the freedom of human ac- 
tions, to explain the meaning of " necessary," ** impossi- 
ble," &c. ; and having themselves a corresponding ambi- 
guity, they only tend to increase the perplexity.* 

" Chaos umpire sits, 

And by deciding worse embroils the fray." 

MUST.— «^e" May." 

NECESSARY.— This word is used as the contrary to 
** impossible " in all its senses, and is of course liable io 
a corresponding ambiguity. Thus it is ** mathematically 
necessary " that two sides of a triangle should be greater 
than the ihird ; there is a " physical necessity " for the 
fall of a stone ; and a " moral necessity " that beings of 
such and such a character should act, when left perfe(,'llf 
free, in such and such a manner ; i. e. we are sure they 
tfft^ act so; though of course it is in their power to ai!9 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 329 

©therwise ; else there would be no moral agency.* This 
tmbiguity is employed sophistically to justify immoral con- 
iuct ; since no one is responsible for any thing done under 
'necessity," — i. e. "physical necessity ;" as when a man 
^ dragged anywhere by external force, or fails down from 
♦eing too weak to stand ; and then the same excuse is 
feUaciously extended to " moral necessity" also. 

There are likewise numberless different applications of 
the word ** necessity " (as well as of those derived from 
it) in which there is a practical ambiguity, from the differ- 
ence of the things understood in conjunction with it : e. g. 
food is " necessary ;" viz. — to life ; great wealth is " ne- 
cessary " — to the gratification of a man of luxurious ha- 
bits ; the violation of moral duty is in many cases ** ne- 
cessary " — for the attainment of certain worldly objects ; 
the renunciation of such objects, and subjugation of the 
desires, is " necessary " — to the attainment of the gospel 
promises, &c. And thus it is that " necessity " has come 
to be " the tyrant's plea ;" for as no one is at all responsi- 
ble for what is a matter of physical necessity — what he 
has no power to avoid — so, a degree of allowance is made 
for a man's doing what he has power to avoid, when it 
appears to be the less of two evils ; as e. g. when a man 
who is famishing takes the first food he meets with, as 
** necessary " to support life, or throws over goods \xi a 
Btorm, when it is " necessary " in order to save the ship. 
But if the plea of necessity be admitted withoutinquiring 
for what the act in question is necessary, anything what- 
ever may be thus vindicated ; since no one commits any 
crime which is not, in his view, " necessary " to the at- 
tainment of some supposed advantage or gratification. 

The confusion of thought is further increased by the 
employment on improper occasions of the phrase " abso- 
lutely necessary ;" which, strictly speaking, denotes a case 
in which there is no possible alternative. It is necessary 
for a man's safety, that he should remain in a house which 
ne cannot quit without incurring danger : it is absolutely 
{or simply) necessary that he should remain there, if he is 
closely imprisoned in it. 

I have treated more fully on this fruitful souree of so- 

* S66 the article " Impossibility j" note. 
26 



S30 APPENDIX I 

pWstry in the Appendix (No. I.) to King's " Discourse on 
Predestination." In the course of it, I suggested (in the 
first edition) an etymology of the word, which I have rea- 
son to think is not correct; but it should be observed, that 
this makes no difference in the reasoninsr, which is not in 
any degree founded on that etymology ; nor have I, as 
some have represented, attempted to introduce any new or 
unusual sense of the word, but have all along appealed to 
common use — the only right standard — and merely pointed 
out the senses in which each word has actually been em- 
ployed. See the introduction to this Appendix. 

OLD. — This word, in its strict and primary sense, de- 
notes the length of time that any object has existed ; and 
many are not aware that they are accustomed to use it in 
any other. It is, however, very frequently employed in- 
stead of ** ancient," to denote distance of time. The 
same transition seems to have taken place, in Latin. Hor- 
ace says of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient Ro- 
man authors, but who did not live to be old— 
- * quo fit ut omnis 



Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella 
Vita SenisP 

The present is a remarkable instance of the influence of 
an ambiguous word over the thoughts even of those who 
are not ignorant of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on 
the watch against its effects ; the impressions and ideas 
associated by habit with the word when used in one sense, 
being always apt to obtrude themselves unawares when it 
is employed in another sense, and thus to affect our rea- 
sonings. E. G. " old times," — " the old world," (fee, 
are expressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than 
not, produce imperceptibly the associated impression of 
the superior wisdom resulting from experience, which, as 
a general rule, we attribute to old men. Yet no one is re- 
ally ignorant that the world is older now than ever it was; 
and that the instruction to be derived from observations on 
the past (which is the advantage that old persons possess) 
must be greater, supposing other things equal, to every 
successive generation ; and Bacon's remark to this purpose 
itppe-cirs, as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism: yet 
itWy perhaps, that he made, are more important. There is 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 331 

Always a tendency to appeal with the same kind of defer- 
ence, to the authority of "old times," as of aged men. 

It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient cus* 
toms, institutions, ^c. when they still exist, may be liter- 
ally called old ; and have this advantage attending them, 
that their effects may be estimated fram long experience ; 
whereas we cannot be sure, respecting any recently-estab- 
lished law or system, whether it may not produce in time 
some effects which were not originally contemplated.* 

ONE — is sometimes employed to denote strict and pro- 
per numerical unify; sometimes, close resemblance; — 
correspondence with one single description. — See *' Same." 



' Facies non omnibus UNA, 



Nee diversa tamen ; qualem decet esse sororum." — Ov. Met. b. ii. 

It is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and 
proper sense of this word, that men are exhorted to ** be 
of one mind ;" t. e. to agree in their faith — pursuits — 
mutual affections, &;c " The Church" [viz : the Univer- 
sal or Catholic Church] " is undoubtedly one, and so is the 
human race one ; but not as a society. It was from the 
first composed of distinct societies; which were called 
one, because formed on common principles. It is One So- 
ciety only when considered as to its future existence. The 
circumstance of its having one common Head, Christ, one 
.Spirit, one Father, are points of unity, which no more make 
the Church One Society on earth, than the circumstance 
of all men having the same Creator, and being derived from 
the same Adam, renders the human race one family. "f 

It is also in this sense that two guineas, e. g. struck from 
a wedge of uniform fineness, are said to be " of one arid 
the same form and weight," and also " of one and the same 
substance." In this secondary or improper sense also, a 
child is said to be " of one and the same (bodily) substance 
with its mother ;" or, simply ** of the substance of its mo- 
ther ;" for these two pieces of money, and two human be- 
ings, are numerically distinct. 

It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view, 
and to explain on proper occasions, these different uses of 

♦ See however the Article reprinted from the Londojn Review, in 
the first letter to Earl Grey on Secondary Punishments, 
t £acyclop, Mctrop., p. 77*. 



332 APPENDIX I. 

the word ; lest men should insensibly slide into error on 
the most important of all subjects, by applying, in the se- 
condary sense, expressions which ought to be understood 
in the primary and proper. — {See " Person.") Unity is, 
as might have been expected, liable to corresponding am- 
biguities- E. G. Sometimes what the Apostles say con- 
cerning •* Unity of Spirit" — of Faith— &c. is transferred to 
Unity of Church-Government. 

PAY. — In the strict sense, a person is said to " pay," 
who transfers to another what was once his own : in another 
sense " pay" is used to denote the mere act of handing 
over what perhaps never was one's own. In this latter sense 
a gentleman's steward or house-keeper is said to pay the 
tradesmen their bills ; in th^ other sense, it is the master 
who pays them. 

It is in the secondary or improper sense that an executor 
is said to pay legacies — a land-owner or farmer to pay tithes, 
6cc., since the money these hand over to another never 
was theirs. See " Evidence," (in vol. of Tracts,) p. 339. 

PERSON,* in its ordinary use at present, invariably im- 
plies a numerically distinct substance. Each man is one 
person, and can be but one. It has also a peculiar theologi- 
cal sense, in which we speak, of the ** three Persons" of 
the blessed Trinity. It was probably thus employed by our 
divines as a literal, or perhaps etymological, rendering ot 
the Latin word " persona." I am inclined to think, how- 
ever, from the language of Wallis (the Mathematician and 
Logician) in the following extract, as well as from that of 
some other of our older writers, that the English word per- 
son was formerly not so strictly confined as now, to the 
sense it bears in common conversation among us. 

** That which makes these expressions" (viz. respecting 
the Trinity) " seem harsh to some of these men, is because 
they have used themselves to fancy that notion only of the 
word person, according to which three men are accounted 
to be three persons, and these three pcrsous to be three 
men. But he may consider that there is another notion of 
the word person, and in common use too, wherein the same 
man may be said to sustain divers persons, and those per- 

• Most of the following observations will apply to the word " per* 
legality." *^*^ ^ 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 833 

sons to be the same man : that is, the same man as sus- 
taining divers capacities. As was said but now of Tully, 
Tres Personas Unus sustineo j 7neam, adversariii judicis. 
And then it will seem no more harsh to say, The Three 
Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are one God, 
than to say, God the Creator, God the Redeemer, and 

God the Sanctifier, are one God it is much the 

same thing whether of the two forms we use." — Letters on 
the Trinity, p. G3. 

" The word person (jKrsona) is originally a Latin word, 
and does not properly signify a Man ; (so that another 
person must needs imply another man) for then the word 
homo would have served, and they needed not have taken 
in the word persona ; but rather one so circumstantiated. 
And the same man^ if considered in other circumstances 
(considerably different) is reputed another ^:>erson. And 
that this is the true notion of the word person, appears by 
those noted phrases, personam induere^ 2y^rsonam deponere, 
personain agere, and many the like, in approved Latin au- 
thors. Thus the same man may at once sustain the per- 
son, of a king and a father, if he be invested both with 
regal diXidi paternal authority. Now because the king and 
the father are for the most part not only different persons 
but different men also, (and the like in other cases) hence 
it comes to pass that another person is sometimes supposed 
to imply another man; but not always, nor is that the 
proper sense of the v>'ord, It is Englished in our diction- 
aries by the state, quality or condition whereby one man 
differs froon another ; and so, as the condition alters, the 
person alters, though the man be the same. 

"The hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concern- 
ing the three somewhats, which the fathers (who first used 
it) did intend to design by the name person ; so that we 
are not from the word person to determine what was that 
notion ; but from that notion which they would express, 
to determine in what sense the word person is here used," 
&c. &c. — Letter V. in answer to the Arian^s vindication * 

What was precisely the notion which these Latin fathers 

*Dr, Wallis's theological works, considering his general celeb- 
rity, are wonderfully little known. He seems to have been, mbi« 
day, one of the ablest defenders of the Church'& doctrine, against 
the Arians and Socinians of that period. Of course he incurred the 



33t APPENDIX I. 

intended to convey, and how far it approac. ed the classi 

cal signification of the word '* persona," it may not be ea 
sy to determine. But we must presume that they did not 
intend to employ it in what is, now, the ordinary sense 
of the word person ; both because " persona " never, 1 
believe, bore that sense in pure Latinity, and also because 
It is evident that, in that sense, *' three divine persons " 
would have been exactly equivalent to " three Gods ;" a 
meaning which the orthodox always disavowed. 

It is probable that they had nearly the same view with 
which the Greek theologians adopted the word Hyposta- 
sis ; which seems calculated to express " that which stands 
under {i. e. is the subject of) attributes." They meant 
it may be presumed, to guard against the suspicion of 
teaching, on the one hand, that there are three Gods, or 
three parts of the one God ; or, on the other hand, that 
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are no more than three 
names,* all, of the same signification ; and they employed 
accordingly a term which might serve to denote, that, 
(though divine attributes belong to all and each of these, 
yet) there are attributes of each, respectively, whicK are 
not so strictly applicable to either of the others, as such ; 
as when, for instance, the Son is called especially the 
" Redeemer," and the Holy Spirit, the " Comforter or 
Paraclete, "t (fee. The notion thus conveyed is in- 
deed very faint, and imperfect ; but is perhaps for that 

censure, not only of thetn, but of all who, though not professedly 
Arian, gave such an expK)sition of their doctrine as amounts virtu- 
ally to Tritheism. I beg to be understood however as not demand* 
ing an implicit deference for his, or for any other human authority, 
however eminent. We are taught to " call no man master, on 
earth." But the reference to Dr. Wallis may serve both to show the 
Qse ol the word in his days, and to correct the notion, should any 
have entertained it, that the views of the subject here taken are, in 
our Church any thing novel. 

♦It is possible that some may have used this expression in the 
very sense attached by others to the word " person ;" led, in a 
great degree, by the peculiar signification of " name " in Scripture. 
For some very important remarks on that signification, see Hind's 
Hietory, and also a sermon on the name Emmanuel in the vol. I late- 
ly published. 

f English readers are not usually aware that the title of *' Para- 
clete " is ever distinctly applied to Christ in Scripture, as it is in 
1 Johnii. 1, because it is there translated ''adi^ocate" instead ol 
• ^mforter.** 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 335 

Tery reason, (considering what man is. and what God is,) 
the less likely to lead to error. On<^ may convey to a 
blind man a notion of seeing, correct as far as it goes, and 
instructive to him, though very imperfect: if he form, a 
more full and distinct notion of it, his ideas will inevita- 
bly be incorrect. — See Essay VII. § 5, second series.* 

It is perhaps to be regretted that our divines, in render- 
ing the Ldtm " persona," used the word person, whose 
ordinary sense, in the present day at least, differs in a 
most important point from the theological sense, and yet 
is not so remote from it as to preclude all mistake and 
perplexity. If ** hypostasis," or any other completely 
foreign term had been used instead, no idea at all would 
have been conveyed except that of the explanation given; 
and thus the danger at least of being misled by a word, 
would have been avoided. f 

Our reformers however did not introduce the v^^ord into 
their catechism ; though it has been (I must think, inju- 
diciously) employed in some popular expositions of the 
catechism, without any explanation, or even allusion to 
its being used in a peculiar sense. 

As it is, the danger of being not merely not understood, 
but T^iisunderstood, should be guarded against most sedu- 
lously, by all who wish not only to keep clear of error, 
but to inculcate important truth ; by seldom or never 
employinglhis ambiguous word without some explanation 
or caution. For if we employ, without any such care, 
terms which we must be sensible are likely to mislead, at 
least the unlearned and the unthinking, we cannot stand 
acquitted on the plea of not having directly inculcated error. 

I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, 
may be traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is 
not wonderful that some should be led to renounce a 
doctrine, which, through the ambiguity in question, may 

* It is worth observing, as a striking instance of the little reh'ance 
to be placed on eiyinology as a guide to the meaning of a word, that 
"hypostasis," " substantia," and " understanding." so widely dif« 
erent in thevr sense, correspond in their etymology. 

\ I wish it to be observed, that it is the ambiguity af the word 
person which renders it objectionable ; not, its bei.ag nowhere 
employed in Sciipture in the technical sense of theologians ; lor 
this circumstance is rather an advantage.- -See Essay VI. (second 
■eries) § 4, note. 



336 APPENDIX I. 

be represented to them as involving a self-contradiction, 
or as leading to tritheism; — that others should insensibly 
slide into this very error; — or that many more (which I 
know to be no uncommon case) should, for fear of that 
error, deliberately, and on principle, keep the doctrine of 
the trinity out of their thoughts, as a point of speculative 
belief, to which they have assented once for all, but 
which they find it dangerous to dwell on ; though it is in 
fact the very faith into which,* by our Lord's appointment, 
vi^e are baptized. 

Nor should those who do understand, or at least have 
once understood, the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied 
that they are thenceforward safe from all danger in that 
quarter. It should be remembered that the thoughts are 
habitually influenced, through the force of association, by 
the recurrence of the ordinary sense of any word to the 
mind of those who are not especially on their guard 
against it." See ** fallacies," § 5. 

The correctness of a formal and deliberate confession of 
faith, is not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against 
error in the habitual impressions on the mind. The Ro- 
manists flatter themselves that they are safe from idolatry, 
because they distinctly acknowledge the truth, that " God 
only is to be served i^ viz. with "latria;" though they 
allow ADORATION, ('* hyperdulia '* and " dulia ") to the 
virgin and other saints — to images — and to relics : to 
which it has been justly replied, that supposing this dis- 
tinction correct in itself, it would be, in practice, nugatory ; 
since the mass of the people must soon (as experience 
proves) lose sight of it entirely in their habitual devotions. 

Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of one God, 
of it«eli'a sufficient safeguard; since, from the additional 
ambiguities of " one " and *' unity," (noticed in a pre- 
ceding article) we may gradually fall into the notion of a 
mexi^Xy figurative unity ; such as unity of substance merely, 
(see a preceding article)— unity of purpose — concert of 
action, &c. such as is often denoted by the phrase *' one 
mind." See " Same," in this Appendix, and " Disserta- 
tion," Book IV. Ch. V. 

When however I speak of the necessity of explanation, 

* ch rb Hvofia *^into the name j" not **»n the name." Matt 
XXTiii, 19 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 337 

the reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, not 
explanations of the nature of the deity, but of our own use 
of words. On the one hand we must not content our- 
selves with merely saying that the whole subject is mys- 
terious and must not be too nicely pried into; while we 
neglect to notice the distinction between divine revela- 
tions, and human explanations of them ; — between inqui- 
ries into the mysteries of the divine nature, and into the 
mysteries arising from the ambiguities of language, and of 
a language too, adopted by uninspired men. For, what- 
ever Scripture declares, the Christian is bound to receive 
implicitly, however unable to understand it : but to claim 
an uninquiring assent to expressions of man's framing, 
(however judiciously framed) without even an attempt to 
ascertain their meaning, is to fall into one of the worst 
errors of the Romanists. 

On the other hand, to require explanations of what God 
is in himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach jof 
the human faculties, and foreign from the apparent design 
of Scripture-revelation ; which seems to be, chiefly, if not 
wholly, to declare to us, (at least to insist on among the 
essential articles of faith) with a view to our practical 
benefit, and to the influencing of our feelings and conduct, 
not so much the intrinsic nature of the deity, as, what he 
is and does, relatively to us. Scripture teaches us (and 
our church-catechism directs our attention to these 
points) to '' believe in God, who, as the Father, hath made 
us and all the world — as the Son, hath redeemed us andall 
mankind — as the Holy Ghost, sanctifieth us, and all the 
elect people of God.'"** And this distinction is, as I have 
said, pomted out in the very form of baptism. Nothing 
indeed can be more decidedly established by Scripture — 
nothing more indistinctly explained (except as far as re- 
lates to us) than the doctrine of the trinity ;t nor are we 
perhaps capable, with our present faculties, of comprehend- 
ing it more fully. 

* Hawkins's Manual, p. 12. 

t Compare together, for instance, such passages as the following ; 
for it is by comparing Scripture with Scripture, not by dwelling on 
insulated texts, that the word of God is to be rightly understood : 
Luke i. 35, and John xiv. 9 ; John xiv. 16, 18, 26, Matt, xxviii. 19^ 
20 ; John xvi. 7 ; Coloss. li. 9 ; Philip, i. 19 ; 1 Cor. vi. 19 j Matt, x 
20, and John xiv. 23. 



138 APPENDIX I. 

In these matters, our inquiry — at least our Jirst inquiry 
—should always be, what is revealed : nor, if any one re- 
fuses to adopt as an article of faith, this or that exposition, 
should he be understood as necessarily maintaining its 
falsity. For we are sure that there must be many truths 
relative to the deity, which we have no means of ascer- 
taining: nor does it follow that even every truth which 
can be ascertained, must be a part of the essential faith 
of a Christian. 

And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such instruc- 
tions as are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it 
seems the part of a like wisdom, to abstain, during this our 
state of childhood, from curious speculations on subjects 
in which even the ablest of human minds can but *' see 
by means of a glass, darkly." On these, the learned can 
have no advantage over others ; though we are apt to for- 
get that any mysterious point inscrutable to man, as man 
— surpassing the utmost reach of human intellect — must 
be such to the learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and 
to the simple, alike ; — that in utter darkness, the strongest 
sight, and the weakest, are on a level. " Sir, in these 
matters," (said one of the most eminent of our reformers, 
respecting another mysterious point,) " I am so fearful, 
that I dare spieak no further, yea almost none otherwise, 
than as the Scripture doth as it were lead me by the hand.'* 

And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, 
and take it for a guide, than to resort to it merely for con- 
firmationSf contained in detached texts of the several 
parts of some system of Theology, which the student fixes 
on as reputed orthodox, and which is in fact made the 
guide which he permits to "lead him by the hand;" 
while passages culled out from various parts of the Sacred 
Writings in subserviency to such system, are formed into 
what may be called an anagram of Scripture : and then by 
reference to this system as a standard, each doctrine or 
discourse is readily pronounced Orthodox, or Socinian, or 
Arian, or Sabellian, or Nestorian, &c. ; and all this on 
the ground that the theological scheme which the student 
has adopted, is supported by Scripture. The materials 
indeed are the stones of the temple ; but the building coti' 
etructed with them is a fabric of human contrivance. If 
instead of this, too common, procedure, students would 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS 309 

feirly search the Scriptures with a view not mereiy to de^ 
fend their opinions, but to form them — not merely for ar* 
guments, but for truth — keeping human expositions to 
their own proper purposes iSee Essay VI. First Series,] 
and not allowing these to become, practically, a standard 
— if, in short, they were as honestly desirous to be on the 
side of Scripture, as they naturally are to have Scripture on 
their side, how much sounder, as well as more charitable, 
would their conclusions often be ! 

With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded 
to, many theologians, even of those who lived near, and 
indeed during, the apostolical times, seem to have been 
alike chargeable, widely as they differed in respect of the 
particular explanations adopted by each : 

" Unus utrique 
Error ; sed variis illudit partibus." 

And it is important to remember — what we are very liable 
to lose sight of — the circumstance, that, not only there 
arose grievous errors during the time of the Apostles, and 
consequently such were likely to exist in the times imme- 
diately following, but also that when these inspired guides 
were removed, there was no longer the same infallible 
authority tcJ decide what was error. In the absence of such 
a guide, some errors might be received as orthodox, and 
some sound doctrines be condemned as heterodox. 

The Gnostics* introduced a theory of ^^ons, or succes- 
sive emanations from the divine "Pleroma" or fulness; 
one of whom was Christ, and became incarnate in the man 
Jesus. t The Sabellians are reported to have described 
Christ as bearing the same relation to the Father, as the 
illuminating {^utlotlkov) quality does to the Sun; while 
the Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming quality 
da^'KOV' or again, the Three as corresponding to the 
"Body, Soul, and Spirit, of a man ; or again, to substance 

thought or reason — and will or action. The Arians 

♦ Of these, and several other ancient heretics, we have no ac- 
counts but those of their opponents ; which however we may pre- 
sume to contain more or less of approximation to what was usually 
maintained. 

f These heretics appear to have split into many different sects, 
teaching various modifications of the same absurdities.— See Bur 
t^n's JBumpton Lectures. 



340 APPENDIX I. 

again represented the Son and the Holy Spirit, as created 
Beings, but with a certain imparted divinity. TheNesto- 
rians and Eutychians gave opposite, but equally fanelful 
and equally presumptuous explanations of the Incarna- 
tion, &c. &c. 

Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, alto- 
gether exempt from the same fault of presumptuous 
speculation. " Who," says Chrysostom, *' was he to 

whom God said, Let us make man 1 who but he 

the Son of God V^ And Epiphanius, on the same passage, 
says, ** This is the language of God to his word." Each 
of these writers, it may be observed, in representing God 
(under that title) as addressing Himself to the Son as to 
a distinct being previously to the birth of Jesus on earth, 
approaches very closely to the Arian view. And Justin 
Martyr, in a similar tone, expressly speaks of God as 
" One, not in number, but in judgment or designs."* I 
will not say that such passages as these may not be so 
interpreted as to exclude every form of tritheism ; but it 
is a dangerous thing, to use (and that, not in the heat of 
declamation, but in a professed exposition) language of 
such a nature that it is a mere chance whether it may not 
lead into the most unscriptural errors. If the early writers 
had not been habitually very incautious in this point, that 
could hardly have taken place which is recorded respecting 
the council held at Rimini, (a. b. 360) in which a con- 
fession of faith was agreed upon, Vv'hich the Arians soon 
after boasted of as sanctioning their doctrine, and ** the 
church," we are told, " was astonished to find itself 
unexpectedly become Arian. "f 

The fact is, that numberless w^riters, both of those who 
were, and who were not, accounted heretics, being dis- 
pleased, and justly, with one another's explanations of the 
mode of existence of the deity, instead of taking warning 
aright from the errors of their neighbours, sought, each, 
the remedy, in some other explanation instead, concerning 
matters unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found 
nothing to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the briet 
and indistinct, though decisive, declarations of Scripture, 

* OZrog . . . . yeypafjifiEVOsQebs,eT£posiaTiTovTa iriivTaiToi^aavTOS 

t See Essay VI. (second series,) ^ 2, Note b. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS 341 

that ** God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto 
Himself ;"— that " in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the 
Godhead, bodily;" — that " it is God that worketh in us 
both to will and to do of his good pleasure ;" — that if we 
"keep Christ's saying, He dwelleth in us, and we, in 
Him ;" — that " if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, 
he is none of his ;" — and that ** the Lord is the Spirit," 
&c.* They wanted something more full and more philo- 
sophical, than all this ; and their theology accordingly was 
** spoiled, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the 
tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and 
not after Christ." Hostile as they were to each other, 
the grand mistake in principle was common to many in 
all parties. 

And in later ages the schoolmen kept up the same 
spirit, and even transmitted it to Protestants. '* Theology 
teaches," (says a passage in a Protestant work) " that there 
is in God, one Essence, two Processions, three Persons, 
four Relations, five Notions, and the Circumincession, 
which the Greeks call Perichoresis." .... What follows 
is still more to my purpose ; but I cannot bring myself to 
transcribe any further. "Who is this that darkeneth 
counsel by words without knowledge '?" 

But the substance of great part of what I have been 
saying, has been expressed in better language than mine, 
in a late work, which displays no ordinary ability, Mr. 
Douglas's Errors regarding Religion. 

"The radical mistake in all these systems, whether he- 
retical or orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so 
many scandalous disputes, and absurd and pernicious opin- 
ions, proceeds from the disposition so natural in man of 
being wise above what is written. They are not satisfied 
with believing a plain declaration of the Saviour, * I and 
the Father are one.' They undertake with the utmost 
presumption and folly to explain in what manner the Fa- 
ther and the Son are one ; but man might as well attempt 
to take up the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as endeav- 



• Not, as in our version, ''that spirit;" O ^iKvpiogTO irvtvuA 
iariv> In this place, and also in John i. 21, our translators were 
apparently looking to some version in which an attempt is made 
to express in Latin the force of the Greek article. 



342 APPENDIX 1. 

our, by his narrow understanding, to comprehend the man- 
ner of the; divine existence." .... P. 50. 

*' Heresies, however, are not confined to the heterodcx. 
While the Arians and semi-Arians were corrupting the 
truth by every subtilty of argument and ingenious perver- 
sion of terms, the orthodox all the while were dogmatizing 
about the Divine nature with a profusion of words which 
either had no meaning or were gross mistakes, or inappli- 
cable metaphors when applied to the infinite and spiritual 
existence of God. And not content with using such ar- 
guments against the heretics as generally produced a new 
heresy without refuting the f(^rmer one, as soon as they 
obtained the power they expelled them from the Roman 
empire, and sent them with all the zeal which persecution 
confers, and which the orthodox, from their prosperity, had 
lost, to spread evtry variety of error amongst the nations 
of the barbarians. 

"Orthodoxy was become a very nice aflfair, from the 
rigour of its terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very 
unlike the highway for the simple, which the Gospel pre- 
sents. A slip in a single expression was enough to make 
a man a heretic. The use or omission of a single word 
occasioned a new rent in Christianity. Every heresy 
produced a new creed, and every creed a new heresy. . . 
Never does human folly and learned ignorance appear in 
a more disgusting point of view than in these disputes of 
Christians among themselves ; nor does any study appear 
so well calculated to foster infidelity as the history Oi 
Christians sects, unless the reader be guided by light from 
above, and carefully distinguish the doctrines of the Bible 
from the miserable disputes of pretended Christians." — 
P. 53. 

To discuss this important subject more fully (or perhaps 
indeed as fully as it has been here treated of) is hardly 
suitable to a logical work : and yet the importance of at- 
tending to the ambiguity I have now been considering, 
cannot be duly appreciated, without ofleringsome remarks 
on the subject-matter with which that ambiguity is con- 
nected ; and such remarks again, if scantily and imperfect- 
ly developed, are open to cavil or mistake. I must take 
the liberty therefore of referring the reader to such works, 
(in addition to those already mentioned^ both my own. 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 343 

iind those of others, as contain sometl.ingof a fuller state- 
ment of the same ^"'ews. It may be added, that the views 
I have tiken derive confirmation, now that they have 
been so long before the public, from the total absence (to 
the best of my knowledge) of all attempts at refutation ; 
especially when considered in conjunction with the strong 
objection to them which is felt by some. E. G. I have 
seen, in an argumentative work, a warning given to the 
reader against this very Article (by name) as containing 
very erroneous doctrine ; of which, however, no refutation 
at all is subjoined ; which one cannot but suppose any 
writer would have done, who had never thought of, or 
heard of, any, even plausible, arguments against the doc 
trine censured. — See Essays (First Series,) Essay II. §4, 
and Essays IV. and V. ; — Second Series, Essay VI. § 2, p. 
199 ; VII. § 3 ; and IX. § 1.— Third Series, Essay II. § 1. 
jirchbishop King's Sermon on Predestination^ ^c, and 
Uncyclop. Metropol. History, Chap, xxvii. p. 589, and 
Chap, xxxiv. p. 740. 

POSSIBLE,— This word, like the others of kindred 
meaning, relates sometimes to contingency^ sometimes to 
power or liberty ; and these two senses are frequently 
confounded. In the first sense we say, e. g. " it is possible 
this patient may recover," not meaning, that it depends on 
his choice ; but that we are not sure whether the event will 
not be such. In the other sense it is *' possible " to the 
best man to violate every rule of morality ; since if it were 
out of his power to act so if he chose it, there would be no 
moral goodness in the case ; though we are quite sure that 
such never will be his choice. — See " Impossible." 

PRE ACH—The word ** preach " has " so much slid 
from its original sense of proclaiming as a*^kerald, as to 
obscure the sense of every passage in which the preaching 
of the gospel — {kijpvttelv to evayye?iLov,) — literally, • pro- 
claiming the good tidings,' occurs. The sacred writers 
constantly preserve the distinction between * preaching ' 
and * teaching :' — * announcing,' — 'giving information of 
an event ;' and giving instruction to believers. And our 
translators have also, almost always, adhered to this 
distinction 5 though the word * preach,' having in great 
measure acquired, in their time, its secondary sense 



344 APPENDIX T. 

there is one passage in which they inadvertently so employ 
it. When the disciples were assembled at Troas, * to 
break bread, Paul preached unto them, and as Paul was 
long preaching, the young man Eutychus fell down from a 
window, and was taken up dead ;" the word dtaXeyoiievog 
should have been rendered * discoursing.' To disciples^ 
he did not, in the strict sense, preach. So also it is not 
our business, in the strict sense, to 'preach the gospel,' 
except to any who, from their tender years, or from 
neglected education, have never had the glad tidings 
announced to them of God's giving his Soii for our 
salvation. Our ordinary occupation is not to preach 
{KTjgvTTecv) but {dtddaKeiv) to teach men how to under- 
stand the Scriptures, and to apply them to their lives." — 
Discourse appended to " Essays on the Dangers to Christian 
Faith.''— V^. 264, 265. 

PRIEST.— iSee " Dissertation," Book IV. Ch. iv. § 2. 

Etymologically, the word answers to presbyter, i. e. 
elder, in the Christian church, or Jewish synagogue,* 
and is often applied to the second order of Christian 
ministers at the present day. But it is remarkable that 
it never occurs in this sense, in our translation of the 
Scriptures : the word izqec^vTepo^ being always rendered 
by elder; and its derivative, priest, always given as the 
translation of ^legevg^. This latter is an office assigned to 
none under the gospel»scheme, except the ONE great 
High Priest, of whom the Jewish priests were types, and 
who offered a sacrifice (that being the most distinguishing 
office of a priest in the sense of 'leqevg) which is the only 
one under the gospel. 

It is incalculable how much confusion h^s arisen from 
confounding together the two senses of the word priest, 
and thence, the two offices themselves. 

I have enlaiged accordingly on this subject in a sermon, 
delivered before the University of Oxford, and subjoined 
to the last edition of the Bampton Lectures. See also 
Essays, Third Series, Essay II. 

REASON. — This word is liable to many ambiguities, 

* See Vitringa on the Synagogue. The abridged translation, by 
Mr. Bernard, of this valuable work, is an important addition to our 
theological literature 



AMBIGUC/US TERMS. 345 

»f wliich I propose to notice only a few of the most 
important. Sometimes it is used to signify all the intellec- 
tual powers collectively; in which sense it can hardly be 
said to be altogether denied to brutes; since several of 
what we reckon intellectual processes in the human mind, 
are evidently such as some brutes are capable of. 

Reason is, however, frequently- employed to denote 
those intellectual powers exclusively in which man differs 
from brutes ; though what these are no one has been able 
precisely to define. The employment at will of the faculty 
of abstraction seems to be the principal; that being, at least, 
principally concerned in the use of language. The moral fac- 
ulty, or power of distinguishing right from wrong, (which 
appears algo to be closely connected with abstraction, 
without which it eould not exist) is one of which brutes 
are destitute ; but then Dr. Paley and some other ethical 
writers deny it to man also. The description given by 
that author of our discernment of good and bad conduct, 
{viz. as wholly dependent on expectation of reward and 
punishment,) would in a great degree apply to many ot 
the brute-creation ; especially the more intelligent of 
domestic animals, as dogs and horses. It is in this sense, 
however, that some writers speak of " reason " as enabling 
us to judge of virtue and vice ; not, as Dr. Campbell in 
his Philosophy of Rhetoric has understood them, in the 
sense of the power of argumentation. 

Reason, however, is often used for the faculty of carry- 
ing on the " third operation " of the mind ; viz. reasonings 
or ratiocination. And it is from inattention to this am- 
biguity (which has been repeatedly noticed in the course 
of the foregoing treatise,) that some have treated of Logic 
as the art of rightly employing the mental faculties in 
general. 

Reason is also employed to signify the premiss or pre- 
mises of an argument ; especially the minor-premiss ; and 
it is from reason in this sense that the word " reasoning" 
is derived. 

It is also very frequently used to signify a cause ; as 
when we say, in popular language, that the ** reason of an 
eclipse of the sun is, that the moon is interposed between 
it and the earth.*' This should be strictly called the cause. 
On the other hand, " because *' (i. e. " by-cause ") isiwed 
27 



34* APFKNDIX I. 

ta intixjdtice either the physical eauseor the logical proof* 
and "therefore," henee," "since," "follow," " eonse-* 
quence,** and many other kindred words, have a corres- 
ponding ambiguity : e. g. "the ground is yvety because it 
has rained ;"' or " it has rained, and hence the ground is 
wet f^ this is the assignment ©f the cause: again, " it has 
rained, because the graund is wet ;" " the ground is wet,, 
and therefore it has rained:" this is assigning the logical 
proof; the wetness of the ground is the cause, not of the 
rain having fallen, but of our knowing that it has fallen* 
And thiB probably it is that has led to the ambiguous use 
in all languages of almost ail the words relating to these 
two points. It is an ambiguity which has produ^ced incaU 
culable confusion of thought, and from which it is the 
harder to escape, on acco^unt of its extending to those 
very forms of expressi€^n which are introduced in Ojrder to- 
dear it up. 

Whai adds to the confusion is, that the eause is of tea 
employed as a proof of the effect :* as when we infer, from 
a great fall of rain, that there is, or will be, a flood ; which 
is at once the physical effect, and the logical conclusion. 
The case is just reversed, wlien from a flood we infer thai 
the rain has fallen. 

The more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity, 
the nM>re ejEtensive and important its results will aj^ar.-* 
See "Book i. §2. See also Rhetoric, Book i. 

JREOENERATION.— This word is etnr^oyed by «o^ 
divinds to signify the actual new hfe and character which 
ought to distinguish the Christian; by others, a release 
from a state of condemnation t— a reconciliation to God 
-^adoption as his children, &c.,t which is a necessary 
preliminary to the entrance on such a stale ; (but which, 
unhappily, is not invariably followed by it :> and these are, 
of course, as different things as a grain &f seed sown, and 
•' the full corn in the ear." 

Much controversy has taken place as to the time at 

• See Fallacies. *^ Non causa pro causa." 'Book III. § 14. 

f " .... Baptism, wherein Ivmsmade a memberof ChFist^^achildJ 
of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven.'* . ..." A death 

ttiitosin, and a new birth unto righteousness," &c " We beinf 

yeg^«rat^, a&4 »a4e thv chJldren Uy ad^^ti^d a^ g£^tt«" is^^ 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 347 

which, and the circumstance under which, ** regeneration" 
takes place ; the greater part of which may be traced to 
this ambiguity. 

SAME (as well as "One," "Identical," and other 
words derived from them) is used frequently in a sense 
very different from its primary one ; (as applicable to a 
single object ;) viz. it is employed to denote great similari- 
ty. When several objects are undistinguishably alike, 
one single description will apply equally to any of them ; 
and thence they are said to be all of one and the same na- 
ture, appearance, &c. : as e.g. when we say, ** this house is 
buih of the same stone with such another," we only mean 
that the stones are undistinguishable in their qualities; 
not that the one building was pulled down and the other 
constructed with the materials. Whereas sameness, in 
the primary sense, does not even necessarily imply simi- 
larity ; for if we say of any man that he is greatly altered 
since such a time, we underst«and, and indeed imply by 
the very expression, that he is one person, though differ- 
ent in several qualities , else it would not be he. It is 
worth observing also that " same," in the secondary sense, 
admits according to popular usage, of degrees : we speak 
of two things being nearly the same, but not entirely ; 
personal identity does not admit of degrees. 

Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the errors of 
realism than inattention to this ambiguity. When sev- 
eral persons are said to have one and the same opinion- 
thought — or idea— many men, overlooking the true sim- 
ple statement of the case, which is, that they are all think- 
ing alike, look for something more abstruse and mystical, 
and imagine there must be some one thing, in the primary 
sense, though not an individual, which is present at once 
in the mind of each of these persons : and thence readily 
sprung Plato's theory of ideas ; each of which was, accord- 
ing to him, one real, eternal object, existing entire and 
complete in each of the individual objects that are known 
by one name. Hence, first in poetical mythology, and 
ultimately, perhaps, in popular belief, fortune, liberty, pru- 
dence, (Minerva,) a boundary, (Terminus,) and even the 
the mildew of corn, (Rubigo,) &g., became personified, 
deiii<^d, and represented by statues ; somewhat according 



348 APPENDIX I. 

to the process which is described by Swift, in his humor- 
ous manner, in speaking of zeal, (in the Tale of a Tub,) 
" how from a notion it became a word, and from thence, 
in a hot summer, ripened into a tangible substance.'* We 
find Seneca thinking it necessary gravely to combat the 
position of some of his stoical predecessors, " that the 
cardinal virtues are animals:'* while the Hindoos of the 
present day, from observing the similar symptoms which 
are known by the name of small-pox, and the communica- 
tion of the like from one patient to another, do not merely 
call it (as we do) one disease, but believe (if we may credit 
the accounts given) that the small-pox is a goddess, who 
becomes incarnate in each infected patient. All these 
absurdities are in fact but the extreme and ultimate point 
of realism.— iSee Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. v. 

SIN, in its ordinary acceptation, means some actual 
transgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral law 
or of a positive divine precept. .It has also, what may be 
called, a theological sense, in which it is used for that sin- 
fulness or frailty — that liability, or proneness, to trans- 
gression, which all men inherit from our first parents, and 
which is commonly denominated '* original " sin;* in which 
sense we find such expressions as " in sin hath my moth- 
er conceived me." The word seems also to be still fur- 
ther transferred, to signify the state of condemnation it- 
self, in which the children of Adam are " by nature born," 
in consequence of this sinful tendency in them: (or^ ac- 
cording to some divines, in consequence of the very guilt 
of Adam's offence being actually imputed to each individ- 
ual of his posterity.!) It must be in the sense of a *' state 
of condemnation," that our Church in her office for infant 

* Of the degree of this depravity of our nature, various accounts 
are given ; some representing it as amounting to a total loss of the 
moral faculty, or even, to a preference of evil for its own sake ; 
others making it to consist in a certain undue preponderance of the 
lower propensities over the nobler sentiments, &c. But these seem 
to be not differences as to the sense of the word, (with which alone 
we are here concerned) but as to the siate of the fact. 

It is worth while to notice however the carelessness with which, 
some are apt to express themselves, as if this frailty were introduc- 
ed && Ql consequence of Adam's transgression j as if, supposing him 
mot frail, he would have so transgressed. 

1 1 must again remind the reader that I am inquiring only into the 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 349 

baptism, speaks of " remission of sins," with reference to 
a child, which is no moral agent: "following the inno- 
cency of children,'* {i. e. o( actual sin) being mentioned 
within a few sentences. And as it is plain that actual 
sin cannot, in the former place, be meant, so, neither can 
it be, in this place, man^ s proneness to sin : since the bap- 
tismal office would not pray for, and hold out a promise 
of " release," and " remission " of that (I>p6vrifia oapKoq 
which, according to the article, " remains even in the re- 
generate." 

Though all theologians probably are aware of these dis- 
tinctions, yet much confusion of thought has resulted from 
their not being always attended to. 

SINCERITY and SINCERE, have a twofold meanmg 
of great moral importance. Sincerity is often used to de- 
note mere *' reality of conviction ;" — that a man actually 
believes what he professes to believe. Sometimes again 
it is used to denote " unbiassed conviction ;" or at least 
an earnest endeavour to shake off all prejudices, and all 
undue influence of wishes and passions on the judgment, 
and to decide impartially. 

It is in this latter sense that " sincerity " is justly re- 
garded as so commendable a quality that many and great 
errors are reckoned pardonable in proportion as a man has 
earnestly and sincerely endeavoured to ascertain what is 
right and true : while he who has not acted thus, but has 
allowed himself to be biassed by self-interest or passion, 
deserves no credit for the " sincerity " (i. e. reality) of 
his conviction, even if it should happen to be in itself a 
right one. 

It is a common mistake to suppose that the only influ- 
ence of interest, party spirit, or other improper motives is 
to induce men to make professions contrary to their real 
conviction. But "a gift," as the Scriptures express it, 
" blinds the eyes-''^ Not only the outward profession but 
the real convictions of the judgment are liable to be bias- 
sed by such motives. In fact " sincerity," in this sense 
will usually be the last stage of depravity : as Aristotle has 
remarked in respect of the character of the '' kKoTiacsToq — the 
senses in which each word Isf s actually heen used ; not into the tru^ 
or falsity of each doctrine in question. On the present question, see 
Etsayu on th* Difficultus in St, PavVs Writings, Essay VI. 



350 APPENDIX I 

man who from long indulgence in vice has so corrupted 

his principles as to feel no disapprobation of it. It is no- 
torious that liars often bring themselves by continual repe- 
tition to " credit their own lie."* And universally any 
one who persists in what is wrong, and in seeking excusea 
to justify it, will usually in time succeed in deceiving him- 
self into the belief that it is right,t and thus warping his 
conscience. 

Yet the credit due to the one kind of conscientious sin- 
cerity is often (partly through this ambiguity) bestowed on 
the other. But it makes all the difference whether you 
pursue a certain course because you judge it right, or judge 
it to be right because you pursue it; — whether you follow 
your conscience as one follows a guide, or as one follows 
the horses in a carriage, while he himself guides them ac- 
cording to his will. 

TENDENCY. " The doctrine, as mischievous as it is, 
I conceive, unfounded, that since there is a tendency in 
population to increase faster than the means of subsistence, 
hence the pressure of population against subsistence, may 
be expected to become greater and greater in each succes- 
sive generation, (unless new and extraordinary remedies 
are resorted to,) and thus to produce a progressive dimi- 
nution of human welfare ; — this doctrine, which some 
maintain in defiance of the fact that all civilized countries 
have a greater proportionate amount of wealth, (in other 
words, a smaller population, in proportion to the means of 
subsistence now than formerly — may be traced chiefly to 
an undetected ambiguity in the word * tendency,'' which 
forms a part of the middle term of the argument. By a 
•tendency' towards a certain result is sometimes meant, 
* the existence of a cause which, if operating unimpeded^ 
would produce that result.' In this sense it may be said 
with truth, that the earth, or any other body moving round 
a centre, has a tendency to fly off at a tangent ; i. e. the 
centrifugal force operates in that direction, though it is 
controlled by the centripetal ; or, again, that man has a 
greater tendency to fall prostrate than to stand erect ; i. e. 
the attraction of gravitation and the position of the centre 
of gravity, are such that the least breath of air would over- 

t Shakesnere-^The Tempest. f See Epistle to Horn. ch. i. 



AMBIGTJOUS TEKMS. 3|tt 

oethiin, but for the voluntary exertion of muscular force ; 
and, again, that population has a tendency to increase be- 
yond subsistrntje ; i. e. there are in man propensities, 
which, if unresti-ained, l«ad Vo that result. 

•' But sometimes, again, ^ a tendency towards a certain 
result is understood io mean * the existence of such a state 
ef tilings that that result may be expected ta take place.'* 
Now it is in these two senses thaf the word is used, in the 
two i:renaises of the .argument in question. But in this 
latter sense the earth has a greater tendency to remain in 
its orbit than to ily off' from it ; man has a greater tenden- 
cy to stand erect than to fall prcstrate ; and (as may be 
proved by comparing a more barbarous with a more civ- 
ilized period in the history of any country) in the progress 
of society, subsistence ha« a tendency to increase at a 
:greater rate than population ; or at least with a continually 
diminishing inferiority. In this country, for instance, 
much as our population has increased within the last five 
centuries, it yet bears a far less ratio to subsistence (though 
4still a much greater than could be wished) than it did five 
hundred years ago.'** But many of the writers, I have al- 
luded to seem to have confounded '^ an excess of increase^* 
with " an increase of the excess J'' 

THEREFORE.— Se€ ** Reason," and «^ Why." 

TRUTH, in the strict logical sense, applies to proposi- 
tions, and to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity 
of the declaration made to the actual state of the case; 
agreeably to Aldrich's definition of a " true" proposition 
—vera est, quae quod res est dieit. 

It would be an advantage if the word trueness or verity 
could be introduced and employed in this sense, since the 
word truth is so often used to denote the " ixwe^"* proposition 
itself. " What I tell you is the truth ; the truth of what 
I say shall be proved ;" the term is here used in these two 
senses; viz., in the "concrete," and in the "abstract" 
sense t In like manner falsehood is often opposed to truth 
in both these senses; being commonly used to signify the 
<5uality of a false proposition. But as we have the word 
falsity, which properlv denotes this, I have ihoughi it best, 
£ii a scientific treatise, always to employ it for that purpose. 

• Pol. Econ. Lcct. IX. p. 248—260. f See Book ii. Oh. t. ^ I 



952 APPENDIX I. 

la its etymological sense, truth signifies that which 
the speaker " trows," or believes to be the fact. The 
etymology of the word AAH9ES seems to be similar; 
denoting non-concealment. In this sense il is opposed to a 
lie : and may be called moral, as the other may logical, 
truth. A witness therefore may comply with his oath to- 
speak the truth, though it so happen that he is mistaken 
m some particular of his evidence,, provided he is fully 
convinced that the thing is as he states it. 

Truth is not unfrequently applied, in loose and inaccurate 
language, to arguments ; where the proper expression would 
be " correctness," " conclusive-ness," or "validity." 

Truth again, is often used in the sense oireality, TO ON. 
People speak of the truth or falsity of facts ; properly 
speaking, they are either real or fictitious : it is the state- 
ment that is "true" or "false." The "true" cause oi 
anything, is a common expression ; meaning " that whicb 
may with truth be assigned as the cause." The senses oi 
falsehood correspond. 

" Truth " in this sense, of " reality," is also opposed to 
shadows — types — pictures, &c. Thus, " the law was giveia 
hy Moses, but grace and * truth ' came by Jesus Christ :" for 
the law had only a " shadow of good things to come." 

The present is an ambiguity of which advantage has been 
often taken — through a deficiency either in candour or in 
clearness of thought — in advocating the claims of the 
Romish Church ; the ambiguity of the word church 
(which see) lending its aid to the fallacy. "Even the 
Protestants," they say, " dare not deny ours to be a * trui 
church;' now there can be but ^ one true churcl^:'" 
(which they support by those passages of Scripture which 
relate to the collective body of Christians in all thos^ 
several societies which also ^re called in Scripture, 
churches ;> " ours therefore must be the true Church ; if 
you forsake us, you forsake the truth and the Church, and 
consequently shut yourself out from the promises of the 
Crospel " Those wh© are of a logical and accurate turn 
of mind will easily perceive that the sense in which the 
Romish Church is admitted by her opponents to be a true 
church, is that of reality ; — it is a real, not a pretended 
church ; — it may be truly said to be a church. The sense 
in which the concession is sometimes made use of, is that 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 359 

♦f B, church teaching true doctrines; which was never 
conceded to the Church of Rome by Protestants ; who 
hold, that a church may err without ceasing to be a church. 

" The church is oney* then, not, as consisting of one 
society, but because the varioua societies or churches 
were then modelled, and ought still to be so, on the same 
principles ; and because they enjoy common privileges — 
one Lord, one Spirit, one baptism. Accordingly, the Holy 
Ghost, through his agents the Apostles, has not left any 
detailed account of the formation of any Christian society ; 
but He has very distinctly marked the great principles on 
which all were to be founded, whatever distinctions may 
exist amongst them. In short, the foundation of the 
Church by the Apostles was not analogous to the work of 
Romulus, or Solon ; it was not, properly, the foundation 
of Christian societies which occupied them, but the esta- 
blishment of the principles on which Christians in all 
ages might form societies for themselves. 

** The above account is sufficiently established even by 
the mere negative circumstance of the absence of all 
mention in the Sacred Writings of any one society on 
earth, having a government and officers of its own, and 
recognised as the Catholic or Universal Church ; espe- 
cially when it is considered that the frequent mention of 
the particular churches at Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, 
Corinth, &c. — of the seven churches in Asia — and of 
* the care of all the churches ' which Paul had founded, 
would have rendered unavoidable the notice of the one 
church (had there been any such) which bore rule over 
all the rest, either as its subjects, or as provincial depart- 
ments of it."t 

UNITY— -Seg "One." 

WHENCE— Sec " Why," and ** Reason." 

WHY 1 — As an interrogative, this word is employed in 
three senses^ viz. " By what proof 1" (orreason) "From 
what cause V* " For what purpose T' This last is com- 
monly called the " final cause." E. G. "Why is this 
prisoner guilty of the crime V " Why does a stone fall 

♦ See " One." 

t •' Essays on the Dangers," &c. Nate A, pp. 169, 170. 



^4 APPENDIX 1. 

to the earth T* " Why did yom go to London 1»' Mudi 
confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these diffe<^ 
rent inquiries. Se£ Reason. 



N. B. As the words which follow are all of them con- 
nected together in their significations, and as the explana- 
tions of their ambiguities have been furnished by the 
kindness of the professor of political economy, it seemed 
advisable to place them by themselves, and in the order in 
%vhich they appeared to him most naturally to arrange 
themselves. 

The foundation of political economy being a few gene- 
ral propositions deduced from observation or from con- 
sciousness, and generally admitted as soon as stated, it 
might have been expected that there would be as little 
difference of opinion among political- economists as among 
mathematicians ; — that, being agreed in their premises, 
they could not differ in their conclusions, but through 
some error in reasoning, so palpable as to be readily de- 
tected. And if they had possessed a vocabulary of general 
terms as precisely defined as the mathematical, this would 
probably have been the case. But as the terms of this 
science are drawn from common discourse, and seldom 
carefully defined by the writers who employ them, hardly 
one of them has any settled and invariable meaning, and 
their ambiguities are perpetually overlooked. The prin- 
cipal terms are only seven : viz. value, wealth, laboue, 

CAPITAL, RENT, WAGES, PROFITS. 

1. VALUE. As value is the only relation with which 
political economy is conversant, we might expect all 
economists to be agreed as to its meaning. There is no 
subject as to which they are less agreed. 

The popular, and far the most convenient, use of the 
word, is to signify the capacity of being given and receiv- 
ed in exchange. So defined, it expresses a relation. The 
value of any one thing must consist in the several quanti- 
ties of all other things which can be obtained in exchange 
for it, and never can remain fixed for an instant. Most 
writers admit the propriety of this definition at the outset, 
5ut they JBcarcely ever adheie to it 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 359 

Adam Smith defines value to mean either the utility of 
ft particular object, or tiie power o[ purchasing other goods 
which the possession of that object conveys. The first he 
calls " value in use," the second " value in exchange." 
But he soon afterwards says, that equal quantities of labour 
at all times and places are of equal value to the labourer, 
whatever may be the quantity of goods he receives in 
return for them ; and that labour never varies in its own 
value. It is clear that he affixed, or thought he had affix- 
ed, some other meaning to the word ; as the first of these 
propositions is contradictory, and the second false, which- 
ever of his two definitions we adopt. 

Mr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam 
Smith's definition of value in exchange. Sut in the 
greater part of his ** Principles of Political Economy," he 
uses the word as synonymous with cost : and by this one 
ambiguity has rendered his great work a long enigma. 

Mr. Malthus* defines value to be the power of purchas- 
ing. In the very next page he distinguishes absolute from 
relative value, a distinction contradictory to his definition 
of the term, as expressive of a relation. 

Mr. M'Cullochf distinguishes between real and ex- 
changeable, or relative value. And in his nomenclature, 
the exchangeable, or relative, value of a commodity consists 
in its capacity of purchasing ; — its real value in the quan- 
tity of labour required for its production or appropriation. 

All these differences appear to arise from a confusion of 
cause and eflect. Having decided that commodities are 
valuable in proportion to the labour they have respectively 
cost, it was natural to call that labour their value. 

2. WEALTH. Lord Lauderdale has defined wealth to 
be " all that man desires." Mr. Malthus,^: " those fnate- 
rial objects which are necessary, useful, or agreeable." 
Adam Smith confines the term to that portion of the results 
of land and labour which is capable of being accumulated. 
The French economists, to the net product of land. Mr. 
M'Culloch§ and M. Storch,]| to those material products 

* ** Measure of Value," p. 1. 

t ♦' Principles of Political Economy," Part HI. sect. 1. 

♦ " Principles of Political Economy," p. 28. 

I " Supplement to the EncyclopasdiaBritannica," Vol. VI. p. 217 
I " Cours d'Economi* Politique/^ Tome I. p. 91. Paris «dit 



356 APPENDIX I. 

which have exchangeable value ; according to Colonel 
Torrens* it consists of articles which possess utility, and 
arf produced by some portion of voluntary effort. M. Sayf 
divides wealth into natural and social, and applies the 
latter term to whatever is susceptible of exchange. It 
will be observed that the principal difference between 
these definitions consists in the admission or rejection of 
the qualifications " exchang-eable," and, " material. "4: 

It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done no 
more than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave birth to 
the mercantile system. In common language, to grow 
rich is to get money ; to diminish in fortune is to lose 
money : a rich man is said to have a great deal of money ; 
a poor man, very little : and the terms wealth and money 
are in short employed as synonymous. In consequence of 
these popular notions (to use the words of Adam Smith) 
all the different nations of Europe have studied every 
m^ns of accumulating gold and silver in their respective 
countries. This they have attempted by prohibiting the 
exportation of money, and by giving bounties on the ex- 
portation, and imposing restrictions on the importation, of 
other commodities, in the hope of producing what has been 
called a "favourable balance of trade ;" that is, a trade in 
which, the imports being always of less value than the 
exports, the difference is paid in money. A'conduct as 
wise as that of a tradesman who should part with his goods 
only for money ; and instead of employing their price in 
paying his workmen's wages, or replacing his stock, should 
keep it for ever in his till. The attempt to force such a 
trade has been as vain, as the trade, if it couft have been 
obtained, would have been mischievous. But the results 
have been fraud, punishment, and poverty at home, and 

* " Production of Wealth," p. 1. 

t ** Traite d'Economie Pol." Liv. II. Chap. ii. 

j " In many cases, where an exchange really takes piace, the fact 
is liable (till the attention is called to it) to be overlooked, in con- 
sequence of our not seeing any actual transfer from hand to hand 
of a material object. For instance, when the copyright of a book 
is sold to a bookseller, the article transferred is not the mere paper 
covered with writing, but tlie exclusive privilege of printing and 
publishing. It is plain, however, on a moment's thought, that the 
transaction is as real an exchange, as that which takes place be- 
tween the bookseller and his customers who buy copies trf the 
work."— Infrod. to Pol. Econ. Lect. I 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 357 

discord and war without. It has made nations consider 
the wealth of their customers a source of loss instead of 
profit ; and an advantageous market a curse instead of a 
blessing. By inducing them to refuse to profit by the 
peculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry, possessed 
by their neighbours, it has forced them in a great measure 
to give up iheir own. It has for centuries done more, and 
perhaps for centuries to come will do more, to retard the 
improvement of Europe than all other causes put together. 

3. LABOUR. The word labour signifies both the act 
of labouring, and the result «f that act. It is used in the 
first sense when we talk of the wages of labour ; in the 
second when.we talk of accumulated labour. When used 
to express the act of labouring, it may appear to have a 
precise sense, but it is still subject to some ambiguity. 
Say's definition* is ** action suivie, dirigee vers un but ;" 
Storch'Sjf " Paction des facultes humaines dirigee vers 
un but utile." These definitions include a waik taken 
for the purposes of health, and even the exertions of an 
agreeable converser. 

The great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own econo- 
mists in general, is the want of definitions. There is, 
perhaps, no definition of labour by any British economist. 
If Adam Smith had framed one, he would probably have 
struck out his celebrated distinction between " produc- 
tive " and " unproductive " labourers ; for it is difficult 
to conceive any definition of labour which will admit the 
epithet ** unproductive " to be applied to any of its sub- 
divisions, excepting that of misdirected labour. On the 
other hand, if Mr. M'OuUoch or Mr. Mill had defined 
labour they would scarcely have applied that term to the 
growth of a tree, or the improvement of wine in a cellar. 

4 . CAPITAL. This word, as might have been expected, 
from the complexity of the notions which it implies, has 
been used in very different senses. 

It is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general 
meaning which he attached to it will however appear from 
his enumeration of its species. He divides it^: into Jixea 
and circulating : including in the first what the capitalist 

» *' Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 606. | Book II. Chap i. 

♦ " Cours," &c. Liv. 1. Chap» ir. 



35S APPENDIX I. 

petain£, in the second what he parts with. Fixed capiti^ 
he subdivides into — 1. Machinery; 2. Shops and other 
buildings used for trade or manufacture ; 3. Improvements 
of land ; 4. Knowledge and skill. Circulating capital he 
subdivides into— 1. Money ; 2. Provisions in the hands of 
the provision-venders; 3. Unfinished materials of manu- 
facture ; 4. Fmished work in the hands of the merchant 
or manufacturer ; such as furniture in a cabinet-maker's 
shop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller. 

The following is a list of the definitions adopted by 
some of the most eminent subsequent economists : 

Ricardo* — " that part of the wealth of a country which 
is employed in production ; consisting of food, clothing, 
tools, raw materials, machinery, &c., necessajry to give 
effect to labour." 

Malthusf — " that portion of the material possessions 
of a country which is destined to be employed with a view 
te profit." 

Sayj — " accumulation de valeurs soustraites a la con- 
Bomption improductive." Chap. iii. ** Machinery, neces- 
saries of the workman, materials." 

Storch§ — " un fonds de richesses destin^ a la production 
materielle." 

M'Cullochll — " that portion of the produce of industry 
which can be made directly available to support human 
existence or facilitate production." 

Millir — "something produced, for the purpose of being 
employed as the means towards a further production." 

Torrens** — " those things on which labour has been be- 
stowed, and which are destined, not for the immediate 
supply of our wants, but to aid us in obtaining other arti 
cles of utility." 

It is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coin- 
cide. Adam Smith's (as implied in his use of the term ; 
for he gives no formal definition) excludes the necessar».ei 
of the labourer, when in his own possession ; all the rest 

♦ '• Principles of Political Economy," p. 89^ 3d edit. 

t •• Principles," See. p. 293. 

\ " Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 454. 

\ '* Cours," &c. Liv. II. Chap. i. 

II •* Principles," &c. p.. 92. 

IT ** Elements," &c. p. 19, 3d edit. 

♦»*' Pl»ductionafWeaIth,"p.d 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 350 

tfAftd perhaps with better reason) admit them. On the 
uther hand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to 
be right) those things which are incapable of productive 
consumption, provided they have not yet reached their con- 
sumers. All the other definitions, except perhaps that of 
Mr. Malthus, which is ambiguous, are subject to the in- 
consistency of affirming that a diamond, and the gold in 
which it is to be set, are capital while the jeweller keeps 
them separate, but cease to be so when he has formed them 
into a ring ; almost all of them, also, pointedly exclude 
knowledge and skill. The most objectionable, perhaps, 
is that of Mr. M'Cultoch, which, while it excludes all the 
finished contents of a jeweller's shop, would include a rac- 
ing stud. 

Adam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in 
his use of the word; ihus, in the beginning of his second 
hook he states, that all capitals are destined for the main- 
tenance of productive labour only. It is difficult to see 
what labour is maintained by what is to be unproductively 
consumed. 

5. RENT. 6. WAGES. 7. PROFIT. 

Adam Smith first divided revenue into Rent, "Wages, 
and Profit ; and his division has been generally followed. 
The following definitions will best show the degree of pre- 
cision with which these three terms have been employed. 

Adam Smith. 

1. R«»nt. What is paid for the licence to gather the 
ptodvice of the land. — Book I. Chap. vi. 

2. Wages. The price of labour. — Book I. Chap. v. 

3. Profit. The revenue derived from stock by the per- 
fion who manages or employs it. — Book I. Chap. vi. 

Say. {Traiti d^ Economic Politique.) 4eme Edit. 

1. Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la 
terre.— Tome II. p. 169 

2. Wages. Le prix de I'achat d'un service productif 
industriel.— Tome II. p. 503. 

3. Profit. La portion de lavaleur produite, retiree par 
le capitaliste.— Tome I. p. 71, subdivided into interet, pro- 
fit industriel, and profit capital. 



380 APPENDIX I. 

Storch. {Cours iV Economic Politiqm.) Paris, 1823. 

1. Rent. Le prix qiron paye pour Tusage d*un fonds 
de terre. — Tome I. p. 354. 

2. Wages. Le prix du travail. — p. 283. 

3. Profit. The returns to capital are considered by 
Storch, under the heads, rente de capital, and profit de 
^entrepreneur. The first he divides into loyer, the hire 
of fixed capital, and interet, that of circulating capital. 
The second he considers as composed of, 1st remuneration 
for the use of capital ; 2nd, assurance against risk ; 3rd, 
remuneration for trouble. — Liv. III. Chap. ii. viii. xiii. 

SisMONDi. {Nouveau Principles, &c.) 

1. Rent. La part de la recolte annuelle du sol qui re- 
vient au proprietaire apres qu'il a acquitte les frais qui Pont 
fail naitre ; and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la compensation 
du travail de la terre ; 2nd, le prix de monopole : 3rd, la 
mieux valeur que le proprietaire, obtient par la comparaison 
d'une terre de nature superieure a une terre inferieure ; 
4th, le revenu des capitaux qu'il a fixes luimeme sur la ter- 
re, et ne puet plus en retirer. — Tome I. p. 280. 

2 Wages. Le prix du travail. — p. 91. 

3. Profit. La valeur dont I'ouvrage acheve surpasseles 
avances qui Pont fait faire. L'avantage qui resulte des 
travajx passes. Subdivided into inteert and profit mer- 
cantile.— p. 94, 359. 

Malthus. {Principles, fyc.) 

1. Rent. That portion of the value of the whole pro- 
duce of land which remains to the owner after payment of 
all the outgoings of cultivation, including average profits 
on the capital employed. The excess of price above wages 
and profits — p. 134. 

2 Wages. The remuneration of the labourer for hii 
personal exertions. — p. 240. 

3. Profit. The difference between the value of the ad- 
vances necessary to produce a commodity, and the value 
of the commodity when produced. — p. 293. 

Mill. {Elements, &c.) 3d Ed. 

1. Rent. The difference ^between the rettirn made to 



AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 36' 

the most productive, and that which is made to the leaw 
productive portion of capital employed On the land. — p. 33. 

2. Wages. The price of the labourer's share of the 
commodity produced. — p. 41. 

3. Profit. The share of the joint produce of labour and 
stock which is received by the owner of stock after repla- 
cing the capital consumed. The portion of the whole an- 
nual produce which remains after deducting rent and wa- 
ges. Remuneration for hoarded labour. — Chap. 2, 3. 

ToRRENS. {Corn Trade.) 3d Ed. 

1 . Rent. That part of the produce which is given to the 
land-proprietor for the use of the soil. — p. 130. 

2. Wages. The articles of wealth which the labourer 
receives in exchange for his labour. — p. 83. 

3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished work 
possesses above the value of the material, implements, and 
subsistence expended. The surplus remaining after the 
cost of production has been replaced. — Production of 
Wealth, p. 53. 

M*CuLLOCH. {Principles, &c.) 

1 . Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which 
is paid by the farmer to the landlord for the use of the nat- 
ural and inherent powers of the soil. — p. 265. 

2. Wages. The compensation paid to labourers in re- 
turn for their services — Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1. 

3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by 
the expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that 
quantity of capital. — Principles, p. 36G. 

RiCARDO. {Principles, &c.) 3d Ed. 

1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which 
IS paid to the landlord for the use of the original and in- 
destructible powers of the soil. — p. 53. 

2. Wages. The labourer's proportion of the produce 
Chap. V. 

3. Profit. The capitalist's proportion of the produce. 
Chap. vi. 

The first observation to be made on these definitions, is, 
that the rent of land, which is only a species of an extensive 
genus, is used as a genus, and that its cognate species are 
either omitted or inchided under genera to which they do 
28 



362 APPENDIX I. 

not properly belong. Wages and profits are of faumaa" 
creation : they imply a sacrifice of ease or immediate enjoy- 
ment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is indicated 
by the common expressions of " the rate of wages," and the 
" rate of profits :" a ratio which has a strong tendency to 
uniformity. But there is another and a very large source of 
revenue, which is not the creation of man, but of nature ; 
which owes its origin, not to the will of its possessor, but to 
accident; which implies no sacrifice, has no tendency to 
uniformity, and to which the term " rate" is seldom applied. 

This revenue arises from the exclusive right to some in 
strument of production, enabling the employment of a given 
amount of labour or capital to be more than usually pro- 
ductive. The principal of these instruments is land ; but 
all extraordinary powers of body or mind — all processes 
in manufacture which are protected by secrecy or by 
law — all peculiar advantages from situation or connexion 
— in short, every instrument of production which is not 
universally accessible, affords a revenue distinct in its or- 
igin from wages or profits, and of which the rent of land is 
only a species. In the classification of revenues, either 
rent ought to have been omitted as a genus, and considered 
only as an anomalous interruption of the general uniformi- 
ty of wages and profits, or all the accidental sources of rev- 
enue ought to have been included in one genus, of which 
the rent of land would have formed the principal species. 

Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of 
profit include the wages of the labour of the capitalist. The 
continential economists have in general been aware of this, 
and have pointed it out in their analyses of the component 
parts of profit. The British economists have seldom en- 
tered into this analysis, and the want of it has been a great 
cause of obscurity. 

On the other hand, much of what properly belongs to 
profit and rent is generally included under wages. Almost 
all economists consider the members of the liberal profes- 
sions under the class of labourers. The whole subsistence 
of such persons, observes Mr. M'Culloch,* is derived from 
wages ; and they are as evidently labourers as if they hand- 
led the spade or the plough. But it should be considered, 
that those who are engaged in any occupation requiring 
♦ " Principles," &c. p. 228. 



AMBIGLX)US TERMS. 368 

more skill than that of a common husbandman, must have 
expended capital more or less, on the acquisition of their 
skill ; their education must have cost something in every 
case, from that of the handicraft-apprentice, to that of the 
legal or medical student ; and a profit on this outlay is of 
course looked for, as in other disbursements of capital ; 
and the higher profit, in proportion to the risk ; viz. the 
uncertainty of a man's success in his business. Part, 
therefore, and genera-lly far the greater part, of what has 
been reckoned the wages of his labour ought more properly 
to be reckoned profits on the capital expended in fitting 
faim for that particular kind of labour. And again, all the 
excess of gains acquired by one possessing extraordinary 
talents, opportunities, or patronage (since these correspond 
to the possession of land — of a patent- right — or other mo- 
nopoly — of a secret, &c.) may be more properly regarded 
as rent than as wages. 

Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from 
the use of the word wages, sometimes as expressing a 
g^uantity, sometimes as expressing a proportion. 

In ordinary language, wages means the amount of some 
commodity, generally of silver, given to the labourer in 
return for a given exertion ; and they rise or fall, as that 
amount is increased or diminished. 

In the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the 
labourer's proportion of what is produced, supposing that 
produce to be divided between him and the capitalist. 
In this sense they generally rise as the whole produce is 
diminished ; though if the word be used in the other sense, 
they generally fall. If Mr. Ilicardo had constantly used 
the word "wages," to express a proportion, the only 
inconvenience would have been the necessity of always 
translating this expression into common language. But 
he is not consistent. When he says,* that ** whatever 
raises the wages of labour lowers the profits of stock," 
he considers wages as a proportion. When he says,f 
that " high wages encourage population ;" he considers 
wages as an amount. Even Mr. M'CuUoch, who has 
clearly explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He 
has even suflfered it to affect his reasonings. In his 
valuable essay, ** on the Rate of Wages,":t he admits that 

♦ " Principles," &c. p. 312. f Ibid. p. 83 X P- l^l' 



364 APPENDIX II. 

** when wages are high, the capitalist hijs to pay a largef 
share of the produce of industry to his labourers." An 
admission utterly inconsistent with his general use of the 
word, as expressing the amount of what the labourer 
receives, which, as he has himself observed,* may increase 
while his proportion diminishes. 

A few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which 
attach to the seven terms that have been selected ; and 
these terms have been fixed on, not as the most ambiguous, 
but as the most important, in the political nomenclature. 
" Supply and demand," " productive and unproductive,*' 
" overtrading," and very many others, both in political 
economy, and in other subjects, which are often used with- 
out any more explanation, or any more suspicion of their 
requiring it, than the words " triangle " or ** twenty," are 
perhaps even more liable to ambiguities than those above 
treated of. But it is sufficient for the purpose of this 
appendix to have noticed, by way of specimens, a few of 
the most remarkable terms in several different branches 
of knowledge, in order to show both the frequency of an 
ambiguous use of language, and the importance of clearing 
up such ambiguity. 



No. ir. 

MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF 
LEARNERS. 

N. B. In such of the following examples as are not in 
a syllogistic form, it is intended that the student should 
practise the reduction of them into that form ; those oi 
them, that is, in which the reasoning is in itself sound : 
viz. where it is impossible to admit the premises and deny 
the conclusion. Of such as are apparent syllogisms, the 
validity must be tried by logical rules, which it may be 
advisable to apply in the following order : 1st. Observe 
whether the argument be categorical or hypothetical; re 
collecting that an hypothetical premiss does not necessa* 
rily imply an hypothetical syllogism, unless the reasoning 
turns on the hypothesis. If this appear to be the case, the 
• " Principles," &c. p. 365. 



EXAMPLES. M5 

rules for hypothetical syllogisms must be applied. 2dly. 
If the argument be categorical, count the terms. 3dly. If 
only three, observe whether the middle be distributed. 
4thly. Observe whether the premises are both negative; 
(i. e. really, and not in appearance only,) and if one is, 
whether the conclusion be negative also ; or affirmative, 
if both premises affirmative. 5thly. Observe what terms 
are distributed in the conclusion, and whether the same 
are distributed in the premises. 6thly. If the syllogism is 
not a categorical in the first figure, reduce it to that form. 



1. No one is free who is enslaved by his appetites: a 
sensualist is enslaved by his appetites : therefore a sen- 
sualist is not free. 

2. None but whites are civilized : the ancient Germans 
were whites : therefore they were civilized. 

3. None but whites are civilized : the Hindoos are not 
whites : therefore they are not civilized. 

4. None but civilized people are whites : the Gauls were 
whites ; therefore they were civilized. 

5. No one is rich who has not enough : no miser has 
enough : therefore no miser is rich. 

6. If penal laws against papists were enforced, they 
would be aggrieved : but penal laws against them are not 
enforced: therefore the papists are not aggrieved. 

7. If all testimony to miracles is to be admitted, the 
popish legends are to be believed : but the popish legends 
are not to be believed : therefore no testimony to miracles 
is to be admitted. 

8. If men are not likely to be influenced in the perform- 
ance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the 
oaths commonly administered are superfluous : if they are 
likely to be so influenced, every one should be made to 
take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life ; but one 
or the other of these must be the case : therefore either 
the oaths commonly administered are superfluous, or every 
man should be made to take an oath to behave rightly 
throughout his life. 

9. The Scriptures must be admitted to be agreeable to 
truth ; and the Church of England is conformable to the 
Scriptures : A. B. is a divine of the Church of England ; 



366 APPENDIX II. 

and this opinion is in accordance with his sentiments < 
therefore it must be presumed to be true. 

10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture,) 
pleased God ; but without faith it is impossible to please 
Him ,• (for he that cometh to God must believe that He 
is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek 
Him :) therefore, &c. 

11. "If Abraham were justified by works, then had he 
whereof to glory [before God :] but not [any one can have 
whereof to glory] before God:" therefore Abraham was 
not justified by works. 

12. " He that is of God heareth my words : ye therefore 
hear them not, because ye are not of God." 

13. Few treatises of science convey important truths, ' 
without any intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and in- 
teresting form : and therefore, though a treatise would de- 
serve much attention which should possess such excellence, 
it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve much 
attention. 

14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for re- 
ligious duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory on 
us : but we are bound to set apart one day in seven for re- 
ligious duties ; and hence it appears that the fourth com- 
mandment is obligatory on us. 

15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference 
to the divine institution of sacrifices : one of the precepts 
delivered to Noah was abstinence from the eating of blood ; 
therefore one of the precepts delivered to Noah contained 
the divine institution of sacrifices. 

16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed be- 
fore the Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not 
of ceremonial sin (which could not then exist,) but of mor- 
al sin : if so, the Levitical sacrifices must have had no less 
efficacy ; and in that case, the atonements under the Mo- 
saic law would have " made the comers thereunto perfect 
as pertaining to the conscience ;" but this was not the 
case : therefore, &c. [Davison on Prophecy.] 

17. The adoration of images is forbidden to Christians, 
if we suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israel- 
ites alone, but for all men : it was designed, however^ for 
the Israelites alone, and not for all men : therefore the 
adoration of images is not forbidden to Christians. 



EXAMPLES. 367 

18. A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of 
the tenth commandment : all gaming, therefore, since it 
implies a desire to profit at the expense of another, in- 
volves a breach of the tenth commandment. 

19. All the fish that the net mclosed were an indiscri- 
minate mixture of various kinds : those that were set aside 
and saved as valuable, were fish that the net enclosed : 
therefore those that were set aside, and saved as valuable, 
were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds. 

20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as are 
trar»*y separated from the rest of mankind by the divine 

decree .* ie the elect : therefore such persons as are arbi- 
trarily separated from the rest of mankind by the divine 
decree, are finally saved. [The opponents of this conclusion 
generally deny the minor premiss and admit the major ; the reverse 
would be the more sound and the more eflectual objection.] 

21. No one who lives with another on terms of confi- 
dence is justified, on any pretence, in killing him : Brutus 
lived on terms of confidence with Caesar : therefore he was 
not justified, on the pretence he pleaded, in killing him. 

22. He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power 
in a free country deserves well of his countrymen : Brutus 
destroyed Coesar, who usurped despotic power in Rome : 
therefore he deserved well of the Romans. 

23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary : virtue is 
voluntary : therefore so is vice. [Aristh. Eth. B. iii.] 

24. A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards 
and punishments of a future state, or must be able to ap- 
peal to an extraordinary Providence, dispensing them re- 
gularly in this life j Moses did not do the former: there- 
fore he must have done the latter. [Warburton.] 

25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than 
the falsity of testimony can be fairly established by testi- 
mony : any extraordinary and unusual fact is a thing of 
less frequent occurrence than the falsity of testimony (that 
being very common ;) therefore no extraordinary and un- 
usual fact can be fairly established by testimony. 

26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely 
to be false ; the evidence on which most men believe that 
there are pyramids in Egypt is testimony : therefore the 
evidence on which most men believe that there are pyra- 
mids in Egypt is very likely to be false. 

27. The religion of the ancient Greeks an,d Romans WQi 



365 APPENDIX II. 

a tissue of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions, 
credited by the vulgar and the weak, and maintained by 
the more enlightened, from selfish or political views : the 
same was clearly the case with the religion of the Egyp- 
tians : the same may be said of the Brahminical worship 
of India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese ; 
the same of the romantic mythological system of the Pe- 
ruvians, of the stern and bloody rites of the Mexicans and 
those of the Britons and of the Saxons : hence we may 
conclude that all systems of religion, however varied in 
circumstances, agree in being superstitions kept up among 
the vulgar, from interested or political views in the more 
enlightened classes. [See Dissertation. Chap. i. § 2.] ^ 

28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities ; 
a miracle is an impossibility ; therefore no man can possess 
power to perform a miracle. [See Appendix, Art. " impossible." 

29. A. B. and C. D. are each of them equal to E. F. ; 
therefore they are equal to each other. 

30. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the in- 
nocent ; therefore, as you maintain that this person ought 
not to be punished, it appears that you are convinced of 
his innocence. 

31 . All the most bitter persecutions have been religious 
persecutions : among the most bitter persecutions were 
those which occurred in France during the revolution : 
therefore they must have been religious persecutions. 

32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does^ 
has neither merit nor demerit in his action ; a liberal and 
benevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he does 
in relieving the poor : therefore such a man has neither merit 
nor demerit in his action. [See App. Art. " Impossible."] 

33. What happens every day is not improbable : some 
things against which the chances are many thousands to 
one, happen every day : therefore some things against which 
the chances are many thousands to one, are not improbable. 

34. The early and general assignment of the epistle to the 
Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either from 
Its professing to be his, and containing his name, or from 
its really being his ; since, therefore, the former of these 
is not the fact, the epistle must be Paul's. 

35. " With some of them God was not well pleased ; for 
they were overthrown in the wilderness " 



EXAMPLES. 369 

^ , ^ 36. A sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratificatione 
, 'without satiety : it is impossible to enjoy perpetual gratifi- 
cations without satiety : therefore it is impossible for a 
sensualist to obtain his wish. 
" D 37. If Paley's system is to be received, one who has no 
knowledge of a future state has no means of distinguishing 
virtue and vice : now one who has no means of distinguish- 
ing virtue and vice can commit no sin : therefore, if Pa- 
ley's system is to be received, one who has no knowledge 
of a future state can commit no sin. 

38. The principles of justice are variable : the appoint- 
ments of nature are invariable : therefore the principles of 
justice are no appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. v.] 

39. Every one desires happiness: virtue is happiness: 
therefore every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. hi.] 

, ^1^0. A story is not to be believed, the reporters of which 
give contradictory accounts of it ; the story of the life and 
exploits of Bonaparte is of this description : therefore it is 
not to be believed. See B. i.§ 3. 

41. When the observance of the first day of the week 
as a religious festival in commemoration of Christ's 
resurrection, was first introduced, it must have been a 
novelty: when it was a novelty, it must have attracted 
notice: when it attracted notice, it would lead to inquiry 
respecting the truth of the resurrection : when it led to 
this inquiry, it must have exposed the story as an impos- 
ture, supposing it not attested by living witnesses: there- 
fore, when the observance of the first day of the week, 
&c. was first introduced, it must have exposed as an 
imposture the story of the resurrection, supposing it not 
attested by living witnesses. 

42. All the miraclesof Jesus would fill more books than 
the world could contain : the things related by the Evan- 
gelists are the miracles of Jesus : therefore the things 
related by the Evangelists would fill more books than the 
world could contain. 

43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been 
written without knowledge of the events of the time of 
Christ, they could not correspond with them exactly ; and 
if they had been forged by Christians, they would not be 
preserved and acknowledged by the Jews : they are pre- 
served and acknowledged by the Jews, and they corres- 

29 



ttO APPENDIX II. 

pond exactly with the events of the time of Christ : there- 
fore they were neither written without knowledge of 
those events, nor were forged by Christians. 

44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred : occasional 
turbulence, therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism, 
is to be preferred to it. 

45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith 
in order to be acceptable to the Deity : now he who 
believes all the fables of the Hindoo mythology must 
possess faith : therefore such an one must, according to 
theologians, be acceptable to the Deity. 

46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either 
by faith or by works : now he was not justified by faith, 
(according to James,) nor by works, (according to Paul :) 
therefore Abraham was not justified. 

47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it : 
all punishment is an evil : therefore no punishment should 
be allowed that good may come of it. 

48. Repentance is a good thing : wicked men abound in 
repentance [Arist Eth.B.ix. :] therefore wicked men abound 
in what is good. 

49. A person infected with the plague will (probably) die 
[suppose three in five of the infected die :] this man is (probably) 
infected with the plague [suppose it an even chance :] there- 
fore he will (probably) die. query. What is the amount of 
this probability ? Again, suppose the probability of the major to be 
(instead of ^ ) ^ , and of the minor, (instead of ^ ) to be 5, Query. 
What will be the probability of the conclusion ? 

50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has 
been accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the 
condition of a slave : many of the negroes, however, may 
be happy in the condition of slaves, because they have 
never been accustomed to enjoy liberty. 

51. Whatever is dictated by Nature is allowable : devo- 
tedness to the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that of 
gain in old age, are dictated by Nature [Arist. Rhet. B. ii. :] 
therefore they are allowable. 

52. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that 
person's greatest good : a virtuous man seeks the greatest 
good for himself: therefore a virtuous man is the greatest 
lover of himself. [Arist. Eth. B ix.] 

53 He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action. 



EXAMPLES. tti 

exercises no self-denial in the practice of that action : a 
good man has a confirmed habit of Virtue : therefore he 
who exercises self-denial in the practice of Virtue is not 
a good man. [Aiist. Eth. B. ii.] 

54. That man is independent of the caprices of fortune 
who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual ex- 
cellence ; a true philosopher is independent of the caprices 
of fortune : therefore a true philosopher is one who places 
his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence. 

55. A system of government which extends to those 
actions that are performed secretly, must be one which re- 
fers either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to 
the rewards and punishments of another world ; every per- 
fect system of government must extend to those actions 
which are performed secretly : no system of government 
therefore can be perfect, which does not refer either to a 
regular divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and 
punishments of another world. [Warburton's Divine Legation,] 

56. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds 
by diligent study, the incitement of academical honours 
is unnecessary ; and it is ineffectual, for the idle, and such 
as are indifferent to mental improvement : therefore th«i 
incitement of academical honours is either unnecessary' 
or ineffectual. 

57. He who is properly called an actor, does not eii 
deavour to make his hearers believe that the sentiment! 
he expresses and the feelings he exhibits, are really hi* 
own : a barrister does this : therefore he is not properly td 
be called an actor. 

58. He who bears arms at the command of the magia«" 
trate does what is lawful for a Christian : the Swiss in th« 
French service, and the British in the American service, 
bore arms at the command of the magistrate : therefore 
they did what was lawful for a Christian. 

59. If Lord Bacon is right , it is improper to stock a 
•new colony with the refuse of jails: but this we nust al- 
low not to be improper, if our method of colonizing New 
South Wales be a wise one : if this be wise, therefor^. 
Lord Bacon is not right. 

60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aris» 
totle is to be regarded as infallible : but he is not : ho* 
gic therefore is not worthy of being cultivated. 



372 APPENinx II. 

61 . All studies are useful which tend to advance a man 
in life, or to increase national and private wealth : but the 
course of studies pursued at Oxford has no such tendency: 
therefore it is not useful. 

62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed, 
tends to heighten in others the dread of undergoing the 
same fate, it may be expected that those soldiers who have 
seen the most service, should have the most dread of death 
in battle ; but the reverse of this is the case : therefore 
the former is not to be believed. 

63 If the everlasting favour of God is not bestowed at 
random, and on no principle at all, it must be bestowed 
either with respect to men's persons, or with respect to 
their conduct : but " God is no respector of persons :'* 
therefore his favour must be bestowed with respect to 
men's conduct. [Sumner's Apostolical Preaching. 1 

64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment, 
it is in itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime ; if it is 
80 felt, much of its severity is wasted, from its taking 
place at too great a distance to affect the feelings, or even 
come to the knowledge, of most of those whom it is de- 
signed to deter; but one or other of these must be the 
case ; therefore transportation is not calculated to answer 
the purpose of preventing crime. 

65. War is productive of evil : therefore peace is like- 
ly to be productive of good, 

66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other per- 
ceptible purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers 
have great beauty ; and many of them accordingly answer 
no other purpose but to gratify the sight. 

67. A man who deliberately devotes him self to a life ot 
aensuality is deserving of strong reprobation : but those do 
not deliberately devote themselves to a life of sensuality 
who are hurried into excess by the impulse of the passions : 
such therefore as are hurried into excess by the impulse 
of the passions are not deserving of strong reprobation. 
[Arist. Eth, B. vii.] 

68. It is a difficult task to restrain all inordinate desires : 
to conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint 
of all inordinate desires : therefore it is a difficult task to 
conform to the precepts of Scripture. 

69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemn- 



EXAMPLES. 8T3 

ing a book Without reading it: some reviewers do not 
refrain from this : therefore some reviewers are not 
candid. 

70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a 
change ©f established laws, no laws could reasonably be 
maintained : but some laws can reasonably be maintained : 
therefore no objection that can be urged will justify a 
change of establisiied laws. 

71. If any complete theory could be framed, to explain 
the establishment of Christianity by human causes, such a 
theory would have been proposed before now ; but none 
such ever has been proposed : therefore no such theory 
can be framed. 

72. He who is content with what he has, is truly rich : 
a covetous man is not content with what he has: no 
covetous man therefore is truly rich. 

73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the cir- 
cumstances of such an event as could not be conjectured 
by natural reason : this is the case with the prophecies of 
the Messiah contained in the Old Testament : therefore 
these are true prophecies. 

74. The connexion of soul and body cannot be compre- 
hended or explained ; but it must be believed : therefore 
something must be believed which cannot be comprehend- 
ed or explained. 

75. Lias lies above red sandstone ; red sandstone lies 
above coal : therefore lias lies above coal. 

76. Cloven feet being found universally in horned ani- 
mals, we may conclude that this fossil animal, since it 
appears to have had cloven feet, was horned. 

77. All that glitters is not gold : tinsel glitters : therefore 
it is not gold. 

78. A negro is a man: therefore he who murders a 
negro murders a man. 

79. Meat and drink are necessaries of life : the revenues 
of Vitellius were spent on meat and drink: therefore the 
revenues of Vitellius were spent on the necessaries of life* 

80. Nothing is heavier than platina : feathers are hea- 
vier than nothing : therefore feathers are heavier than 
platina. 

81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother: 
$he governed her husband ; he governed Athens ; Athens, 



174 APPENDIX II. 

Greece ; and Greece, the world : therefore the cLild ol 

rhemistocles governed the world. 

82. He who calls you a loan speaks truly : he who calla ; 
you a fool, calls you a maii : therefore he who calls you a 
'bol speaks truly. 

83. Warm countries alone produce wines : Spain is a 
warm country: therefore Spain produces wines. 

84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to 
freeze quicksilver: the climate of Siberia is sufficient to 
freeze quicksilver : therefore the climate of Siberia is in- 
tensely cold. 

S5. Mistleto of the oak is a vegetable excrescence which"^^^ 
is not a plant ; and every vegetable excrescence which is f 
^not a plant, is posses&r.d of magical virtues: therefore 
Mistleto of the oak is possessed of magical virtues. 

86. If the hour-hand of a clock be any distance (sup- 
pose a foot) before tke irinute-hand, this last, though 
moving twelve times fijaf/;T, va^ never oy^^.rtake the other ; 
for while the minute liv id is moving over those twelve 
inches, the hour-hand v A have moved ov^r one inch : so 
that they will then b': an inch apart ; and while the 
minute-hand is movirn;, over that one inch, the hour-hand 
will have moved over ~ inch, so that it wili still be a- 
head; and again, wuile the minute-hand is pa«jsing ovei 
that space of ~ in* h which now divides them^ the hour- 
hand will pass over y~ inch ; so that it will still be a- 
head, though the distance between the two is diminish- 
ed ; &c. &c. &c., and thus it is plain we may go on for 
ever: therefore tl-* minute-hand can never overtake the 
hour-hand. [This is one of the sophistical puzzles noticed by 
Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achilles and a tortoise ;) but he 
ris not happy in his attempt at a solution. He proposes to remove 
the difficulty by demonstrating that, in a certain given tin^, 
Achilles would overtake the tortoise : as if any one had ever 
doubted that. The very problem proposed is to surmount the diffi- 
culty of a seeming demonstration of a thing palpably impossible ; 
to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of the problem. 

I have heard the present example adduced as a proof that the pre- 
tensions of Logic are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect 
logical demonstration may lead from true premises to an absurd 
conclusion. The reverse is the truth ; the example before us fur 
nishes a confirmation of the utility of an acquaintance with the 
•yllogis^c form : in which form the pretended demonstration in guM 



EXAMPLES. 375 

ii<m cannot possibly be exhibited. An attempt to do so will evinci 
the utter want oi connexion between the premises and the conclu 
sion.] 

^ 87. Theft 13 a crime : theft was encouraged by the laws 
of Sparta : therefore the laws of Sparta encouras^ed crime. 

88. Every hen comes from an egg : every egg comes 
from a hen : therefore every egg comes from an egg. 

89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn ; therefore the son of 
Jupiter was the grandson of Saturn. 

90. All coM is to be expelled by heat : this person's dis- 
order is a cold : therefore it is to be expelled by heat. 

91. Wine is a stimulant : therefore in a case where 
stimulants are hurtful, wine is hurtful. 

92. Opium is a poison : but physicians advise some of 
their patients to take opium: therefore physicians advise 
eome of their patients to take poison. 

93. What we eat grew in the fields : loaves of bread are 
what we eat : therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields. 

94. Animal-food may be cntir^^ly dispensed with: (as is 
shown by the practice of the Brahmjns and of some 
monks ;) and vegetable -food may be entirely dispensed with 
(as is plain from the example of the Esquimaux and 
others ;) but all food consists of animal-food and vegetable- 
food : therefore all food may be dispensed with. 

95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it : 
a mining speculation is no trifling business : therefore a 
mining speculation will enrich those engaged in it. 

96. He who is most hungry eats most ; he who eats least 
is most hungry : therefore he who eats least eats most. 
{See Aldrich's Compendium : FallacisB : where this is rightly 
solved.] 

97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in 
the place where it is, or in a place where it is not : neither 
of these is possible : therefore there is no such thing as 
motion, [in this instance, as well as in the one lately noticed, 
Aldrich mistakes the character of the difficulty ; which is, npt to 
prove the truth of that which is self-evident, but to explain an ap- 
parent demonstration militating against that which nevertheless 
no one ever doubted. He says in this case, " solvitur ambulando j" 
but (pace lanti viri) this is no solution at all, but is the very thing 
which constitutes the difficulty in question 3 for it is precisely because 
we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of its im- 
possibility produces perplexity. — See Introduction. 

98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the 



876 APPENDIX II. 

moon : hair is a vegetable ; therefore hair grows most 14 
the increase of the moon. 

99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to 
the improvement of the mind : all the works of the most 
celebrated ancients are among the studies pursued at Ox- 
ford : therefore some of the works of the most celebrated 
ancients conduce to the improvement of the mind. 

100. Some poisons are vegetable : no poisons are use- 
ful drugs : therefore some useful drugs are not vegetable. 

101. A theor)^ will speedily be exploded, if false, which 
apppeals to the evidence of observation and experiment : 
Cranioiogy appeals to this evidence : therefore, if Cra- 
niology be a false theory, it will speedily be exploded. 
[Let the probability of one of these premises be ^q ; and of the 
other T : (^uery. What is the probability of the conclusion and 
which are the terms. 

102. Wilkes was a favourite with the populace; he who 
18 a favourite with the populace must understand how to 
manage them ? he who understands how to manage them, 
must be well acquainted with their chai'acter: he who is 
well acquainted with 4heir character, must hold them in 
contempt : therefore Wilkes must have held the populace 
in contempt. 

103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he 
should be viewed in that state in which all his faculties 
are most fully developed ; the civilized state is that in 
which all man's faculties are most fully developed : 
therefore, to discover whether man has any moral sense, 
he should be viewed in a civilized state. 

104. Revenge, robbery, adultery, infanticide, &c. have 
been countenanced by public opinion in several countries: 
all the crimes we know of are revenge, robbery, adultery, 
infanticide, &c. : therefore, all the crimes we know of have 
been countenanced by public opinion in several countries. 
fPaley's Moral Philosophy.] 

105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who 
are not well qualified to perform their part. None but 
veterans are well qualified to perform their part. None 
but veterans should be brought into the field. 

106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining businesses bene- 
ficial to sugar-refiners : and of the corn-trade to corn- 



EXAMPLES. 877 

growers: and of the silk-manufacture to silk-weavers, 
&c. &c. ; and thus each class of men are benefited by 
some restrictions. Now all these classes of men make up 
the whole community : therefore a system of restrictions 
is beneficial to the community. [See Chap.iii.§ 11.] 

107. There are two kinds of things which we ought not 
to fret about: what we can help, and what we cannot. 
[To be stated as a dilemma.] 

Iu8. He who believes himself to be always in the right 
in his opinion, lays claim to infallibility : you always 
believe yourself to be in the right in your opinion : there- 
fore you lay claim to infallibility. 

109. No part of mankind can ever have received divine 
instruction in any of the arts of life : because the Israel- 
ites, who are said to have had a revelation made to them 
of religion, did not know, in the times of Solomon, that 
the circumference of a circle differs from the treble of 
the diameter. 

110. The epistle attributed to Barnabas is not to be 
reckoned among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers ; 
because, if genuine, it is a part of Scripture, and, if 
spurious. It is the work of some forger of a later age. 

111. If the original civilization of mankind was not 
the work of a divine instructor, some instance may be 
found of a nation of savages having civilized themselves 
[Pol. Econ. Lect. v.] 

112. The law of Moses prohibited theft, murder, &c. 
But that law is abolished : therefore theft, murder, &c. 
arc not prohibited. 

113. Agriculture might have been invented by man, 
without a superhuman instructor ; and so might the work- 
ing of metals ; and so might medicine ; and so might 
navigation, &c. ; and in short there is no art of civilized 
life that can be pointed out, which might not have been - 
invented by the natural faculties of man. Therefore the 
arts of civilized life might have been invented by man 
without any superhuman instructor.* 

114. All those must disapprove of inflicting punishment 
on this woman who consider her as iijnocent: and as you 
disapprove of inflicting punishment on her, it is to be 
presumed you think her innocent. 

♦ See Polit. Econ. Lect. V. p. 123. 



f7$ APPENDLX III. 

115. If a state has a right to enforce laws, (and without 
this it could not subsist) it must have a right to prescribe 
what the religion of the people shall be. [See Book III. ^9.] 

116. Every man is bound in duty to aim at promoting 
the good — generally, and in all respects — of mankind : a 
civil magistrate (or legislator) is a man : therefore a 
civil magistrate is bound in duty to aim at promoting the 
good generally and in all respects — of mankind. And 
hence it appears that, since true religion is one of the 
greatest of goods, the civil magistrate is bound to enforce, 
by means of the power committed to him, the profession 
of a true religion, and to suppress heresy. [S«e Essay I, on 
the " Kingdom of Christ.."] 

117. The month of May has no " R" in its name ; nor 
has June, July, or August ; all the hottest months are 
May, June, July and August: therefore all the hottest 
months are without an "^" in their names. [See Book 
IV.Ch. i.§;.] 

118. This man may possibly be right in his peculiar re- 
ligious creed : and the same may be said of that man ; and 
of a third, and a fourth, &c. : therefore it is possible they 
may be all right . 

119. "When the Disciples were first called Christians, 
they must have received the title either from believers, or 
from Jewish unbelievers, or from pagans : but one of these 
suppositions is impossible; and another is negatived by 
the New Testament records : therefore the remaining sup- 
position is established. 



NO. III. 

PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 

Some have expressed much contempt for the mode id 
which logic is usually taught, and in which students are 
examined in it, as comprising no more than a mere enu- 
meration of technical rules, and perhaps an application of 
them to the simplest examples, exhibited in a form already 
syllogistic, or nearly so. That such a description, if in- 
tended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly cer- 
tain ; though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALr©iS. 379 

Logic horn all candidates for a degree, has confined both 
lectures and examinations, in a greater degree liian is de- 
sirable, to this elementary character.* But the student 
who wishes to acquire, and to show that he has acquired, 
not only the elementary rules, but a facility of applying 
them in practice, should proceed from the study of such 
examples as the foregoing, to exercise himself in analys- 
ing logically, according to the rules here given, and some- 
what in the manner of the subjoined specimen, some of 
Euclid's demonstrations — various portions of Aristotle's 
works — the opening of Warburton's " Divine Legation," 
(which exhibits the arguments in a form very nearly syl- 
logistic) — several parts of Chillingworth's Defence of Pro- 
testantism — the concluding part of Paley's Horae Paulinas 
— Leshe's method with the deists — various portions of 
A. Smith's Wealth of Nations — and other argumentative 
works on the most dissimilar subjects. The latter part of 
§ 1. Chap. V. of the dissertation on the province of reason- 
ing, will furnish a convenient subject of a short analysis 

A student who should prepare himself, in this manner, 
in one or more such books, and present himself for this 
kind of examination in them, would furnish a good test 
for ascertaining his proficiency in practical Logic. 



As the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after they 
have been exhibited at full length in the bare elementary 
form, it may be useful to subjoin some remarks on the 
mode of analysing and reducing to that form, any train of 
argument that may be presented to us : since this must in 
general be the first step taken in an attempt to apply 
logical rules. t 

First t«hen, of whatever length the reasoning may be, 
whether treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin with the 
concluding assertion ; — not necessarily the last sentence 
expressed, but the last point established ; — and this, 
whether it be formally enunciated, or left to be understood. 
Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on what 
ground that assertion is made. The assertion will be 

• See preface. 

t These directions are, in substance, and nearly , in words, ex 
Iracted from the Preface to Hind's abridged Introduction to Logic 



S80 APPENDIX III. 

your conclus on ; the ground on which it rests, your 
preniises. The whole syllogism thus obtained may be 
tried by the rules of Logic. 

If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed to 
take the premises separately, and pursue with each the 
same plan as with the conclusion you first stated. A 
premiss must have been used as such, either because it 
required no proof, or because it had been proved. If it 
have not been proved, consider whether it be so self- 
evident as to have needed no proof. If it have been 
proved, you must regard it as a conclusion derived from 
other assertions which are premises to it ; so that the 
process with which you set out will be repeated ; viz. to 
observe on what grounds the assertion rests, to state these 
as premises, and to apply the proper rules to the syllogism 
thus obtained. Having satisfied yourself of the correct- 
ness of this, proceed, as before, to state its premises, if 
needful, as conclusions derived from other assertions. 
And thus the analysis will go on (if the whole chain of 
argument be correct) till you arrive at the premises with 
which the whole commences ; which of course should be 
assertions requiring no proof; or, if the chain be any where 
faulty, the analysis will proceed till you come to some pro* 
position, either assumed as self-evident, though requiring 
proof, or incorrectly deduced from other assertions.* 

* Many students probably will find it a very clear and conveni- 
ent mode of exhibiting the logical analysis of a course of argument, 
to draw it out in the form of a tree, or logical division ; thus, 

[Ultimate Conclusion.] 

ZisX, 

proved by 

•"Yirx; zWyt* 

proved proved by 

by j 

I ' AisY. ZlTT, ^ 

I [suppose a dmittfe^.] proved by &c. 

' the argument that and by the ' 
I argument that 

^SlaXT YisB, ' j 

kc. &£; I 

' C is X, Y is C. « 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAI ANALYSIS. 381 

It will often happen that the same assertion will have 
been proved by many different arguments ; and then, the 
inquiry into the truth of the premises will branch out ac- 
cordingly. In mathematical or other demonstrative 
reasoning, this will of course never take place, since ab- 
solute certainty admits of no increase : and if, as is often 
the case, the same truth admits of several different de- 
monstrations, we select the simplest and clearest, and dis- 
card the rest. But in probable reasoning there is often a 
cumulation of arguments, each proving the same conclu- 
sion ; i. e. each proving it to be probable. In such cases 
therefore you will have first to try each argument sepa- 
rately ; and should each of them establish the conclusion 
as in some degree probable, you will then have to calcu- 
late the aggregate probability. 

In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it ena- 
bles us to place the several items of probability in the 
most convenient form. As the degree of probability ot 
each proposition that is originally assumed, is a point to 
be determined by the reasoner's own sagacity and expe- 
rience as to the matter in hand, so, the degree of proba- 
bility of each conclusion, (given that of each of its premi- 
ses,*) and also the collective liYohfihlVity resulting from sev- 
eral different arguments all tendmg to the same conclu- 
sion, is an arithmetical question. But the assistance af- 
forded by logical rules in clearly stating the several items 
so as to prepare the way for the other operations, will 
not be thocght lightly of by any who have observed the 
confusion of thought and the fallacy, which have often 
been introduced through the want of such a statement. 

Example of Analysis applied to the first part of Paley's 
Evidences. 

The ultimate conclusion, that " the Christian religion 
came from God" is made to rest [as far as " the direct 
historical evidence '• is concerned] on these two premi- 
ses ; that " a religion attested by miracles is from God ;" 
and that "the Christian religion is so attested." 

Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the mi- 
nor seems to have been admitted, while the major was dc» 

* See Fallacies, \ 14, near the end. 



382 APPENDIX III. 

nied, by the unbelievers of old ; whereas at present the 
case is reversed.* 

Paley's argument therefore goes to establish the minoi 
premiss, about which alone, in these days, there is likely 
to be any question. 

Pie states with this view two propositions : viz. 

Prop. I. — " That there is satisfactory evidence, that 
many, professing to be original witnesses of the Christian 
miracles, passed their lives in labours, dangers, and suffer- 
ings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the accounts 
which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their 
belief of those accounts ; and that they also submitted, 
from the same motives, to new rules of conduct." 

Prop. II. — ** That there is not satisfactory evidence, 
that persons pretending to be original witnesses of any 
other similar miracles, have acted in the same manner, in 
attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and sole- 
ly in consequence of their belief of the truth of those 
accounts." 

Of these two propositions, the latter, it will easily be 
perceived, is the major premiss, stated as the converse by 
mgation (Book II. Chap. ii. § 4) of a universal affirma- 
tive : the former prpposition is the minor- 

As a syllogism in Barbara, therefore, the whole will 
stand thus : 

** All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are 
worthy of credit.:" (by conversion ; " none which are not 
worthy of credit are so attested.") 

** The christian miracles are attested by such and such 
evidence:" therefore "they are worthy of credit." 

♦ It is clear from the fragments remaining of the ancient argu 
ments against Christianity, and the allusions to them in Christian 
writers, and also from the Jewish accounts of the life of Jesus which 
are stiil extant, (under the title of Toldoth Jeschu) that the original 
opponents of Christianity admitted that miracles were wrought, 
but denied that they proved the divine origin of the religion, and 
attributed them to magic. This concession, in persons living so 
much nearer to the times assigned to the miracles, should be notice 
ed as an important evidence ; for, credulous as men were in those 
days respecting magic, they would hardly have resorted to this ex 
planation, unless some, at least plausible, evidence for the miracles 
had been adduced. And they could not but be sensible that to 
prove (had that been possible) the pretended miracles to be impos- 
tures, would have been the most decisive course ; since that would 
at once have d'S}}Toved the religion. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS 38* 

The minor premiss lis first proved by being taken as«c- 
veral distinct ones, each of which is separately established. 
— «f€ Book II. Chap. iv. § 1. 

T. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity 
suffered ; by showing, 

1st A priori, from the nature of the case, that they 
were likely to suffer : [because they were preachers 
of a religion unexpected and unwelcome : 1. to the 
Jews ; and 2. to the Gentiles.*] 
2d. Yrovci profane testimony. 

3d. From the testimony of Christian writings. [And 
here comes in the proof of one of the premises of 
this last argument ; viz. the proof of the credibility, 
as to this point at least, of the Christian writings.] 
These arguments are cumulative ; i. e. each separately 
goes to establish the probability of the one common con- 
clusion, that "the first propagators of Christianity suffered.'' 
By similar arguments it is shown that their sufferings 
were such as they voluntarily exposed themselves to. 

II. It is proved that *' what they suffered/or was amiVacw- 
lous story :" by 

1st. The nature of the case ; they could have had no- 
thing but miracles on which to rest the claims of the 
new religion. 

2d. By allusions to miracles, particularly to the resur- 
rection, both in Christian and in profane writers, as 
the evidence on which the religion rested. 

The same course of argument goes to show that the 
miracles in attestation of which they suffered were such 
as they professed to have witnessed. 

These arguments again are cumulative. 

III. It is proved that " the miracles thus attested are what 
we call Christian miracles:" in other words, that the 
story was, in the main, that which we have now in the 
Christian Scriptures ; by 

§lst. The nature of the case; viz. that it is improba- 
ble the original story should have completely died 
away, and a substantially new one have occupied 
its place ; 

§ 2d. by the incidental allusions c f ancient writers, both , 

* As Paul expresses it, "to the Jews^ i stumbling-block ; and to 
the Greeks, foolishness.^' 



384 APPENDIX IH. 

Christian and profane, to accounts agreeing with thoM 
of our Scriptures, as the ones then received ; 
§ 3d. by the credibility of our historical Scriptures : 
this is established by several distinct arguments, each 
separately tending to show that these books were 
from the earliest ages of Christianity, well known 
and carefully preserved among Christians : viz. 
§ i. They were quoted by ancient Christan writers. 
§ ii. with peculiar respect. 
§ iii. Collected into a distinct volume, and 
§ iv. distinguished by appropriate names and titles of 
respect. 

§ V. Publicly read and expounded, and 

§ vi. had commentaries, &c. written on them : 

§ vii. Were received by Christians of different sects ; 

&c. &c.* 
The latter part of the first main proposition, branches 
off into two ; viz. 1st., that the early Christians submitt«ed 
to new rules of conduct ; 2d, that they did so in conse- 
quence of their belief in miracles wrought before them. 

Each of these is established in various parts of the 
above course of argument, and by similar premises ; viz. 
the nature of the case — the accounts of heathen writers— 
and the testimony of the Christian Scriptures, &c. 



The major premiss, that " miracles thus attested are 
worthy of credit" (which must be combined with the 
former, in order to establish the conclusion, that ** the 
Christian miracles are worthy of credit,") is next to be 
established. 

Previously to his entering on the second main propo 
sition, (which I have stated to be the converse by negation 
of this major premiss,) he draws his conclusion (Ch. x 
Part I.) from the minor premiss, in combination with the 
major, resting that major on 

. § 1st. The a priori improbability that a false story 
fhould have been thus attested : viz. 

, * For some important remarks respecting the different ways in 
which this part of the argumentjs presented to different persons, 
0ee " Hinds on inspiration,* pp. 30— 46. 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 38d 

^* If it be so, the religion must be true.* These men 
tould not be deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, 
they might have avoided all these sufferings, and have 
lived quietly. Would men in such circumstances pretend 
to have seen what they never saw ; assert facts which 
they had no knowledge of; go about lying, to teach 
virtue ; and, though not only convinced of Christ's being 
an imposter, but having seen the success of his imposture 
in his crucifixion, yet persist in carrying it on ; and so 
persist, as to bring upon themselves, for nothing, and with 
a full knowledge of the consequence, enmity, and hatred, 
danger and death 1" 

§ 2d. That no false story of miracles is likely to be so 
attested, is again proved, from the premiss that " no 
false story of miracles ever has been so attested ;" and 
this premiss again is proved in the form of a propo- 
sition which includes it ; viz. that " JVo other mira- 
culous story tolmtever is so attested." 
§ This assertion again, bifurcates ; viz. it is proved 
respecting the several stories that are likely to be, or 
that have been adduced, as parallel to the Christian, 
that either 

1 §. They are not so attested ; or 

2 §. They are not properly miraculous ; i. e. that admit- 
ting the veracity of the narrator, it does not follow 
that any miracle took place ; as in cases that may be 
explained by false perceptions — accidents, Sfc. 



In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest 
of the work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the 
argument which I have but slightly touched upon.f 

It will be observed that, to avoid unnecessary prolixity, 
I have in most of the above syllogisms suppressed one 
premiss, which the learner will be able easily to supply 
for himself. E. G. In the early part of this analysis it 
will easily be seen, that the first of the series of cumu- 

* This is the ultimate conclusion deduced from the premiss, that 
*« it is attested by real miracles, which, in the present day, comes 
to the same thing : since those lor whom he is writing, are ready 
at once to admit the truth of the religion, if convinced of the reality 
of the miracles. The ancient Jews were not. 

t See note at the end of this appendix. 
30 



386 APPENDIX III. 

lative arguments to prove that the propagators of Cliri9* 
tianity did suffer^ would at full length stand thus ; 

** Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews 
and to the Gentiles, was likely to suffer ; 

The Apostles did this ; 

Therefore they were Fikely to suffer," &c. &r. 

It is also to be observed, that the same proposition used 
in different syllogisms may require to be differently ex- 
pressed by a substitution ©f some equivalent, in order to 
render the argument, m each, formally correct. This o4 
course is always allowable, provided great care is taken 
that the exact meaning be preserved r e. g. if the proposi- 
tion be, " The persons wko attested the Christian miraclea 
underwent sufferings in attestation of them," I am autho- 
rized to state the same assertion in a different form, thus^ 
" The Christian miracles are attested by men who suffer- 
ed in attestation of their reality," &c. 

Great care however should be used to avoid being mis- 
led by the substitution of one proposition for another, when 
the two are not (though perhaps they sound so) really equi- 
valent, so that the one warrants the assumption of the other. 
—See Book iii. § 3. 

Lastly, the learner is referred to the supplement to Chap, 
lii. § 1, p. ^7, where I have treated of the statement of a 
proposition as several distinct ones, each implying all the 
rest, but differing in the division of the predicate from the 
subject. Of this procedure the above analysis affords an 
instance. 



Note referred to at page 38d. 

When the student considers that the foregoing is only 
one out of many branches of evidence, all tending to the 
same point, and yet that there have been intelligent men 
who have held out against them all, he may be apt to sus- 
pect either that there must be some flaw in these argu- 
ments, which he is unable to detect, or else that there must 
be much stronger arguments on the other side than he has 
ever met with. 

To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading 
%o infidelity would be unsuitable tct this occasion ; but 1 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 387 

will notice one as being more especially connected with the 
enbject of this work, and as being very generally overlook- 
ed. ** Jn no other instance perhaps ^^^ (says Dr. Hawkins, in 
his valuable Essay on Tradition) " besides that of religion, 
do men commit the very illogical mistake, of first canvassing 
nil the objections against any particular system whose preten- 
tions to truth they would examine, befbre they consider the 
iirect arguments in its favour.^* (P. 82.) But why, it may 
be asked, do they make such a mistake in this case 1 An 
answer which I think would apply to a large proportion of 
Buch persons, is this ; because a man having been brought 
up in a christian country, has lived perhaps among such as 
have been accustomed from their infancy, to take for grant' 
ed the trnth of their religion, and even to regara an unin^ 
quiring assent as a mark of commendable faith ; and hence 
he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself 
the question — ^Why should I receive Christianity as a di- 
vine revelation 1 Christianity being nothing new to him, 
and the presumption being in favour of it, while the burden 
of proof lies on its opponents, he is not stimulated to seek 
reasons for believing it, till he finds ^ controverted. And 
when it is controverted — when an opponent urges — How 
do you reconcile this, and that, and the other with the idea 
of a divine revelation 1 these objections strike by their nov- 
elty, by their being opposed to what is generally received. 
He is thus excited to inquiry ; which he sets about — natu- 
rally enough, but very unwisely — by seeking for answers 
to all these objections ; and fancies that unless they can all 
be satisfactorily solved, he ought not to receive the religion. 
" As if," (says the author already cited) " there could not 
be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable arguments, and 
yet at the same time obnoxiojus to objections, numerous, 
plausible, and by no means easy of solution. There arc 
objections [said Dr. Johnson] against a plenum, and ob- 
jections against a vacuum ; but one of them must be true.** 
He adds, that, "sensible men, really desirous of discover- 
ing the truth, will perceive that reason directs them to ex- 
amine first the argument in favour of that side of the ques- 
tion, where the first presumption of truth appears. And the 
presumption is manifestly in favour of that religious creed 
already adopted by the country. . . . Their very earliest 
inquiry therefore must be into the direct arguments fot 



888 APPENDIX III. 

the authority of that book on which their country rests itfl 
religion. 

But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have 
said, a strong temptation, and one which should be care- 
fully guarded against, to adopt the opposite course ; to at- 
tend first to the objections which are brought against what 
is established, and which, for that very reason, rouse the 
mind from a state of apathy. 

When Christianity was first preached, the state of things 
was reversed. The presumption was against it, as being 
a novelty. " Seeing that all these things cannot bespoken 
against, ye ought to be quiet,^' was a sentiment which fa* 
voured an indolent acquiescence in the old pagan worship 
The stimulus of novelty was all on the side of those who 
came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The first in- 
quiry of any one who at all attended to the subject, must 
have been, not — " What are the objections to Christia- 
nity 1" — but, ** on what grounds do these men call on me to 
receive them as divine messengers V And the same ap- 
pears to be the case with the Polynesians among whom 
our missionaries ar? labouring : they begin by inquiring, 
" Why should we receive this religion 1" and those of 
them accordingly who have embraced it, appear to be 
Christians on much more rational and deliberate convic- 
tion than many among ws, even of those who, in general 
maturity of intellect and civilization, are advanced con- 
siderably beyond those Islanders. 

I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a 
religious education : but, pointing out the peculiar temp- 
tations which accompany it. The Jews and Pagans had, 
in their early prejudices, greater difficulties to surmount 
than ours : but they were difficulties of a different kind.—- 
See Essays on the Dangers ^c. Disc. i.§3; and also 
Rhet, Part I. Ch. iii. § 1. 

I have subjoined extracts from Hume's " Essay on 
Miracles," from two reviews professedly Christian, but 
organs of two most opposite religious schools, and from 
Scripture. The coincidence between the first three, and 
the contrast they present to Scripture, being, I think, not 
only curioub but instructive. 

** Upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian Religion 
•lOt only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day 



PRAXIS OF LOGICAIi ANALYSIS. 38» 

cannot be helieved by any reasonable person without one. Mere 
reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity ; and whoever 
is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle 
in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his under- 
standing, and gives him a determination to believe what is most coiHf 
trary to custom and experience." — Hume's Essay, (at the end.) 

* ♦ we are to be censured for having ** shifted the ground of our 
belief from testimony to argument, and from faith to reason." * * ♦ 

In answering the question why our religion is to be believed, 
• the poor ignorant uninstructed peasant will probably come near- 
est to the answer of the Gospel. He will say, because I have been 
told so by those who are wiser and better than myself. My parents 
told -me so, and the clergyman of the parish told me so ; and I hear 
the same whenever I goto church. And I put confidence in these 
persons, because it is natural that I should trust my superiors. I 
have never had reason to suspect that they would deceive me. I 
hear of persons who contradict and abuse them, but they are not 
such persons as I would wish to follow in any other matter of life, 
and therefore not in religion. I was born and baptized in the church, 
and the Bible tells me to stay in the church, and obey its teachers ; 
and till I have equal authority for believing that it is not the Church 
of Christ, as it is the Church of England, I intend to adhere to it^ 
Now, such reasoning as this will appear to this rational age very 
paltry and unsatisfactory : and yet the logic is as sound as the 
spirit is humble. And there is nothing to compare with it either 
intellectually, or morally, or religiously, in all the elaborate de- 
fences and evidences which would be produced from Paley, and 
Grotius, and Summer, and Chalmers." — British Critic. 

** The sacred writers have none of the timidity of their modem 
apologists. They never sue for an assent to their doctrines, but 
authoritatively command the acceptance of them. They denounce 
unbelief as guilt, and insist on faith as a virtue of the highest order. 
In their catholic invitations, the intellectual not less than the social 
distinctions of mankind, are unheeded. Every student of their 
writings is aware of these facts, &c. * ♦ * » * They presuppose that 
vigour of understanding may consist with feebleness of reason ; 
and that the power of discriminating between religious truth and 
error does not depend chiefly on the culture or on the exercise 
of the mere argumentative faculty. The especial patrimony of 
the poor and illiterate — the Gospel — has been the stay of count 
less millions who never framed a syllogism : of the great multi- 
tudes who, before and since the birth of Grotius, have lived in the 
peace and died in the consolations of our Faith, how small is the 
proportion of those whose convictions have been derived fronv 
the study of works like his. Of the numbers who have addicted 
themselves to such studies, how small is the proportion of those 
who have brought to the task either learning, or leisure, or 
industry, sufficient, &c. * * * He who lays the foundation of his 
faith on such evidences will too commonly end either in yielding 
a credulous and therefore an infirm assent, or in reposing in a 
self-sufficient and far more hazardous incredulity."— £dtw6ufj* 
Review. 



J90 APPENDIX III. 

" This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and 
manifested his glory, and his disciples believed on Him." 

" We know that thou art a teacher sent from God ; for no man 
can do these miracles that thou docst except God be with him." 

" If I had not done among them the works that jiane other man 
did, they had not had sin." 

" The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness 
of me." 

'• Him God raised up and shewed him openly ; not to all the 
people, but to witnesses chosen afore of God, even to us," &c. 

" To Him bear all the Prophets witness." 

" Be always ready to give to every one that asketh you, a reason 
of the hope that is in you," &c. 

The coincidence between writers of such different 
schools is very striking, and affords matter for much re- 
flection. They all agree in representing the " faith" that 
is required of a Christian as wholly independent of m- 
dence, and as necessarily, or most properly, based on 
feelings such as attach Pagans to their superstitions.* 
And they all apparently calculate on the reader's being to- 
tally ignorant of the New Testament, of which almost 
every chapter convicts Jesus and his followers of that 
" timidity " in appealing to the evidence of miracles and 
prophecies which is censured and derided. For, the pas- 
sages above cited from Scripture, even if multiplied many 
fold, as might easily be done, would give but a very inade- 
quate view of the case ; inasmuch as the general tenor of 
all the narrative, and all the teaching of the New Testa- 
ment, jpresit/7/>oses evidence as the original ground on which 
belief had been all along demanded: the unbelief which 
it " denounces as sin " being, not as those other writers 
represent, the requiring of evidence, but — on the contrary 
—the rejection of evidence. 

The fallacy of representing all appeal to reason as use- 
less in cases where the " argumentative faculty '* is not 
alone sufficient — which is like denying the utility of light, 
because it will not enable a man to see, whose eyes are 
not in a state to perform their functions — has been already 
noticed, Book IV. Ch. ii. § 5. 

It may be a useful exercise for the learner to analyze 
Bome others o^ this collection of fallacies, referring to 
Book I. § 2, to Book 11. Ch. ii. § 3, and to Appendix L 
Art. "Experience." 

*■ Bee Professor Powell's valuable work, " Tradition unveiled.** 



INDEX 



PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS. 



Jibsoluie terms, b ii. ch. v. § 1. 

mAbstractien. — The act of " drawing off" in thought, and attending 
to separately, some portion of an object presented to the mind, b. 
ii. ch. V. § 2. 

•Abstract terms, b. M. eh. v. § !• 

^Accident, — ^In its widest technical sense, (equivalent to Attrihute.) 
anything that is attributed to another, and can only be conceived 
as belonging to some sufestance (in which sense it is opposed to 
" Substance ;") ia its narrower and more properly logical sense^ 
«i Predicable which may be present or absent, the essence of the 
Species remaining the same, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 

Jiccidental Definition. — A definition which assigns Ihe Properties of 
a Species, or the Accidents of an Individual ; it is otherwise call- 
ed a Description, fe. ii. eh, v. § 6. 

•Affirmative — denotes the quality of a Proposition which asserts the 
agreement of the Predicate with the subject, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 

dmphiboUa — a kind of aiasbiguity of sentence, h. iii. § 10. 

Analogous. — A term is so called whose single signification applief 
w^ith unequal propriety to more than one object, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 

. Intecedent.—Thdit part oif a Conditional Proposition on which the 
other depends, b, ii. ch iv. § 6. 

.^preliension, {simple.) —the operation ^i the mind by which we 
mentally perceive or form a notion of some object, b. ii. ch. i. § 1. 

.^'gument. — An expression in which, from something laid down as 
granted, something else is deduced, b, ii. clu iii. § i. 

j£rW<i-o»^— division, faulty, b. ii ch. v. ^ 5 ; definition, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. 

Assertion — an affirmatioa or denial, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 
Attributive term, b. ii. ch. v. § i. 

Bacon — erroneously supposed to have designed his Organon as a 
rival system to that here treated of, Intro. \ 3, and b. iv. ch. iii. §3, 
Vategorits, b. iv. ch. ii. ^ 1. 

Jategorem&dc. — A word is so called which may by itself be employ- 
ed as a Term, b. ii. ch. i. § 3. 
iatitgorical Proposition — ^is one which affirms or denies a Predicate 
of a Subject, absolutely, and without any hypothesis, b. ii. ch. iL 
^ 4. 

CircZe— fallacy of, b. iii. § 13. 

Cioss— strictly speaking, a Class consists of several things coming 
under a common description, h. i. ^3. 

Contraposition y see N^egation. 

Common term—is one which is applicable in the same sense to more 
than one individual object, b. i. ^ 6 \ b. ii. ch. i. §3, and b. ii. ch. 



S92 INDEX. 

Compatible tenns, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 

Composition — Fallacy of, b. iii. § 11. • 

Conclusion,— Thai Proposition which is inferred fram the Prenustt 

of an Argument, b. ii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iii. ^1. 
Concrete terra^b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 
Conditional Proposition— is one which asserts the dependence of one 

categorical Proposition on another. A conditional Syllogism is 

one in which the reasoning depends on such a Proposition, b..ii. 

ch. iv. ^ 6 
Connotative term, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 
Consequent. — That part of a conditional Proposition which depend* 

on the other. (Consequens,) b. ii. ch. iv. ^ 6, Note. 
Consequence. — The connexion between the Antecedent and Conse- 
quent of a conditional Proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. ^ 6, Note. 
Constructive —conditional syllogism, b. ii. ch. iv. § 3. 
Contingent. — The matter of a Proposition is so called when thft 

terms of it in part agree,, and in part disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. § 2. 
Contradictory Propositions-are those which, having the same term«^ 

differ both in Quantity and Quality, b. ii. ch. iii. § 5. 
Contrary Propositions — are two universals,afiSrmatiTeand negatire* 

with the same terms, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3. 
Contrary terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 
Converse, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. 
Conversion of a Proposition — b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. 

Copula. — That part of a Proposition which affirms or denies the Pre- 
dicate of the Subject : viz. is, oris not, expressed or implied, b.ii 

ch. i. § 2. 
Cross-divisions, b. ii. ch. v. § 5 and 6. 
Hefinite terms, b. ii. ch. v. \1. 
Definition. — Anexpressian explanatory of that which is defined, t. 

e. separated, as by a boundary, from everything else, b. ii. ch. t 

§ 6 ; b. iii. § 10. 
Description. — An accidental Definition, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. 
i>6Sfrwc<iye— conditional Syllogism, b. ii. ch. iv. § 3. 
Dea/-mwf€5— incapable of a train of reasoning, till they shall have 

learned some kinds of general signs. Introd. § 5. 
Dictum — " de omni et nullo ;" Aristotle's : an abstract statement of 

an Argument, generally, U i § 4. Applicable to a Sorites, b. iL 

ch. iv. § 7. 
Difference (Differentia.) — The formal or distinguishing part of thi 

essence of a Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 
Dilemma. — b. ii. ch. iv. § 5. 

Discovery of Truth — two kinds of, h. iv. ch. ii. § 1. 
Discourse. — Reasoning, b. ii. ch. i- ^ 1. 
Disjunctive Proposition — is one which consists of two or more cate 

goricals, so stated as to imply that some one of them must be true 

A syllogism is called disjunctive, the reasoning of which tura 

on such a proposition, b. ii, ch. iv. § 4. 
Distributed — is applied to a Term that is err ployed in its full extent 

so as to comprehend all its significates — e very thing to which it w 

applicable, b. i. § 5, and b. ii. ch. iii. § 2. 
Division, logical — ^is the distinct enumeration of several things si|^ 

nified by a common name • and it is so called metaphorically 

b. ii. ch. V 6. 



INDEX 393 

Division.— Fallacy of, b. iii. § II . 

JJhrift of a proposition, b. ii. c. iv § 1. 

Elliptical expressions— apt to lead to ambiguity, b. iii. ^ 10. 

Ensfah'c— Figure, the third Figure, so called, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4. 

Enthymeme. — b. ii. ch. iv. § 7. 

Eqvivoeal.—A Term is denned to be equivocal whose different «ig« 
nifications apply equally to several objects. Strictly speaking, 
there is hardly a word in any language which may not be regard- 
ed, as in this sense, equivocal ; but the title is usually applied 
only in any case where a word is employed equivocally 5 e. g. 
where the Middle-term is used in different senses in the two Pre- 
mises J or where a Proposition is liable to be understood in vari- 
ous senses, according to the various meanings of one of its terms, 
b. iii. § 10. 

Essential Definition— is one which assigns, not the Properties or 
Accidents of the thing defined, but what are regarded as its es- 
sential parts, whether physical or logical, b. ii. ch. v. ^ 6. 

Evidence — of Christianity, App. No. III. 

Example — use of, implies a universal premiss, b.iv. ch. i. § 2. 

Exception, proof of a rule,^ b. ii. ch. v. § 6. 

Exclusive — Figure, the second Figure, so called, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4. 

Extreme. — The Subject and Predicate of a Proposition are called its 
Extremes or Terms, being, as it were, the two boundaries, having 
the copula (in regular order) placed between them, b. ii. ch. i. §2. 

Fallacy. — Any argument, or apparent argument, which professes to 
be decisive of the matter at issue, while in reality it is not, b. ii. 
ch. V. § 4. 

False — in its strict sense, denotes the quality of a Proposition which 
states something not as it is, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 

Figure of a Syllogism — denotes the situation of its Middle-term in 
reference to the Extremes of the Conclusion — The Major and 
Minor Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4. 

Form — fallacies in, b. iii §§ 1 and 7. 

Generalization, — The act of comprehending under a common name 
several objects agreeing in some point which we abstract from 
each of them, and which that common name serves to indicate, 
b. ii. ch.v. §2. 

Genus. — A Predicable which is considered as the material part of 
the Species of which it is affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. ^3. 

Hume. — Essay on Miracles, b. i. § 3, note ; and Appendix I. Art. 
Experienee. Coincidence with some Christian writers. Appen- 
dix III. 

Hypothetical Proposition — is one which asserts not absolutely, but 
under an hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction, b. ii. ch. iv. § 2. 

Idea, — '* abstract," (supposed) Introduction, ^ 5, and b. iv. ch. y 
§§ 1 and 2. 

Illative Conversion — is that in which the truth of the Converse fol- 
lows from the truth of the Exposita, b.ii. ch. ii. §4. 

Impossible.— The Matter of a Proposition is so called when the ex- 
tremes altogether disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 
indefinite Proposition — is one which has for its Subject a Common 
term without any sign to indicate distribution or non-distribution 
b. ii. ch. ii. § 2. 
indsfinitt Terms, b. ii ch. v. ^ 1. 



394 INDEX. 

Indirect rertuction—of Syllogisms in the last hwe Fifeures, b. it 
ch.iii. §6. 

Individual.— An object which is, in the strict and primary sense^ 
one, and consequently cannot be /o»tca% dvUded, b, ii. ch. v. § 5. 

Induction.— A kind of argument which infers, respecting a wholf 
class, what has been ascertained respectirjg one or more indi 
viduals of that class^, b. iv. ch. i. § i. 

Infer. — To draw a conclusion from granted premises, b. iv. ch. iii 
§ 1. See Prove. 

Infimu Species — ^b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 

Information. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. 

Ignoratio-elenchi — fallacy of, b. iii. § 15 — 19, 

Inseparable Accident— is that which cannot be separated from ihn 
individual it belongs to, though it may from the Species, b. ii. cU 
V, §4. 

Instruction.— -h. iv. ch. ii. § 1. 

IntetTogation — fallacy of, b. iii. ^ 9. 

Irrelevant-conclusion — fallacy of, b. iii. § 15 — 19. 

Judgment. — The second operation of the mind, wherein we pro- 
nounce mentally on the agreement and disagreement of two of 
the notions obtained by simple Apprehension, b. ii. ch. i. § 1. 

Knowledge. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 2. Note. 

Language — an indispensable instrument for reasoning, Introd. § S 
Logic, conversant about, b. ii. ch. i. ^2. 

Limitation. — See ' ' Per Accidens." 

Locke — notions of Syllogism, Introd. ^3. 

Logical definition — is that which assigns the Genus and Difference 
of the Specie* defined, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. 

Logomachy. — ^b. iv. ch. iv. § 12. 

Major term of a Syllogism— is the Predicate of the Conclusion. 
The Major Premiss is the one which contains the Major term. In 
Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Hypothetical Premiss is called the 
Major, b. ii. ch. iii. §2, and b. ii. ch. iv. §2. 

Matter of a proposition— b. ii. ch. ii. ^ 3. 

Metaphor. — b. iii. ^ 10. 

Metonymy. — b. iii. § 10. 

Middle term of a categorical Syllogism— is that with which the two 
extremes of the conclusion are separately compared, b. ii. ch. iii. 
^ 2. and b. iL ch. iii. § 4. 

Minor term of a categorical Syllogism— is the Subject of the con- 
clusion. The yiinQv premiss is that which contains the Minor 
term. In Hypothetical Syllogisms, the Categorical Premiss if 
called the Minor, b. ii. ch. iii. ^ 2, and b. li. ch. iv. § 2. 

Modal categorical proposition— b. ii. ch. ii. § 1, and b. ii. ch. iv. § 1. 

Mood of a categorical Syllogism — is the designation of its three 
propositions, in the order in which they stand, according to their 
quantity and quality, b. ii. ch. iii. ^ 4, 

Necessary matter of a proposition — is the essential or invariable 
agreement of its terms, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3.-»JVec«s«ary, ambiguity o^ 
Appendix No. I. 

JVeo'afton— conversion by, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. 

Negative categorical proposition — ^b. ii. ci: . ii. ^ 1. 

Negative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 

New truths— of two kinds, b. iv, ch. ii. ^ 1. 



INDEX. 395 

ifominaE Definition'— i« one which explains only the meaning of 
the term defined, and nothing more of the nature of the thing 
signified by that term than is implied by the term itself to every 
one who understands the meaning of it, b. ii. ch. v. ^ 6, and b 
iv. ch. ii. § 3. 

Nominalism. — b. iv. ch. v. Introd. § 5, and b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 

Objections — fallacy of, b. iii. § 17. 

)perations of the mind — three laid down by logical writeis, b. ii 
ch. i. § 1, 

Apposed.— Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, 
when, having the same subject and predicate, they differ either 
in quantity or quality, or both, b. ii. ch. ii. ^ 3. 

Jpposition of terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 
sUnsive reduction— of Syllogisms in the last three figures, b. IL 

ch. iii. ^ 5. 
^aronymous words, b. iii. § 8. 
i'ari— logically, species are called parts of the genus they come 

under, and individuals, parts of the species ; really, the genus is 

a part of the species, and the species, of the individual, b. ii. ch 

v. §5. 
Jfm'ticular proposition — ^b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 
Ftr Reddens, — Conversion of a proposition is so called when the 

quantity is changed, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. 
Physical definition — is that which assigns the parts into whieh the 

thing defined can be actually divided, b. ii. ch. v. § 6. 
Positive terms, b. ii. ch. v. ^ 1. 

Postulate — a form in which a definition may be stated, b. ii. ch. T. § 0« 
Predicaments, b. iv. ch. ii. § 1. 
Predicate of a proposition — b. iL ch. 1. § 2. 
Predicable. — ^b. ii. ch. v. § 2. 
Premiss. — ^b. ii. ch. iii. ^ 1. 
Privative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1. 
Probable arguments, b. iii §§11 and 14. 
Proper'names — ambiguity of, b. iii. § 10. 
Property. — A predicable which denotes something essentially con* 

joined to the essence of the species, b. ii. eh. v. § 3. 
Proposition. — A sentence which asserts, t. e. affirms or deniei, 

b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 
Prove.— To adduce premises which establish the truth of a certain 

conclusion, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1. 
Proximum genus of any species — is the nearest [least remote] to 

which it can be referred, b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 
Pure categorical proposition — is one which asserts simply that the 

Predicate is, or is not, contained in the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1, 

and b. ii. ch. iv. § 1. 
i^uality of a Proposition — is its affirming or denying. This is the 

Quality of the expression, which is, in Logic, the essential 

circumstance. The Quality of the matter is, its being true or 

false ; which is, in Logic, accidental, being essential only in 

respect of the subject-matter treated of, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 
Quantity of a Proposition — b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 
Question.— ThBi which is to be established as a Conclusion, stated 

in an interrogative form, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4. 
Real definition— b. ii. ch, y. ^ 6. 



396 INDKX. .;.4f 

Realism. — Introd. § 3, b. iv. ch. v. 

Reasoning — General-Signs necessary for, Introd. § 5. 

Redaction — of syllogisms in the last three Figures, to the first, flo M 
to fall under the Dictum, b. ii. ch. iii. §§ 5 and 6— of hypothetical 
syllogisms to categorical, b. ii. ch. iv. ^ 6 

References — ^fallacy of, b. iii. 614. 

Refutation — of an argument, liable to be fallaciously used, b. iii. ^ 
6 and 7. 

Relative terms, b. ii. ch. v.§ 1. 

Sa7ne. — Secondary use of the word, b. iv. ch. v. § 1, and Appendix, 
No. I. 

Second intention of a term, b. iii. § 10. 

Separable accident — is one which may be separated from the indi- 
vidual, b. iii. Introd. 

Significate. — The several things signified by a common Term are its 
significates (Significata,) b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 

Singular term is one which stands for one individual. A Singular 
proposition is one which has for its Subject either a Singular 
term, or a common term limited to one Individual by a singular 
sign, c. g^ " This," b. ii. ch. i, § 3 ; b. ii. ch. ii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. v. § 1 

Soi'ites. — ^b. ii. ch. iv. § 7. 

Species. — b. ii. ch. v. § 3, — ^peculiar sense of, in Natural History, b 
iv. ch. V. § 1. 

Subaltern Species and Genus— is that which is both a Species ol 
some higher Genus, and a Genus in respect of the Species into 
which it is divided. Subaltern opposition, is between a univer- 
sal and a Particular of the same Quality. Of these, the Univer- 
sal is the Subaltei-nant, and the Particular the Subalternate, b. ii, 
ch. ii. ^ 3, and b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 

Subcontrary opposition — ^b. ii. ch. ii. h 3. 

Subjected Si proposition — ^b. ii. ch. ii. ^ 2. 

Summum Genus — ^b. ii. ch. v. § 4. 

Syllogism. — An argument expressed in strict logical form ; viz. so 
that its conclusiveness is manifest from the structure of the 
expression alone, without any regard to the meaning of the 
Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. § 1. 

Syncategorematic words — are such as cannot singly express a 
Term, but only a part of a Term, b. ii. ch. i. § 3. 

Term. — The»Subject or Predicate of a Proposition, b. ii. ch. i. § 2. 

Tendency — ambiguity of, Appendix, No. I. 

Tkaumatrope, b. iii. § 11. 

True proposition — is one which states what really is, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1 • 

Truth new — two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii. § 2, and Appendix, No. 1. 

Universal Proposition — is one whose Predicate is affirmed or denied 
of the whole of the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1. 

ITnivocal. — A Common term is called Univocal in respect of those 
things to which it is applicable in the same signification, b. ii. ch. 
T. § 1. 



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